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FBI, Justice Department Hold Briefing

Aired May 29, 2002 - 13:09   ET


CAROL LIN, CNN ANCHOR: We're going to take you and our audience live now to FBI headquarters.


On September the 4th, 2001, Bob Mueller took the oath of office as the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. At that time, Bob certainly knew he faced enormously challenges in leading the bureau's 27,000 employees.

One week later, on September 11, those challenges were unbelievably magnified. Yet, as a former Marine, Bob well understood the concepts of adapting and overcoming. For over eight months now, Bob has simultaneously adapted the bureau to the new mission of preventing future terrorist activities while overcoming bureaucratic hurdles to restructure dramatically anti-terrorism operations.

We appreciate your leadership, your integrity, Bob, and your passion for reform.

When Bob was unanimously confirmed by the United States Senate as the director of the FBI, he was lauded by Republicans and Democrats alike.

Senator Dianne Feinstein, who came to know Bob through his service as U.S. attorney in California, praised him as a hands-on manager who was known as a man who can come in and whip an operation into shape, no nonsense, no excuses, just results. Senator Barbara Boxer, who recommended Bob for his job as a U.S. attorney for Northern California, lauded his selection.

Senator Leahy expedited Bob's nomination as FBI director, stating, "Is the president's choice the best person? I believe it is. I have faith in him." Senator Leahy also acknowledged, "We know he has a very difficult job ahead of him."

That difficult job on September 4 became the herculean task after September the 11th. Bob has met the challenge head on, and he's met it by activating a 24-hour-a-day command center at the FBI's Strategic Information Operations Center to track terrorists around the world. He's met it by briefing the president daily on the latest terrorist threat assessment. He's met it by leading the largest criminal investigation in U.S. history, which deployed 6,000 special agents, tracked over a quarter of a million investigative leads and received close to a half a million tips and phone calls.

He's met it by working to enact new laws to strengthen dramatically our information-gathering capacity. He's met it by sharing intelligence and investigative information more broadly than ever before within the law enforcement community and intelligence community.

Bob has met the challenge by reorganizing the FBI's senior headquarters management and planning at the upper levels of the FBI headquarters and establishing new leadership positions to oversee counterintellgience and counterterrorism.

Bob has realigned the work force with 900 new agents scheduled to come on line by September of this year, including a massive campaign to recruit specialists in areas like computers, language, engineering and science. And most importantly, Bob has met the challenge by shifting the FBI's structure, culture and mission to one of preventing terrorism.

Last November, I announced a wartime reorganization and mobilization of the nation's justice and law enforcement resources to meet the overriding counterterrorism mission of the Department of Justice. Director Mueller continues that transformation in our mission today in announcing the second phase of the FBI's reorganization.

This reorganization goes forward with the knowledge that Congress and those within and outside the FBI will provide us with constructive advice and criticism. Where there are responsible changes to be made we will make them. Where there are mistakes to acknowledge we will not shy away from doing so. Those who step forward to voice their legitimate concerns will be welcomed and, often, their ideas reviewed and embraced.

We have worked and will continue to work with the September 11 joint inquiry of the House and Senate intelligence committees to examine the deficiencies in our intelligence gathering and analysis. We will strive to determine better how the enemies of freedom seek to exploit our system in order to murder innocent civilians. And we will never shy away from making the tough decisions to keep our citizens safe and our liberties secure.

As Bob highlighted in his nomination hearings last summer, the FBI is -- and I quote Bob -- "is on the front lines every day in the battle against terrorism and violent crime." Bob Mueller has never retreated from the front lines, whether it was in Vietnam, where he led in battle as an officer in the Marine Corps and received the Bronze Star, two Navy commendation medals, the Purple Heart, and the Vietnamese Cross of Galantry; or commanding the criminal division of the U.S. Justice Department and two major U.S. Attorneys Offices at the Justice Department; or in reforming the FBI. As the director, Bob has served his country on the front lines where the fight is always the most fierce.

There is a difficult job, there is a difficult job ahead. Bob Mueller is the right man for that job. He has a mandate for change from this administration. This battle-tested leader will execute his mission. This reformer will overhaul the FBI.

