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Congress to Hear Report on Iraq; Portions of Opening Statements at House Armed Services Hearing

Aired September 10, 2007 - 13:00   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

REP. DUNCAN HUNTER (R-CA) PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE: Now, in my estimation, the stand-up of the Iraqi military is the key to a stabilized Iraq. And that means those 131 battalions that we have trained and equipped.
And for those who said that we could have kept Saddam Hussein's army in place and that was somehow a major blunder, I'm reminded that Saddam Hussein's army had 11,000 Sunni generals. Now, what are you going to do with an army with 11,000 Sunni generals? Literally, squads of generals, many of whom who have made their careers beating up on a Shiite population, when that army is supposed to be the honest broker that brings reconciliation to the communities in Iraq?

And, you know, something? If you look at the leadership of the Iraqi army now, as shaped by General Petraeus and his is subordinates, you now see Shiites in leadership positions. You see Sunnis in leadership positions. You see Kurds in leadership positions. You see a military which is starting to emerge as a professional force.

And for those who say that we could have simply adopted Saddam Hussein's army and that would have been the, quote, "smooth road," there is absolutely no precedent for that.

But Mr. Chairman, I've been here before. I was here when -- when the left in this body said that if we stood up to the Russians in central Europe, we would bring on another war, that President Ronald Reagan was going to bring on World War III. Instead, we -- we held tough. We stood tough. And we brought down the Berlin Wall.

And I was here when, in Central America, when we had the communists supplying the FMLN, and we put a small protection around that fragile government, and we allowed them to have free and fair elections. I remember people in this body saying that would be our next Vietnam. We would be bogged down.

Well, we hung tough. We provided that shield, and today there's El Salvadorans standing with American forces in Iraq.

Now, the key to having a stabilized Iraq, which is a friend, not an enemy, of the United States, which will not be a state sponsor of terrorism for the next five to 10 to 15 to 20 years, in my estimation is a successful hand-off of the security apparatus from American forces to the Iraqi armed forces. And that requires one thing. It requires reliability, having a reliable Iraqi force, and that is manifest in those 131 battalions that are now maturing. And the idea that this Congress is going to arbitrarily overlay a requirement for a reduction in America's forces when we are moving toward a maturing of the Iraqi forces and a successful hand-off, which will be a victory for the United States, I think should not be supported by this body.

So, Mr. Chairman, let's -- let's lead off this hearing with this stipulation -- that the gentlemen who are appearing before us, and particularly General Petraeus, whose credibility has been attacked all week long by the left in this country, represents the very best in military tradition.

That he's going to testify with an independent, candid view, and he's going to give us the one thing we ask of all of our military officers, and that's a candid, independent assessment, given with integrity, in the same tradition of McArthur and Eisenhower and Schwarzkopf.

I look forward to this hearing, Mr. Chairman.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Thank the gentleman. Let it be understood that the capability, the integrity, the intelligence, and the wisdom of our two witnesses requires nothing but admiration from me and those of us that are about to receive their testimony.

I had a long friendship with General Petraeus. And when a few moments ago in my opening statements I said he's one of the best, he is. We expect their best judgment. And we will receive it.

Mrs. Ros-Lehtinen?

REP. ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN (R), FLORIDA: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, for your leadership and for the dedication of all who serve with you, our nation is eternally grateful.

As the wife of a Vietnam veteran, who was severely wounded in combat, I understand the sacrifices that you and all of our men and women defending our nation's security interests in Iraq and beyond have made and continue to make on a daily basis.

I experienced the anxiety of having once children in harm's way as my stepson Douglas and daughter-in-law Lindsay, both Marine captains, served in Iraq, and now Lindsay continues to serve in Afghanistan.

I take comfort, listening to them defend the importance of our mission in Iraq, for our broader regional interests and strategic priorities, including our efforts to protect our homeland. They understand what is at stake, and they remind me that we cannot yield the victory to the radical Islamists.

Their words resonate so profoundly today on the eve of the sixth anniversary of the horrific events of September 11. Douglas and Lindsay were in Iraq during the historic elections and described the sight of Iraqi families ling up to vote for the first time, bringing their children as witnesses, despite the al Qaeda threats that the streets would run red with the blood of anyone who voted.

They said it was nothing less than awe-inspiring. They will never forget that sight. And they ask Congress to never forget it either. They believe that those Iraqi voters deserve our continued assistance. They believe the Iraqis are worth it, and I do as well. General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, do you think so, as well?

It is also significant that on the eve of this grim anniversary, we would be holding a hearing highlighting the contrasts between those of us who are inspired by this new, greatest generation, and believe that we must confront and defeat al Qaeda and other jihadists on the Iraqi battlefield, and those of us who believe that we should simply retreat.

I am distressed by the accusations leveled by some in the media and by some members of Congress during hearings like these, calling into question the integrity of our military, accusing the military of cherry-picking positive numbers to reflect a dramatic decline in sectarian violence. Some in Congress accuse you, General Petraeus, of presenting a report that is simply White House propaganda.

