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Q&A WITH ZAIN VERJEE
Q&A
Aired October 21, 2002 - 12:30 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
JIM CLANCY, CNN INTERNATIONAL HOST: The official response from North Korea to the United States: Stop the hostility, and we'll talk. But worldwide, there is plenty of anger.
ZAIN VERJEE, CNN INTERNATIONAL HOST: South Korea called on the north to abandon any nuclear weapons program, while Japan's prime minister says it's outrageous North Korea would have nuclear arms when its people are starving.
CLANCY: Behind the rhetoric, leaders worldwide consider their options and actions.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
GEN. COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE: This is the time for us to work with our friends and allies and to see what next steps are appropriate.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
KOFI ANNAN, UN SECRETARY GENERAL: And citations are going around capitol as to what steps should be taken to deal with this new development in North Korea.
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VERJEE: The European Parliament meets and could move to cut off aid to Pyongyang as the penalty for its deception. But Europe, too, wants to avoid a diplomatic meltdown.
CLANCY: On this edition of Q&A: what path for North Korea, isolation or engagement?
Hello, and welcome once again to Q&A. There's no end to the political fall-out from the revelations about North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
VERJEE: Now that questions have been raised about the promises North Korea made, how can the world move forward until it can be verified just what weapons North Korea has?
CLANCY: Well, one individual, who very well may be in charge of finding that out, is Mohamed El Baradei. He is the director general of the Atomic Energy Agency. We talked with him just a short while ago, asking him first whether the IAEA had any inkling that North Korea was carrying out a clandestine nuclear weapons program.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
MOHAMED EL BARADEI, DIRECTOR GENERAL, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY: Well, Jim, we did know that they have been working on plutonium production since 1993, when we came to the conclusion that they had not really declared all the plutonium in their possession. And, therefore, we reported to the Security Council. And at that time, they were considered to be in violation of their safeguard agreement under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
They have been, in fact, in continuing violation for nine years now. We were not able, since that time, to do full fledged inspections there to verify that they have come clean, that they have declared all the plutonium they have.
But since that time, since 1993, our access to nuclear facilities in DPRK, our inspection was rather limited. So we could not have a full picture. We know they had a processing capacity. We were verifying that capacity under the framework agreement with the United States. But we had no inkling that they were working on a parallel program to produce hydrogen and radium. This came as a shock, but not really as a surprise.
CLANCY: A shock, but not a surprise. But how do you deal with it, Dr. El Baradei? What does the IAEA want?
EL BARADEI: Well, we want to go back to North Korea, have full access to all nuclear facilities. We have been asking them to give us that access since 1993, without avail. Now, with additional proof that they are working on a weapon program, I think it's about time that they open up, that they come into compliance with their non-proliferation obligation.
I think the Security Council is quite concerned about it. The United States is concerned about it. And we, clearly, at the IAEI, are very disturbed by this news. Another proliferator is not good news.
VERJEE: When do you think, Dr. El Baradei, that IAEA inspectors will get the change to go into North Korea? You've been quoted as saying pretty soon.
EL BARADEI: Well, we have, Zain, and we have inspectors there on a continuing basis, in North Korea, since 1994, in fact. But their inspection is limited to verifying the freeze of the existing program. We do not have access yet to this undeclared program that was reported recently.
I wrote to them a couple of days ago urging them to open up for full inspection in their country, urging them to come into compliance with their non-proliferation obligation. I am yet waiting a reply, and I hope that a reply will be positive, because we need to go back there. We need to assure the world that that program will come to a complete halt as soon as we can.
VERJEE: Who do you believe supplied North Korea with materials to carry out a clandestine nuclear weapons program? There have been reports suggesting Russia, suggesting Pakistan. Where do you stand?
EL BARADEI: Well, there are a lot of reports. We have not yet verified this information. I think, if I express personal view, I think it's a combination of supply from the outside and the indigenous production. But we still have to verify this information, Zain.
