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Q&A WITH ZAIN VERJEE
Q&A
Aired April 17, 2002 - 12:30:00 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
GEORGE W. BUSH, U.S. PRESIDENT: The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax and nerve gas and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world.
COLLEEN MCEDWARDS, CNN ANCHOR (voice-over): Getting weapons inspectors back into Iraq to find out what it's been doing since they were kicked out.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Why should we bring spies to Iraq to spy on us, spy on our headquarters where we work, spy on our legitimate military activities in the country, because we are a sovereign nation.
COLIN POWELL, U.S. SECT. OF STATE: Let the inspectors in, as the president has called for. You say you don't have any weapons of mass destruction, you're not doing any of these things, then let the inspectors in.
MCEDWARDS: New information about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, mobile weapons labs and efforts to develop missiles that could reach well beyond its borders.
A high level defector talks to "Vanity Fair."
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: This information dovetails extremely closely with all our verified information. For example, he has given me a long list of sites where Saddam is now developing weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological and ultimately nuclear weapons.
MCEDWARDS: On Q&A, what does Iraq have in store?
(END VIDEO CLIP)
Hello, and welcome to Q&A. I'm Colleen McEdwards.
Today the United Nations was supposed to meet with Iraq to talk about a plan to get weapons inspectors back in, but the meeting is off and it looks like things are very much on hold.
And the United States says it has new information for the U.N. Security Council, information that Iraq is developing banned missile technology.
That briefing appears to be on hold as well while officials deal with the crisis in the Middle East.
And now a defector, who says he was part of Saddam Hussein's inner circle, gives the magazine "Vanity Fair" new information about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, front companies setup around the Mideast to raise money, and much more.
We'll talk to the journalist who wrote the story in just a moment, and hear from a former weapons inspector as well.
But first, CNN's Jane Arraf joins us live from Baghdad.
Jane, tell us where the plan to have inspectors back in stands at this point.
JANE ARRAF, CNN CORRESPONDENT: Well, Colleen, those talks that were supposed to address that have been postponed temporarily, but they're still on the table. Iraq's foreign minister was supposed to be in New York, virtually at this moment, discussing what the U.N. hoped would be the start of talks to bring the U.N. weapons inspectors back in.
But at Iraq's request, those talks have been postponed, and the Iraqi foreign minister said just a while ago, here in Baghdad, that they hope to announce a new date in a couple of days. The reason, they said, they didn't want to deflect attention from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
They say their main priority right now is to support the Palestinians and they wanted to hold off on those talks for just a while.
So no date set, but it looks like they will take place, and possibly we'll see Iraq going back to the table with a slightly different attitude.
There had been signs that it would be quite conciliatory, and it was showing hints it was ready to talk about letting those inspectors back in. Now, with violence raging in the West Bank and anger in the Arab street over Israel and over the United States, Iraq seems to feel it's in a somewhat stronger position to resist United States demands -- Colleen.
MCEDWARDS: Well, and Jane, from Iraq's perspective, what's the bigger problem here, in terms of allowing inspectors back in?
ARRAF: Well, Iraq doesn't like to talk about this very much anymore. In fact, they declined to have an official appear on this program, and they decline generally these days to talk about either weapons of mass destruction or these persistent reports from defectors that are coming out.
But their line is that they have no weapons of mass destruction, and they say that seven years of inspections by U.N. weapons inspectors has proved that.
Now, with this threat of United States attack hanging over Baghdad, Iraq will dispute that this is the reason, but most diplomats seem to feel that it very much is the reason that Iraq has been willing to entertain, at least, the idea of the weapons inspectors coming back in -- Colleen.
MCEDWARDS: But where does it stand, there, Jane, in terms of how nervous, how vulnerable, Iraq feels? Does anybody there really believe that the United States could pull together the kind of coalition that most people say it would need?
ARRAF: I think a lot of people on the street, here in Baghdad, as well as Iraqi officials, are aware that there are problems with the United States pulling together a coalition, more problems in the past few weeks, since the Palestinian uprising and Israel's incursions into the West Bank, Colleen.
President Saddam Hussein has been taking great advantage of this, not only out of what seems is a sincere affinity with the Palestinians and desire to help that cause, but because it has also strengthened his hand.
He is appearing as one of the few Arab leaders that is supporting the Palestinians, and that's helping him to resist United States demands, particularly the return of the weapons inspectors.
But one of the things that does disturb people here, as well as any of the allies that the United States would have to call upon to launch a major attack, is that it seems to have gone beyond letting the weapons inspectors back in, signs from the United States that clearly, even if Iraq lets these inspectors back in and lets them inspect, no matter how intrusive the inspections, the real aim, the real goal, is not just letting inspectors back in, but actually toppling President Saddam Hussein.