I have more respect for the military and for the military leaders' regard for the men and women whom they lead than to believe that you would misrepresent the facts and alter conclusions to serve partisan purposes. I trust your reporting and that of our troops on the ground regarding the levels of sectarian violence over those compiled by individuals and entities who wish to discredit the information, to justify an immediate withdrawal.

General Petraeus, does this report reflect your knowledge and conclusions regarding the facts on the ground in Iraq? Do you stand behind it?

The personal attacks launched today by MoveOn.org against General Petraeus, calling this man of honor and courage General Betray Us, in a full-page ad in "The New York Times", is outrageous, and it is deplorable.

It has been reported that the organization that paid for this ad has been coordinating its efforts in the last few months with certain members to derail the strategy spearheaded by you, General Petraeus. I sincerely hope that those reports are untrue.

In an interview reported in "The Politico", published just last Friday, an anonymous Democratic senator was quoted as saying, "No one wants to call Petraeus a liar on national TV. The expectation is that outside groups will do this for us."

This cannot be tolerated. I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to publicly denounce the ad that says that you are cooking the books for the White House. And to apologize to you, General Petraeus, for casting doubt upon your integrity.

Today's hearing must focus on answering fundamental questions. How do we achieve critical U.S. strategic objectives? What policies will help us defend and advance our nation's security interests?

The developments of viable, stable, representative governments with economic development and political freedom for their citizens is a key element of our broad, strategic approach to the war against Islamic militants. And this is considered by radical Islamists as the greatest threat to their aims, which is why Islamic jihadists, including al Qaeda, are blocking the developments of such institutions in Iraq.

Radical Islam sees Iraq as a central front in their war on freedom. The enemies of the emerging Iraqi representative government are the enemies of democracies everywhere. They are our enemies, as well. Do we fight and defeat this enemy?

We must not fool ourselves into believing that we can accommodate our enemies, and thereby secure their cooperation. Accommodation has been tried in the past, with catastrophic consequences.

Chamberlain generally believed that he had brought peace in our time, washing his hands of what he believed to be an isolated dispute in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing. Chamberlain only ensured that an immensely larger threat was thereby unleashed.

Many speak of national reconciliation and granting amnesty as if the Mehdi army, other Islamic jihadists, al Qaeda in Iraq, would lay down their arms, simply because the Iraqi central government or the U.S. Congress asked them to.

Our military strategy and our presence in Iraq is critical to progress on the political front, which helps ensure long-term security goals. Iraq has taken significant steps toward building a representative government, but it does have a long way to go on this difficult road.

Our own history reminds us of how truly difficult that road is, but also of how worthy is the goal. Yet, rapid withdrawal from Iraq would transmit to the radical Islamists that America has little real commitment to this goal and will abandon its stated core beliefs for temporary short-term relief.

There could be no greater confirmation of radical Islam's indictment of this decadent west and its great Satan, us, America, which, in their view, is weak and unreliable.

The latest NIE on Iraq said perceptions that the coalition is withdrawing probably will encourage factions anticipating a power vacuum to seek local political solutions and security solutions that could intensify sectarian violence and intrasectarian competition. Precipitous withdrawal plays into the Islamist terrorist agenda.

Al Qaeda leader al-Zawahiri has confirmed jihad in Iraq requires several incremental goals. First, expel the Americans from Iraq. The second stage, establish an Islamic authority. The third stage, extend the jihad wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq. The fourth stage, the clash with Israel. The enemy, however, did not count on the United States regaining the initiative and going on the offensive throughout the strategy behind the surge.

This strategy has driven a wedge between the al Qaeda and the Sunni population, and that will help drive a similar wedge between the Shia extremists, particularly those in Sadr's Mehdi militia.

The Jones report suggests that the Iraqi security forces have made progress, with the exception of the national police, which are not to be confused with the Iraqi police. The report concluded that there should be increasing improvements in both their readiness and their capability to provide for the internal security in Iraq.

As President Reagan would remind us, the ultimate determinant in the struggle now going on for the world will not be bombs and rockets, but a test of wills and ideas, a trial of spiritual resolve.

For all who have served and died, defending what our nation holds dear, I hope that we, too, rise to the occasion and not let them down by precipitously withdrawing from the fight before the mission is truly accomplished.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Thank the gentle lady.

General David Petraeus, the floor is yours.

We'll have to ask you to stand a bit closer to the microphone, because the acoustics in here are not well -- not good at all.

DON LEMON, CO-HOST: General David Petraeus about to testify now before a joint committee about the progress in Iraq, as they're preparing the microphones there for him here. I'm Don Lemon at the CNN world headquarters in Atlanta.

KYRA PHILLIPS, CO-HOST: And I'm Kyra Phillips. Side by side with Petraeus is also U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker.