CLANCY: Dr. El Baradei, when you look over the whole scene here, the record North Korea has for trying to sell its missile technology and other things, setting off alarm bells, Europe, the entire international community outraged by this disclosure. If it proves to be true, what kind of a stand do you expect to see from Europe, the U.S., Japan, South Korea?
EL BARADEI: What I think everybody is in agreement, Jim, that we need to disarm North Korea from its weapons of mass destruction as soon as possible, as there is equal agreement to disarm Iraq. How we go about it is a question that we are still discussing. There is obviously -- these are complex situations. There is not one solution fits all. But we need to use all the means at our disposable, maximizing the incentive for them to comply, raising the cost for their non-compliance, and hope that we will be able to resolve these issues without resort to force.
VERJEE: This time, though, who is it that you believe is more dangerous, Iraq or North Korea?
EL BARADEI: Well, it depends on your perception, Zain. I mean, if you look -- if you talk to the Japan, South Korea, for example, North Korea is much more dangerous. It's a nuclear -- it's a potential nuclear weapon state or a weapon state in their neighborhood. If you look to the Middle East, to the U.S., it's Iraq. So they are both -- in my view, they are both dangerous -- they are both dangerous situations. They both need to be dealt with equal priority.
VERJEE: Mohamed El Baradei, the director general for the International Atomic Energy Agency, thanks a lot for joining both Jim and I here on Q&A.
EL BARADEI: Thank you very much, and good luck.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
VERJEE: And after the break, how to handle North Korea, isolate or engage?
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: And naturally, the issue of clandestine missile and nuclear technology, the building up of nuclear arsenals in our region to set methods are a natural, perpetual concern for us. And they may form the subject of several dialogues.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
CLANCY: Welcome back to Q&A. The European Union meeting to decide, among other things, what to do about North Korea.
VERJEE: What's the appropriate response? Should negotiations be continued? Should aid be cut off? With their views on the best course of action, we're joined, from Washington, by Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution and the author of "Defense Policy Choices for the Bush Administration."
CLANCY: Also from there is Nicholas Eberstadt. He's a researcher with the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. And he's the author of "The End of North Korea".
VERJEE: Good to have you both with us.
Michael -- let me start with you first. What do you think is the best strategy here, isolation or engagement with North Korea?
MICHAEL O'HANLON, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION: Well, engagement, but, of course, that doesn't really answer the question of what you do next. It has to be a tough engagement. The basic logic of the agreed framework doesn't work anymore, and we have to put pressure on North Korea.
So the only question, I think, is do you cut off all aid? Or, as I would prefer, do you continue humanitarian relief and some of the fuel oil, while you tell North Korea, listen the long-term deal is off, and we're going to have to get a serious new regime of inspections in here before we can engage with you any further?
CLANCY: Nicholas Eberstadt, you know, everybody is saying you've got to engage; you don't have any choice. But the fact of the matter is these guys were engaged; North Korea was engaged. They didn't keep their word. They're carrying on a nuclear weapons program. There are South Koreans that say, you are fools. You have to stop doing this. What you have to do is undermine the regime; pull the rug out.
NICHOLAS EBERSTADT, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE: It's a pretty hard path now to figure out exactly how you negotiate with this government because the problem is exactly the same people who signed the agreed framework told Assistant Secretary Kelly that they'd been violating the agreed framework for years and that the agreed framework was nullified.
So where do you find your negotiating partner in Pyongyang? It's kind of an important question.
VERJEE: Even with that having been said, I just wonder if we should also not consider the point of view of the North Korean government here, who says it's actually the U.S. that didn't live up to its side of the deal.
O'HANLON: Everybody wants...
VERJEE: Well, you know, Michael, what do you think about that?
O'HANLON: You go back to the history of this agreed framework, there have been acts of delay on both sides. And for the North Koreans to say it's been all on the U.S. side, I think, is incorrect. But there are times when the United States took longer than I would have preferred.
That's not the real issue here. The real issue here is that North Korea is now embarking on a nuclear program that's fundamentally at odds with the basic logic of the agreed framework. And that necessitates a whole new approach, whether they want it or not.