It is now my pleasure to introduce FBI Director Bob Mueller, to thank him for his service.

ROBERT MUELLER, FBI DIRECTOR: Thank you, General. Thank you for being here. Appreciate it.

Well, I want to quite obviously start by thanking the attorney general for those words. I still find them somewhat embarrassing. The work that's been done by the FBI since September 11 has been done by the agents of the FBI, the men and women who comprise the FBI.

Let me just go back and start with what I perceive to be where we've been and where we're going.

When I arrived at the FBI in September, it was already clear that there was a need for a change at the bureau. Recent events, such as the Hanssen matter, the McVeigh documents and the Wen Ho Lee case, all brought to light certain problems that needed to be addressed, and that was before the events of September 11.

But then came the events of September 11, and the events of September 11 marked a turning point for the FBI. And I say that because I think it's fair to say that after 9-11 it became clearer than ever that we had to fundamentally change the way we do our business.

Now, as I recently testified, responding to the post-9-11 realities requires a redesigned and a refocused FBI. New technologies are required to support new and different operational practices, and we have to do a lot better -- a much better job at recruiting, managing and training our work force.

We have to do a better job at collaborating with others. And as critically important, we have to do a better job managing, analyzing and sharing information.

In essence, we need a different approach that puts prevention above all else. And simply put, we need to change, and we indeed are changing.

In December, I described to you a new headquarters structure, one designed to support, not hinder the critically important work of our employees stationed here and around the world. It is working, but quite obviously there's a lot more work that needs to be done.

And today I am presenting for congressional consideration the second and I think clearly the most important part of what must be done. It comes after much consultation within the bureau, with the attorney general and Strategic Management Council, with administration officials, and the state and municipal law enforcement officials, and with members of Congress.

And what I'm about to describe does not necessarily stand by itself. Much else needs to change if we are to succeed, not the least of which is the new information technology, which is critical to conducting business a different way, critical to analyzing and sharing information on a real-time basis.

And as an aside, I should note that we are, as we go along, becoming much better connected, intertwined with our colleagues, particularly the CIA. And I want to spend a moment to thank Director Tenet's willingness to share his analytical resources with us in this redefinition of our mission.

In the last few weeks, two separate matters have come to symbolize that which we must change. First is what did not happen with the memo from Phoenix, which points squarely at our analytical capacity. Our analytical capability is not where it should be. Our analysts are working harder than ever and they need help, and I believe that this plan addresses that need.

And second, the letter from Agent Rowley in Minneapolis points squarely to a need for a different approach, especially at headquarters. And with that proposition, there really should be no debate.

And let me just take a moment to thank Agent Rowley for her letter. It is critically important that I hear criticisms of the organization, including criticisms of me, in order to improve the organization, to improve the FBI.

Because our focus is on preventing terrorist attacks, more so than in the past we must be open to new ideas, to criticism from within and from without, and to admitting and learning from our mistakes. And I certainly do not have a monopoly, a monopoly on the right answers. And so I seek the input from those both within the organization, as well as those without the organization.

And from new priorities to new resources to a new structure applying a new approach, I do believe that we're on the way to changing the FBI.

And while we believe that these changes are relatively dramatic, a dramatic departure from the past, in the end our culture must change with that.

Long before me, the bureau had years of major successes based on the efforts of the talented men and women who make up the FBI. It is a history we should not forget as we evolve to an agency centered on the prevention of any further terrorist attacks.

And we must never forget, as well, that our actions must be undertaken according to a constitutional and a statutory framework that protects the rights and the privacy of our citizens. That, too, is part of our culture, representing an appreciation unique to those who enforce the laws, and that must not get lost either.

Now, what I've proposed to do is talk to you for a few minutes about the changes I am proposing to Congress. After that I'd be happy to respond to some of your questions.

Let me start by talking to you about FBI priorities. When I first started in September and looked at the way we stated our priorities, I did not believe there were as clearly designated as they should be. In my mind, the FBI, both for its employees but also for the American people, should have a short, readily understandable statement of its priorities.

And let me run through what I have put out to the field in the last couple of weeks as what I believe our FBI priorities should be and what I believe our FBI priorities will be for at least the next two years.