We've been waiting for this moment for a number of weeks now, the final report that they have put together to lay out right there before Congress, to try and decide when and if U.S. troops will be coming home any time soon.

LEMON: Let's listen back into the testimony.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Mr. Chairman, I'm getting charts, not a statement.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: This is what's been provided.

LEMON: Obviously, they are having a little problem there with -- with the microphone, trying to get General Petraeus' microphone up and ready. And we know that with technical things, there can always be a couple problems. So we're going to continue to monitor this, and hopefully, they can get that situation resolved any moment.

PHILLIPS: And, of course, we'll be waiting to hear from General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker about the status in Iraq from their perspective. We've heard from a number of various nonpartisan, like the GAO report that came out, a week and a half ago. Also other politicians, leaders that have been in country.

Now, we're actually going to hear from the man in charge of all forces there in Iraq, side by side by the U.S. ambassador to Iraq.

One of the things we're waiting to hear, of course, Don, is what type of progress does the general see in a country that is still plagued with violence and a number of religious sects in that country, not getting along. They do not have control of their country. You have a military and a police force still not able to take over that country.

One of the main discussion points you heard there from the members of Congress, the general has talked a lot about al Anbar province, Diyala province, the fact that they've been able to work with tribal sheikhs, gained their trust. They've actually worked with U.S. military to fight al Qaeda.

LEMON: Yes.

PHILLIPS: And these are the same tribal sheikhs that didn't want to help in the fight against the insurgency. They actually were battling U.S. troops. So, the question is, is that something that will be able to be carried out throughout the rest of that country?

LEMON: And they've also been talking about the cost of the war. They're saying, some of the members of Congress saying before the testimony, saying that, you know, we are ignoring things here in our own country, infrastructure and what have you.

And then the big question, having a reliable Iraqi force, they said, in those 134 battalions over there.

David Gergen is standing by, Kyra, to -- he's going to listen in with us and give us some perspective on this. Of course, he's a former adviser to four presidents. So he is sort of our go-to guy today that we're going to talk to.

PHILLIPS: David, why don't we -- as we're waiting for these mics to get in order here so we can actually hear from the general and hear from the ambassador. Your impressions so far. You heard the members of Congress, a number of them, basically laying out support for the general.

But let's, of course, be nonpartisan here and remind our viewers as they well know, things have not gone as well as, of course, these members of Congress would like to see operations in Iraq. It's very controversial still to this point.

DAVID GERGEN, FORMER PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR: It sure is. You know, it's a little startling to see testimony that's been awaited now for months, in fact, the most important testimony of any general in 40 years, and they can't get the mics to work. You know, we have sort of a hot situation of a general who can't speak to a Congress that increasingly looks like it's not going to listen.

Because those opening statements on both the Democratic and the Republican side suggested a high degree of partisanship: skepticism bordering on hostility coming from the Democrats; a welcoming embrace on the part of the Republicans, with -- and sort of wrapping themselves around without hearing one word from the general.

LEMON: And, David, as you're talking there, you're seeing some of the -- I think there was someone just being led out. Early on there were protesters, and Ike Skelton said, "You know what? We're not going to have that. And so early on, he got them out of there.

But you know, I want to talk to you about -- you're talking about the partisanship in all of this. Several of the members this morning mentioned General Petraeus and him being referred to in the papers and also by some organizations as General Betray Us. They're feeling like they have to defend his reputation.

GERGEN: Well, that's right. There has been what appears to be a concerted effort on the part of some, on the left, Democratic Party, to undermine the credibility of General Petraeus before he even speaks, which I think has been a -- I think they've misplayed their hand on this.

Because that advertisement in "The New York Times" today by MoveOn.org, you know, saying is he General Petraeus or General Betray Us, you know, I think struck many Republicans and, frankly, it will strike a lot of fair-minded Americans as a sort of below-the-belt kind of attack before we've had a chance to hear from one of the most decorated and respected generals in the United States Army.

So I thought that the MoveOn.org people made a mistake by doing that. Their hand was a little too plain, if you like.

But I also think that it seems undignified. After all, General Petraeus is putting his life on the line over there, too, in running this operation. And he's come back here. I think most people feel, let's give him a hearing.

You know, it was interesting. "The New York Times" public opinion survey today came out and said that Americans do not give a lot of credibility to politicians about the war. The people they give the most credibility to are the U.S. generals.

PHILLIPS: What's interesting is that Petraeus not only was one of the most popular commanders when it came to the 101st Army Airborne, but also he's an intellectual of sorts, David, a Ph.D. from Princeton.

GERGEN: Yes.

PHILLIPS: And this is a general who came in and devised a team of intellectuals to surround him and support him and to add to that military background, an intense intellectual -- I guess you should say -- round table as he dealt with operations there.

GERGEN: That's right. This is a man who is now in his third tour, who had a celebrated first tour in Iraq in the north. And then came back for a second tour to try to work with the Iraqi army, trying to train them up. That was regarded as less successful. And now he's back for his third tour.

