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Iraq Progress Report

Aired September 10, 2007 - 14:00   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

(JOINED IN PROGRESS)
REP. IKE SKELTON (D-MO), CHAIRMAN, ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE: The person will be removed.

Let me make this announcement, that those who have been -- please remove them -- those who have been..

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: No! No! No! No!

SKELTON: Please remove them.

Let me make this announcement, that those who have caused (INAUDIBLE) improper conduct, who have, who are and who will throughout the remaining of this hearing will be prosecuted under Section 10-50316 of the District of Columbia. And we will prosecute them under the law.

This is intolerable. We will not allow it. And I hope everyone that's considering it understands, because they will be prosecuted.

Ambassador Crocker.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: (INAUDIBLE)

SKELTON: Order will be restored.

Mr. Ambassador.

RYAN CROCKER, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ: Mr. Chairman, Ranking Members, Members of the Committees, thank you for the opportunity to address you today.

I consider it a privilege and an honor to serve in Iraq at a time when so much is at stake for our country and the people of the region, and when so many Americans of the highest caliber in our military and civilian services are doing the same. I know that a heavy responsibility weighs on my shoulders to provide the country with my best, most honest assessment of the situation in Iraq in its political, economic, and diplomat dimensions, and the implications for the United States.

In doing so, I will not minimize the enormity of the challenges faced by the Iraqis nor the complexity of the situation. At the same time, I intend to demonstrate that it is possible for the United States to see its goals realized in Iraq and that Iraqis are capable of tackling and addressing the problems confronting them today. A secure, stable, democratic Iraq at peace with its neighbors is, in my view, attainable.

The cumulative trajectory of political, economic, and diplomat developments in Iraq is upwards, although the slope of that line is not steep. This process will not be quick. It will be uneven, punctuated by setbacks, as well as achievements, and it will require substantial U.S. resolve and commitment.

There will be no single moment at which we can claim victory. Any turning point will likely only be recognized in retrospect.

This is a sober assessment, but it should not be a disheartening one.

I have found it helpful during my time in Iraq to reflect on our own history. At many points in our early years our survival as a nation was questionable. Our efforts to build the institutions of government were not always successful in the first instance, and tough issues, such as slavery, universal suffrage, civil rights, and states' rights were resolved only after acrimonious debate and sometimes violence.

Iraq is experiencing a revolution, not just regime change. It is only by understanding this that we can appreciate what is happening in Iraq, what Iraqis have achieved, as well as maintain a sense of realism about the challenges that remain.

Evaluating where Iraqis are today only makes sense in the context of where they have been. Any Iraqi under 40 years of age -- and that is the overwhelming majority of the population -- would have known nothing but the rule of the Ba'ath Party before liberation four and a half years ago. Those 35 years were filled with crimes against humanity on every scale.

Saddam Hussein ruled without mercy, not hesitating to use lethal force and torture against even those in his inner circle. His genocidal campaign against the Kurds and savagery toward southern Shia are well known, but he also used violence and intimidation as tools in the complete deconstruction of Iraqi society.

No organization or institution survived that was not linked in some way to regime protection. He created a pervasive climate of fear in which even family members were afraid to talk to one another.

This is the legacy that Iraqis had as their history when Saddam' s statute came down on April 9, 2003. No Nelson Mandela existed to emerge on the national political scene. Anyone with his leadership talents would not have survived. A new Iraq had to be built almost literally from scratch, and the builders in most cases were themselves reduced to their most basic identity, ethnic or sectarian.

Much progress has been made, particularly in building an institutional framework where there was none before. But rather than being a period in which old animosities and suspicions were overcome, the past 18 months have further strained Iraqi society. The sectarian violence of 2006 and early 2007 had its seeds in Saddam' s social deconstruction and it had dire consequences for the people of Iraq, as well as its politics. Extensive displacement and widespread sectarian killings by al Qaeda and other extremist groups have gnawed away at the already frayed fabric of Iraqi society and politics. It is no exaggeration to say that Iraq is and will remain for some time to come a traumatized society.