CLANCY: Yes, but, Michael, a whole new approach. You've got the old problem that you still haven't dealt with, and that's North Korea. That's a regime that is enigmatic, to say the least.
O'HANLON: Yes, but let's look at a couple other -- Nick knows North Korea better than I do, but let me quickly take off a couple of things there, at least give me some hope for future diplomacy.
One, their support for terrorism is much less than it was in the past.
Secondly, they have been engaging with the South Koreans, the Japanese, and the United States, even if it's been in their own special way and often too steps forward, one-and-a-half steps back.
Third, their military forces are beginning to weaken, especially compared to allied forces. And I don't think they're a major conventional threat, and they know it.
And so, for all those reasons, I think it's better to work with them rather than to try to undermine them and hope for a collapse of North Korea, which could actually be extraordinarily dangerous.
EBERSTADT: But, Michael, I don't understand how we work with them exactly. I mean we've seen that we can't trust them to negotiate agreements with us. What does working with them exactly mean?
O'HANLON: Well, it means that you no longer rely on trust. I agree with that point, Nick. You have to have inspections inside of North Korea. As you know, we've had one, essentially, in the past. We need to -- or a couple -- we need to really do this much more rigorously and systematically. We also...
EBERSTADT: Michael, but there are 8,000 holes in the ground. Do we go into each one? We paid half a million tons of food aid for the last hole we saw. I'm not sure we've got that much food in America.
O'HANLON: Yes. Well, that's a fair point. I would not do this as some kind of a deal where we have to buy their permission.
But as you know, it's harder to hide big nuclear programs or even smaller nuclear programs than chemical and biological arms. It's something we're seeing in the Iraq debate. It's also true in the nuclear area. We may not find everything they've got. But the good news is we caught them while they were still trying to buy technologies that they hadn't yet obtained, as far as we know. So I think there's a decent chance of really nipping this program in the bud, if we get in there with inspections.
VERJEE: Nipping this program in the bud. I just wonder, though, Nick, you look at the 1994 agreement, Right? North Korea saying it's nullified, and all indications are that, you know, it's pretty much tossed. But is there a concern, do you think, that if it does ultimately become null and void effectively, North Korea could say, could pursue a nuclear weapons development program at a much faster pace? That's one of the major concerns going on in the Bush administration right now.
EBERSTADT: Clear so. That's a very important consideration. It's also true that we don't know how fast they're pursuing a surreptitious program. This is just one aspect of a surreptitious program that we know about after catching them.
CLANCY: All right. Let me -- let's take this forward a little bit. The question has to be, what do the Europeans do about it? Right now, they're giving, what, 20 million euros to help fund this nuclear project. South Korea giving much, much more than that. The U.S., all told, it's a $5 billion project. Doesn't that have to come to a screeching halt, gentlemen?
O'HANLON: Well My -- go ahead, Nick.
EBERSTADT: I think it clearly does. I think that all political aid to the DPRK has to stop yesterday because, among other things, we now know that foreign aid to the DPRK has been helping to finance surreptitious nuclear program. We can't go along with that. And by the way, I hope that is one of the things that President Bush will say to Jiang Zemin when he meets him this week.
CLANCY: Michael?
O'HANLON: I think you have to be tough, but I would tend to continue at least humanitarian aid and some level of fuel. The fuel is obviously a more dicey thing because, as I think Nick's been suggesting, that's part of the basic agreed framework. And if that framework is no longer operative, it's not clear why we should have to keep providing the fuel.
But I would want to keep the North Koreans willing not to reprocess that plutonium that we know they already have. And I want to give them enough incentive, at least for a few months or a year, as we devise a broader strategy to stay and keep that program under wraps.
So I would tend to support food aid and fuel oil, but cut off work on the nuclear reactors. And also tell them you're not going to get any Japanese aid, the $10 billion you expect as a form of essentially reparations for Japanese colonialism from early in the 20th century, unless you make big progress on this issue and the Japanese agree with us 100 percent on that.