And he is -- there is a considerable degree to which General Bush -- President Bush went looking for him. He wanted General Petraeus over there. He wanted someone who thought as he did. So, you have to say that there is an alliance of, at least, outlook between the president and General Petraeus at the beginning.

At the same time, General Petraeus has won high marks within the military on all services as one of the most respected, independent- minded men and who really is the -- become a father figure on counterinsurgency. How do you do -- how do you run smart counterinsurgency? He's written a book on that for U.S. Army training.

I must tell you, I have a personal relationship with him, so I'm sure I'm biased in this regard. But I think what he's -- I think what all of us are looking forward to, what does he really have to say? Then we can assess it. But it sort of seems unfair to load it up against him personally before he's even had a chance to open his mouth in this long-awaited testimony.

PHILLIPS: Stay with us, David Gergen. We're being told they're going to take a five-minute recess, try to get that mic situation taken care of. Of course, we're going to keep an eye on the testimony here all day.

LEMON: Yes, the testimony all day. And you can, too, online. Just go to CNN.com, and it's right there in its entirety.

CNN NEWSROOM continues after a quick break. We're back in a moment.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

PHILLIPS: Well, we've heard it all year, as more and more U.S. troops poured into Iraq, as more and more pressure built up in Washington, as more and more uncertainty surrounded the Baghdad government, "just wait until September."

LEMON: And the progress report by the top U.S. general in Iraq, David Petraeus, and the U.S. ambassador, Ryan Crocker, today at long last, both men are front and center before the joint House committee for testimony that may or may not change the course of the war.

Hello, everyone, I'm Don Lemon, live in the CNN world headquarters in Atlanta, along with Kyra Phillips here.

Changing a war plan is one thing; changing minds on Capitol Hill, well, it is quite another. CNN congressional correspondent Dana Bash brings up to speed on the back-and-forth. And already before they even speak, there's been some back and forth among committee members.

DANA BASH, CNN CORRESPONDENT: There sure have, Don. And you know, it's sort of -- I'm sure there's a metaphor in here somewhere. We're waiting to hear from the general and the ambassador. They should -- their testimony should be under way right now, but there are problems inside that hearing room with the microphones. And that's why the committee took a five-minute break so see if they could work out their technical glitches.

But before that, we did hear lengthy statements from the chairman, the Democratic chairman and the ranking Republicans. And already, the political battle is -- is brewing here, specifically over General Petraeus and what Democrats -- what Republicans say are Democrats' attacks on General Petraeus' credibility.

At issue, at least this morning, Don, is an ad, a full-page newspaper ad, in "The New York Times" by the anti-war group MoveOn.org, which is a powerful, vocal group here -- here in Congress and certainly around the political world. And what it said is, it called General Petraeus "General Betray Us" and accused him of cooking the books for the White House.

Well, that has produced an onslaught of Republican statements -- really, a well-coordinated slew of statements from Republicans, attacking Democrats and their like-minded groups for -- for hitting the general, somebody who they consider very respected, even before he speaks. And that was on full display at the hearing already this morning.

LEMON: CNN's Dana Bash. Dana, thank you for that.

I think we're -- I think they have the microphones working now, Kyra. We're going to get back to it. Let's take a listen.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: ... any signs or demonstrative evidence will cause your removal.

Once again, General, the floor is yours.

GEN. DAVID PETRAEUS, U.S. COMMANDER IN IRAQ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, ranking members, members of the committees, thank you for the opportunity to provide my assessment of the security situation in Iraq and to discuss the recommendations I recently provided to my chain of command for the way forward.

At the outset, I would like to note that this is my testimony. Although I have briefed my assessment and recommendations to my chain of command, I wrote this testimony myself. It has not been cleared by nor shared with anyone in the Pentagon, the White House, or the Congress until it was just handed out.

As the bottom line upfront, the military objectives in the surge are, in large measure, being met. In recent months, in the face of tough enemies and the brutal summer heat of Iraq, coalition and Iraqi security forces have achieved progress in the security arena.

Though the improvements have been uneven across Iraq, the overall number of security incidents in Iraq has declined in eight of the past 12 weeks, with the number of incidents in the last two weeks at the lowest levels seen since June 2006.

One reason for the decline in incidents is that coalition and Iraqi forces have dealt significant blows to al Qaeda, Iraq. Though al Qaeda and its affiliate in Iraq remain dangerous, we have taken away a number of their sanctuaries and gained the initiative in many areas. We have also disrupted Shia militia extremists, capturing the head and numerous other leaders of the Iranian-supported special groups, along with a senior Lebanese Hezbollah operative supporting Iran's activities in Iraq.

Coalition and Iraqi operations have helped reduce ethno-sectarian violence as well, bringing down the ethno-sectarian deaths substantially in Baghdad and across Iraq since the height of the sectarian violence last December.