It is against this backdrop that development in Iraqi national politics must be seen. Iraqis are facing some of the most profound political, economic, and security challenges imaginable. They are not simply grappling with the issue of who rules Iraq, but they are asking what kind of country Iraq will be, how it will be governed, and how Iraqis will share power and resources among each other. The constitution approved and a referendum in 2005 answered some of these questions in theory, but much remains uncertain in both law and practice.

Some of the more promising political developments at the national level are neither measured in benchmarks nor visible to those far from Baghdad. For instance, there is a budding debate about federalism among Iraq' s leaders and, importantly, within the Sunni community.

Those living in places like Anbar and Salah ad Din are beginning to realize how localities, having more of a say in daily decision making, will empower their communities. No longer is an all-powerful Baghdad seen as the panacea to Iraq' s problems. This thinking is nascent, but it is ultimately critical to the evolution of a common vision among Iraq' s leaders.

Similarly, there is a palpable frustration in Baghdad over the sectarian system that was used to divide the spoils of the state in the last few years. Leaders from all communities openly acknowledge that a focus on sectarian gains has led to poor governments and served Iraqis badly. And many claim to be ready to make the sacrifices that will be needed to put government performance ahead of sectarian and ethnic concern. Such ideas are no longer controversial, although their application will be.

Finally, we are seeing Iraqis come to terms with complex issues not by first providing a national framework, but instead by tackling immediate problems. One such example is how the central government has accepted over 1,700 young men from the Abu Ghraib area, west of Baghdad, as General Petraeus mentioned. This number includes members of -- former members of insurgent groups to be part of Iraqi security forces.

Another example is how the government, without much public fanfare, has contacted thousands of members of the former Iraqi army, offering them retirement, return to the military, or public sector employment. So without the proclamation of a general amnesty, we see provisional immunity being granted and we see de-Ba'athification reform in advance of national legislation. In both instances, the seeds of reconciliation are being planted.

We have come to associate progress on national reconciliation as meaning the passage of key pieces of legislation. There is logic to this, as the legislation we are urging the Iraqis to produce does, in one way or another, have to do with the question of how to share power and resources among Iraq's communities.

This legislation also has to do with the vision of the future Iraqi state. The oil and revenue-sharing laws, for instance, deal with deeper issues than simply whether Iraqis in oil-producing areas are willing to share their wealth with other Iraqis.

What is difficult about these laws is that they take Iraq another step down the road toward a federal system that all Iraqis have not yet embraced. But once again, we see that even in the absence of legislation, there is practical action as the central government shares oil revenues through budget allocations on an equitable basis with Iraq's provinces.

In many respects, the debates currently occurring in Iraq on de- Ba'athfication reform and provincial powers are akin to those surrounding our civil rights movement or struggle over states' rights. With de-Ba'athfication, Iraqis are struggling to come to terms with a vicious past. They are trying to balance fear that the Ba'ath Party would one day return to power with the recognition that many former members of the party are guilty of no crime and joined the organization not to repress others but for personal survival.

With provincial powers, Iraqis are grappling with very serious questions about what the right balance between the center and the periphery is for Iraq. Some see the devolution of power to regions and provinces as being the best insurance against the rise of a future tyrannical figure in Baghdad. Others see Iraq with its complex demographics as in need of a strong central authority.

In short, we should not be surprised or dismayed that Iraqis have not fully resolved such issues. Rather, we should ask whether the way in which they are approaching these issues gives us a sense of their seriousness and ultimate capability to resolve Iraq's fundamental problems.

Is the collective national leadership of Iraq ready to prioritize Iraq over sectarian and community interests? Can and will they come to agreement about what sort of Iraq they want?

I do believe that Iraq's leaders have the will to tackle the country's pressing problems, although it will take longer than we originally anticipated because of the environment and the gravity of the issues before them. Prime Minister Maliki and other Iraqi leaders face enormous obstacles in their efforts to govern effectively. I believe they approach the task with a deep sense of commitment and patriotism.

An important part of my assessment was the effort made by the leaders this past summer. After weeks of preparatory work and many days of intensive meetings, Iraq's five most prominent national leaders from the three major communities issued a communique on August 26th that committed them to an ongoing, consultative process on key issues and noted agreement on draft legislation dealing with de- Ba'athification and provincial powers. This agreement by no means solves all of Iraq's problems, but the commitment of its leaders to work together on hard issues is encouraging.

