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CNN Live Today

Interview With Doug Laird

Aired March 25, 2002 - 14:01   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
BILL HEMMER, CNN ANCHOR: Government investigators who have tested some of the unprecedented security measures in the wake of 9/11 came away less than impressed. A confidential memo obtained by "USA Today" shows investigators able to slip knives, once again, past airport checkpoints 70 percent of the time. Guns got through 30 percent, fake bombs went unnoticed 60 percent of the time.

Some insight now from San Francisco on those figures, former security director for Northwest Airlines, Doug Laird is our guest. Doug, good afternoon to you.

DOUG LAIRD, AVIATION SECURITY CONSULTANT: Good afternoon.

HEMMER: How does this happen? Explain this.

LAIRD: Well, I think part of the problem maybe that the screeners, since September 11, have been so -- looking so hard to find objects that are very difficult to find with the current technology, that they may, in fact, miss more obvious objects. I think what it does is make a case for the known passenger card that the airlines are pushing.

HEMMER: How so?

LAIRD: Well, it's very difficult to find some of the items, particularly, for example, a razor blade in a suitcase. If the airlines could institute the known-traveler card, using, for example, a 2-D bar code which is very inexpensive, we could spend more time in airports looking at the people we don't know as opposed to spending time looking at people we do know. You know, i.e., the 80-year-old grandmother.

HEMMER: Is the bottom line here, any way we slice this, Doug, is it the fact that humans are involved?

LAIRD: I'm sorry. I didn't hear that.

HEMMER: The fact that humans are involved and we are never perfect at any of this?

LAIRD: That does plays a factor. But keep in mind that the technology we're providing the screeners today doesn't provide them adequate information to make a timely decision. So they are going to miss things, again, simply because they have the wrong technology. HEMMER: Now, since the Fed has took over back in February, is it the same or do we know?

LAIRD: As to the quality of security?

HEMMER: Correct.

LAIRD: I would guess it may, in fact, be right about even. A lot more effort is going in, but at the same time, if people are so intent, as I said earlier, on finding very small, difficult to locate objects such as a razor blade in a cluttered suitcase, they may, in fact, miss something more obvious.

HEMMER: OK. Doug, tell me this then, in Europe, in Israel, take El-Al for example. Do they do it better? Do we know? Has testing like this ever been done in, say, European capital cities or the Middle East to find out if it's as, shall we say, able to be worked through just as much as they did in this study?

LAIRD: There are two answers to that question. Firstly on Israel, El-Al does a remarkable job under the circumstances which they work. Hard to remember, El-Al only has around 50 airplanes. Secondly, in Europe, I think tests have shown that the European checkpoints have about the same failure rate as those in the United States. Again, remember, we're dealing with basically the same technology and human beings.

HEMMER: You finished?

LAIRD: Well. I just think we can't overlook the human factor. But keep in mind the TSA will not have hired and fully trained the screeners until November of this year. So between now and November, again, it's the same people. I don't think anything is necessarily wrong with those screeners. The problem, again, is we're not giving them adequate technology to find what it is they're trying to find.

HEMMER: Tell me this then, look past this security screeners and the actual passengers themselves, how is it that this testing could allow access just about 50 percent of the time to the tarmac and actually board an airplane? How is that possible?

LAIRD: I have no explanation for that. With the access control systems in place at our nation's airports, that should not be happening. I would assume -- I have not seen the reports -- so I would assume that many of those cases involved what's called piggybacking. In other words, an employee with a card swiped the door, entered, and before the door shut, somebody stopped the door from totally closing and slipped in behind them. That's probably the most common.

HEMMER: Doug, tell us this. I mean, as viewers listen to this story and read this story that came out based on this testing, what do you say to travelers and passengers?

LAIRD: I would say it's, believe it or not, I would say it's still safe to fly. I fly two to three times a week and I still think we have a safe system, regardless of the IG report.

HEMMER: We have a ways to go, but, as you say, it is still safe, by and large, and I agree with you, actually.

LAIRD: Keep in mind that we have 30-35,000 flights a day in the United States. And, you know, most of those flights do just fine every day.

HEMMER: All right. Doug, thanks. Doug Laird, our security expert there in San Francisco. Appreciate your coming on today. Thank you, sir.

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