The overall number of civilian deaths has also declined over this period, although the numbers in each area are still at troubling levels.

Iraqi security forces have also continued to grow and to shoulder more of the load, albeit slowly and amid continuing concerns about the sectarian tendencies of some elements in their ranks. In general however, Iraqi elements have been standing and fighting and sustaining tough losses. And they have taken the lead in operations in many areas.

Additionally, in what may be the most significant development of the past eight months, the tribal rejection of al Qaeda that started in Anbar province and helped produce such significant change there, has now spread to a number of other locations as well.

Based on all this, and on the further progress we believe we can achieve over the next few months, I believe that we will be able to reduce our forces to the pre-surge level of brigade combat teams by next summer without jeopardizing the security gains that we have fought so hard to achieve. Beyond that, while noting that the situation in Iraq remains complex, difficult, and sometimes downright frustrating, I also believe that it is possible to achieve our objectives in Iraq over time, although doing so will be neither quick nor easy.

Having provided that summary, I would like to review the nature of the conflict in Iraq, recall the situation before the surge, describe the current situation, and explain the recommendations I have provided to my chain of command for the way ahead in Iraq.

The fundamental source of the conflict in Iraq is competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This competition will take place. And its resolution is key to producing long-term stability in the new Iraq. The question is whether the competition takes place more or less violently. This chart shows the security challenges in Iraq.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: General, let me interrupt you. The members should have the charts in front of them. The chart over near the wall is very difficult to see from here, so I would urge the members to look at the charts that have been handed out and should be immediately in front of them. Thank you, general.

PETRAEUS: This chart shows the security challenges in Iraq. Foreign and homegrown terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists and criminals all push the ethno-sectarian competition towards violence. Actions by Syria and especially by Iran fuel that violence. Lack of adequate governmental capacity, lingering sectarian mistrust and various forms of corruption add to Iraq's challenges.

In our recent efforts to look to the future, we found it useful to revisit the past. In December 2006, during the height of the ethno-sectarian violence that escalated in the wake of the bombing of the Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra, the leaders in Iraq at that time, General George Casey and Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad said the coalition was failing to meet its objectives. Their review underscored the need to protection the population and reduce sectarian violence, especially in Baghdad.

As a result, General Casey requested additional forces to enable the coalition to accomplish these tasks. And those forces began to flow in January.

In the ensuing months our forces and our Iraqi counterparts have focused on improving security, especially in Baghdad and the areas around it, resting sanctuaries from al Qaeda control and disrupting the efforts of the Iranian-supported militia extremists.

We have employed counterinsurgency practices that underscore the importance of units living among the people they are securing. And according our forces have established dozens of joint security stations and patrol bases manned by coalition and Iraqi forces in Baghdad and in other areas across Iraq.

In mid-June, with all the surge (inaudible) in place, we launched a series of offensive operations, focused on expanding the gains achieved in the preceding months in Anbar province, clearing Baqubah, several key Baghdad neighborhoods, the remaining sanctuaries in Anbar province and important areas in the so-called belts around Baghdad and pursuing al Qaeda in the Diyala River Valley and several other areas.

Throughout this period as well, we engaged in dialogue with insurgent groups and tribes, and this led to additional elements standing up to oppose al Qaeda and other extremists. We also continued to emphasize the development of the Iraqi security forces, and we employed non-kinetic means to exploit the opportunities provided by the conduct of our kinetic combat operations, aided in this effort by the arrival of additional provincial reconstruction teams.

The progress our forces have achieved with our Iraqi counterparts has, as I noted at the outset, been substantial. While there have been setbacks as well as successes and tough losses along the way, overall our tactical commanders and I see improvements in the security environment.

We do not, however, just rely on gut feel or personal observations. We also conduct considerable data collection and analysis to gauge progress and determine trends. We do this by gathering and refining data from coalition and Iraqi operation centers, using a methodology that has been in place for well over a year, and that has benefited over the past seven months from the increased presence of our forces living among the Iraqi people.

We endeavor to ensure our analysis of that data is conducted with rigger and consistency, as our ability to achieve a nuanced understanding of the security environment is dependent on collecting and analyzing data in a consistent way over time.

Two U.S. intelligence agencies recently reviewed our methodology and they concluded that the data we produced is the most accurate and authoritative in Iraq.

As I mentioned up front and as the chart before you reflects, the level of security incidents has decreased significantly since the start of the surge of offensive operations in mid-June, declining in eight of the past 12 weeks, with the level of incidents in the past two weeks the lowest since June 2006, and with the number of attacks this past week, the lowest since April 2006.

Civilian deaths of all categories, less natural causes, have also declined considerably, by over 45 percent Iraq wide since the height of the sectarian violence in December. This is shown by the top line on this chart. And the decline by some 70 percent in Baghdad is shown by the bottom line.