Perhaps most significantly, these five Iraqi leaders together decided to publicly express their joint desire to develop a long-term relationship with the United States. Despite their many difference and perspectives and experiences, they all agreed on language acknowledging the need for a continued presence by the multinational forces in Iraq and expressing gratitude for the sacrifices these forces have made for Iraqis.

At the provincial level, political gains have been more pronounced, particularly in the north and west of Iraq where the security -- where the security improvements have been in some places dramatic. In these areas there is abundant evidence that the security gains have opened the door for meaningful politics.

In Anbar, as General Petraeus has noted, the progress on the security side has been extraordinary. Six months ago, violence was rampant, our forces were under daily attack, and Iraqis were cowering from the intimidation of al Qaeda. But al Qaeda overplayed its hand in Anbar, and Anbaris began to reject its excesses, be they beheading school children, or cutting off people's fingers as punishment for smoking. Recognizing that the coalition would help eject al Qaeda, the tribes began to fight with us, not against us, and the landscape in Anbar is dramatically different as a result.

Tribal representatives are on the provincial council, which is now meeting regularly to find ways of restoring services, developing the economy, and executing a provincial budget. These leaders are looking for help to rebuild their cities, and they are talking of attracting investment.

Such scenes are also unfolding in parts of Diyala and Nineveh, where Iraqis have mobilized with the help of the coalition and Iraqi security forces to evict al Qaeda from their communities. The world should note that when al Qaeda began implementing its twisted version of the caliphate in Iraq, Iraqis from Anbar to Baghdad to Diyala have overwhelmingly rejected it.

Shia extremists are also facing rejection. Recent attacks by elements of the Iranian-backed Jaish al-Mahdi and the worshipers in the holy city of Karbala have provoked a backlash and triggered a call by Muqtada al-Sadr for Jaish al-Mahdi to cease attacks against Iraqis and coalition forces.

A key challenge for Iraqis now is to link these positive developments in the provinces to the central government in Baghdad. Unlike our states, Iraqi provinces have little ability to generate funds through taxation, making them dependent on the central government for resources. The growing ability of the provinces to design and execute budgets and the readiness of the central government to resource them are success stories.

On September 5th, for example, Iraq's senior federal leadership traveled to Anbar, where they announced a 70 percent increase in the 2007 provincial capital budget, as well as $50 million to compensate losses incurred by Anbaris in the fight against al Qaeda. The support of the central government is also needed to maintain hard-won security through the rapid expansion of locally-generated police, and the government of Iraq has placed some 21,000 Anbaris on police roles.

Iraq is starting to make some gains in the economy. Improving security is stimulating revival of markets with the active participation of local communities. In some places, war damage is being cleared and buildings repaired, roads and suers built, and commerce energized. The IMF estimates that economic growth will exceed six percent for 2007.

Iraqi ministries and provincial councils have made substantial progress this year in utilizing Iraq's oil revenue for investment. The 2007 governmental budget allocated $10 billion, nearly one-third of Iraq's expected oil export revenue, to capital investment. Over $3 billion was allocated to the provinces in the Kurdish region for spending.

The latest data show that the national ministries and provincial councils have proceeded to commit these funds at more than twice the rate of last year. Doing the best are the provincial authorities, and in the process gaining experience with making plans and decisions and running fair tenders.

In so doing, they are stimulating local business development and providing -- and providing employment. Over time we expect the experience with more responsive local authorities will change Iraqi attitudes toward their elected leaders and of the provinces toward Baghdad.

At two conferences in Dubai in the last two weeks, hundreds of Iraqi businessmen met an equal number of foreign investors newly interested in acquiring shares of businesses in Iraq. An auction of cell phone spectrum conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers netted the government a better than expected sum of $3.75 billion. The minister of finance plans to use the funds, along with all the country's oil revenue, to apply to its pressing investment and current expenditure needs.

Overall, however, the Iraqi economy is performing significantly under potential. Insecurity in many parts of the countryside raises transport costs and especially affects manufacturing and agriculture.

