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Columbia Investigation Board Outlines Three Different Categories of Recommendations in Report

Aired August 26, 2003 - 11:13   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


LEON HARRIS, CNN ANCHOR: Let's go back to Miles O'Brien though, who has been sitting there and listening to what we've been hearing described now as the three different categories of recommendations and other items that are being addressed immediately -- Miles.
MILES O'BRIEN, CNN SPACE CORRESPONDENT: Well you know I thought one of the most interesting things Admiral Gehman just said was that he doesn't like that term "contributing factors". His sense, the board's sense here is that these integral things, these organizational issues are just as important as factors as the raw fact of foam hitting wing.

And, so, he does not -- in other words, put it into a situation where things become less important in the minds of those accepting that report.

Let's check in with Randy Avera and Norm Thagard and see what their thoughts are on that. While he says there aren't priority items, all of these items are just as important, that's a lot to chew on for NASA. They're still going to have to make priority decisions, aren't they?

RANDY AVERA, FORMER NASA ENGINEER: It's going to take direct leadership like in the Apollo program to quickly prioritize the most important actions to take. It's going to take leadership to do it in a timely and a safe manner. And that's going to be the No. 1 reorganization effort for the NASA culture and the contractor culture is to get with the new program and get it under way.

O'BRIEN: All right what are your thoughts, Norm Thagard? I think it's worth pointing out what -- his point at the beginning is that while this is a harsh report, that is its mission, to be harsh to NASA. and that the board itself walked away impressed with NASA as a whole.

Nevertheless, the fact that the board is saying one thing it could have said is that the shuttle is simply too old and too unsafe to fly. Time to scrap that. That would have surprised a lot of people, obviously, Norm Thagard, but clearly this is a spacecraft that has lived on past its designed intended life span.

DR. NORM THAGARD, FORMER ASTRONAUT: It has, but that does not mean the shuttle themselves are worn out. And I'm sure that's far from the case. And I think what he eludes to in treating everything as equal is you had a foam problem, with Challenger you had O-ring problems. These were problems that occurred a number of times before they actually caused an accident.

So part and parcel of the problem is that management did nothing about them. So that has to be corrected. It is an integral part of the problem.

O'BRIEN: As he said that golden nugget, that kernel of trouble could lie somewhere else entirely. And of course agencies by their nature are very good at solving the last problem they face, not necessarily the one that's lying ahead.

What is to ensure in all this, Norm Thagard, that NASA embraces it? The NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe has told me lock, stock, barrel, NASA is not going to rebut this, they are going to go forward and accept it. Can we take that at face value?

THAGARD: You can take that at face value. There's no way current NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe, who has a reputation of being a pretty honest and straightforward guy, is going to do anything but that. What you have to worry the future, just as we've seen in the past. The leadership changes and so do policies.

O'BRIEN: All right. And the devil, of course, is in the details, Randy Avera, as any engineer will tell you.

We're going to continue to monitor this briefing, Leon. And as more information dribbles out here, it's a lot to digest, so we're kind of doing it in real time with our viewers present for all that.

We apologize for the rough nature of getting this altogether, but 250 pages on something that has a million moving parts is a challenge to say the least -- Leon.

HARRIS: Yes, no doubt at all, Miles. I'm just very curious about looking at this third category of recommendations and findings, because we just heard Admiral Gehman say that perhaps these necessarily didn't have anything do with Columbia but could still lead to an accident down the road. I'm very curious to hear about what they think may be in that particular category of findings. Thank you very much, Miles. We'll get back to you in just a bit.

As a matter of fact, as Miles says, we're going to continue to monitor this press conference as it still continues plays out in the NTSB there building in Washington. Right now the panelists are giving their individual statements, but when they go back to the question and answer sessions, when the reporters there will get a chance to flesh out some more of the details in this report, we'll go back inside and get more information for you.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com




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Categories of Recommendations in Report>


Aired August 26, 2003 - 11:13   ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
LEON HARRIS, CNN ANCHOR: Let's go back to Miles O'Brien though, who has been sitting there and listening to what we've been hearing described now as the three different categories of recommendations and other items that are being addressed immediately -- Miles.
MILES O'BRIEN, CNN SPACE CORRESPONDENT: Well you know I thought one of the most interesting things Admiral Gehman just said was that he doesn't like that term "contributing factors". His sense, the board's sense here is that these integral things, these organizational issues are just as important as factors as the raw fact of foam hitting wing.

And, so, he does not -- in other words, put it into a situation where things become less important in the minds of those accepting that report.

Let's check in with Randy Avera and Norm Thagard and see what their thoughts are on that. While he says there aren't priority items, all of these items are just as important, that's a lot to chew on for NASA. They're still going to have to make priority decisions, aren't they?

RANDY AVERA, FORMER NASA ENGINEER: It's going to take direct leadership like in the Apollo program to quickly prioritize the most important actions to take. It's going to take leadership to do it in a timely and a safe manner. And that's going to be the No. 1 reorganization effort for the NASA culture and the contractor culture is to get with the new program and get it under way.

O'BRIEN: All right what are your thoughts, Norm Thagard? I think it's worth pointing out what -- his point at the beginning is that while this is a harsh report, that is its mission, to be harsh to NASA. and that the board itself walked away impressed with NASA as a whole.

Nevertheless, the fact that the board is saying one thing it could have said is that the shuttle is simply too old and too unsafe to fly. Time to scrap that. That would have surprised a lot of people, obviously, Norm Thagard, but clearly this is a spacecraft that has lived on past its designed intended life span.

DR. NORM THAGARD, FORMER ASTRONAUT: It has, but that does not mean the shuttle themselves are worn out. And I'm sure that's far from the case. And I think what he eludes to in treating everything as equal is you had a foam problem, with Challenger you had O-ring problems. These were problems that occurred a number of times before they actually caused an accident.

So part and parcel of the problem is that management did nothing about them. So that has to be corrected. It is an integral part of the problem.

O'BRIEN: As he said that golden nugget, that kernel of trouble could lie somewhere else entirely. And of course agencies by their nature are very good at solving the last problem they face, not necessarily the one that's lying ahead.

What is to ensure in all this, Norm Thagard, that NASA embraces it? The NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe has told me lock, stock, barrel, NASA is not going to rebut this, they are going to go forward and accept it. Can we take that at face value?

THAGARD: You can take that at face value. There's no way current NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe, who has a reputation of being a pretty honest and straightforward guy, is going to do anything but that. What you have to worry the future, just as we've seen in the past. The leadership changes and so do policies.

O'BRIEN: All right. And the devil, of course, is in the details, Randy Avera, as any engineer will tell you.

We're going to continue to monitor this briefing, Leon. And as more information dribbles out here, it's a lot to digest, so we're kind of doing it in real time with our viewers present for all that.

We apologize for the rough nature of getting this altogether, but 250 pages on something that has a million moving parts is a challenge to say the least -- Leon.

HARRIS: Yes, no doubt at all, Miles. I'm just very curious about looking at this third category of recommendations and findings, because we just heard Admiral Gehman say that perhaps these necessarily didn't have anything do with Columbia but could still lead to an accident down the road. I'm very curious to hear about what they think may be in that particular category of findings. Thank you very much, Miles. We'll get back to you in just a bit.

As a matter of fact, as Miles says, we're going to continue to monitor this press conference as it still continues plays out in the NTSB there building in Washington. Right now the panelists are giving their individual statements, but when they go back to the question and answer sessions, when the reporters there will get a chance to flesh out some more of the details in this report, we'll go back inside and get more information for you.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com




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Categories of Recommendations in Report>