Number one, protect the United States from terrorist attack. In the wake of September 11, that goes without further explanation. But number two, the second priority is to protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage.

And these two priorities are somewhat unique in the sense that, in its history, the bureau has had television programs, had accolades for its work on the criminal side, all justified. But when you come right down to it, the American people look to the FBI to protect the United States against further terrorist attacks, and they look to the FBI to protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations.

We are the one federal agency that has that mandate, and while state and local law enforcement can help us, really the American people look to the FBI to perform those two missions, and therefore they have to be our two top priorities.

And when I say priorities, what I mean is that each special agent in charge in the field, everybody at headquarters should understand that our resources first go to these top priorities. Everything flows from those two top priorities.

Number three, protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes. Again, this is a protection of our infrastructure. As with the first two priorities, a cyber-attack can occur anyplace in the country, a terrorist attack can occur anyplace in the country, and consequently you need the overarching responsibility, the overarching supervisory responsibility of those investigations in an agency such as the FBI.

Number four, combat public corruption at all levels. This is another area in which the FBI throughout the years of its existence has expended its manpower and developed the cases. And again, if the FBI does not do this, there are very few other prosecutorial bodies that would be able to perform it.

Protect civil rights. Critically important. Again, the bureau has been the agency, the federal agency over the years to protect the civil rights of our citizens, and that has to be one of the top priorities that we pursue.

Number six, combat transnational and national criminal organizations and enterprises. A number of people have said that the bureau cannot be all things to all people. That's absolutely true, particularly when you understand that our principal priorities are protect the United States from attack and foreign intelligence operations.

But where we can bring something to the table in addressing transnational crime, we need to. We have the contacts, the legates overseas. Increasingly, as the globe grows smaller, increasing, as the investigations become more international, it is the FBI that needs to bring its special expertise, its special relationships with its counterparts overseas to address transnational and national criminal organizations and enterprises, which includes narcotics.

Combat major white collar crime. When there's major white collar crime, the FBI has been in the forefront in addressing, whether it be major securities fraud cases, health care fraud, environmental crimes, and accordingly, we have to stay, in my mind, in the investigation of substantial white collar crimes, combat significant violent crime.

Having been a prosecutor here in D.C. for a number of years, I come away from that experience believing that every law enforcement individual who can do something to protect neighborhoods from violence should work to do that.

The challenge for the FBI is to do that in such a way that it does not replicate the great job that's done by state and locals. And we ought to stay on those task forces where we're addressing violent crime but be brought in when we bring something special to the mix, whether it be the statutes that we enforce, whether it be our ability to do wire taps, whether it be the manpower that we have. We have to stay in some unique violent-crime areas.

I would expect us to stay on the violent crime task forces, for instance. And if there is a particularly ruthless gang someplace, we would expend the manpower to address that particular violent enterprise in a particular city.

Now, the last two priorities do not really fit with programmatic priorities, numbered one through eight. And you could say we're mixing a little bit of apples and oranges.

And in terms of where the bureau must go in the future, critically important the health of the bureau is to support federal, state, local and international partners but also, and more importantly, to work closely with them to share information and to work, whether it be on terrorist matters or any other of these priorities up here. It is critically important that we develop those relationships with state and locals such as they have not been developed in the past.

And I want to say that the bureau is only so good as its relationships, not only with state and local law enforcement within the United States but with our counterparts overseas. So supporting federal, state, local and international partners is critically important for everybody in the bureau to work on.

And lastly, you've heard me talk about the necessity for upgrading our technology. And upgrading our technology means not just getting the computers onboard, the hard drives. It means everybody from top to bottom becoming facile with the computer, understanding the computer and understanding how technology can assist us to do our job better. And that is somewhat of a transformation for an organization such as the FBI, which is years behind where it should be, in terms of having the technological infrastructure.

Those are the 10 priorities.

Let me turn to the near-term actions to address counterterrorism that some have been implemented and some I'm requesting the support of Congress on.

Number one, restructuring counterterrorism division at FBI headquarters. And there are a couple things that need to be addressed here.

