Return to Transcripts main page

CNN Newsroom

Senate Hearing on Security Failures That Led to Capitol Riot. Aired 11-11:30a ET

Aired February 23, 2021 - 11:00   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

[11:00:01]

SEN. AMY KLOBUCHAR (D-MN): Would you agree that this was a highly dangerous situation which was horrific but could have actually been worse without the courage of the officers that you commanded?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes.

KLOBUCHAR: OK.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes.

KLOBUCHAR: Thank you.

So now let's look at what we knew leading up to it or what you knew leading up to it or what people that worked for you knew leading up to it. We knew leading up to it that on January -- leading up to January 6th, the President Trump sent nationwide tweets telling people to come to Washington on January 6th and saying, be there, it will be wild.

And according to public reporting by "The Washington Post," the FBI's Norfolk field office issued a threat report on January 5th that detailed specific calls for violence online in connection with January 6th including the protesters, quote, be ready to fight and, quote, go there ready for war, end quote.

I guess I'll start with you, Mr. Sund, when a critical intelligence report is received by the Capitol police, from an intelligence community source like the FBI, who usually would receive it and I guess I'll start with did you receive this report?

STEVEN SUND, FORMER U.S. CAPITOL POLICE CHIEF: Thank you very much for the question, ma'am.

I actually just in the last 24 hours was informed by the department that they actually had received that report. It was received by what we call -- it is one of our sworn members that is assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force which is a task force with the FBI. They received it the evening of the 5th. Reviewed it and then forwarded it over to an official at the intelligence division over at U.S. Capitol Police headquarters.

KLOBUCHAR: So you hadn't seen it yourself?

SUND: No, ma'am, it did not go any further than that.

KLOBUCHAR: Okay. And then was it sent to the House and Senate sergeant at arms.

SUND: I don't believe it went any further than the sergeant at the Intelligence Division.

KLOBUCHAR: And Mr. Irving and Mr. Stenger, did you get that report?

Beforehand, Mr. Stenger, did you get the report?

MICHAEL STENGER, FORMER SENATE SERGEANT AT ARMS: No.

KLOBUCHAR: OK. Mr. Irving?

PAUL IRVING, FORMER HOUSE SERGEANT AT ARMS: I did not.

KLOBUCHAR: OK. OK. So, I think that may have contributed part to the lack of information but I'll leave that for the future.

Now let's go back to another report that I know on January 3rd, Mr. Sund, you said in your written testimony that the Capitol Police published intelligence assessments of the event including one on January 3rd.

Do you mostly rely on your federal partners like the FBI to gather and analyze intelligence on potential threats to the Capitol and members of Congress?

SUND: Yes. I think what is important to realize as a law enforcement agency, we're a consumer of intelligence and information that's provided by the intelligence community. The intelligence community is 18 federal agencies that collect information, due to the analyzing of the raw data, raw intelligence and then provided to us. So we're reliant on that information to be complete and accurate.

KLOBUCHAR: But in that report, we now know according to your testimony that tens of thousands of participants were likely to descend on Washington. Is that correct?

SUND: Yes, ma'am.

KLOBUCHAR: OK. And that January 3rd memo, according to "The Washington Post," made clear that supporters of President Trump see January 6th as the last opportunity to over turn the results of the presidential election, and that, quote, this sense of desperation and disappointment may lead to more of an incentive to become violent. Is that correct?

SUND: Yes, it is, ma'am.

KLOBUCHAR: The article also quoted the memo as stating that unlike previous post-election protests, the targets of the pro-Trump supporters are not necessarily the counter protesters but rather Congress itself is the target on the 6th, is that right?

SUND: That is correct.

KLOBUCHAR: And did you have any indication that many of these protesters might arrive armed or that members of extremist groups might be there?

SUND: We knew members of extremist groups would be there and there was social media calls for people to come armed, yes.

KLOBUCHAR: You've also said that at a January 5th meeting with Capitol police, the sergeant at arms and federal law enforcement and military officials all present at the meeting indicated that there was no new intelligence to report for January 6th, is that right?

SUND: That is correct, ma'am.

KLOBUCHAR: But your testimony states that the Capitol police took a number of steps after these assessments, like what you said was the largest number of civil disturbance unit platoons possible, increasing dignitary protection coverage, coordinating with the D.C. police and ordering all hands on deck status for Capitol police, is that right?

SUND: That is correct. We took extensive efforts to prepare for the events based on the information and much of which you just reviewed. Yes.

KLOBUCHAR: OK, good. So if the information was enough to get you to do that, why didn't we take some additional steps, why didn't you and others involved to be better prepared to confront the violence?

[11:05:06]

SUND: We expanded our perimeter. When we expanded the perimeter, again, we knew there would be maybe limited violence. But we did.