Electricity supply has improved in many parts of the country, but it remains woefully inadequate in Baghdad. Many neighbors in the city receive only two hours a day or less from the national grid, although power supplies for essential services such as water pumping stations or hospitals are much better. The minister of electricity said last week that it would take $25 billion through 2016 to meet demand requirements, but that by investing the $2 billion a year the ministry is now receiving from the government's budget, as well as private investment in power generation now permitted by law, that goal could be met.

We are deploying our assistance funds to make a difference to ordinary Iraqis and to support our political objectives. Military units are using commanders' emergency response SURP (ph) funds to ensure that residents see a difference when neighborhood violence declines.

USAID community stabilization funds provide tens of thousands of jobs throughout the country. With the recent apportionment of 2007 supplemental funds, we are putting quick response funds, QRF, in the hands of our provincial reconstruction team leaders to help build communities and institutions in post-kinetic environments. Vocational training and micro-finance programs are supporting nascent private businesses, and in Baghdad we are increasing our engagement in capacity-building efforts with ministries.

On the diplomatic level, there is expanding international and regional engagement with Iraq. In August, the U.N. Security Council, at Iraq's invitation, provided the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, UNAMI, with an expanded mandate through UNSCR-1770.

The work of the international compact with Iraq moves forward, jointly chaired by Iraq and the United Nations. Seventy-four countries pledged support for Iraq's economic reform efforts at a ministerial conference in May. The U.N. has reported progress in 75 percent of the 400 areas Iraq has identified for action. Later this month, the Iraqi prime minister and the U.N. secretary-general will chair a ministerial level meeting in New York to discuss further progress under the compact and how UNSCR-1770 can be most effectively implemented.

Many of Iraq's neighbors recognize that they have a stake in the outcome of the current conflict in Iraq and are engaging with Iraq in a constructive way. A neighbor's ministerial in May, also attended by the P5 and the G8 has been followed by meetings of working groups on security, border issues, and energy. An ambassadorial-level meeting just took place in Baghdad and another neighbor's ministerial will be held in Istanbul in October.

Against the backdrop of these new mechanisms, the business of being neighbors is quietly unfolding. For the first time in years, Iraq is exporting oil through its neighbor, Turkey, as well as through the Gulf.

Iraq and Kuwait are nearing conclusion on a commercial deal for Kuwait to supply its northern neighbor with critically-needed diesel. Jordan recently issued a statement welcoming the recent leaders' communique and supporting Iraqi's efforts at reconciliation. And Saudi Arabia is planning on opening an embassy in Baghdad, its first since the fall of Saddam.

Syria's role has been more problematic. On one hand, Syria has hosted a meeting of the border security working group and interdicted some foreign terrorists in transit to Iraq. On the other hand, suicide bombers continue to cross the border from Syria to murder Iraqi civilians.

Iran plays a harmful role in Iraq. While claiming to support Iraq in its transition, Iran has actively undermined it by providing lethal capabilities to the enemies of the Iraqi state, as General Petraeus has noted. In doing so, the Iranian government seems to ignore the risks that an unstable Iraq carries for its own interests.

As we look ahead, we must acknowledge that 2006 was a bad year in Iraq. The country came close to unraveling politically, economically, and in security terms.

2007 has brought some improvements. The changes to our strategy last January, the surge, have helped change the dynamics in Iraq for the better.

Our increased presence made besieged communities feel that they could defeat al Qaeda by working with us. Our population security measures have made it much harder for terrorists to conduct attacks. We have given Iraqis the time and space to reflect on what sort of country they want. Most Iraqis genuinely accept Iraq as a multiethnic, multisectarian society. It is a balance of power that is yet to be sorted out.

Enormous challenges remain. Iraqis still struggle with fundamental questions about how to share power, accept their differences, and overcome their past. Whether Iraq reaches its potential is, of course, ultimately the product of Iraqi decisions, but the involvement and support of the United States will be hugely important in shaping a positive outcome.

Our country has given a great deal in blood and treasure to stabilize the situation in Iraq and help Iraqis build institutions for a united democratic country governed under the rule of law. Realizing this vision will take more time and patience on the part of the United States.

I cannot guarantee success in Iraq. I do believe, as I have described, that it is attainable. I am certain that abandoning or drastically curtailing our efforts will bring failure, and the consequences of such a failure must be clearly understood by us all.

