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American Morning

Nuclear Revelation

Aired June 26, 2003 - 08:03   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


DARYN KAGAN, CNN ANCHOR: And, Miles, we have some news breaking out of Iraq. We're getting this just in to CNN. We're getting word that the military, U.S. troops in Iraq have found 300 bags of a certain type of bean, a bean that is used to create a toxic chemical. It is the -- they're castor beans and they are the beans that are used to create ricin. That is a poison which could be used in biological weapons.
More on this just ahead, but apparently they found it in a brake fluid plant inside of Iraq.

There are more things now on the unearthing of nuclear parts of documents in Iraq.

With this exclusive report, our national security correspondent David Ensor.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

DAVID ENSOR, CNN CORRESPONDENT: CNN has learned that the CIA has in its hands critical parts needed to develop a nuclear bomb program, equipment that was buried by Iraq in a backyard in Baghdad. They are the key parts and documents for reconstructing a sophisticated gas centrifuge system for enriching uranium for bombs, shown exclusively to CNN at CIA headquarters in Virginia.

The parts were dug up by an Iraqi scientist, Mahdi Obeidi, who had hidden them under a rose bush 12 years ago under orders from Qusay Hussein and Saddam Hussein's then son-in-law, Hussein Kamal.

David Kay, former U.N. arms inspector and now the CIA's top weapons investigator in Iraq, spoke to us about the case over a secure teleconferencing line from CIA headquarters.

DAVID KAY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO CIA DIRECTOR: It begins to tell us how huge our job is. Remember, his material was buried in a barrel behind his house in a rose garden. There's no way that that would have been discovered by normal international inspections. I couldn't have done it, my successors couldn't have done it.

ENSOR: The gas centrifuge equipment, which could enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon, dates back to Iraq's pre-1991 efforts to build a bomb, experts say. The documents and pieces Obeidi gave the U.S. were critical information and parts to restart a nuclear weapons program.

Officials emphasize this is not a smoking gun. This is not evidence Iraq had a nuclear weapon. But it is evidence the Iraqis concealed plans to reconstitute their nuclear program as soon as the world was no longer looking.

David Ensor, CNN, Washington.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

KAGAN: U.S. officials are emphasizing that these parts and documents don't prove that Iraq had a nuclear weapon, but they do indicate that Saddam Hussein might have had plans to reconstitute a program to build one.

Our guest now from Munster, Germany, former U.N. weapons inspector David Albright.

Mr. Albright, thanks for joining us.

DAVID ALBRIGHT, FORMER U.N. WEAPONS INSPECTOR: Sure. Glad I can.

KAGAN: You had a chance to talk with Mahdi Obeidi. Did he have a chance to explain to you why he waited so long or why now was the right time to come forward with this information?

ALBRIGHT: Well, he actually, one of the things he had said to me was is that if he had been taken out of the country by the inspectors and they had also brought his family, he would have been willing to provide this information to the inspectors. The main thing he was worried about is his safety. I mean he's, he fears attacks from other Iraqis if he revealed this information. Certainly when Saddam Hussein is in power, it was, it would have been a death sentence to reveal this information. So I think he wanted to feel secure.

Now, one of the twists in all this is that he had to worry about the U.S. government arresting him and that -- and so it was a very complicated situation to arrange for him to actually reveal this information and not actually get arrested by the U.S. government at the same time. And he's still, from what I understand, waiting to see if he is going to get asylum for himself and his family in the United States. I assume it'll work out well, but my understanding is is that that approval has not yet been given.

KAGAN: Well, do you think that other scientists, Iraqi scientists, will be watching this very closely and this might open the floodgates for other information to come forward?

ALBRIGHT: Well, it's, I think -- and I even, I guess, two months ago had a discussion with Obeidi that, where he really felt that his case could be an example and that if it was handled well, it would encourage other scientists to come out. The problem is is that the basic U.S. policy remains we've got a list of scientists, let's go get them and their reward is you don't go to jail. And so I think the fundamental U.S. policy hasn't shifted enough, but I'm hoping that if this whole situation with Obeidi works out that other scientists, who definitely are looking, will see that they could actually get some rewards for cooperating. And certainly they'll be protected.

KAGAN: Looking back on your experience as a U.N. weapons inspector and looking where this one bit of information was found, does it surprise you that it was underneath a rose bush in someone's backyard?

ALBRIGHT: No. No. Because it's, and, in fact, when I started looking for these scientists back in April, I assumed that they had these kind of documents. I mean it had been an open question. In fact, Mahdi had denied having them directly to me in 1996 and he was just not believable. We knew they had these documents and perhaps had centrifuge components in small numbers, which is what, in fact, turned out to be the case. And that so I think there was an expectation these things would be found.

Now, but after the war and the loss of control by the Saddam Hussein regime, a new concern was that these kind of, this kind of information could end up in the hands of enemies of the United States. It's very sophisticated information in these documents and in these centrifuge components, extremely valuable to countries like Iran, Pakistan, North Korea. And that it would provide them with a tremendous leg up on in developing the wherewithal to make highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.

So part of our motivation was to get back into Iraq and find ways to get these, get this information and get it under control so that it doesn't come back to haunt us later.

KAGAN: Well, it has been an interesting revelation, indeed. We will see where it leads.

David Albright, thank you for joining us on the phone from Germany this morning.

