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American Morning

Weapons Inspectors in Iraq Want to Talk With Scientists

Aired December 16, 2002 - 09:35   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


PAULA ZAHN, CNN ANCHOR: Now back to the hunt for weapons in Iraq. As we have been reporting, there are now more than 100 U.N. weapons inspectors in Iraq. They're not just interested in looking inside buildings, the inspectors also want to talk with Iraqi scientists, too.
David Albright is a former nuclear weapons inspector, now with the Institute for Science and International Security. He joins us from Washington.

Good to see you again, David, welcome back.

DAVID ALBRIGHT, FMR WEAPONS INSPECTOR: Thank you.

ZAHN: So, David, how critical is it for these inspectors to sit down and talk with these Iraqi scientists?

ALBRIGHT: It is absolutely essential to do that. It was true in the 1990s and it's even more true today. But it's very important that they sit down with the Iraqis without their minders and have a mechanism to get those Iraqis out of the country, if necessary.

ZAHN: William Safire of "The New York Times" wrote a pretty excoriating piece today saying that if Hans Blix had any interest in getting hard intelligence and information on germs and nukes, he would draw up his own list of Iraqi scientists and go directly to them. And they say that because he has characterized the interviewing of these Iraqi scientists as, quote, "abductions," or defections that it has undermined the inspections at every single turn. Is he right?

AL:BRIGHT: Well, I think he's gone too far. I mean, Hans Blix's comments early on did not help the process. I mean, it's a very important tool in the resolution and his statements have made it harder. But I think he's gotten the message. And you can almost be assured on the nuclear side that such a list has been drawn up. I assume on the Hans Blix side, which is on chemical and biological missiles, if they haven't prepared those lists, they are now.

ZAHN: How easily do you think the noncooperation part of the resolution can be triggered when it comes to this issue of Iraqi scientists?

ALBRIGHT: Well, if they don't allow the inspectors to see the Iraqis that they wish to see alone or allow them to take Iraqis out with their families, then they're in violation of the resolution. And I think it would -- at that point this whole thing would probably go back to the security council. ZAHN: What about the kind of information you get from the defectors? How valuable might that be?

ALBRIGHT: It can be extremely valuable in many ways. Think of interrogating suspects in a legal case, someone could say something inadvertently. By interviewing people separated, you can discover lies more easily and you may find someone who just wants to blow the whistle. I mean, this finally -- the idea of taking Iraqis out is a whistle-blower program, it's not a defection program. Iraq is violating international law by having weapons of mass destruction and these people are whistle-blowers that may do it, may reveal what they know for moral reasons.

ZAHN: I know you have felt very strongly that the this 12,000 page declaration turned in has an awful lot of recycled information in it. Give our viewers a sense of where you think the United States is in this process, as inspectors get ready potentially to interview Iraqi scientists and potentially look at the possibility of noncooperation?

ALBRIGHT: Well, I have to admit, I have not read the thing, I'm looking forward to looking at it, like everyone else. My understanding is that a lot of it is recycled, particularly -- I know the nuclear side very well and the declaration appears to be almost exactly what was submitted in 1997 or 1998.

There is some new stuff, and that has to be looked at carefully for clues, it's information about what Iraq has done from '91 to 2002, but -- and it's all about civil activities that are allowed, but there may be some clues in there. But now what the inspectors have to do is put together a process where they're going to check the declaration, which in this case really unfortunately means they're going to be looking to show that Iraq is not complying. They can't give Iraq the benefit of the doubt, and they're going to have to move forward and actively have a strategy to show that Iraq is in violation of the agreement because it's declared nothing about its weapons of mass destruction program.

ZAHN: David, is it conceivable that could be done by the end of January, which some military experts say is the ideal window of time to go into Iraq, if you're going to attack?

ALBRIGHT: I think given the delays, I don't think so, and I think we should allow the inspectors a chance to do their work. I mean, finally, they were created to provide a window into Iraq that member states don't have. Intelligence information is often weak, and the inspectors can get much better information. You also, they are a judge, in a way it is impartial, and I think the international community, the public of America, will listen much more to the inspectors than to reports by the U.S. government.