VERJEE: I'm wondering if I can take a slightly different tack here with both of you and many analysts are saying, look, just read between the lines here. You know, what's the rationale North Korea has for coming out with this right now? And what many are saying is, look, they're driven by an impulse for survival.
Howard French had a piece in "The New York Times" this morning. He said, look, they are driven by an impulse to survive. The world super- power is the United States; South Korea, much richer; Soviet block, it's gone; China, in recent days, weeks, creating a distance from North Korea; and North Korea's economy is crumbling. So many are saying this is a call for dialogue. Please talk with us. We need you.
EBERSTADT: Well, you can't keep on buying the North Korean nuclear program. We bought the North Korean nuclear program in '94 with the agreed framework. We bought the North Korean nuclear program in '99 with the Kumchang-ni negotiations.
If you get into a situation where you're endlessly repurchasing something already promised, you're in a very perilous situation, especially as the program moves forward.
O'HANLON: I agree with Nick on that point. I think we need to make clear to the North Koreans, as this point, we're not going to start increasing the amounts of money we're offering. The Japanese aid was already something that was being discussed for a variety of historical reasons. That aid should only be given if they come clean on this and if they're beginning some kind of an economic reform that assures some of the aid won't be wasted.
VERJEE: But what about dialogue, Michael? I mean you're talking about aid on the one hand. But do you think the United States should talk?
O'HANLON: Well, we have to talk. We talk, virtually, with everyone. We talk indirectly with Saddam Hussein, for heaven sakes, even though it's through the UN. So the idea of talking is not the issue. The idea -- the issue for me is how tough your rhetoric is. And here I think we need to be relatively tough, in fact, quite tough.
It's one thing to say that the North Koreans are opening up and fessing up because they want dialogue, but they're the ones that started an underground nuclear program in the last few years. They clearly see this incentive for them to develop new weapons programs and then use that as a bargaining lever to get money -- extort money from us.
And that -- there was a certain logic to the agreed framework which I support, but at this point, it's run its course, and we need something new.
EBERSTADT: I agree with Michael. The logic of the agreed framework is over now. And I also agree with Michael that it's barbaric not to talk with your adversaries.
Moreover, if you do not talk with your adversaries, there is an additional chance that they will make terrible miscalculations. So talk, it seems to me, is fine, but aid it not.
With respect to food aid, I think it's important that we have a very different approach from what we've had over the past number of years. Instead of cutting, in effect, a check for Pyongyang through their public distribution system, if we're really going to help people who are hard up, we want to have very intrusive humanitarian assistance with the same rules that operate in other parts of the world.
North Korea can't continue to be a special case. That's part of what got us into this trouble to begin with.
CLANCY: You know, guys, I sit here, and I listen to us as we're talking about Pyongyang and logic in the same sentence. Somehow, to me, it seems a very difficult thing to do.
And, Nick, I want to ask you this because you're the man that's written the book, so to speak, on this. What is Kim Jong Il really up to here? Is he distancing himself from his father's legacy? What is going on with this guy?
EBERSTADT: Well, I haven't had the privilege of talking with him directly, but I have had the pain of reading quite a bit of his writings. And if one takes what he says seriously, he's interested in an independent, socialist, unified Korea, which is to say a Korea run by his government, including what we think of as South Korea today. And it means U.S. out of South Korea and also out of Japan, thank you very much, and a North Korean state that can stand up to the world. And I think that probably includes nukes.
VERJEE: Michael, do you think that Kim Jong Il is also saying, look, I'm a new leader now. This is a different day, a different time. My leadership does not support or promote terrorism. I'm not keeping anything a secret anymore. Deal with me. Is that the tact he's taking?
O'HANLON: Well, the progress on terrorism is certainly welcome, and that is, I think, genuine. The progress on the nuclear issue, however, the fact that they're admitting to something that they're still actively doing is not progress.
I think it was progress for them to admit to the Japanese kidnappings of decades ago and, essentially, come clean on bad things they had done in the past that they're no longer doing now. That caused an obvious back- lash in reaction in Japan, but it was still the right thing for North Korea to do, and it reflected a certain willingness to get beyond.