Appreciate it.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com







Aired June 26, 2003 - 08:03   ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
DARYN KAGAN, CNN ANCHOR: And, Miles, we have some news breaking out of Iraq. We're getting this just in to CNN. We're getting word that the military, U.S. troops in Iraq have found 300 bags of a certain type of bean, a bean that is used to create a toxic chemical. It is the -- they're castor beans and they are the beans that are used to create ricin. That is a poison which could be used in biological weapons.
More on this just ahead, but apparently they found it in a brake fluid plant inside of Iraq.

There are more things now on the unearthing of nuclear parts of documents in Iraq.

With this exclusive report, our national security correspondent David Ensor.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

DAVID ENSOR, CNN CORRESPONDENT: CNN has learned that the CIA has in its hands critical parts needed to develop a nuclear bomb program, equipment that was buried by Iraq in a backyard in Baghdad. They are the key parts and documents for reconstructing a sophisticated gas centrifuge system for enriching uranium for bombs, shown exclusively to CNN at CIA headquarters in Virginia.

The parts were dug up by an Iraqi scientist, Mahdi Obeidi, who had hidden them under a rose bush 12 years ago under orders from Qusay Hussein and Saddam Hussein's then son-in-law, Hussein Kamal.

David Kay, former U.N. arms inspector and now the CIA's top weapons investigator in Iraq, spoke to us about the case over a secure teleconferencing line from CIA headquarters.

DAVID KAY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO CIA DIRECTOR: It begins to tell us how huge our job is. Remember, his material was buried in a barrel behind his house in a rose garden. There's no way that that would have been discovered by normal international inspections. I couldn't have done it, my successors couldn't have done it.

ENSOR: The gas centrifuge equipment, which could enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon, dates back to Iraq's pre-1991 efforts to build a bomb, experts say. The documents and pieces Obeidi gave the U.S. were critical information and parts to restart a nuclear weapons program.

Officials emphasize this is not a smoking gun. This is not evidence Iraq had a nuclear weapon. But it is evidence the Iraqis concealed plans to reconstitute their nuclear program as soon as the world was no longer looking.

David Ensor, CNN, Washington.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

KAGAN: U.S. officials are emphasizing that these parts and documents don't prove that Iraq had a nuclear weapon, but they do indicate that Saddam Hussein might have had plans to reconstitute a program to build one.

Our guest now from Munster, Germany, former U.N. weapons inspector David Albright.

Mr. Albright, thanks for joining us.

DAVID ALBRIGHT, FORMER U.N. WEAPONS INSPECTOR: Sure. Glad I can.

KAGAN: You had a chance to talk with Mahdi Obeidi. Did he have a chance to explain to you why he waited so long or why now was the right time to come forward with this information?

ALBRIGHT: Well, he actually, one of the things he had said to me was is that if he had been taken out of the country by the inspectors and they had also brought his family, he would have been willing to provide this information to the inspectors. The main thing he was worried about is his safety. I mean he's, he fears attacks from other Iraqis if he revealed this information. Certainly when Saddam Hussein is in power, it was, it would have been a death sentence to reveal this information. So I think he wanted to feel secure.

Now, one of the twists in all this is that he had to worry about the U.S. government arresting him and that -- and so it was a very complicated situation to arrange for him to actually reveal this information and not actually get arrested by the U.S. government at the same time. And he's still, from what I understand, waiting to see if he is going to get asylum for himself and his family in the United States. I assume it'll work out well, but my understanding is is that that approval has not yet been given.

KAGAN: Well, do you think that other scientists, Iraqi scientists, will be watching this very closely and this might open the floodgates for other information to come forward?

ALBRIGHT: Well, it's, I think -- and I even, I guess, two months ago had a discussion with Obeidi that, where he really felt that his case could be an example and that if it was handled well, it would encourage other scientists to come out. The problem is is that the basic U.S. policy remains we've got a list of scientists, let's go get them and their reward is you don't go to jail. And so I think the fundamental U.S. policy hasn't shifted enough, but I'm hoping that if this whole situation with Obeidi works out that other scientists, who definitely are looking, will see that they could actually get some rewards for cooperating. And certainly they'll be protected.

KAGAN: Looking back on your experience as a U.N. weapons inspector and looking where this one bit of information was found, does it surprise you that it was underneath a rose bush in someone's backyard?

ALBRIGHT: No. No. Because it's, and, in fact, when I started looking for these scientists back in April, I assumed that they had these kind of documents. I mean it had been an open question. In fact, Mahdi had denied having them directly to me in 1996 and he was just not believable. We knew they had these documents and perhaps had centrifuge components in small numbers, which is what, in fact, turned out to be the case. And that so I think there was an expectation these things would be found.

Now, but after the war and the loss of control by the Saddam Hussein regime, a new concern was that these kind of, this kind of information could end up in the hands of enemies of the United States. It's very sophisticated information in these documents and in these centrifuge components, extremely valuable to countries like Iran, Pakistan, North Korea. And that it would provide them with a tremendous leg up on in developing the wherewithal to make highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.

So part of our motivation was to get back into Iraq and find ways to get these, get this information and get it under control so that it doesn't come back to haunt us later.

KAGAN: Well, it has been an interesting revelation, indeed. We will see where it leads.

David Albright, thank you for joining us on the phone from Germany this morning.

Appreciate it.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com