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CNN Saturday Morning News

Persian Gulf Analyst Discusses Risks Of War With Iraq

Aired October 12, 2002 - 09:16   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


LIN: Well, a U.S.-led war against Iraq could have a domino effect, starting with Israel and eventually embroiling the entire Middle East region. At least that's one of the fears of the United States going to war against Iraq.
Joining us from Washington to talk more about that is Kenneth Katzman, a Persian Gulf analyst.

Kenneth, thank you very much for joining us.

KENNETH KATZMAN, PERSIAN GULF ANALYST: Thank you. Good morning.

LIN: Can you outline in a pretty basic term what essentially could be a potential domino effect, if the United States attacks Iraq in that region?

KATZMAN: Well, of course, my view is that it strongly depends on the context. If inspectors, weapons inspectors do go back, and Iraq is perceived to be at least trying to comply, and the U.S. doesn't accept any level of compliance, the standard that the U.S. sets is so high that Iraq can't comply, and then, therefore, there is a war, I think you're looking at probably substantial unrest in the Arab world...

LIN: All right.

KATZMAN: ... particularly in Jordan or Egypt, the Gulf, some of the Gulf states as well, possibly.

LIN: And when you say unrest, what do you mean? Protests in the streets? Terrorist strikes against tourists? Or American or Western targets?

KATZMAN: Well, it really could be all of the above, any of the above. I'm particularly concerned about the prospects of Jordan, the kingdom of Jordan. Large Palestinian population, economy is linked to Iraq. Obviously, King Abdullah could potentially be destabilized if he's perceived as cooperating with the U.S.-led effort.

LIN: And you also have a situation both with the king of Jordan, the president of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, and the Saud family in Saudi Arabia, where the -- there is a disconnect between the leadership and its relationship with the United States and that leadership and its relationship with their people. There's not a lot of loyalty there.

KATZMAN: Very much so, very much so. That's why these leaders could all easily be threatened if indeed they're perceived as cooperating with the U.S. war, that the Arab world feels is unjustified.

Now, that said, if indeed inspectors go back and it's clear Iraq has no intention of complying, and the blame is clearly on Iraq, and they don't make a good-faith effort, then I think the unrest, the demonstrations might be fairly muted.

So I think a lot of this is actually up to Iraq and how it reacts to...

LIN: Really? Do you think the Arab streets, do you think the Arab street really cares about that rationale, or do you think the Arab street is really looking at an imperialist move into their region to occupy a Muslim country?

KATZMAN: No, I really think they do care. And in fact, you know, in the Afghan-Pakistan theater, you know, basically everybody believed that the Taliban were in the wrong. They had invited al Qaeda in, September 11 happened, and really, once the war got going, there was very little sympathy for the Taliban.

So with Iraq, you know, as I said, if it make a good-faith effort to comply, and it looks like the U.S. is just -- will not take yes for an answer and just is insistent on a war, then there could be a lot of sympathy for Saddam Hussein in that situation.

LIN: What makes Iran the wild card?

KATZMAN: Well, Iran is a wild card, because, actually, 60 percent of Iraq's population is Shiite Muslims. Ayatollah Khomeini was in exile and taught in southern Iraq, and actually the Iranian revolution, the theology, the ideology, started in the schools of southern Iraq.

So Iraq could wield a lot of influence, and what concerns me, actually, is some of the groups that the U.S. is talking to, some of the opposition groups are the same groups that carried out -- or cousins of the same groups that carried out terrorism in the '80s, the Dowa (ph) Party, Hezbollah, Shiite terrorism, hijackings, holding of American hostages in Lebanon, bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, et cetera.

LIN: Because the dynamic in Iraq is that the Shiites, though they are the majority population, they are the minority representation in the government. It's the Sunnis who hold the power. And wasn't it basically after the Gulf War, I mean, what united the Sunnis with Saddam Hussein, though they didn't like the man very much back in 1991, was the fear and the pressure from the Shiite majority? They said, Better to stick with a guy we know than to let the majority take over the power base.

KATZMAN: That's absolutely correct, and some of that thinking may happen again. Could lead the military to stick with Saddam fairly long, even in the event of a U.S.-led operation.

And then after, let's say there is a war, let's say Saddam is overthrown, after the war, if the U.S. does establish, let's say, some sort of a democracy in Iraq, if that's possible, do the Shiites then have the top job in Iraq? I mean, they're the majority. So one would think if it's a democracy, that Shiite Islam -- Shiite Muslims would have the top slots there.

LIN: So Kenneth, it seems to me, given the chaos you have outlined, the potential for chaos here, that it makes for the argument for having a U.S.-led occupation of Iraq in a postwar regime, if it comes to that.

KATZMAN: Well, again, I wouldn't want to get that far down the road. I mean, my view is, there's still a lot of chess moves left in this game. There is going to be a new U.N. resolution. Iraq is probably going to, I think, eventually accept that resolution. Inspectors will go back, and then we'll see what the level of compliance is.

I'm not taking it as a given that we should be right now thinking about the post-Saddam period. I think there's a lot of moves to this game left.

LIN: Well, certainly the Bush administration has been giving it a lot of thought these days, many scenarios being played out in the press.

KATZMAN: Right.

LIN: Thank you very much, Kenneth Katzman, for joining us.

