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American Morning

Shuttle Columbia Report Due Today

Aired August 26, 2003 - 07:07   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


SOLEDAD O'BRIEN, CNN ANCHOR: Less than three hours from now, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board will unveil its findings about the shuttle tragedy. It's expected to tell the world not only what happened, but how it could have been prevented.
CNN's space correspondent Miles O'Brien is at the NTSB today. He's there, along with former NASA astronaut Norm Thagard, and they are both awaiting details from the report.

Miles -- let's begin with you. I know that family members of the astronauts were already briefed on what's inside the report. You spoke to John Clark (ph), who is the husband of one of the deceased astronauts. What was his reaction to this report?

MILES O'BRIEN, CNN ANCHOR: He was thoroughly impressed, Soledad. The briefing lasted about three hours yesterday in Houston. Representatives of all of the families were there. In one case, Lonnie McCool (ph) was on the telephone from Guam, but they were all participants, asking a lot of pointed questions.

They were briefed by three members of the independent board investigating the Columbia accident. They said it's a very, very blunt report, blunt by design to capture the attention of NASA. And that there are an additional 24 recommendations beyond what we have heard, all of which point to NASA's organization and culture. In other words, how the management, or perhaps in this case mismanagement, allowed some obvious signs of trouble to pass by.

He described it as a report that comes to the conclusion, do this, do these 29 recommendations, or don't bother flying at all.

S. O'BRIEN: Give me a sense, 29 recommendations, the top few that are the most important in your mind, what are they specifically -- Miles?

M. O'BRIEN: Well, five have already come to the fore already, and these are recommendations which are more much specific to the foam striking the wing. The committee -- the independent board released these recommendations to give NASA an opportunity to try to get the fixes in work for that.

The first thing they had done is said that NASA has to beef up its inspections of those carbon panels, those heat shields on the leading edge of the wing, which is now strongly suspected of having shattered as a result of the foam striking it 80 seconds after the launch of Columbia. In addition, they have to make on-orbit imaging by spy satellites and telescopes part of the routine and not something that has to be requested as a special item. NASA has agreed to do both of these things, by the way.

They have asked NASA to come up with way to train astronauts and supply them to create the capability for on-orbit repairs -- spacewalkers doing a repair kit. That's not going to be an easy one to figure out, but NASA is working on that idea.

They want them to enhance their launch camera capability. Several of the cameras were inoperative on the day that Columbia launched. It would have given them a better view of the striking of the foam on the wing.

And finally, a better capability of looking at the external fuel tank and the underside belly of the space shuttle with special cameras that could beam back pictures during the mission.

Those are just the five we've heard. We've got a lot more to hear today. We've got people inside reading that report now, and as soon as we can tell you about it, we will.

S. O'BRIEN: Dr. Thagard, you flew on shuttle flights before and after the Challenger disaster. How did flight safety improve in that period? And how come those improvements that were made back then weren't enough to forestall the disaster that we saw with the shuttle?

DR. NORM THAGARD, FORMER ASTRONAUT: There were differences, of course, between what happened with Challenger and the SRB o-ring problem and the foam problem on the external tank of the shuttle. For one thing, before Challenger, there was ample evidence that that was a serious problem. Even though the foam coming off of the external tank was an anomaly, it wasn't per design, it never caused any problems prior to the Columbia accident that would suggest that it needed more serious attention.

S. O'BRIEN: Are you confident now -- you've heard 5 of the 29 recommendations from Miles just moments ago. Are you confident that if indeed these recommendations are taken through to fruition that there will be long-term improvement?

THAGARD: I think there would be. And it's becoming pretty clear that when you have anything in the shuttle that's not working per design, even if it appears to be minor, you can't neglect it. You've really got to take a strong look at it and think seriously about correcting it.

S. O'BRIEN: All right, Dr. Norm Thagard, thanks for joining us this morning, and also Miles O'Brien as well. Appreciate it, Miles.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com.