An Iraq that falls into chaos or civil war will mean massive human suffering well beyond what has already occurred within Iraq's borders. It could well invite the intervention of regional states, all of which see their future connected to Iraq's in some fundamental way. Undoubtedly, Iran would be a winner in this scenario consolidating its influence over Iraqi resources and possibly territory. The Iranian president has already announced that Iran will fill any vacuum in Iraq.

In such an environment, the gains made against Al Qaeda and other extremist groups could easily evaporate and they could establish strongholds to be used as safe havens for regional and international operations. Our current course is hard; the alternatives are far worse. Every strategy requires recalibration as time goes on. This is particularly true in an environment like Iraq where change is a daily or hourly occurrence.

As chief of mission in Iraq, I am constantly assessing our efforts and seeking to ensure that they're coordinated with and complementary to the military. I believe that thanks to the support of Congress we have an appropriate civilian posture in Iraq. Over the coming year, we will continue to increase our civilian efforts outside of Baghdad and the international zone. This presence has allowed us to focus on capacity building, especially in the provinces. The number of provincial reconstruction teams has grown from 10 to 25 this year.

In support of these efforts, we will be seeking additional economic assistance, including additional quick response funds for capacity building. We will also seek support for two significant proposals that hold the prospect of creating permanent jobs for thousands of Iraqis. One would be the establishment of an Iraqi/American enterprise fund modeled on our successful funds in Poland, and elsewhere in Central Europe.

Such a fund could make equity investments in new and revamped firms based in Iraq. The second would be a large-scale operations and maintenance facility based on our highway trust fund. On a cost- sharing basis, such a fund would train Iraqis to budget for and maintain important public sector infrastructure such as power plants, dams, and roads. Over time the cost-sharing would phase down and out leaving behind well-trained professionals and instilling the habits of preventative maintenance.

We will continue our efforts to assist Iraqis in the pursuit of national reconciliation while recognizing that progress on this front may come in many forms and must ultimately be done by Iraqis themselves. We will seek additional ways to neutralize regional interference and enhance regional and international support. And we will help Iraqis consolidate the positive developments at local levels and connect them with the national government.

Finally, I expect we will invest much effort in developing the strategic partnership between the United States and Iraq which is an investment in the future of both countries.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank the gentlemen. Since we had a few moments of --

(END LIVE FEED, IN PROGRESS)

KYRA PHILLIPS, CNN ANCHOR, CNN NEWSROOM: The commanding general and the U.S. ambassador testify before Congress on the situation in Iraq. Our Pentagon Correspondent Jamie McIntyre checking the facts as we hear them. Stay with us right here, in the CNN NEWSROOM for continuing live coverage of the progress report.

DON LEMON, CNN ANCHOR, CNN NEWSROOM: And, Kyra, we also want to remind our viewers you can watch this testimony online. Testimony of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker will be live and free on CNN.com in its entirety. We're back in a moment.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

PHILLIPS: We're keeping an eye on General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker's testimony all day today. You can, too, online. It's live and free on cnn.com. You can watch it in its entirety.

Meanwhile changing a war plan is one thing, changing minds on Capitol Hill is another. CNN Congressional Correspondent Jessica Yellin brings us up to speed on the back and forth.

Hi, Kyra.

JESSICA YELLIN, CNN CONGRESSIONAL CORRESPONDENT: Hi, Kyra.

Well, General Petraeus' testimony made some news today. He announced he does plan to withdraw 30,000 combat troops from Iraq by next summer, by July of next year. That's his recommendation. He said in his testimony this morning that he plans to bring one Marine unit home this month. An Army brigade home in December. And he says that drawdown will continue through July of 2008.

He also emphasized this message that you expected to hear from him, and he certainly sent it home. He said premature withdrawal would be devastating in Iraq. Let's listen to what he had to say.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

GEN. DAVID PETRAEUS, U.S. CMDR., IRAQ: The military objectives of the surge are in large measure being met. In recent months in the face of tough enemies and the brutal summer heat of Iraq, coalition and Iraqi security forces have achieved progress in the security arena. Though the improvements have been uneven across Iraq, I believe that we will be able to reduce our forces to the pre-surge level of brigade combat teams by next summer without jeopardizing the security gains that we have fought so hard to achieve.