We expanded the perimeter, we took a number of steps to outfit our personnel with additional hard gear. We developed a plan for if we had protesters that may be armed and that was one of the reasons that the expanded perimeter and the heightened risk that I went to the sergeant at arms and requested the National Guard.

KLOBUCHAR: And -- but now you realize it wasn't enough. The security measures, is that right?

SUND: That is now hindsight being what it is and you look around the Capitol right now and you see the resources that are brought to bear based on the information we now from January 6th.

KLOBUCHAR: OK. Mr. Sund, you stated in your written testimony that you first made a request for the Capitol police board to declare an emergency and authorize National Guard support on Monday, January 4th, and that request was not granted.

SUND: That's correct, ma'am.

KLOBUCHAR: Your testimony makes clear that the current structure of the Capitol police board resulted in delays in bringing in assistance from the National Guard. Would you agree with that?

SUND: Yes.

KLOBUCHAR: That is one of the things that we want to look at.

SUND: Yes, ma'am.

KLOBUCHAR: Do you think that changes are need needed to make clear that the Capitol police officer has the authority to call in the National Guard?

SUND: I certainly do. I think in these circumstances, there needs to be a stream lined process for the Capitol chief -- chief of police with Capitol Police to have authority.

KLOBUCHAR: OK. And. Mr. Stenger, do you think that reforms are needed to the structure of the Capitol Police Board to make that clear?

STENGER: I think review of the Capitol Police Board and their statutory authorities probably would be a good time to do this now. There is a lot of statutes out there on the Capitol Police Board that go back many, many years. Things have changed and it is probably to make the board a little bit more nimble. It's probably not a bad time and idea to take a look at that's there.

KLOBUCHAR: That is probably an understatement with what happened. But thank you.

Mr. Irving, your views?

IRVING: I would certainly agree with both Chief Sund and Michael Stenger. I think a review would certainly be warranted at this time of the Capitol Police Board.

KLOBUCHAR: Mr. Sund, your written testimony states that you had no authority to request the assistance of the National Guard without an emergency declaration of the Capitol police board. On what rule, regulation or authority did you base that view?

SUND: I'd have to go back and look at the specific rule but it is a standing rule that we have. I cannot request the National Guard without a declaration of emergency from the Capitol Police Board. It is kind of interesting because it is very similar to the fact that I can't even give my men and women cold water on a excessively hot day without declaration of emergency. It is just a process that is in place.

KLOBUCHAR: And to be clear, apart from the Capitol police board, you also face delays in getting authorization to bring in the National Guard from the Department of Defense. Is that correct? We'll be hearing from them next week.

SUND: Yes, ma'am. That is correct.

KLOBUCHAR: Would you agree there were serious issues at the Pentagon that contributed to the fact that guard troops did not arrive at the Capitol until about 5:40 that day after most of the violence has subsided.

SUND: I don't know what issues there were at the Pentagon but I was certainly surprised that at the delays I was hearing and I was seeing.

KLOBUCHAR: OK, very good.

And my last question just of all of you -- in addition to the reforms of the police board, which are very clear, need to be made, any other suggestions that wouldn't involve classified information you have for us, Mr. Sund?

SUND: As referenced to some of the recommendations?

KLOBUCHAR: Mm-hmm.

SUND: I would look at, again, one of the big things that I think was a contributing factor was intelligence. I think as you meet with the intelligence community and law enforcement in the intelligence community, we have a good relationship, I think the aperture just needs to be opened up a little bit further.

You know, like Chief Contee had mentioned, you know, January 6th was a new day. It was a change of what threat we face and I think getting them to open the aperture and look a little bit harder.

And I think internally, looking at some of our policies and procedures, our processes for how we handle special events, how we handle incident command was stuff we can do and then looking at physical security of the buildings and the grounds I think is going to be -- is going to be critical.

I know a lot of people have talked about, you know, the fencing, the open environment. I understand and I know that goes way back and members of Congress like the open environment. I think there are ways to develop a more secure campus while keeping an open environment. But I would leave that for a more classified or restricted hearings.

KLOBUCHAR: OK, thank you. Anything that you would add in addition, just any other thing that you would add in addition to what the former police chief laid out here, Mr. Stenger.

[11:10:01]

STENGER: I would be very supportive of those areas that the chief mentioned. I think he's right on. I think there is maybe another area like use of force that probably needs to be coordinated better in the region here. But certainly intelligence needs to be taken a look at as to how it works.

KLOBUCHAR: OK.

STENGER: We have a lot of people that we've ramped up since 9/11. And I think maybe it is time to take a look at how efficient it is on the gathering of intelligence and collection of intelligence.

