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American Morning
New Report From London Could Shed Light on How Deadly Hussein's Arsenal Really Is
Aired September 09, 2002 - 08:35 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
PAULA ZAHN, CNN ANCHOR Gary Saymore is the author of a report from the International Institute Strategic Studies and joins us from London this morning. Thank you for being with us, Mr. Saymore. I wanted you to walk us through some of your findings.
Good morning, Paula.
GARY SAYMORE, INTERNATIONAL INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES: Good morning.
ZAHN: Starting off with nuclear weapons, Sunday, top Bush administration officials took to the airwaves, basically talking about Saddam Hussein buying aluminum pipes that could eventually be used in the manufacture of a centrifuge.
SAYMORE: Yes. What we argue in the report is that Iraq has a long-standing interest in acquiring nuclear weapons that goes back to the mid 1970s. Twice that ambition has been frustrated, first with the Israeli bomb engine 1981, and secondly with the American bombing during the Gulf War in 1991. We argue that it's likely that Iraq retains an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, although its ability to achieve that through the indigenous production of nuclear material is likely to be several years away.
If they were to somehow acquire nuclear material from a foreign source, then they could probably do it much quicker, perhaps within a matter of months. In terms of the information that has come out over the weekend about the high-strength aluminum tubes, I think that's a very interesting indication that the Iraqis may be trying in the absence of inspectors since 1998 to restart their effort, which was very, very extensive before 1991, to build facilities for the production of highly enriched uranium.
Although as I emphasized, I think it's probably a couple of years away before they can achieve that.
ZAHN: Scott Ritter just said on our air that it's ridiculous to think that those pipes would have anything but a civilian use. Your response to his statement?
SAYMORE: Well, U.S. and other Western governments have a very good understanding of the technical design for the gas centrifuges that the Iraqis were trying to build prior to 1991. And those centrifuges included high-strength aluminum tubes with particular dimensions and specifications. So if the U.S. government has information that Iraq was trying to buy those particular type of tubes, in terms of the physical dimensions and the particular specifications of the type of material, then I think that's a pretty strong tip-off that the Iraqis are seeking to revive their nuclear weapons program. There aren't really other civilian uses for tubes of that precise dimension and type.
ZAHN: Let's move to the issue of biological weapons, because your report suggest that Hussein might have liters of anthrax on hand?
SAYMORE: Yes, and that argument is based on both stockpiles of biological weapons agent that Iraq probably retains from before 1991, because they were never willing to let the U.N. inspectors get to the bottom of their pre-'91 production capabilities.
But perhaps even more important, there are existing civilian facilities in Iraq that could be converted for the production of thousands of liters of anthrax since '98, when the inspectors left. The key question in the biological area is not stockpiles of raw agent. I think one has to assume they're capable of producing that. The key question is what kind of delivery capability they have. And our reports suggests that their capability to actually deliver biological agents is probably pretty limited, certainly against long- range targets. Their air force and whatever missile capability they've retained since '91 is quite a bit smaller than in 1991.
ZAHN: Final thought about what your report shows about chemical weapons?
SAYMORE: Well, in terms of chemical weapons, I think, again, it's very plausible that the Iraqis were able to retain a small stockpile of chemical weapons agents from before '91 and since the inspectors left in '98, they would be able to reconstitute that force using civilian dual-use chemical facilities.
In terms of what the actual size of their stockpile is, I don't think one can be very precise, beyond saying that it, most likely, constitutes several hundred tons of different types of agent, including mustard and nerve agent.
Again, as with bio, the key question is what their delivery capability is. They have a strong capability, I think, to deliver chemical weapons against troops in the field, through a variety of tactical munitions, artillery shells, rockets, aerial bombs, but their capability to deliver chemical weapons agents against long-range targets through missiles or aircraft, either manned or unmanned, is probably fairly limited at this time. Of course, it will grow over time if nothing is done.
ZAHN: There is plenty more to talk about. Gary, we would love to have you come back and tell us a little bit more about the institute study.
SAYMORE: Thank you.
ZAHN: Glad to have you with us this morning. SAYMORE: Thank you, Paula. I'd be happy to come back.
ZAHN: Our pleasure well.
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