Understandably, officials here say privately, why should they comply if that is the case -- Colleen.
MCEDWARDS: And what does Iraq say, when it says, as you point out, that it doesn't have these weapons of mass destruction, so why let the inspectors in. And the United States says well, if you don't have them, then that's the reason you should let them in. What's Iraq's response to that generally been?
ARRAF: Iraq's response has always been that it's not about weapons inspections, that it's not about weapons of mass destruction. It claims it doesn't have them.
Now, the problem, as you know, as I'm sure you'll talk about later in the show, is that without having inspectors here, there's no way for Iraq to prove that it doesn't have them.
It says that during the seven years of UNSCOM, the United Nations weapons inspections teams, and the thousands of inspections that they did make, that was enough to determine that they were free of weapons of mass destruction and that the fact they didn't categorically say that Iraq was free of those weapons was a political move.
This new inspection team does promise to be a kinder, gentler inspection team, one more to Iraq's liking, but no one is pretending that there won't be problems, if they do come in.
Iraq says, repeatedly, it is a sovereign country, and like the United States, it has a right to defend itself and a right to its sovereignty and integrity. And increasingly, it is getting its Arab neighbors to sign on to that idea.
A lot of the countries surrounding Iraq that would have to participate, or at least stand back if there were a United States attack on Iraq, are not very comfortable with the idea that the United States would launch a major attack on proof that they feel is not conclusive about the revival of these weapons programs, just to depose a leader.
Understandably, that makes them feel a little bit antsy -- Colleen.
MCEDWARDS: Understood. CNN's Jane Arraf, thanks so much -- appreciate it.
And coming up, what kind of weapons does Iraq really have in its arsenal? "Vanity Fair" magazine's David Rose met with a high level Iraqi defector who might offer some new details.
That's next. Stay with Q&A.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
MCEDWARDS: Welcome back.
We're talking about Iraq and what weapons it might have in its arsenal.
In the May issue of "Vanity Fair" magazine, in an article called "Iraq's Arsenal of Terror," journalist David Rose says he met with a high level Iraqi defector who worked in the country's weapons program.
Jim Clancy had the chance to talk with David Rose. He started by asking him what kind of new information this defector is offering up.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
DAVID ROSE, "VANITY FAIR": He's really addressing two separate audiences in a sense.
For the kind of wider public, he's reiterating, underling, what in a sense we already know, which is that Saddam Hussein and Iraq does possess weapons of mass destruction, has got programs which have only accelerated since the U.N. inspection team, UNSCOM, was turned out in 1998, and that Iraq can and does pose a real strategic threat.
On a slightly more detailed level, in a sense, if you like, for a more specific, intelligence kind of audience, because as I say in the article, he has been speaking to the Pentagon's defense intelligence agency, he's given some very specific information about the network of front companies that Iraq runs in the Middle East and in the rest of the world, both to raise money for weapons procurement and actually to buy weapons.
And he's giving some new details of weapons of mass destruction development and production sites, and also he's suggesting that Iraq has been making quite serious efforts to acquire a so-called dirty or radiological weapon.
JIM CLANCY, CNN ANCHOR: All right, let's break this down and go through by the numbers here, if you want to call it like that.
First of all, what is he saying about these front companies? And perhaps to dash the notion that sanctions have somehow prevented Iraq from gaining more weapons of mass destruction, working on those kinds of programs?
ROSE: The purpose of the front companies, and he lists -- has given me details of 10 with addresses and names and directions and so fort, I mean, very specific information. The purpose of the front companies is twofold.
The first is to raise hard cash, dollars, to buy other weapons. Under the U.N. sanctions regime, Iraq can only export oil for certain restriction goods in kind, food and so forth. It's known as the food for oil program.
But what the front companies do is that they re-market some of the items that Iraq can import under this program, and then resell them on the world market for hard currency. And he says that some of the deals done under this, and there are many hundreds of them, amount to deals worth say $20 million.
So a lot of hard currency is coming into Iraq's coffers to enable it to buy weapons of mass destruction components, materials and so forth.
And, of course, as part of that process, the people of Iraq are getting further impoverished.
(CROSSTALK)
CLANCY: He's also making a point there, too, you know, mundane things, like refrigerators, a circuitous route coming back into Iraq and a route which perhaps enables Iraq to smuggle in weapons or weapons components?
ROSE: That's right. He is saying -- and certainly, one of these companies warehouses in United Arab Emeritus. Iraqi intelligence agencies open up the casings of refrigerators, TV sets, this kind of thing, and they pack them with prohibited items, sensitive military electronics, fiber optic cables, this kind of thing.