KLOBUCHAR: OK. Thank you. I'm going to allow my colleagues to ask the same question of you, Mr. Irving, and you, Chief Contee, because I've gone over my time. Thank you.

SEN. GARY PETERS (D-MI), CHAIRMAN, HOMELAND SECURITY & GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE: Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Sund, you've made or brought up the issue of intelligence throughout your testimony and the gaps that were there and how we need to strengthen the intelligence. But I was struck by the fact that you said the FBI report. My understanding is that that report had some fairly specific information that was troubling. That you said that the report did get sent to the Capitol police, that it went to the folks in the intelligence department, but then you were not aware of it, which raises a really big question.

Had something coming in like that right before an event, that I think is significant, it does not get to operational commanders who are there to deal with it? How could that happen? How could you get not get that vital intelligence on the eve of what's going to be a major event?

SUND: Well, thank you, sir.

I know that is something that is going to be looked at. I think that information would have been helpful to be aware of it. Again, you know, looking at the information for the first time yesterday, it is strictly raw data. It is raw intelligence information that has come in, seen on a social media post. Lots of people post things on social media, that need to be, you know, corroborated and confirmed.

So it, again, it is coming in as raw data, so please keep that in mind. But I agree, that is something that we need to look at, what is the process and how do we stream line that information to get it where it needs to go.

PETERS: Well, I understand it's raw data, but it's the eve of the event. You're not going to have the time to do the analysis that you would normally like to do. That is information that has to get to you. So that's clearly a major problem.

And my question is also related to the report that was put out by Capitol Police by your intelligence folks on January 3rd. The intelligence division of the Capitol police issued a internal report which reportedly stated and this is been out in the public domain, that instead of targeting counter-protesters, as you've seen in the prior events that occurred that you've referenced earlier, that, quote, this is, quote, though it is in the public domain that Congress itself is the target on the 6th by Trump supporters. Congress was the target.

The report also mentioned that members of the Proud Boys, white supremacist groups, other extremist groups would be in attendance and, quote, again, out in public sources, may be inclined to become violent.

So you have your own report. Did you see that report that was put out on 3rd?

SUND: Yes, I did.

PETERS: So, how is that not a warning of some extraordinary measures? Now I understand you increased and you had folks there and you increased your presence. But how was that not really a big warning flag? And if it was, what exactly did you do when you read that report?

SUND: So, that was -- one of that reports contributed to the fact that we expanded our perimeter. I reached out, you know, looking out it, I reached out to the Metropolitan Police Department knowing before that report, knowing what that -- that extremists were likely to be there in the previous reports that has been called for on social media for people to be armed, in talking with our partners over the Metropolitan Police Department, I reached out to say, hey, will you provide us some support and we coordinated the additional support the morning of the 6th.

So, yeah, we did take all that into consideration as we developed the extensive security plans for this event.

PETERS: So you changed plans on January 3rd after getting that report?

SUND: Yeah, just our perimeter. We did a number of things. We actually were adjusting our perimeter a little bit before that as well.

PETERS: So, that was happening before. So, we're going to want to know more specifically when you get that. And then, of course, I think we're going to see you get additional information from the FBI for example. But that did not get to you.

SUND: Right.

PETERS: So I understand that.

SUND: Yeah.

PETERS: I think it is important for us to understand and I heard all of you mentioned this in your -- in your testimony, that this was not just -- it's actually in response to Chairwoman Klobuchar's question, it is not just a random violent attack, it was actually coordinated that you saw.

[11:15:01]

And I believe in your testimony as well, I'm going to ask other witnesses to respond to this, too, because you all mentioned.

How do you define coordinated? What did we actually see from these folks that lead you to believe that it was coordinated? And I think in your testimony now, you just mentioned military style coordination.

So, that would mean command and control. It would mean understanding the layout of the Capitol and it may mean knowing the internal operations of defense perimeters, of folks that are engaged. Talk to me, what did you see that leads to you believe this is a coordinated attack? And I would like our other witness engage in that as well.

SUND: Yeah. I may able to provide a quick overview of why I think it was a coordinated attack.

One, these people came specifically with equipment. You're bringing climbing gear to a demonstration. You're bringing explosives. You're bringing chemical spray such as what Captain Mendoza talked about. You're coming prepared.

The fact that the group that attacked our west front, attacked our west front, 20 minutes -- approximately 20 minutes before the event over at the ellipse ended which means they were planning on our agency not being at what they call full strength, you know, watching the other events and that is ending and everybody get on post, they're marching our way, knowing that we may not be at full strength at that time.

And also the fact that we're dealing with two pipe bombs that were set off the edge of our perimeter to -- what I suspect draw resources away. I think there was a significant coordination with this attack.

PETERS: Anyone else -- Chief Contee? I think you also believe it's a coordinated attack?