With the nuclear issue, however, this is a recent sin that they have begun to carry out, and they continue to carry out. And, therefore, I am not particularly impressed that they fessed up. That was a sign of inevitable reaction to the fact that we had the intelligence on them, and so I don't see that as a sign of goodwill in any way.
CLANCY: Gentlemen, I just want to put this out to you very briefly and ask you who could potentially be their clients. We already know that they're selling missile technology. The fear right now is that they're going to sell nuclear arms as a nuclear warhead on the end of one of those missiles.
EBERSTADT: Michael, do you want to handle that? I mean it's the international, the usual suspects.
O'HANLON: Yes. There's always the chance that they would do that. But -- and they probably do have one or two plutonium bombs, which they've had for a decade, in all likelihood. There's always the extreme possibility that they would sell those bombs. Chance are, though, they way a ton. First generation nuclear weapons are very large, as we know from what we built and dropped on Japan 55 years ago.
I think North Korea might have a hard time even shipping those things out of its country without getting caught. And I'd be surprised if they want to use the one or two, especially because, if somehow they were ever caught doing so, it would lead, I believe, to a decision to overthrow the regime.
CLANCY: Is this blackmail, though, gentlemen, what we're looking at, this call?
EBERSTADT: Of course.
CLANCY: We want to be treated nice by the United States.
EBERSTADT: Of course, it's military extortion.
O'HANLON: Yes, it's extortion.
EBERSTADT: I mean that's -- it is the logic of the regime to saber rattle and to expect to get dividends from abroad. That's the whole nature of the military first politics, which Kim Jong Il has spelled out very, very clearly. I wish we would read what he says.
VERJEE: Nicholas Eberstadt, a researcher with the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, also Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, thanks both of you for speaking to us on Q&A. We appreciate it. Thanks.
EBERSTADT: Thanks a lot.
VERJEE: You're welcome.
CLANCY: All right.
VERJEE: Well, those are our questions on Q&A.
CLANCY: We're going to be right back with yours. Stay with us.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
CLANCY: All right. Welcome back. Well, we'll have your views in just a moment, and "YOUR WORLD TODAY" will continue with Michael Holmes and Daljit Dhaliwa.
VERJEE: That's right. Let's check in with them for a preview of what's coming up. Over to you both.
MICHAEL HOLMES, CNN INTERNATIONAL ANCHOR, YOUR WORLD TODAY: Hey, guys, thanks very much. We're going to continue those breaking news stories. We'll be talking to our Mike Hannah, our Jerusalem bureau chief, about that bombing, which has claimed several lives in Israel.
DALJIT DHALIWA, CNN INTERNATIONAL ANCHOR, YOUR WORLD TODAY: And we're going to have the latest on the sniper investigation on the United States, where we're standing by for a live news conference from Hem Richo (ph) in Virginia, so a lot more on those two stories.
HOLMES: Yes, developing stories. Back to you guys.
VERJEE: OK. Thank you so much.
CLANCY: Michael and Daljit there. We'll be watching them. And before we go, a little bit about your views.
Jawaid Chaudhry writes in this:
"he U.S. has more weapons of mass destruction than any country, therefore it is time for the U.S. to take action, become an example and disarm... then others will follow."
VERJEE: Dr. Abbas Abdus-Salam Ibadan of Nigeria says:
"he spate of killing by terrorists is extremely worrisome... world leaders should rise up to address rising hatred in the world... we must do this before terrorists and thoughtless leaders kill all of us."
CLANCY: And Ignatius Mugabo of Denmark writing in:
"Dear Q&A, I have fallen in love with the program... whether it is with Jim or Zain... I never miss it, unless I'm traveling... thank you."
Well, thank you.
VERJEE: Thank you so much. Now, if you have a comment, make sure you e-mail us, ywt@cnn.com. Both Jim and I would love to hear from you. So would Daljit and Michael. Please include your city and your name.
CLANCY: That's Q&A for this day.
END
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