Of course, the other purpose of the front companies is just to make contact with criminal mafias and with governments that are prepared to do business with Iraq, and buy stuff, stuff that they've used to make weapons of mass destruction or just regular conventional armaments.
CLANCY: He speaks specifically about several programs. His background was really as a man in the security apparatus, but he made his way up the chain, and he saw some of the various different programs. In particular, he was talking about a biological program on wheels, if you want to call it that.
ROSE: That's right. He is an intelligence officer, an extremely bright, intelligent intelligence officer, and I think that's what gave him access to some of Iraq's most sensitive state programs.
But, yes, he's talking about an idea he says he actually had himself in a meeting with Dr. Rihab Tarha, this so called Dr. Germ who runs Iraq's biological weapons program.
And he said the problem is, with the laboratories where we make these biological agents, they're very easily targeted. Once the United States or other Western countries find out where they are, they can bomb them and destroy them.
If we put them in mobile trucks, refrigerator trucks, such as the kind you use for carrying yogurt and chilled meats and so forth, they'll be far harder to detect.
And so quite legitimately, though the Iraqi transport ministry, he says he organized the purchase of rental trucks and they were converted for this purpose.
CLANCY: Another area that he claims to have a lot of expertise is in the efforts by Saddam Hussein and the government of Iraq to build a longer range missile, capable of delivering warheads as far away as Cairo or, in further development, even a swath of southern Europe.
ROSE: That's right. Under the terms of the U.N. resolutions which terminated the Gulf War in 1991, Iraq can't legally possess missiles with a range of more than 150 kilometers, just over 100 miles, which means that, effectively, legally, it can't hit targets -- or large targets, anyway -- outside its borders, with perhaps the exception of Kuwait.
We already knew, and the UNSCOM final report and work by UNSCOM inspectors since, has established that Iraq already retained a number of longer range missiles, maybe 40 or 50 of the so-called Hussein Missile, which was an adapted SCUD-B system with a range of maybe 400 kilometers, that is 250 to 300 miles.
What my new defector says -- not my new defectors, the defector I interviewed, says, is that his last mission was to travel to China to try to buy components for a new system under development. It's know as the Tamus (ph), which in its first version would have a range of maybe 900 kilometers, or say 600 to 700 miles. And then in further adapted versions that were already being planned, maybe as much as say 1200 to 1300 miles, which would, in theory, give Iraq the capability to hit parts of southern Europe.
CLANCY: There has to be some skepticism here. Many critics of the group -- he defected through the Iraqi National Congress, correct? A group of exiles that has lost favor with Washington, now regained favor with the Bush administration and this Defense Department.
A lot of critics say these guys are coming in, they're repeating stuff that they've read in "Time" magazine, telling this to people, and literally just singing for their supper, hoping to get pensions, payrolls, hoping to get houses, hoping to get relatives over from Iraq.
They're telling you, in other words, what you want to hear -- David Rose.
ROSE: Sure. Of course. Any journalist going to a Middle East city and meeting somebody like this has got to be skeptical. Indeed, journalists should always be skeptical.
But I don't think you need to be cynical. And I think you have to take what you find with an open mind. And what I find, what I conclude, is this. This guy is saying stuff that corroborates, in detail, information that is regarded as highly credible by very credible sources, such as, for example, Charles Duelfer, the former deputy head and at one stage acting head of UNSCOM.
Such as perhaps, very significantly, the other recent defector, Adnan Saeed al-Haideri. He was the guy who surfaced in Bangkok just before Christmas, was interviewed briefly by "The New York Times" and is now I believe in the care of the defense intelligence agency.
The point about him is that he was a building contractor. He built sites which were being developed for the building and development of weapons of mass destruction. And he brought with him copious documentation, thick documentation, which established absolutely that he was giving factual information. They were given locations of these sites, the precise specifications. I've actually seen many of these contracts, and there is simply no doubt what they are describing.
The point is here, that many of the details of what Adnan Saeed al- Haideri has said have not been published anywhere. They weren't in "The New York Times." They haven't been published in "Time" magazine or anywhere else.
Now, this guy, the new defector, who I interviewed recently, is actually giving details of precisely the same locations. He doesn't know what al-Haideri said. What he says.
(CROSSTALK)
CLANCY: Yes, but their stories do not match. Their stories do not match.
Al-Haideri is saying that there's a massive complex underneath a hospital in Baghdad or in Iraq with epoxy coated walls, that the weapons of mass destruction. The very chemical weapons or biological weapons that the man you interviewed says are on trucks running all around the country, he says are hundreds of feet underground in bunkers that are protected.
So the stories don't match, do they?
ROSE: Not on that one detail, but the defector that I interviewed mentioned about eight sites, and they do match. And in other respects they match too.