KATZMAN: Thank you.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com







Aired October 12, 2002 - 09:16   ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
LIN: Well, a U.S.-led war against Iraq could have a domino effect, starting with Israel and eventually embroiling the entire Middle East region. At least that's one of the fears of the United States going to war against Iraq.
Joining us from Washington to talk more about that is Kenneth Katzman, a Persian Gulf analyst.

Kenneth, thank you very much for joining us.

KENNETH KATZMAN, PERSIAN GULF ANALYST: Thank you. Good morning.

LIN: Can you outline in a pretty basic term what essentially could be a potential domino effect, if the United States attacks Iraq in that region?

KATZMAN: Well, of course, my view is that it strongly depends on the context. If inspectors, weapons inspectors do go back, and Iraq is perceived to be at least trying to comply, and the U.S. doesn't accept any level of compliance, the standard that the U.S. sets is so high that Iraq can't comply, and then, therefore, there is a war, I think you're looking at probably substantial unrest in the Arab world...

LIN: All right.

KATZMAN: ... particularly in Jordan or Egypt, the Gulf, some of the Gulf states as well, possibly.

LIN: And when you say unrest, what do you mean? Protests in the streets? Terrorist strikes against tourists? Or American or Western targets?

KATZMAN: Well, it really could be all of the above, any of the above. I'm particularly concerned about the prospects of Jordan, the kingdom of Jordan. Large Palestinian population, economy is linked to Iraq. Obviously, King Abdullah could potentially be destabilized if he's perceived as cooperating with the U.S.-led effort.

LIN: And you also have a situation both with the king of Jordan, the president of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, and the Saud family in Saudi Arabia, where the -- there is a disconnect between the leadership and its relationship with the United States and that leadership and its relationship with their people. There's not a lot of loyalty there.

KATZMAN: Very much so, very much so. That's why these leaders could all easily be threatened if indeed they're perceived as cooperating with the U.S. war, that the Arab world feels is unjustified.

Now, that said, if indeed inspectors go back and it's clear Iraq has no intention of complying, and the blame is clearly on Iraq, and they don't make a good-faith effort, then I think the unrest, the demonstrations might be fairly muted.

So I think a lot of this is actually up to Iraq and how it reacts to...

LIN: Really? Do you think the Arab streets, do you think the Arab street really cares about that rationale, or do you think the Arab street is really looking at an imperialist move into their region to occupy a Muslim country?

KATZMAN: No, I really think they do care. And in fact, you know, in the Afghan-Pakistan theater, you know, basically everybody believed that the Taliban were in the wrong. They had invited al Qaeda in, September 11 happened, and really, once the war got going, there was very little sympathy for the Taliban.

So with Iraq, you know, as I said, if it make a good-faith effort to comply, and it looks like the U.S. is just -- will not take yes for an answer and just is insistent on a war, then there could be a lot of sympathy for Saddam Hussein in that situation.

LIN: What makes Iran the wild card?

KATZMAN: Well, Iran is a wild card, because, actually, 60 percent of Iraq's population is Shiite Muslims. Ayatollah Khomeini was in exile and taught in southern Iraq, and actually the Iranian revolution, the theology, the ideology, started in the schools of southern Iraq.

So Iraq could wield a lot of influence, and what concerns me, actually, is some of the groups that the U.S. is talking to, some of the opposition groups are the same groups that carried out -- or cousins of the same groups that carried out terrorism in the '80s, the Dowa (ph) Party, Hezbollah, Shiite terrorism, hijackings, holding of American hostages in Lebanon, bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, et cetera.

LIN: Because the dynamic in Iraq is that the Shiites, though they are the majority population, they are the minority representation in the government. It's the Sunnis who hold the power. And wasn't it basically after the Gulf War, I mean, what united the Sunnis with Saddam Hussein, though they didn't like the man very much back in 1991, was the fear and the pressure from the Shiite majority? They said, Better to stick with a guy we know than to let the majority take over the power base.

KATZMAN: That's absolutely correct, and some of that thinking may happen again. Could lead the military to stick with Saddam fairly long, even in the event of a U.S.-led operation.

And then after, let's say there is a war, let's say Saddam is overthrown, after the war, if the U.S. does establish, let's say, some sort of a democracy in Iraq, if that's possible, do the Shiites then have the top job in Iraq? I mean, they're the majority. So one would think if it's a democracy, that Shiite Islam -- Shiite Muslims would have the top slots there.

LIN: So Kenneth, it seems to me, given the chaos you have outlined, the potential for chaos here, that it makes for the argument for having a U.S.-led occupation of Iraq in a postwar regime, if it comes to that.

KATZMAN: Well, again, I wouldn't want to get that far down the road. I mean, my view is, there's still a lot of chess moves left in this game. There is going to be a new U.N. resolution. Iraq is probably going to, I think, eventually accept that resolution. Inspectors will go back, and then we'll see what the level of compliance is.

I'm not taking it as a given that we should be right now thinking about the post-Saddam period. I think there's a lot of moves to this game left.

LIN: Well, certainly the Bush administration has been giving it a lot of thought these days, many scenarios being played out in the press.

KATZMAN: Right.

LIN: Thank you very much, Kenneth Katzman, for joining us.

KATZMAN: Thank you.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com