One of the arguments made by Agent Rowley is that the headquarters needs to expedite and be aggressive in assisting the field. She's absolutely right, absolutely right. We need to do a better job at headquarters in assisting the field, and that's number one. And we need the people back at headquarters who are aggressive, who have spent time in the field and who will be understanding of the field in terms of pressing forward on terrorism cases.

And to that end, I've brought, for instance, Pat Demorrow (ph) down from New York, who is the head of the New York task force, the ASAC (ph) up there who is responsible for counterterrorism for a long period of time. And nobody who knows Pat would say that he is shy, retiring or not aggressive. And with him have come a new set of section chiefs and others from the field so that headquarters can be as aggressive as the field.

But by the same token, it is important to have at headquarters people who are knowledgeable about UBL, people who are knowledgeable investigators and people who and agents who are respect from the field. Because headquarters has to play a principal role in addressing terrorism. It has to be the focal point for the intelligence, not only from around the country, but from the CIA, from various countries overseas, and should be in the position to take that intelligence, analyze that intelligence, disseminate that intelligence, and suggest to the field avenues of investigation.

It is critically important to our ability to address terrorism that we have a vibrant, active, aggressive headquarters and it has the analytical capability to support that mission. And that's what I mean when I say up here redefine the relationship between the headquarters and field.

And there's one other aspect of that; is we cannot expect an office in the field to know what other offices are doing. It's up to headquarters to make certain that, in the case of Moussaoui, for instance, that the agents who were working on the Moussaoui case got the Phoenix memorandum that was put out in July by Agent Williams there. It is critically important that we have that connection of dots that will enable us to prevent the next attack.

And to do that, headquarters has to assume a responsibility for assuring that information comes in, that information is analyzed and that information is disseminated.

A shift from reactive to proactive orientation. In my own mind, the bureau has done a superb job, particularly the New York office, in investigating Osama bin Laden, particularly the World Trade Center, where defendants were prosecuted successfully in New York City and they're spending life terms in jail; the defendants who were prosecuted for the 1998 embassy bombings, convicted, many of them spending life in jail. The FBI has done a terrific job in putting those cases together.

What we need to do better is be predictive. We have to be proactive, we have to develop the capability to anticipate attacks, we have to develop the capability of looking around corners, and that is the change, that is the shift in focus, particularly at headquarters. No longer can we be traffic cops sending ECs here or ECs there -- ECs, electronic communications -- but we have to take a management and a responsibility role for assuring that the investigations are going well and that we are gathering and getting the intelligence we need to prevent additional attacks.

Establish flying squads to coordinate national and international investigations. We have not had agents at headquarters for probably a long time active in investigations.

In my mind, we need a cadre of agents here who stay here for a period of time and who are well versed in the particular terrorist group they're looking at, know all the players, know the history, know the background. And so that if you have an incident overseas or if you have a terrorist threat in the United States where you have an office that is looking at it but you need that expertise, there are people from headquarters that can go out with the expertise.

Likewise, it's important when we have prosecutions or investigations around the country where information and evidence is developed, that that is brought back to headquarters and put into the matrix for both us, the CIA, as well as DOD intelligence purposes.

And I'll give you an example. We have up in Boston now the prosecution of Richard Reid. And as you are all aware, Mr. Reid boarded a plane in Paris; plane was destined for Miami. And I very alert flight attendant saw that he was trying to light a match to his shoes. He was taken down, subdued. And we come to find that he had plastic explosives in his shoes. Well, the pilot on that plane does a jog on the rotor and the plane goes into Boston. And under our venue laws, that's where this case has to be prosecuted.

You have agents doing a great job up there. You have assistant United States attorneys investigating that case, bringing in intelligence and information to address the case.

And what we need in the future, in my mind, is to have persons from headquarters to participate in that, so when that case is done, the information from that case is not lost on those prosecutors and agents as they move on to address other cases in Boston, but comes back to headquarters. So when I talk about flying squads to coordinate national and international investigations, I do not mean flying squads to supersede the agents in the field, but flying squads to go out and assist with a body of knowledge that will be helpful throughout not just the United States but also overseas.

When we get something like the kidnapping of Pearl, Danny Pearl, or some other incident such as that, we would want agents overseas who are familiar with the players on the ground to assist, whether it be the Pakistani authorities or legates or other law enforcement agencies.

