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CNN Live Today
Interview With Norm Thagard, Randy Avera
Aired August 26, 2003 - 10:33 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
LEON HARRIS, CNN ANCHOR: Now NASA today's facing some pressure this morning for perhaps not paying enough attention to what's in the skies. Also determining the cause of the space shuttle Columbia tragedy now is a panel that has come out with its report today.
After seven months of investigation, the final report being released officially next hour. However, we did get a sneak peek at it. Our space correspondent Miles O'Brien is standing by now outside the NTSB building where the findings are going to be announced.
And with him former NASA astronaut Norm Thagard and former NASA engineer Randy Avera who, as we said, got to see this advanced copy earlier this morning. Gentlemen, Miles, take it away.
MILES O'BRIEN, CNN SPACE CORRESPONDENT: Hello, Leon. First of all let's bring people back to the basics for just a moment before we talk about the deep root causes of this.
If you'll recall, the probable cause of why Columbia was lost was a piece of foam about a pound and two-thirds in size, about the size of a suitcase falling off the external fuel tank which is attached here, that big orange tank which has the fuel for the main engines, about 80 seconds after launch, 81 seconds, striking this part of the left wing of the space shuttle Columbia.
Now, that foam strike most probably caused a fatal breach in that gray area here which is a carbon material called reinforced carbon carbon which would have exposed the aluminum sub-structure of the shuttle to the heat of reentry 16 days later when Columbia came in. Three thousand degree 000 degree heat versus aluminum, not a good combination.
OK, that's the basics. This report certainly validates that. That is not a surprise.
What this report gets into though, is some of the deeper causes as to why, despite the fact that NASA saw foam falling off those external fuel tanks since day one of the shuttle program, why no one ever got too terribly concerned about that. Somehow there was a mind- set developed that just because it's foam, it's light, it can't do serious any damage. It might cause a few repair problems, but nothing that would jeopardize the safety of the crew.
Of course, in July all that was shattered, quite literally, when this independent board conducted a test down in Texas, fired a piece of foam the same size at the same speed toward a mockup of the wing and it blew a hole about the size of a manhole cover in it. It was a very dramatic moment. A pivotal moment in this investigation.
But, it's simplistic to say that's the cause of all this because there is a lot of history that goes behind it. Randy Avera has had a chance to read the report. Norm Thagard has been out here, hasn't had a chance to read it fully.
Norm, I just wanted to get your reaction first. At first blush (ph), what do you see in there that hearkens back to what you witnessed during Challenger, what do you see that's different and do you think NASA is up to the task of answering some of these recommendations?
DR. NORM THAGARD, FORMER NASA ASTRONAUT: Once again, Miles, what really happened is you had some facet that didn't meet design criteria, but it was ruled nonetheless to be an acceptable flight after flight. And after a while folks just sort of tend to ignore the problem entirely.
O'BRIEN: All right, so we're talking about something that's almost human nature here. You see it time and again, it doesn't cause a problem, you decide it's not a risk. That's a trap that anybody can fall into. How does an organization like NASA get way form that?
THAGARD: Just by saying, I'm not going to do it anymore. You can no longer treat these things as minor unless everyone in the whole world practically would agree that, yes, indeed, it's not a problem. So they'll have to look at all these sorts of things anymore.
O'BRIEN: Now, Randy Avera, you've had a chance to look at all these recommendations and you've broken it down into five categories talking about big commitments, big picture, whether the country is committed to do human space flight and doing it right, which is to say funding it properly.
This goes to the issue which NASA has been talking about for years, space advocates have been talking about, that NASA has had to do things on a shoestring and that's just not the way to do business in space.
RANDY AVERA, FORMER NASA ENGINEER: That's correct. And in addition to the technical problem of the foam striking the orbiter and creating the catastrophic event, the board goes into detail about the safety management organization and practice that's been in place, and basically has concluded that it failed to do its mission of safety.
O'BRIEN: Well -- and let's explain to people how the safety organization works. It's essentially people within the NASA organization, NASA -- not necessarily contractors, actually civil servants, who are watching over the shoulder of some of the contractors. And they are all part of the same system.
What they're suggesting is creating an entirely technical engineering advisory capability which answers separately, almost like an inspector general role would be, to Congress and the president. That sounds like it could be a measure of safety. It also sounds like it could bog down the whole process too. AVERA: Well, it certainly is quite a dose of actions to accomplish in a period of time. Some of these recommendations are for return to flight. Others are for the medium and long-term.
But the acronym of today is TEAT is Technical Engineering Authority and that's going to be the core of this new safety program that's going to be implemented. And the United States Congress and the president of the United States are the organizations that will be holding this accountable.
O'BRIEN: All right, Randy Avera, Norm Thagard, thank you very much.
We're still digesting this 250-page report. Lots there to consider. We'll going to keep you posted all through the day. We're going to hear from the head of this board, retired Admiral Hal Gehman at the top of the hour.