ZAHN: David Albright, as always, glad to have you on the air, always appreciate your perspective.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com






Aired December 16, 2002 - 09:35   ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
PAULA ZAHN, CNN ANCHOR: Now back to the hunt for weapons in Iraq. As we have been reporting, there are now more than 100 U.N. weapons inspectors in Iraq. They're not just interested in looking inside buildings, the inspectors also want to talk with Iraqi scientists, too.
David Albright is a former nuclear weapons inspector, now with the Institute for Science and International Security. He joins us from Washington.

Good to see you again, David, welcome back.

DAVID ALBRIGHT, FMR WEAPONS INSPECTOR: Thank you.

ZAHN: So, David, how critical is it for these inspectors to sit down and talk with these Iraqi scientists?

ALBRIGHT: It is absolutely essential to do that. It was true in the 1990s and it's even more true today. But it's very important that they sit down with the Iraqis without their minders and have a mechanism to get those Iraqis out of the country, if necessary.

ZAHN: William Safire of "The New York Times" wrote a pretty excoriating piece today saying that if Hans Blix had any interest in getting hard intelligence and information on germs and nukes, he would draw up his own list of Iraqi scientists and go directly to them. And they say that because he has characterized the interviewing of these Iraqi scientists as, quote, "abductions," or defections that it has undermined the inspections at every single turn. Is he right?

AL:BRIGHT: Well, I think he's gone too far. I mean, Hans Blix's comments early on did not help the process. I mean, it's a very important tool in the resolution and his statements have made it harder. But I think he's gotten the message. And you can almost be assured on the nuclear side that such a list has been drawn up. I assume on the Hans Blix side, which is on chemical and biological missiles, if they haven't prepared those lists, they are now.

ZAHN: How easily do you think the noncooperation part of the resolution can be triggered when it comes to this issue of Iraqi scientists?

ALBRIGHT: Well, if they don't allow the inspectors to see the Iraqis that they wish to see alone or allow them to take Iraqis out with their families, then they're in violation of the resolution. And I think it would -- at that point this whole thing would probably go back to the security council. ZAHN: What about the kind of information you get from the defectors? How valuable might that be?

ALBRIGHT: It can be extremely valuable in many ways. Think of interrogating suspects in a legal case, someone could say something inadvertently. By interviewing people separated, you can discover lies more easily and you may find someone who just wants to blow the whistle. I mean, this finally -- the idea of taking Iraqis out is a whistle-blower program, it's not a defection program. Iraq is violating international law by having weapons of mass destruction and these people are whistle-blowers that may do it, may reveal what they know for moral reasons.

ZAHN: I know you have felt very strongly that the this 12,000 page declaration turned in has an awful lot of recycled information in it. Give our viewers a sense of where you think the United States is in this process, as inspectors get ready potentially to interview Iraqi scientists and potentially look at the possibility of noncooperation?

ALBRIGHT: Well, I have to admit, I have not read the thing, I'm looking forward to looking at it, like everyone else. My understanding is that a lot of it is recycled, particularly -- I know the nuclear side very well and the declaration appears to be almost exactly what was submitted in 1997 or 1998.

There is some new stuff, and that has to be looked at carefully for clues, it's information about what Iraq has done from '91 to 2002, but -- and it's all about civil activities that are allowed, but there may be some clues in there. But now what the inspectors have to do is put together a process where they're going to check the declaration, which in this case really unfortunately means they're going to be looking to show that Iraq is not complying. They can't give Iraq the benefit of the doubt, and they're going to have to move forward and actively have a strategy to show that Iraq is in violation of the agreement because it's declared nothing about its weapons of mass destruction program.

ZAHN: David, is it conceivable that could be done by the end of January, which some military experts say is the ideal window of time to go into Iraq, if you're going to attack?

ALBRIGHT: I think given the delays, I don't think so, and I think we should allow the inspectors a chance to do their work. I mean, finally, they were created to provide a window into Iraq that member states don't have. Intelligence information is often weak, and the inspectors can get much better information. You also, they are a judge, in a way it is impartial, and I think the international community, the public of America, will listen much more to the inspectors than to reports by the U.S. government.

ZAHN: David Albright, as always, glad to have you on the air, always appreciate your perspective.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com