CLANCY: David Rose, very interesting article. Very interesting story, and one that people are going to be looking at for some time to come. Thanks for being with us on Q&A.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
MCEDWARDS: And joining us now in Washington is Charles Duelfer, former United Nations special commissioner, UNSCOM deputy chairman.
He had a chance to look at the information that David Rose gathered from the Iraqi defector, as you heard David mention, and we want to talk to him now.
Mr. Duelfer, do you think this is just another account from another defector trying to curry favor with the United States and Britain?
CHARLES DUELFER, FMR. UNSCOM DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: I think it's another account by another defector who has a very consistent story of continued activities in Iraq on these types of programs.
I don't think it's done to curry favor with the West. I mean, he puts himself at some risk by making these statements. I think there is a large element of truth in this. And he's also very indicative of a continuing flow of defectors who have come out for several years.
MCEDWARDS: So, what's the most crucial information that you get out of this, that's new to you, that's most significant to you?
DUELFER: In point of fact, there is nothing surprising in what he has said. It's all consistent with what we have seen evidence of in Iraq before.
The mention of mobile biological labs -- in point of fact, you know, he probably wasn't the first person to think of this idea in Iraq. We had one of our most controversial inspections in 1997, was designed to investigate exactly such a report, which originally came out in the early 90's.
So all of the things which he says are consistent with other reports. There's nothing which is a news flash about what Iraq is doing.
MCEDWARDS: When he talks about these front companies that he says are all over the Middle East, and it sounds like a lot of hard currency is raised through them -- is that significant?
DUELFER: It's significant. It's a standard method of operation on the part of the government of Iraq.
In fact, when we were discussing the procurement in Iraq of things which had gotten in, they acknowledged this was a tactic which they used. They told us in enormous detail about how these front companies operated.
So this is not a surprise. The specific ones which are emerging may be new, but that method of business is not new.
MCEDWARDS: And the other thing he mentions is that his last mission was to go to China to get these components for a new longer range missile system. What's Iraq's interest here?
DUELFER: They've had a long range missile program in the past. They had exactly the types of programs which he describes. One is the al-Tamus (ph), one is the al-Abas (ph). A two stage version and a single stage missile.
This is a program which they've had an ideal for almost decades. They have a permitted program as well. The question as to whether they were imbedding a prohibited long range missile development program inside a shorter range program, which is in fact permitted by the U.N.
So I think their goal -- and it's important to remember just how important these weapons are to the regime -- but their goal is to be able to strike potential targets at some distance from Iraq.
MCEDWARDS: And do you get any sense that between the time when you were in charge and when your people were there and now, that they've made big strides, little strides -- I mean, can you qualify or quantify this in any way?
DUELFER: It's difficult to gauge. In some ways, they are limited by the sanctions. It constrains their ability to procure things in an efficient way. If they were to test a very long range missile, that would be observed by satellites and so fort.
But the reports of defectors and what one can anticipate, it's clear that they would have a biological weapons capability, a chemical weapons capability. It's very doubtful that they have on hand a nuclear weapon, but certainly I think they have the effort underway to achieve one. That's been a longstanding goal of this regime.
They have the intellectual property to do all of these things. That's sort of the tragic thing. The Iraqis are very, very talented, very energetic and the wisdom to build these weapons is still there.
MCEDWARDS: How close are they, though, do you think, to having nuclear weapons?
DUELFER: There's a big challenge in terms of getting the core material, the fissile material. That is a very major industrial process which is required.
So if they have to build that themselves, it will take them a matter of years.
On the other hand, if they are able to purchase fissile material from -- it's speculated that the former Soviet Union, there might be some available there -- then I think it's a much nearer term risk, because, as I said, they have the intellectual capital. They know how to build this kind of weapon. They can build all the other conventional components, and therein lies the uncertainty. And it's a risky uncertainty.
MCEDWARDS: And what about what we hear called a dirty bomb?
DUELFER: Iraq acknowledged to us in 1995 that I fact they had designed and tested what is called, popularly, a dirty bomb, which is essentially a conventional explosion, but designed to spread radioactive material. We reported this in some detail in December 1995. The material which they were using them was zirconium.
Iraq said that they had stopped this program and were no longer pursuing it, but nevertheless I think the report of this guy who left and spoke to David Rose is in some ways very credible, because they've got an incentive to try almost any type of weapon.
MCEDWARDS: All right. Charles Duelfer, have to leave it there. Thanks very much, appreciate it.
DUELFER: Thank you.
MCEDWARDS: And once again, just a reminder viewers, we did ask a number of Iraqi officials to come on the program, and they declined.
Well, there's more Q&A coming up in just a few hours. That's going to be with Jim Clancy.
That's this edition of Q&A. For now, the news continues, right here on CNN.
END
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