Establish a national joint terrorism task force. We have, as many of you know, around the country 56 joint terrorism task forces. And actually, there's some more because there are divisions that are somewhat broader and have sub-units of JTTS. And they are -- in each of those divisions, they are FBI agents and other federal agents, whether it be Customs or INS or DEA, all sitting in the same rooms addressing terrorism matters. And not only the federal agencies, but also state and local.

And it works exceptionally well in most districts. Occasionally there'll be glitches, as there always are, but it is a vehicle that we have found works exceptionally well in addressing terrorism, and it brings together the federal agencies, as well as the state and locals.

What we need back here at headquarters is a replica of that. We had it in the days after September 11, where we had in SIOC downstairs agents from all federal agencies, but we did not have state and locals. And what we're hoping to do is to put up a national joint terrorism task force that will have not only the federal agencies represented, but also state and local agencies represented. We have currently two officers from the New York Police Department who are working down here. We want to expand on that so that we incorporate in the war on terrorism not only the skills of the federal agencies, but also the skills, the intelligence and the dedication of state and local law enforcement.

Let me use one other example to tell you how and why I think this is important. At the Salt Lake City Olympics, we put up a huge intelligence center, and all the federal agencies were represented, as well as the local agencies, the Utah state police, the Salt Lake City police department, and they all had two sets of computers. They had one computer which was an Internet, they could talk to each other, send e-mails back and forth, and then they had the other computer on their desk went back to their own -- their computer databases.

And if you got a Utah state police officer who stopped somebody and got information off that person, he'd call it into the task force back there who would immediately go out on the Internet, and then each of those databases would be plumbed for additional information. That is the kind of coordinated, quick response that we need to address in our terrorism investigations and what we're hoping to replicate here.

Now, let me just say, as I say that, is that you would hope that those in the future, that those databases would be better able to talk to each other without having, quite obviously, two sets of computer terminals on every desk, but we are not there yet. We're hopeful, but we are not there yet. But in the meantime, we need something like the joint terrorism task forces to address that.

Number four, substantially enhance our analytical capabilities with personnel and technology. Let me talk about the personnel. I'll tell you, the analysts that have been working here in headquarters since September 11 are just superb. They're too few, they are overworked. Congress has given us, as you will see, additional ones.

But we need to focus on our analytical capabilities in ways that we have not in the past, so that when we get pieces of information, whether it be from Phoenix or Oklahoma or from Minnesota, it is fed in and looked at and coordinated, analyzed and decisions made as to what we should do with it.

The technology I've talked about. It would have been very nice if at some point in time I could say -- recently I could say that you out into our computer system a request for anything relating to flight schools, for instance, and have every report in the last 10 years that had been done that mentions flight schools or flight training or the like kicked out. We do not have that capability now. We have to have that capability.

And beyond that, we ought to have the artificial intelligence that doesn't require us to query it, doesn't require us to query it, but automatically looks at those patterns. And that's the type of technology we need to enhance our analytical capability.

We've expanded the use of data mining, financial record analysis and communications analysis since September 11. We've set up particular groups that address each of those areas.

And the other point under here is establish an Office of Intelligence. When I talked to you earlier about the reorganization, initial reorganization last December, I had there this Office of Intelligence, and I'll discuss it a little bit in more detail in a moment, but let me just say that the Office of Intelligence will be that office that oversees both counterintelligence and counterterrorism and will be part and parcel of the process of doing the predictive work, the report writing, which is so important to the policy makers.

Build a national terrorism response capability that is more mobile, agile and flexible. And first question will be, "Well, how does that differentiate from the flying squad you talked about in two?"

And let me preface it by saying that what we have come to find since September 11 is we'll get a terrorism alert anyplace in the country -- it can be Albuquerque, it can be Portland, Oregon, it can be New York City, it could be Boston, Massachusetts, it can be Atlanta -- and by a terrorism alert -- I mean, information that something may be hit there or information that there are one or more individuals there who have supposed ties with terrorist organizations. And what we find happening is that in order to address that particular piece of information that come in, we have to push resources to that particular office. Specialized resources. Surveillance resources. Translators, if we go up on a wire. Surveillance. Special types of surveillance.