Beyond that, while noting that the situation in Iraq remains complex, difficult, and sometimes downright frustrating, I also believe that it is possible to achieve our objectives in Iraq over time.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

YELLIN: Now, he says that U.S. forces truly are making substantial progress. He says there has been a decline in violence in eight of the last 12 weeks there. He says the Iraqi military is stepping up and that Iraqis are turning on Al Qaeda in areas beyond Anbar Province.

Kyra, he also went out of his way to emphasize that this was his own testimony. He wrote it himself. And he was clearly pushing back against accusations by Moveon.org that he's simply a shill for the White House.

But despite the testimony, the charts and the graphs, Democrats tell us that this is not a surprise. They expected him to claim that there is success in Iraq, and Democrats even before Petraeus spoke said that they are ready to start pulling out troops even more quickly than Petraeus. It's too late.

PHILLIPS: All right, Jessica Yellin, live on the Hill. I thought we were going to hear a little bit more from the testimony. Apologize for that. We'll continue to talk to you, of course, in the next couple of hours.

LEMON: The commanding general and the U.S. ambassador testify before Congress. You're looking at it live now. What is -- on the situation in Iraq. Our Pentagon Correspondent Jamie McIntyre, he is checking the facts for us as we hear them. Make sure you stay with us right here in the CNN NEWSROOM, for continuing live coverage of their progress report. Right back.

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LEMON: We're going to get to our Fact Desk in just a bit, with Jamie McIntyre. But we want to get you back to the Q&A part of the hearings today. General Petraeus being questioned by the Tom Lantos, Representative Tom Lantos from California. He is a House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman. Let's take a listen.

(BEGIN LIVE FEED, IN PROGRESS)

REP. THOMAS LANTOS (D), CHAIRMAN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS CMTE.: Considerably more rapid withdrawals than you do, particularly in view of the fact that our global security requirements seem not to be part of the calculation that you properly are making, because you are commander for Iraq. You have no responsibility for Afghanistan, or for any other contingency that might arise.

GEN. DAVID PETRAEUS, U.S. CMDR., IRAQ: Admiral Fallon fully supports the recommendation that I have made, as do the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In fact, I also talked to the chief of staff of the Army most recently this morning.

We had discussions about the pace of the mission transition, but there has been no recommendation I am aware of that would have laid out by any of those individuals a more rapid withdrawal, and so again I'm at a loss. Again, I'm the commander in Iraq. I've given you my best professional military advice on how to accomplish the mission that the Multinational Force Iraq has, and that is represented in the recommendations that I have made.

Having said that, I did, indeed, take into account, as I mentioned, the strain on the ground forces. My last job I was in Army position responsible for some 18 or so schools and centers, and experienced that very much. I might add I was at Fort Benning, Georgia, this past Friday, and spoke to the lieutenants, captains, and noncommissioned officers there as well, and did, indeed, address that same fact.

That was factored in, but again what I have provided is as the Multinational Force Iraq commander, and that's, of course, I think what you would want me to provide to my chain of command. My recommendation on how to accomplish the mission that we have at this time.

LANTOS: Thank you very much. Ambassador Crocker, I would like to explore with you the possibility of a diplomatic surge. This administration has been singularly hostile to exploring diplomatic initiatives with countries and governments that we disapprove of. As a matter of fact, had it not been for congressional initiatives I very much doubt that we would be as far along vis-a-vis North Korea, as we happen to be at the moment, or that we would be having diplomatic relations with Libya.

Both of these were basically lubricated by congressional initiatives, not by the administration. Now, you have been allowed to participate in singularly circumscribed meetings with Iranian officials. Would you share with us your professional judgment as to the desirability of expanding our diplomatic dialogue with both Syria and Iran, which the administration at the moment seems to be opposed to.

RYAN CROCKER, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have had some experience in the past, as I think you know, in negotiating with the Iranians for a period after 9/11. There were U.N. sponsored talks on Afghanistan that brought us together with the Iranians. And for a certain period we had pretty good success in coming to some agreements on the formation of the Afghan interim government, on dealing with warlords, on some security-related issues and so forth. So I had that as a perspective when I held my meetings with my Iranian counterpart in Iraq, and I found a -- really a completely different atmosphere than that which I'd experienced in 2001-2002.

