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CNN Live At Daybreak

Interview With Ken Pollock

Aired December 02, 2002 - 07:08   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


BILL HEMMER, CNN ANCHOR: Saddam Hussein believes he can avoid war with the U.S. That's the theory anyway of the former CIA analyst and National Security Council official who has studied the country and its leader with intensity.
Ken Pollock, the author of "The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq," is now director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution. He's with us in D.C.

Ken, good to see you -- welcome back. Good morning.

KEN POLLOCK, FMR. CIA ANALYST/IRAQ: Good morning, Bill. Good to see you.

HEMMER: What do you make of Christiane Amanpour's reporting on these aluminum tubes? And what are the implications contained there, Ken?

POLLOCK: There's nothing really that's unexpected in what Christiane is reporting. I mean, she's got it absolutely right.

Unfortunately, the United Nations allowed the Iraqis to retain a missile program. The Iraqis are allowed to have missiles under 150 kilometers in range, and they're allowed to build them. They are not allowed to import any military-related items, and as Christiane pointed out, that's the violation that the Iraqis are claiming. They are saying that they violated the sanctions, which is a much lesser offense than if they had been trying to build nuclear weapons or long- range missiles, which then would have meant a violation of the clauses banning them from having weapons of mass destruction.

And what they're trying to do is to say -- is to basically plead guilty to the lesser charge in hopes that that will make it much harder for the United States to use that to build international support for a war.

HEMMER: Ken, it doesn't seem to me like you think this issue has much traction, does it?

POLLOCK: No. My guess is it's not going to have a whole lot of traction, but the key issue really is going to be once we actually find out what it was that the Iraqis imported, as you pointed out, as Christiane pointed out, we don't really know what the diameter or what the dimensions of these aluminum tubes were. The Iraqis are claiming a certain set of dimensions, which would make it more consistent with the rockets, as they've pointed out. There are other people who are suggesting that the dimensions are more consistent with a nuclear program.

If the United States can prove that the tubes are much more consistent with a nuclear program, I think under those circumstances the evidence will be much more damning. The U.S. will be in a much better position to go to its allies and say, look, the Iraqis are clearly importing parts for a nuclear program. We have to go to war.

HEMMER: But that's the whole game right now, though, isn't it, Ken? I mean, whether it's nuclear parts...

POLLOCK: Exactly.

HEMMER: ... or chemical or biological, right?

POLLOCK: Right. And their admission basically tells us nothing. It's the story that we expected to hear from the Iraqis. The key is whether or not we are able to prove it one way or another based on objective analysis rather than what the Iraqis tell us.

HEMMER: Got it. I want to get to two points here quickly -- about two minutes left right now.

Saddam Hussein, you believe the best way to gauge whether or not he is trying to avert war is to watch the military movement on behalf of the Iraqi military. What is it doing right now that would provide evidence to you one direction or another? And explain that.

POLLOCK: That really is the key. And what I think -- a lot of people I think believe that Saddam Hussein is quaking in his boots right now. But in fact, what we're seeing from the Iraqi military is they really aren't making too many preparations. None of their big units have moved. The preparations they are making for going to war are actually really quite minor.

In short, the Iraqis are not taking the steps that we would expect them to take if they were getting ready for a war in the next few weeks or even couple of months. And what that suggests is that Saddam Hussein is so confident that the inspectors are not going to find anything that he does not believe the United States is ever going to be able to build that international coalition to go to war.

HEMMER: Did you -- if you reflect back on late 1990, early 1991, did you see that Saddam Hussein had that same impression then, or not?

POLLOCK: Yes, unfortunately, they did, although at that time, they clearly were making the preparations to go to war. But it also was quite clear, both at the time and especially what we learned afterwards, that Saddam believed that it was highly unlikely that the United States would be able to summon the political will to go to war.

HEMMER: Yes.

POLLOCK: But beyond that, he also thought he could win a war even if we did.

HEMMER: One more point, Ken. Iraq, we are told by one of the lead inspectors here heading up one of the nuclear teams, may need more time for the civilian portion of its chemical and biological weapons programs to find that, make the distinction of why would they need more time. We all thought this was set in stone from the U.N. Security Council. What gives now?

POLLOCK: Well, this is just it. The Iraqis, I think, are playing for time, and what they're going to try to do is to come in with as voluminous a report as they possibly can to try to make it look like they're trying to come clean, when in point in fact all they're likely to be doing is trying to obfuscate the actual programs that are still in hiding.

HEMMER: Why would they U.N., then, give them extra time, Ken? What's the logic behind that?

POLLOCK: Well, I think -- look, honestly, Bill, who knows? But you know, my guess is that the United Nations are trying everything they can to avert a war, and if their feeling is that, well, if we can give the Iraqis a few more days and that will make it a more accurate declaration, that's fine.

I think there's a real danger in doing that, because it allows the Iraqis to string out this process. And if the U.S. comes forward with evidence at a future date, the Iraqis can say, oh, well, we meant to include that in our declaration, we just hadn't gotten around to it.

HEMMER: Hence the cat and mouse game that may continue or may not. We'll see.

Always a pleasure talking to you, Ken.

POLLOCK: Great to be with you.

HEMMER: Ken Pollock, "The Threatening Storm" author, a great book you wrote, my friend.

POLLOCK: Thanks very much.