All of which has to be flooded (ph) into that office until we determine that that threat is no longer a threat that we need to worry about or until we look at those individuals who are under scrutiny and say, "OK, they do not present a threat."

I'm reminding of back in the early 1990s when we had the Savings and Loan crisis. And we had the Savings and Loan crisis and we took -- Congress gave us many resources. And by "us," I mean not only the FBI but also prosecutors. And they sent these resources to particular cities, whether it be Dallas or San Diego or Boston or what have you. The Savings and Loan crisis was over in about two or three years, but those resources are probably still there today.

And so what we need in the FBI, before we commit substantial additional resources to any particular place, we need the flexibility to push the resources to any particular town, any particular city where we have a threat. And that's what I mean by flying squads and regional assets to address those particular threats, as opposed to permanently stationing those resources in a number of different cities.

Permanently shift additional resources to counterterrorism. I'll talk about that in a moment.

Augment our overseas capabilities and partnerships. As many of you know, we have 44 legal attache offices overseas. They have been incredibly helpful in the investigation of the events of September 11. We have asked Congress to enable us to establish more, particularly some in the Middle East where we desperately need them.

But it is that type of coordination, cooperation with our counterparts overseas that are established through the legal attache mechanism that are critically important for the exchange of information on a worldwide basis. And it is the relationships that are developed by having an agent living, talking, working with the counterparts overseas over a period of time that provides the information that you need to make certain that you're not overlooking something.

And finally -- well, actually, number eight, target recruitment to acquire agents, analysts, translators and others with specialized skills and backgrounds. We have always sought in the bureau those individuals whom we felt had other life experiences that they brought to the bureau, whether it be a lawyer, an accountant, former military, former law enforcement, that brought to the bureau a maturity and a judgment that is appropriate to somebody who is given the powers of being an FBI special agent.

What we need to do in the future is augment that background, that type of person with particular skills, computer skills.

We talk about cyber-crime. We talk about protect the United States against cyber-attacks. We need the computer skills and agents. We need the language skills.

We are dealing with the anthrax threat. We need the scientists and we need the engineers, and we've reached out over the last several months to try to attract this type of individual with those specialized skills to be special agents of the FBI.

And finally, enhanced counterterrorism training for FBI and law enforcement partners. We are expanding on the counterterrorism training that we give to new agents, and we are putting in new classes for those who are further along in their career so that we all are singing off the same sheet in terms of our knowledge of counterterrorism. And it is critically important that we play a role in assisting state and locals in this -- or state and municipal law enforcement in this training undertaking.

Those are the actions that we have undertaken or are in the process of undertaking.

Let me just spend a moment on the reorganization of the counterterrorism division. The units that were there before are in green. The new units are in yellow. And I throw this up briefly to show you that in the past we were looking at domestic terrorism and international terrorism sections but we did not have the branch that we're proposing to put up, which is a terrorism prevention and counterterrorism analysis branch. It is critically important that we look not only at individuals who might be terrorists, but we also look at threats, potential threats. The way individuals relate to each other.

It's critically important that on the terrorism prevention and counterterrorism and analytical side, that we take from the interviews at Guantanamo the information that needs to go into a matrix; or take from the documents that were recovered from Afghanistan every shred of information that can go into a matrix that'll enable us to be predictive in terms of where the next attack may come and who might be responsible for it.

I've talked -- I've spent some time on upgrading our analytical capabilities. Actually, let me talk about one last thing here in terms of how we handle intelligence coming from the field.

In the past, documents would come up through the domestic terrorism or international terrorism operations section. In the future, we hope to bring the analytical capability of this section to bear on each of the documents that comes up for action over here, but also for analysis over here.

And here the Office of Intelligence that reports to the deputy executive assistant for counterterrorism is to look over both the operations as well as the analytical sections, pull the information together and be the principal entity that does the predictive analysis that the policymakers need.

Now, this individual heading the Office of Intelligence is an experience CIA officer who started on Monday. And in addition to him running the office, we'll have a combination of both FBI and CIA. I think both agencies have a lot to learn from working together in ways that we have not worked in the past. And consequently, again, the Office of Intelligence will be handled -- will be run, I should say, by an individual who is an experienced CIA intelligence officer.