Aired August 26, 2003 - 07:07   ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
SOLEDAD O'BRIEN, CNN ANCHOR: Less than three hours from now, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board will unveil its findings about the shuttle tragedy. It's expected to tell the world not only what happened, but how it could have been prevented.
CNN's space correspondent Miles O'Brien is at the NTSB today. He's there, along with former NASA astronaut Norm Thagard, and they are both awaiting details from the report.

Miles -- let's begin with you. I know that family members of the astronauts were already briefed on what's inside the report. You spoke to John Clark (ph), who is the husband of one of the deceased astronauts. What was his reaction to this report?

MILES O'BRIEN, CNN ANCHOR: He was thoroughly impressed, Soledad. The briefing lasted about three hours yesterday in Houston. Representatives of all of the families were there. In one case, Lonnie McCool (ph) was on the telephone from Guam, but they were all participants, asking a lot of pointed questions.

They were briefed by three members of the independent board investigating the Columbia accident. They said it's a very, very blunt report, blunt by design to capture the attention of NASA. And that there are an additional 24 recommendations beyond what we have heard, all of which point to NASA's organization and culture. In other words, how the management, or perhaps in this case mismanagement, allowed some obvious signs of trouble to pass by.

He described it as a report that comes to the conclusion, do this, do these 29 recommendations, or don't bother flying at all.

S. O'BRIEN: Give me a sense, 29 recommendations, the top few that are the most important in your mind, what are they specifically -- Miles?

M. O'BRIEN: Well, five have already come to the fore already, and these are recommendations which are more much specific to the foam striking the wing. The committee -- the independent board released these recommendations to give NASA an opportunity to try to get the fixes in work for that.

The first thing they had done is said that NASA has to beef up its inspections of those carbon panels, those heat shields on the leading edge of the wing, which is now strongly suspected of having shattered as a result of the foam striking it 80 seconds after the launch of Columbia. In addition, they have to make on-orbit imaging by spy satellites and telescopes part of the routine and not something that has to be requested as a special item. NASA has agreed to do both of these things, by the way.

They have asked NASA to come up with way to train astronauts and supply them to create the capability for on-orbit repairs -- spacewalkers doing a repair kit. That's not going to be an easy one to figure out, but NASA is working on that idea.

They want them to enhance their launch camera capability. Several of the cameras were inoperative on the day that Columbia launched. It would have given them a better view of the striking of the foam on the wing.

And finally, a better capability of looking at the external fuel tank and the underside belly of the space shuttle with special cameras that could beam back pictures during the mission.

Those are just the five we've heard. We've got a lot more to hear today. We've got people inside reading that report now, and as soon as we can tell you about it, we will.

S. O'BRIEN: Dr. Thagard, you flew on shuttle flights before and after the Challenger disaster. How did flight safety improve in that period? And how come those improvements that were made back then weren't enough to forestall the disaster that we saw with the shuttle?

DR. NORM THAGARD, FORMER ASTRONAUT: There were differences, of course, between what happened with Challenger and the SRB o-ring problem and the foam problem on the external tank of the shuttle. For one thing, before Challenger, there was ample evidence that that was a serious problem. Even though the foam coming off of the external tank was an anomaly, it wasn't per design, it never caused any problems prior to the Columbia accident that would suggest that it needed more serious attention.

S. O'BRIEN: Are you confident now -- you've heard 5 of the 29 recommendations from Miles just moments ago. Are you confident that if indeed these recommendations are taken through to fruition that there will be long-term improvement?

THAGARD: I think there would be. And it's becoming pretty clear that when you have anything in the shuttle that's not working per design, even if it appears to be minor, you can't neglect it. You've really got to take a strong look at it and think seriously about correcting it.

S. O'BRIEN: All right, Dr. Norm Thagard, thanks for joining us this morning, and also Miles O'Brien as well. Appreciate it, Miles.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com.