Return to Transcripts main page

American Morning

Interview with Former NASA Inspector General

Aired February 04, 2003 - 07:09   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


PAULA ZAHN, CNN ANCHOR: Was the shuttle disaster an accident just waiting to happen? NASA's critics say shrinking budgets forced the agency to skimp on safety. Until last year, Roberta Gross was NASA's inspector general, the government watchdog, charged with investigating and evaluating the space agency's procedures.
Roberta Gross joins us now from Washington.

Good of you to join us -- welcome.

ROBERTA GROSS, FMR. NASA INSPECTOR GENERAL: Thank you. Good morning.

ZAHN: Roberta, can you give us some very specific examples of where you felt that NASA budget cuts or downsizing in personnel had a direct effect on the safety of the shuttle program?

GROSS: I think that you had several NASA internal reports that confirmed that the flattened budgets, which resulted in slimming down the workforce both civil servant as well as contracting, and going from a philosophy of oversight by the government to insight, created an increased safety risk in an environment that's already a hostile environment. Space is an inherently hostile environment for mankind to be operating in.

And I think if you look back to 1999 at the end of September through December, NASA itself had commissioned a space shuttle assessment group, an independent space shuttle assessment group. And they, as well as the Aerospace Safety Advisory program, as well as our staff in the GAO, had been saying that the decrease in staff that was resulting from decrease in budget, particularly in the areas of procurement oversight, quality assurance people, safety personnel, was increasing the risk to the safety of the shuttle program.

ZAHN: Now, you've also said that when you were inspector general, you discovered that the foam insulation, now that is sort of at the center of this investigation, was not being stored properly. What is it that you found?

GROSS: It's actually not the insulation that's under discussion. We were talking about an insulation that came with packaging that was found in a shuttle facility. The shuttle was overhauled there, and it was stored there. And it is more like the bubble wrap and plastic foams that are electrically-static sensitive, and they can start a fire. And so that it could have caused damage to personnel and to the shuttle on the ground. It's a different kind of foam. We found that this had been a long-going problem, and even once we posed that problem to NASA, they fixed it in the building, but we explained that it was a problem.

Another building that also was related to the shuttle program, they never bothered to go into that program. It was just not an attitude of the vigilance that you would expect NASA to do for a hazard to its -- a potential hazard to its shuttle program.

ZAHN: We ought to go back to the point you made a little bit earlier, where you were talking about the transition that was made from government oversight, as you called it, into insight. And I want to put up on the screen something that you warned a House subcommittee about back in March of 2000, when you said: "The agency has not applied existing basic safety provisions, such as required contract safety clauses, contractor safety plans. As a result, NASA contractors, including some involved in hazardous operations, may not be implementing NASA safety goals."

GROSS: Correct.

ZAHN: At that time, did you think the shuttle fleet should be grounded? Were you so concerned about that?

GROSS: No. What we were concerned is that NASA was not putting safety clauses in contracts that had to do with the operation of the shuttle and its subsistence, and that as a result, there would be confusion in terms of what the contractors should do and what NASA should do. It didn't mean that it needed to be immediately grounded. It meant that NASA immediately needed to take action and get those procurement requirements in. They needed to make sure that they oversighted those requirements.

When we pointed this out to Dan Golden (ph), he immediately instructed the procurement personnel to take care of that. It's just that you would think that when they were going to go to a transition, they would make sure that this would be in their contracts. Because the contractor would only have to do what the contract says; otherwise, they don't get paid.

And so, if NASA thinks the contractors are doing some safety features, and the contractor says it's NASA's responsibility, that creates a very potential hazard for the shuttle program.

ZAHN: Well, that's interesting that so much of what you said two years ago is something that's being widely debated today in the aftermath of this disaster. Roberta Gross, thank you very much for dropping by.

GROSS: Thank you.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com







Aired February 4, 2003 - 07:09   ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
PAULA ZAHN, CNN ANCHOR: Was the shuttle disaster an accident just waiting to happen? NASA's critics say shrinking budgets forced the agency to skimp on safety. Until last year, Roberta Gross was NASA's inspector general, the government watchdog, charged with investigating and evaluating the space agency's procedures.
Roberta Gross joins us now from Washington.

Good of you to join us -- welcome.

ROBERTA GROSS, FMR. NASA INSPECTOR GENERAL: Thank you. Good morning.

ZAHN: Roberta, can you give us some very specific examples of where you felt that NASA budget cuts or downsizing in personnel had a direct effect on the safety of the shuttle program?

GROSS: I think that you had several NASA internal reports that confirmed that the flattened budgets, which resulted in slimming down the workforce both civil servant as well as contracting, and going from a philosophy of oversight by the government to insight, created an increased safety risk in an environment that's already a hostile environment. Space is an inherently hostile environment for mankind to be operating in.

And I think if you look back to 1999 at the end of September through December, NASA itself had commissioned a space shuttle assessment group, an independent space shuttle assessment group. And they, as well as the Aerospace Safety Advisory program, as well as our staff in the GAO, had been saying that the decrease in staff that was resulting from decrease in budget, particularly in the areas of procurement oversight, quality assurance people, safety personnel, was increasing the risk to the safety of the shuttle program.

ZAHN: Now, you've also said that when you were inspector general, you discovered that the foam insulation, now that is sort of at the center of this investigation, was not being stored properly. What is it that you found?

GROSS: It's actually not the insulation that's under discussion. We were talking about an insulation that came with packaging that was found in a shuttle facility. The shuttle was overhauled there, and it was stored there. And it is more like the bubble wrap and plastic foams that are electrically-static sensitive, and they can start a fire. And so that it could have caused damage to personnel and to the shuttle on the ground. It's a different kind of foam. We found that this had been a long-going problem, and even once we posed that problem to NASA, they fixed it in the building, but we explained that it was a problem.

Another building that also was related to the shuttle program, they never bothered to go into that program. It was just not an attitude of the vigilance that you would expect NASA to do for a hazard to its -- a potential hazard to its shuttle program.

ZAHN: We ought to go back to the point you made a little bit earlier, where you were talking about the transition that was made from government oversight, as you called it, into insight. And I want to put up on the screen something that you warned a House subcommittee about back in March of 2000, when you said: "The agency has not applied existing basic safety provisions, such as required contract safety clauses, contractor safety plans. As a result, NASA contractors, including some involved in hazardous operations, may not be implementing NASA safety goals."

GROSS: Correct.

ZAHN: At that time, did you think the shuttle fleet should be grounded? Were you so concerned about that?

GROSS: No. What we were concerned is that NASA was not putting safety clauses in contracts that had to do with the operation of the shuttle and its subsistence, and that as a result, there would be confusion in terms of what the contractors should do and what NASA should do. It didn't mean that it needed to be immediately grounded. It meant that NASA immediately needed to take action and get those procurement requirements in. They needed to make sure that they oversighted those requirements.

When we pointed this out to Dan Golden (ph), he immediately instructed the procurement personnel to take care of that. It's just that you would think that when they were going to go to a transition, they would make sure that this would be in their contracts. Because the contractor would only have to do what the contract says; otherwise, they don't get paid.

And so, if NASA thinks the contractors are doing some safety features, and the contractor says it's NASA's responsibility, that creates a very potential hazard for the shuttle program.

ZAHN: Well, that's interesting that so much of what you said two years ago is something that's being widely debated today in the aftermath of this disaster. Roberta Gross, thank you very much for dropping by.

GROSS: Thank you.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com