Let me spend a moment also talking about upgrading our analytical capabilities. Prior to September 11, we had a total of 153 analysts devoted to counterterrorism: 41 at headquarters and 112 in the field. We received in the counterterrorism supplement in the fall 108 additional analytical analysts -- or positions for 108 additional analysts. We are in the process of recruiting and hiring those analysts, but it is a lengthy process. It is frustrating because you want to get the right people with the right experience to do the job.

George Tenet and the CIA has agreed to give us, in the meantime, 25 detainees -- detailees, I should say.


Sorry, George. Detailees, 25 detailees to address our analytical capabilities. And I expect to have them in the next two, three or four weeks. And they will augment our capabilities, have access to our information, work shoulder to shoulder with our analysts to put together the dots as we would want to have that done.

Let me just mention, additionally we put in in '03 and '04 budgets requests for additional analysts, both in the field as well as at headquarters. And my hope is that by the end of the -- when the get the resources from the '04 budget, which I know is down the road, that we'll have an analytical capability in counterterrorism of approximately 682, which is substantially above what we have now, as you can see.

Let me just spend a moment talking about the redirection of agents. Over the last several months, I have talked to state and local authorities, I've talked to other federal agencies, I've talked to Congress, I've talked to those in the bureau to determine how best to redirect our resources to address counterterrorism. I've had the special agents in charge in on a number of occasions and discussed with them the best way to do it, what their needs are in their particular divisions.

And ultimately, after looking at the needs of each of the SACs and their divisions, and looking at the programs, have determined that my recommendation to Congress should be the realignment of 400 agents from doing drugs -- and I'll talk about that for a second -- almost 60 from white collar crime and 60 from violent crime. And they would go principally to counterterrorism, 480 would go to counterterrorism, and then another 38 to our security, our new security division, and our training division.

Let me just talk about the narcotics. It's critically important to this country that we continue the war on drugs aggressively. What I hope to do there is have our agents still participate in the task forces, but where we have 10 or 15 working on a particular task force, we'd ratchet back to five or 10. It is critically important that we eliminate any overlap there may be with the DEA and their investigations. And consequently, while we are not retreating from the war on drugs, looking at what we could do under the circumstances, we believe that we can take 400 from agents who are currently doing drugs and reassign them to counterterrorism.

White collar crime, we probably will be upping the limits on the type of bank fraud cases that we'd take to $100,000. There are some cases that we'll defer to the inspector general on. But we have a fairly minor adjustment in white collar crime.

In violent crime, I still believe that we need to participate in task forces addressing violent crime around the country, not only because we bring something unique to the table, but also because it's important for our agents to work side by side with state and local authorities in matters of consequence to particular communities.

And so the reassignment of approximately 60 agents represents fewer agents that will participate in particular task forces. It will mean that our special agents in charge in the field have to look at a particular threat to a community.

And if it's an important one, and the state and local authorities wish us to participate and we bring something unique to the table, we ought to be addressing that threat. And when that threat is over, those agents should be going back to other programs. But it's important for us to stay in violent crime.

Let me finish up with a couple of charts that show where we were prior to September 11 and where we expect to be with the new resources, if approved by Congress.

You'll see joint terrorism task forces resources along with our agent base was almost -- it was 2,178. And by JTTF resources, joint terrorism task force resources, I mean other federal agents that are assigned to those task forces as well as state and local officers.

After the reassignment of these particular agents, we'll be up to 3,718 on our joint terrorism task forces around the country that are addressing counterterrorism. It is a substantial shift.

Let me finish by saying that it is a substantial shift, yes, of resources, but more importantly it is a substantial shift in understanding that our mission, our responsibility in the future is to prevent additional terrorist attacks in the United States. And there is not an agent out there, there is not a support person, there is not an analyst that does not understand that and want to participate in protecting the United States from such attacks.

Now, let me finish with that. And I will be back in a couple minutes to respond to your questions. Thank you.

LIN: All right. Live there with the director of the FBI, who has given the priorities for the new FBI.




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