Periodic mass casualty attacks by al Qaeda have tragically added to the numbers outside Baghdad in particular. Even without the sensational attacks, however, the level of civilian deaths is clearly still too high and continues to be of serious concern.

As the next chart shows, the number of ethno-sectarian deaths, an important subset of the overall civilian casualty figures, has also declined significantly since the height of the sectarian violence in December. Iraq wide, as shown by the top line on this chart, the number of ethno-sectarian deaths has come down by over 55 percent. And it would have come down much further were it not for the casualties inflicted by barbaric al Qaeda bombings attempting to reignite sectarian violence. In Baghdad, as the bottom line shows, the number of ethno-sectarian deaths has come down by some 80 percent since December.

This chart also displays the density of sectarian incidents in various Baghdad neighborhoods, and it both reflects the progress made in reducing ethno-sectarian violence in the Iraqi capital and identifies the areas that remain the most challenging.

As we have gone on the offensive in former al Qaeda and insurgent sanctuaries, and as locals have increasingly supported our efforts, we have found a substantially increased number of arms, ammunition, and explosive caches. As this chart shows, we have so far this year already found and cleared over 4,400 caches, nearly 1,700 more than we discovered in all of last year. This may be a factor in the reduction in the number of overall improvised explosive device attacks in recent months, which, as this chart shows, has declined sharply by about one- third since June.

The change in the security situation in Anbar province has, of course, been particularly dramatic. As this chart shows, monthly attack levels in Anbar have declined from some 1,350 in October of 2006 to a bit over 200 in August of this year. This dramatic decrease reflects the significance of the local rejection of al Qaeda and the newfound willingness of local Anbaries to serve in the Iraqi army and Iraqi police service.

As I noted earlier whoosh we are seeing similar actions in other locations as well. To be sure, trends have not been uniformly positive across Iraq, as is shown by this chart, depicting violence levels in several key Iraqi provinces. The trend in Nineveh province, for example, has been much more up and down until a recent decline. And the same is true in Salah ad Din province, Saddam Hussein's former home province though recent trends there and in Baghdad have been in the right direction recently.

In any event, the overall trajectory in Iraq, a steady decline of incidents in the past three months, is still quite significant. The number of car bombings and suicide attacks has also declined in each of the past five months from a high of 175 in March, as this chart shows, to about 90 this past month. While this trend in recent months has been heartening, the number of high-profile attacks is still too high and we continue to work hard to destroy the networks that carry out these barbaric attacks.

Our operations have, in fact, produced substantial progress against al Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq. As this chart shows, in the past eight months we have considerably reduced the areas in which al Qaeda enjoyed sanctuary. We have also neutralized five media cells, detained the senior Iraqi leader of al Qaeda Iraq, and killed or captured nearly 100 other key leaders and some 2,500 rank-and-file fighters. Al Qaeda is certainly not defeated. However, it is off balance, and we are pursuing its leaders and operators aggressively.

Of note, as the recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq explains, these gains against al Qaeda are a result of the synergy of actions by conventional forces to deny the terrorists sanctuary, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets to find the enemy and special operations elements to conduct targeted raids. A combination of these assets is necessary to prevent the creation of a terrorist safe haven in Iraq.

In the past six months, we have also targeted Shia militia extremists, capturing a number of senior leaders and fighters, as well as the deputy commander of Lebanese Hezbollah department 2,800, the organization created to support the training, arming, funding, and in some cases, direction of the militia extremists by the Iranian guards Qods force. These elements have assassinated and kidnapped Iraqi governmental leaders, killed and wounded our soldiers with advanced explosive devices provided by Iran, and indiscriminately rocketed civilians in the international zone and elsewhere. It is increasingly apparent to both coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the Qods force, seeks to turn the Iraqi special groups into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq.

The most significant development in the past six months, likely has been the increasing emergence of --

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Will the gentleman suspend with the entire group that's back there supporting that person be removed.

PETRAEUS: The most significant development --

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Just a minute, general.

PETRAEUS: Yes, sir.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Proceed.

PETRAEUS: The most significant development in the past six months, likely has been the increasing emergence of tribes and local citizens rejecting al Qaeda and other extremists. This has, of course, been most visible in Anbar province.

A year ago the province was assessed as lost politically. Today it is a model of what happens when local leaders and citizens decide to oppose al Qaeda and reject its Taliban-like ideology. While Anbar is unique in the model it provides cannot be replicated everywhere in Iraq, it does demonstrate the dramatic change in security that is possible with the support and participation of local citizens.

As this chart shows, other tribes have been inspired by the actions of those in Anbar, and have volunteered to fight extremists as well. We have in coordination with the Iraqi government's National Reconciliation Committee, been engaging these tribes and groups of local citizens who want to oppose extremists and to contribute to local security. Some 20,000 such individuals are already being hired for the Iraqi police, thousands of others are being assimilated into the Iraqi army, and thousands more are vying for a spot in Iraq's security forces.

