Return to Transcripts main page

American Morning

Does Iraq Pose Imminent Threat to World?

Aired October 07, 2003 - 08:08   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


BILL HEMMER, CNN ANCHOR: The leader of the U.S. search for banned weapons in Iraq, David Kay, says his team has not found any yet.
So, then, does that mean that Iraq did not pose an imminent threat to the world and to the U.S. before the war? Not necessarily, contends our next guest.

Charles Duelfer, former deputy executive chairman of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, otherwise known as UNSCOM, our guest now.

Good morning to you.

CHARLES DUELFER, FORMER DEPUTY EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN, UNSCOM, SCHOLAR, WOODROW WILSON CENTER: Good morning, Bill.

HEMMER: Where's your evidence to base that opinion?

DUELFER: Well, look at the research and the intentions of the regime. That's the question. If there are no existing weapons which were threatening our forces at the time, there's still the question of were there the intentions to build such weapons after the inspections of the U.N. had left? I think that's the real question and the question which these inspectors under David Kay need to focus upon.

HEMMER: You contend in a recent article that huge stockpiles were thought to be the smoking gun, essentially. That has not been found.

Where was the evidence on behalf of the U.S. that said they would find huge stockpiles in Iraq?

DUELFER: Well, what was made public came out during the Secretary Powell's briefing to the Security Council at the U.N. a year ago or in February. And he laid out a case where he expected, the United States government expected to find such large stocks of weapons based upon the intelligence that they had from defectors and from technical means.

This has not turned out to be the case.

HEMMER: Do you think Colin Powell was off the mark back then? In fact, he wrote a piece today in the "Washington Post" -- I'll put it on the screen for our viewers to read along with us. In part, the secretary of state argues, "Key evidence was deliberately eliminated or dispersed during the post-war period. Computer hard drives were destroyed, files were burned and equipment was carefully cleansed of all traces of use and done so in a pattern that was clearly deliberate and selective."

Even if that is true and you buy that premise that's written today by Colin Powell, he's talking about software and paperwork. And, again, the effort here is to find the weapons.

Why has that been so elusive?

DUELFER: Well, there's two issues here, I think, which are important, Bill. One is the credibility of the United States. I think we need to be very careful about what we say publicly unless we can say with absolute certainty that it is, in fact, true, and that we will be able to substantiate it with publicly releasable information, we ought to be very careful what we state.

The second question is if there were programs which were only in research and development, were inspections sufficient to contain Saddam? There will be a debate over that. In other words, was the war necessary or were the inspections working?

I would argue that the intentions of the regime under Saddam were to outlast the inspections. And I think that over the long haul, the U.N. would not be able to contain this kind of a threat. But that's where the debate will remain.

HEMMER: So you still contend, then, the underlying factor for the war was justified because of the extensive, let's say, deception that was underway with the weapons programs in Iraq? Is that a fair way to categorize what you're saying?

DUELFER: That's a fair way of categorizing it. It appeared that the inspections were working. But we were only looking at that success at a brief moment in time. Over the long haul, would Saddam be able to outlast the Security Council? Would he be able to divide the Security Council?

It'll be very interesting to see the information publicly about how the Iraqis and the Iraqi regime were working to thwart the inspections and were working to divide the Council. They were getting some help.

HEMMER: And if we buy your opinion and your argument today, it's just a question of time, then, correct?

DUELFER: I think it's a question of time before we get some real substantiated views out of the Iraqis themselves.

HEMMER: That's Charles Duelfer down in D.C.

Thank you, sir.

DUELFER: Thank you, Bill.

HEMMER: Appreciate your time this morning.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com







Aired October 7, 2003 - 08:08   ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
BILL HEMMER, CNN ANCHOR: The leader of the U.S. search for banned weapons in Iraq, David Kay, says his team has not found any yet.
So, then, does that mean that Iraq did not pose an imminent threat to the world and to the U.S. before the war? Not necessarily, contends our next guest.

Charles Duelfer, former deputy executive chairman of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, otherwise known as UNSCOM, our guest now.

Good morning to you.

CHARLES DUELFER, FORMER DEPUTY EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN, UNSCOM, SCHOLAR, WOODROW WILSON CENTER: Good morning, Bill.

HEMMER: Where's your evidence to base that opinion?

DUELFER: Well, look at the research and the intentions of the regime. That's the question. If there are no existing weapons which were threatening our forces at the time, there's still the question of were there the intentions to build such weapons after the inspections of the U.N. had left? I think that's the real question and the question which these inspectors under David Kay need to focus upon.

HEMMER: You contend in a recent article that huge stockpiles were thought to be the smoking gun, essentially. That has not been found.

Where was the evidence on behalf of the U.S. that said they would find huge stockpiles in Iraq?

DUELFER: Well, what was made public came out during the Secretary Powell's briefing to the Security Council at the U.N. a year ago or in February. And he laid out a case where he expected, the United States government expected to find such large stocks of weapons based upon the intelligence that they had from defectors and from technical means.

This has not turned out to be the case.

HEMMER: Do you think Colin Powell was off the mark back then? In fact, he wrote a piece today in the "Washington Post" -- I'll put it on the screen for our viewers to read along with us. In part, the secretary of state argues, "Key evidence was deliberately eliminated or dispersed during the post-war period. Computer hard drives were destroyed, files were burned and equipment was carefully cleansed of all traces of use and done so in a pattern that was clearly deliberate and selective."

Even if that is true and you buy that premise that's written today by Colin Powell, he's talking about software and paperwork. And, again, the effort here is to find the weapons.

Why has that been so elusive?

DUELFER: Well, there's two issues here, I think, which are important, Bill. One is the credibility of the United States. I think we need to be very careful about what we say publicly unless we can say with absolute certainty that it is, in fact, true, and that we will be able to substantiate it with publicly releasable information, we ought to be very careful what we state.

The second question is if there were programs which were only in research and development, were inspections sufficient to contain Saddam? There will be a debate over that. In other words, was the war necessary or were the inspections working?

I would argue that the intentions of the regime under Saddam were to outlast the inspections. And I think that over the long haul, the U.N. would not be able to contain this kind of a threat. But that's where the debate will remain.

HEMMER: So you still contend, then, the underlying factor for the war was justified because of the extensive, let's say, deception that was underway with the weapons programs in Iraq? Is that a fair way to categorize what you're saying?

DUELFER: That's a fair way of categorizing it. It appeared that the inspections were working. But we were only looking at that success at a brief moment in time. Over the long haul, would Saddam be able to outlast the Security Council? Would he be able to divide the Security Council?

It'll be very interesting to see the information publicly about how the Iraqis and the Iraqi regime were working to thwart the inspections and were working to divide the Council. They were getting some help.

HEMMER: And if we buy your opinion and your argument today, it's just a question of time, then, correct?

DUELFER: I think it's a question of time before we get some real substantiated views out of the Iraqis themselves.

HEMMER: That's Charles Duelfer down in D.C.

Thank you, sir.

DUELFER: Thank you, Bill.

HEMMER: Appreciate your time this morning.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com