I laid out the concerns we had over Iranian activity that was damaging to Iraq's security, but found no readiness on the Iranian side at all to engage seriously on these issues. The impression I came away with after a couple of rounds is that the Iranians were interested simply in the appearance of discussions, of being seen to be at the table with the U.S. as arbiter of Iraq's present and future rather, than actually doing serious business.

So what I would like to see, Mr. Chairman, is as a first step, the Iranians taking some measures on the ground to qualitatively improve Iraqi security, which they say is in their own interest. If they are prepared to do that, and as I have indicated in my discussions with them, we're prepared to discuss other areas with respect to possibly beneficial cooperation between us on Iraq. And we could see where it goes from there.

But right now I haven't seen any sign of earnest or seriousness on the Iranian side. Maybe it will come. These things can take time. We leave the option open, but I haven't seen it yet.

LANTOS: May I just pursue that for one more moment. In my opening comments I made reference to Prime Minister Maliki's observation that should the United States leave, he has other friends in the region, meaning clearly Iran. Now, given the long relationship between many of the current Iraqi leadership with Iran, given the long period during which members of the current Iraqi leadership lived in Iran, how serious in your view is this statement to be taken as? And is it possible that Maliki, or others, might at some time in the future turn to Iran as a more dependable, quote/unquote, "friend".

CROCKER: Mr. Chairman, sometimes things are said in the heat of the political moment that upon reflection do not turn out to be the best way to phrase a position. I would refer you, in contrast, to Prime Minister Maliki's statement, which I just saw this morning, I think he made it today, in which he said that Iraq needs the multinational force to be present under the conditions that prevail now in Iraq.

And, of course, Prime Minister Maliki was also a signatory to the April 26th communique that called for a long-term partnership between Iraq and the United States.

The prime minister, like most of the Iraqi leadership, I think recognizes the challenge that Iran poses. One example, I think of that recognition is the fact that when Iranian-backed elements of the Jaish al-Mahdi conducted attacks in Karbala about 10 days ago against one of Shia Islam's holiest shrines and on one of the holiest days of the year.

(END LIVE FEED, IN PROGRESS)

LEMON: You're looking at testimony now from these hearings. Representative Tom Lantos questioning General Petraeus, as well as Ambassador Crocker about Iran. Also diplomatic surge rather than a troop surge. And also asking General Petraeus just exactly how much influence his recommendation would have on other parts of the war, like the war in Afghanistan.

So lots of information, lots of facts to check when it comes to both of these men testifying today, more specifically General Petraeus. Congress listens when he talks. CNN's Iraq Fact Desk is checking the general's testimony. Our Senior Pentagon Correspondent Jamie McIntyre is on the Fact Desk duty.

Jamie, any red flags here? Lots of numbers being tossed around.

JAMIE MCINTYRE, CNN SR. PENTAGON CORRESPONDENT: Yes, say that five times fast.

Let's take a look at the key assertion that General Petraeus made to underscore the fact that he believes he can draw down U.S. troops back to the pre-surge levels by next summer. That is that there's been substantial progress in the lowering the leveling of violence in Iraq. Here's what he said.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

PETRAEUS: As a bottom line, up front, the military objectives of the surge are in large measure being met. In recent months in the face of tough enemies and the brutal summer heat of Iraq, coalition and Iraqi security forces have achieved progress in the security arena.

Though the improvements have been uneven across Iraq, the overall number of security incidents in Iraq has declined in eight of the past 12 weeks with the number of incidents in the last 2 weeks at the lowest level seen since June 2006.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

MCINTYRE: Now, no one is disputing those individual facts, but the government accountability office, among others, has pointed out that those statistics don't always tell us what we think they do. In fact, here is what the GAO said in its report last week. It said, if you skip to the bottom of this text, you can see it says that, "It's unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased -- the key security benchmark -- because it's difficult to measure the perpetrators' intent."

What that gets to is how you define and how you split up all these acts of violence. For instance, one of the things that General Petraeus mentioned is that when you look at Iraq, the security situation has been dramatically better in Anbar Province, to the west of Baghdad. He cited last year 1,350 monthly attacks in Anbar Province as opposed to just 200 in the month of August.