As I noted earlier, Iraqi security forces have continued to grow, to develop their capabilities, and to shoulder more of the burdens of providing security for their country. Despite concerns about sectarian influence, inadequate logistics and supporting institutions, and an insufficient number of qualified, commissioned and noncommissioned officers, Iraqi units are engaged around the country.

As this chart shows, there are now nearly 140 Iraqi army, national police and special operations forces battalions in the fight, with about 95 of those capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coalition support.

Beyond that, all of Iraq's battalions have been heavily involved in combat operations that often result in the loss of leaders, soldiers, and equipment. These losses are among the shortcomings identified by operational readiness assessments, but we should not take from these assessments the impression that Iraqi forces are not in the fight and contributing. Indeed, despite their shortages, many Iraqi units across Iraq now operate with minimal coalition assistance.

As counterinsurgency operations require substantial numbers of boots on the ground, we are helping the Iraqis expand the size of their security forces. Currently there are some 445,000 individuals on the payrolls of Iraq's interior and defense ministries. Based on recent decisions by Prime Minister Maliki, the number of Iraq security forces will grow further by the end of this year, possibly by as much as 40,000.

Given the security challenges Iraq faces, we support this decision, and we will work with the two security ministries as they continue their efforts to expand their basic training capacity, leader development programs, logistical structures and elements, and various other institutional capabilities to support the substantial growth in Iraqi forces.

Significantly, in 2007, Iraq will, as in 2006, spend more on its security forces than it will receive in security assistance from the United States. In fact, Iraq is becoming one of the United States' larger foreign military sales customers, committing some $1.6 billion to FMS already with the possibility with up to $1.8 billion more being committed before the end of the year. And I appreciate the attention that some members of congress have recently given to speeding up the FMS process for Iraq.

To summarize, the security situation in Iraq is improving. And Iraqi elements are slowly taking on more of the responsibility for protecting their citizens. Innumerable challenges lie ahead. However, coalition and Iraqi security forces have made progress toward achieving security. As a result, the United States will be in a position to reduce its forces in Iraq in the months ahead.

Two weeks ago, I provided recommendations for the way ahead in Iraq to the members of my chain of command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The essence of the approach I recommended is captured in its title, "Security While Transitioning, From Leading to Partnering to over Watch." This approach seeks to build on the security improvements our troopers and our Iraqi counterparts have fought so hard to achieve in recent months. It reflects recognition of the importance of securing the population and the imperative of transitioning responsibilities to Iraqi institutions and Iraqi forces as quickly as possible, but without rushing to failure. It includes substantial support for the continuing development of Iraqi security forces. It also stresses the need to continue the counterinsurgency strategy that we have been employing, but with Iraqis gradually shouldering more of the load. And it highlights the importance of regional and diplomatic -- regional and global diplomatic approaches.

Finally, in recognition of the fact that this war is not only being fought on the ground in Iraq, but also in cyberspace, it also notes the need to contest the enemy's growing use of that important medium to spread extremism.

The recommendations I provided were informed by operational and strategic considerations. The operational considerations include recognition that military aspects of the surge have achieved progress and generated momentum. Iraqi security forces have continued to grow and have slowly been shouldering more of the security burdens in Iraq. A mission focus on either population security or transition alone will not be adequate to achieve our objectives. Success against al Qaeda Iraq and Iranian-supported militia extremists requires conventional forces as well as special operations forces. And the security and local political situations will enable us to draw down the surge forces.

My recommendations also took into account a number of strategic considerations. Political progress will take place only if sufficient security exists. Long-term U.S. ground force viability will benefit from force reductions as the surge runs its course. Regional, global, and cyberspace initiatives are critical to success. And Iraqi leaders understandably want to assume greater sovereignty in their country, although as they recently announced, they do desire continued presence of coalition forces in Iraq in 2008 under a new U.N. Security Council resolution and following that, they want to negotiate a long-term security agreement with the United States and other nations.

Based on these considerations and having worked the battlefield geometry with Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, the Multinational Corps Iraq commander, to assure we build on the gains our troopers have fought, I recommended a draw-down of the surge forces from Iraq. In fact, later this month, the marine expeditionary unit deployed as part of the surge will depart Iraq.

Beyond that, if my recommendations are approved, that unit's departure will be followed by a withdraw of a brigade combat team without replacement in mid-December, and the further redeployment without replacement of four other brigade combat teams and the two surge marine battalions in first seven months of 2008, until we reach the presurge levels of 15 brigade combat teams by mid-July, 2008.

I would also like to discuss the period beyond next summer. Force reductions will continue beyond the presurge levels of brigade combat teams that we will reach by mid-July, 2008. However, in my professional judgment, it would be premature to make recommendations on the pace of such reductions at this time. In fact, our experience in Iraq has repeatedly shown that projecting too far into the future is not just difficult, it can be misleading and even hazardous. The events of the past six months underscore that point.