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com
Aired August 26, 2003 - 10:33 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
LEON HARRIS, CNN ANCHOR: Now NASA today's facing some pressure this morning for perhaps not paying enough attention to what's in the skies. Also determining the cause of the space shuttle Columbia tragedy now is a panel that has come out with its report today.
After seven months of investigation, the final report being released officially next hour. However, we did get a sneak peek at it. Our space correspondent Miles O'Brien is standing by now outside the NTSB building where the findings are going to be announced.
And with him former NASA astronaut Norm Thagard and former NASA engineer Randy Avera who, as we said, got to see this advanced copy earlier this morning. Gentlemen, Miles, take it away.
MILES O'BRIEN, CNN SPACE CORRESPONDENT: Hello, Leon. First of all let's bring people back to the basics for just a moment before we talk about the deep root causes of this.
If you'll recall, the probable cause of why Columbia was lost was a piece of foam about a pound and two-thirds in size, about the size of a suitcase falling off the external fuel tank which is attached here, that big orange tank which has the fuel for the main engines, about 80 seconds after launch, 81 seconds, striking this part of the left wing of the space shuttle Columbia.
Now, that foam strike most probably caused a fatal breach in that gray area here which is a carbon material called reinforced carbon carbon which would have exposed the aluminum sub-structure of the shuttle to the heat of reentry 16 days later when Columbia came in. Three thousand degree 000 degree heat versus aluminum, not a good combination.
OK, that's the basics. This report certainly validates that. That is not a surprise.
What this report gets into though, is some of the deeper causes as to why, despite the fact that NASA saw foam falling off those external fuel tanks since day one of the shuttle program, why no one ever got too terribly concerned about that. Somehow there was a mind- set developed that just because it's foam, it's light, it can't do serious any damage. It might cause a few repair problems, but nothing that would jeopardize the safety of the crew.
Of course, in July all that was shattered, quite literally, when this independent board conducted a test down in Texas, fired a piece of foam the same size at the same speed toward a mockup of the wing and it blew a hole about the size of a manhole cover in it. It was a very dramatic moment. A pivotal moment in this investigation.
But, it's simplistic to say that's the cause of all this because there is a lot of history that goes behind it. Randy Avera has had a chance to read the report. Norm Thagard has been out here, hasn't had a chance to read it fully.
Norm, I just wanted to get your reaction first. At first blush (ph), what do you see in there that hearkens back to what you witnessed during Challenger, what do you see that's different and do you think NASA is up to the task of answering some of these recommendations?
DR. NORM THAGARD, FORMER NASA ASTRONAUT: Once again, Miles, what really happened is you had some facet that didn't meet design criteria, but it was ruled nonetheless to be an acceptable flight after flight. And after a while folks just sort of tend to ignore the problem entirely.
O'BRIEN: All right, so we're talking about something that's almost human nature here. You see it time and again, it doesn't cause a problem, you decide it's not a risk. That's a trap that anybody can fall into. How does an organization like NASA get way form that?
THAGARD: Just by saying, I'm not going to do it anymore. You can no longer treat these things as minor unless everyone in the whole world practically would agree that, yes, indeed, it's not a problem. So they'll have to look at all these sorts of things anymore.
O'BRIEN: Now, Randy Avera, you've had a chance to look at all these recommendations and you've broken it down into five categories talking about big commitments, big picture, whether the country is committed to do human space flight and doing it right, which is to say funding it properly.
This goes to the issue which NASA has been talking about for years, space advocates have been talking about, that NASA has had to do things on a shoestring and that's just not the way to do business in space.
RANDY AVERA, FORMER NASA ENGINEER: That's correct. And in addition to the technical problem of the foam striking the orbiter and creating the catastrophic event, the board goes into detail about the safety management organization and practice that's been in place, and basically has concluded that it failed to do its mission of safety.
O'BRIEN: Well -- and let's explain to people how the safety organization works. It's essentially people within the NASA organization, NASA -- not necessarily contractors, actually civil servants, who are watching over the shoulder of some of the contractors. And they are all part of the same system.
What they're suggesting is creating an entirely technical engineering advisory capability which answers separately, almost like an inspector general role would be, to Congress and the president. That sounds like it could be a measure of safety. It also sounds like it could bog down the whole process too. AVERA: Well, it certainly is quite a dose of actions to accomplish in a period of time. Some of these recommendations are for return to flight. Others are for the medium and long-term.
But the acronym of today is TEAT is Technical Engineering Authority and that's going to be the core of this new safety program that's going to be implemented. And the United States Congress and the president of the United States are the organizations that will be holding this accountable.
O'BRIEN: All right, Randy Avera, Norm Thagard, thank you very much.
We're still digesting this 250-page report. Lots there to consider. We'll going to keep you posted all through the day. We're going to hear from the head of this board, retired Admiral Hal Gehman at the top of the hour.
TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com