HEMMER: Talk to you soon.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com.







Aired December 2, 2002 - 07:08   ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
BILL HEMMER, CNN ANCHOR: Saddam Hussein believes he can avoid war with the U.S. That's the theory anyway of the former CIA analyst and National Security Council official who has studied the country and its leader with intensity.
Ken Pollock, the author of "The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq," is now director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution. He's with us in D.C.

Ken, good to see you -- welcome back. Good morning.

KEN POLLOCK, FMR. CIA ANALYST/IRAQ: Good morning, Bill. Good to see you.

HEMMER: What do you make of Christiane Amanpour's reporting on these aluminum tubes? And what are the implications contained there, Ken?

POLLOCK: There's nothing really that's unexpected in what Christiane is reporting. I mean, she's got it absolutely right.

Unfortunately, the United Nations allowed the Iraqis to retain a missile program. The Iraqis are allowed to have missiles under 150 kilometers in range, and they're allowed to build them. They are not allowed to import any military-related items, and as Christiane pointed out, that's the violation that the Iraqis are claiming. They are saying that they violated the sanctions, which is a much lesser offense than if they had been trying to build nuclear weapons or long- range missiles, which then would have meant a violation of the clauses banning them from having weapons of mass destruction.

And what they're trying to do is to say -- is to basically plead guilty to the lesser charge in hopes that that will make it much harder for the United States to use that to build international support for a war.

HEMMER: Ken, it doesn't seem to me like you think this issue has much traction, does it?

POLLOCK: No. My guess is it's not going to have a whole lot of traction, but the key issue really is going to be once we actually find out what it was that the Iraqis imported, as you pointed out, as Christiane pointed out, we don't really know what the diameter or what the dimensions of these aluminum tubes were. The Iraqis are claiming a certain set of dimensions, which would make it more consistent with the rockets, as they've pointed out. There are other people who are suggesting that the dimensions are more consistent with a nuclear program.

If the United States can prove that the tubes are much more consistent with a nuclear program, I think under those circumstances the evidence will be much more damning. The U.S. will be in a much better position to go to its allies and say, look, the Iraqis are clearly importing parts for a nuclear program. We have to go to war.

HEMMER: But that's the whole game right now, though, isn't it, Ken? I mean, whether it's nuclear parts...

POLLOCK: Exactly.

HEMMER: ... or chemical or biological, right?

POLLOCK: Right. And their admission basically tells us nothing. It's the story that we expected to hear from the Iraqis. The key is whether or not we are able to prove it one way or another based on objective analysis rather than what the Iraqis tell us.

HEMMER: Got it. I want to get to two points here quickly -- about two minutes left right now.

Saddam Hussein, you believe the best way to gauge whether or not he is trying to avert war is to watch the military movement on behalf of the Iraqi military. What is it doing right now that would provide evidence to you one direction or another? And explain that.

POLLOCK: That really is the key. And what I think -- a lot of people I think believe that Saddam Hussein is quaking in his boots right now. But in fact, what we're seeing from the Iraqi military is they really aren't making too many preparations. None of their big units have moved. The preparations they are making for going to war are actually really quite minor.

In short, the Iraqis are not taking the steps that we would expect them to take if they were getting ready for a war in the next few weeks or even couple of months. And what that suggests is that Saddam Hussein is so confident that the inspectors are not going to find anything that he does not believe the United States is ever going to be able to build that international coalition to go to war.

HEMMER: Did you -- if you reflect back on late 1990, early 1991, did you see that Saddam Hussein had that same impression then, or not?

POLLOCK: Yes, unfortunately, they did, although at that time, they clearly were making the preparations to go to war. But it also was quite clear, both at the time and especially what we learned afterwards, that Saddam believed that it was highly unlikely that the United States would be able to summon the political will to go to war.

HEMMER: Yes.

POLLOCK: But beyond that, he also thought he could win a war even if we did.

HEMMER: One more point, Ken. Iraq, we are told by one of the lead inspectors here heading up one of the nuclear teams, may need more time for the civilian portion of its chemical and biological weapons programs to find that, make the distinction of why would they need more time. We all thought this was set in stone from the U.N. Security Council. What gives now?

POLLOCK: Well, this is just it. The Iraqis, I think, are playing for time, and what they're going to try to do is to come in with as voluminous a report as they possibly can to try to make it look like they're trying to come clean, when in point in fact all they're likely to be doing is trying to obfuscate the actual programs that are still in hiding.

HEMMER: Why would they U.N., then, give them extra time, Ken? What's the logic behind that?

POLLOCK: Well, I think -- look, honestly, Bill, who knows? But you know, my guess is that the United Nations are trying everything they can to avert a war, and if their feeling is that, well, if we can give the Iraqis a few more days and that will make it a more accurate declaration, that's fine.

I think there's a real danger in doing that, because it allows the Iraqis to string out this process. And if the U.S. comes forward with evidence at a future date, the Iraqis can say, oh, well, we meant to include that in our declaration, we just hadn't gotten around to it.

HEMMER: Hence the cat and mouse game that may continue or may not. We'll see.

Always a pleasure talking to you, Ken.

POLLOCK: Great to be with you.

HEMMER: Ken Pollock, "The Threatening Storm" author, a great book you wrote, my friend.

POLLOCK: Thanks very much.

HEMMER: Talk to you soon.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com.