When I testified in January, for example, no one would have dared to forecast that Anbar province would have been transformed the way it has in the past six months. Nor would anyone have predicted that volunteers and onetime al Qaeda strongholds like Ghazali in western Baghdad or Al-Tanmiya in eastern Baghdad would seek to join the fight against al Qaeda. Nor would we have anticipated that a Shia led government would accept Sunni volunteers in the ranks of the local police force in Abu Ghraib. Beyond that, on a less encouraging note, none of us earlier this year appreciated the extent of Iranian involvement in Iraq, something about which we and Iraq's leaders all now have greater concern.

In view of this, I do not believe it is reasonable to have an adequate appreciation for the pace of further reduction and mission adjustments beyond the summer of 2008 until about mid-march of next year. We will no later than that time, consider factors similar to those on which I base the current recommendations, having by then, of course, a better feel for the security situation, the improvements in the capabilities of our Iraqi counterparts and the enemy situation.

I will then, as I did in developing the recommendations I have explained here today, also take into consideration the demands on our nation's ground forces. Although I believe that that consideration should once again inform not drive the recommendations I make.

This chart captures the recommendations I have described. Showing the recommended reduction of brigade combat teams as the surge runs its course and illustrating the concept of our units adjusting their missions and transitioning responsibilities to Iraqis as the situation and Iraqi capabilities permit. It also reflects the no- later-than date for recommendations on force adjustments beyond next summer and provides a possible approach we have considered for the future force structure and mission set in Iraq.

One may argue that the best way to speed the process in Iraq is to change the mission from one that emphasizes population security, county terrorism and transition to one that is strictly focused on transition and counterterrorism. Making that change now would, in our view, be premature.

We have learned before that there is a real danger in handing over tasks to the Iraqi security forces before their capacity and local conditions warrant. In fact, the drafters of the recently released National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq recognize this danger when they wrote, and I quote, "We assess that changing the mission of coalition forces from a primarily counterinsurgency and stabilization role to a primary counter -- combat support role for Iraqi forces and counterterrorist operations to prevent al Qaeda Iraq from establishing a safe haven would erode security gains achieved thus far."

In describing the recommendations I have made, I should note again that like Ambassador Crocker, I believe Iraq's problems will require a long-term effort. There are no easy answers or quick solutions. And although we both believe this effort can succeed, it will take time.

Our assessments underscore, in fact, the importance of recognizing that a premature drawdown of our forces would likely have devastating consequences. That assessment is supported by the findings of a 16 August defense intelligence agency report on the implications of a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq.

Summarizing it, in an unclassified fashion, it concludes that a rapid withdrawal would result in the further release of the strong, centrifugal forces in Iraq and produce a number of dangerous results. Including a high risk of disintegration of the Iraqi security forces, rapid deterioration of local security initiatives, al Qaeda Iraq regaining lost ground and freedom of maneuver, a marked increase in violence and further ethno-sectarian displacement and refugee flows, alliances of convenience by Iraqi groups with internal and external forces to gain advantages over their rivals, and exacerbation of already challenging regional dynamics especially with respect to Iran.

Lieutenant General Odierno and I share this assessment, and believe that the best way to secure our national interests and to avoid an unfavorable outcome in Iraq is to continue to focus our operations on securing the Iraqi people, while targeting terrorist groups and militia extremists and as quickly as conditions are met, transitioning security tasks to Iraqi elements.

Before closing, I want to thank you and your colleagues for your support of our men and women in uniform in Iraq. The soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and coasts guardsmen with whom I'm honored to serve are the best equipped and very likely the most professional force in our nation's history. Impressively, despite all that has been asked of them in recent years, they continue to raise their right hands and volunteer to stay in uniform. With three weeks to go in this fiscal year, in fact, the army elements in Iraq of multinational corps Iraq, for example, have achieved well over 130 percent of re- enlistment goals in the initial career categories and nearly 115 percent in the mid-career category.

All of us appreciate what you have done to ensure that these great troopers have had what they've needed to accomplish their mission, just as we appreciate what you have done to take care of their families as they, too, have made significant sacrifices in recent years.

The advances you have underwritten in weapons systems and individual equipment, ammunitions and command, control, and communications systems and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and vehicles and counter IED systems and programs and in manned and unmanned aircraft have proved invaluable in Iraq.

The capabilities that you have funded most recently, especially the vehicles that will provide greater protection against improvised explosive devices, are also of enormous importance.

Additionally, you're funding of the commanders and emergency response program has given our leaders a critical tool with which to prosecute the counterinsurgency campaign.

Finally, we appreciate as well your funding of our new detention programs and rule of law initiatives in Iraq.

In closing, it remains an enormous privilege to soldier again in Iraq with America's new, greatest generation. Our country's men and women in uniform have done a magnificent job in the most complex and challenging environment imaginable. All Americans should be very proud of their sons and daughters serving in Iraq today. Thank you very much.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: General Petraeus, we want an end to the (inaudible).

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