But what he also conceded as we continued to testify is that nobody anticipated that that would happen, and essentially it wasn't part of the surge plan. They didn't think that that was going to -- the surge strategy of putting more troops in was going to result of that. In fact, that happened with the local sheikhs getting together and deciding to go after Al Qaeda. A positive trend but not necessarily something you can tie directly to the surge -- Don.

He said, at least, on their part as well, no one anticipated Iran's influence, as much influence as they would have as well, Jamie.

Also, if you can just talk about this a little bit. He said that Anbar Province is unique. It cannot be replicated, but it does show how extremism can be fought there.

MCINTYRE: That's right. A lot of people have said the Anbar model could be taken around other parts of Iraq, but there's some unique aspects to Anbar province where it is largely an area of homogeneous sheikhs, who have a common interest together. You can't necessarily transplant that to say, Diyala Province, or some place nearby.

LEMON: All right. Jamie McIntyre at our Iraq Fact Desk for us today, on Fact Desk duty.

Thank you. We'll check back with you throughout the day. Thank you, sir.

PHILLIPS: An analysis of the progress report continues ahead in the NEWSROOM, with our analyst David Gergen. You can count on CNN throughout the day to bring you the best coverage and analysis of the Iraq war progress report, even when you're not in front of your television. You can still watch the hearings live on your computer. Go to cnn.com. You will find live coverage throughout the day. We'll be right back.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK) PHILLIPS: As we've been following the testimony today, David Gergen, former adviser to four presidents, pretty much our go-to guy for political analysis has been talking to us about the political implications of today's testimony.

David, just to step away maybe for a minute, I know a lot of people -- a lot of us wanting to hear about when will U.S. troops come home. But as the ambassador pointed out, I think it was he said the logic to the legislation, and how do you share power and resources. And what kind of Iraq do, all of those living in Iraq, really want? When it comes down to it, you can beat the insurgency, you can bring troops home, but there has to be some type of understanding on how the individuals and religious sects want to run this country?

DAVID GERGEN, FMR. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER: Absolutely. I think what we heard today were two very different statements that will cut very different ways, politically. General Petraeus was highly professional, very factual, avoided hyperbole. Did not go too far, did not claim too much success, always cautious.

I think after hearing him with that blizzard of facts and statistics and charts, it's going to be very hard for Democrats now to say let's pull the plug. He really fortified -- General Petraeus fortified the case for lets do this slowly, in a measured way. Let's bring the surge troops out but, let's not make decisions on the rest. That is going to be very hard for the Democrats to overcome that.

By contrast Ambassador Crocker totally failed to come to grips with the central question was you just posed. The president himself said the reason for the surge is let's give the politicians, the Maliki government in Iraq, some breathing space to put together a true reconciliation. And that has been a matter of severe disappointment. That has not happened.

You would think that Ambassador Crocker would have acknowledged that. He would have expressed some disappointment. Instead he came across as a complete apologist for the Maliki government, as if everything is pretty rosy. And we should -- you know -- he was -- whatever they've done wrong, we should just be apologetic -- you came away feeling with him, he's not tough enough. He's very squishy. Is he tough enough to get the job done?

I must tell you that's going to give a lot of ammunition to Democrats to say, well, even if we're making this progress, militarily, you know, we're living in a world of unreality, with our own ambassador, about the politics of this. So, what's the mission here? What's the point of the strategy if it's not to leave behind a national government that govern Iraq. If we are just sort of propping up a Maliki government that we're just going keep making apologies for, I think that's going to -- that drains confidence. Petraeus built confidence, Crocker drained confidence.

PHILLIPS: You know what else he said too, he said, with regard to success, he said, I can't guarantee it, but I believe it's attainable. GERGEN: Well, he did. And they both came down on that. But you know, after you listen to it, you know, we could be doing rope-a-dope in Iraq for years and years to come and say well, success is just around the corner. Where is the sort of the sense, OK, of this is what we need to see. There were some after all, we had some benchmarks that this administration embraced about what they expected to see by this time. Most of those benchmarks have not been met.

Why didn't Ambassador Crocker acknowledge that? Be up front about it, and then we all sort of know we're playing from the same page, and we're all living in the same world.

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