ROBERT CONTEE, ACTING CHIEF OF D.C. METROPOLITAN POLICE: Oh, absolutely. My view is from the day of the incident.

I think there were hand signals that were being used by several of the insurrectionists. There were radio communication by several individuals that were involved. The coordinated use of chemical admissions to include bear spray by several people that were out there, I certainly believe it was coordinated.

To Chief Sund's point regarding the placement of the pipe bombs in the areas, their discovery prior to this event, all of those things. And plus adding to that, what we know in hindsight now as a result of the ongoing investigation that is being handled by the FBI as they continue to scrub social media, I think we're learning more and more that this is clearly a coordinated effort.

PETERS: Real quick, Mr. Irving, and then I'll ask another question real quick. Mr. Irving?

IRVING: Based on the information provided by Chief Contee and Chief Sund, I would agree, the evidence would indicate a coordinated attack.

PETERS: So we're looking at folks that were coming out in the intelligence reports, that groups like the Oath Keepers, Proud Boys, others were engaged, these violent extremist groups, which we clearly need to collect more intelligence on. It will be the subject of another hearing that we'll do regarding this.

But if you look at what the DOJ is now prosecuting, 200 federal cases. The FBI has linked at least 40 to extremist groups and 59 to other defendants that have connections on social media, the violent or extremist rhetoric, conspiracy theories. This is clearly an area that we've got to focus on as to why did we not have more information about these groups that were coming here, planning, and usually you leave a trail when you are planning. Either that you're sophisticated using encrypted devices on other things, but those are things that we're going to have to be looking at.

Clearly, the National Guard presence was critical. I know you're going to get a lot of questions related to that.

But, Chief Contee, in my remaining time, just a question and you mentioned this in your testimony, but in an earlier statement, Chief, you stated that you were stunned by the -- by, quote, the tepid response of the Army officials in response to Chief Sund's request for assistance while the violent siege was -- was escalating.

Clearly, here, we got a coordinated attack, all of you saw this immediately the way they were doing, I can imagine the conversations with the National Guard.

And, Chief, you were stunned by the tepid response. Could you clarify that and tell us exactly how those conversations went?

CONTEE: Yeah. So just after -- sometime after 2:00 p.m., I had left the west front of the Capitol after initially being at the scene, assessing what was going on, looking at just how violent -- looking at the violent actions that were taken place.

Shortly thereafter, there was a phone call that was convened between several officials. Chief Sund was on the call, literally pleading for -- there were several Army officials on the phone. I don't know all by name who were on the call. Several officials from district government that were on the scene and Chief Sund was pleading for the deployment of the National Guard.

And in response to that, there was not an immediate yes, the National Guard is responding.

[11:20:04]

Yes, the National Guard is on the way. Yes, the National Guard are being restaged from traffic posts to respond.

The response was more asking about the plan, what was the plan for the National Guard, and the response was more focused on in addition to the plan, the optics about how this looks with boots on the ground on the Capitol.

And my response to that was simply, I was just stunned that I have officers that are literally fighting for their lives and we're kind of going through what seemed like an exercise to check the boxes and there was not an immediate response. When I asked specifically, Steve Sund, Chief Sund, was he requesting National Guard and was that request being denied. The response was no, we're not -- from the U.S. Department of Army, was no, we're not denying the request, but they were concerned, they did have concerns.

So, I was just -- again just stunned at that response. PETERS: Thank you.

Senator Blunt?

SEN. ROY BLUNT (R-MO): Thank you, Chairman.

Chief Sund, if I have your testimony correct this morning, I think what I'm hearing you say is based on intelligence you saw on January 3rd, after that on January 4th, you decided this was going to be a different kind of protest than we've -- you've seen in November and December, and that's when you ask for an expanded perimeter and National Guard assistance, is that correct?

SUND: So, the information we received, yes. It was very similar to the previous assessments. It was just a little bit more detailed. We had been analyzing kind of how we responded to the previous MAGA marches and decided to expand the perimeter.

Really, when you expand a perimeter as large as we expanded it, it creates a large area you have to defend and that was the primary reason knowing that these protests were coming here, we were the focused of the protests, and expanded perimeter and we knew this was going to be a long day. The --

BLUNT: So did you know from the time you expanded the perimeter that you were going to have to have more help in all likelihood to defend that perimeter than your force would be able to provide?

SUND: We knew the additional support would be -- we could -- we could utilize the additional support, yes.

BLUNT: So why did you believe that you needed the approval of Mr. Irving and Mr. Stenger to request assistance to the National Guard?

SUND: That's always been the case. We only request the National Guard for very specific events. Usually the inauguration and that requires a declaration of emergency from the Capitol Police Board to utilize those resources.

BLUNT: Do you know if there's a statutory requirement for that?

SUND: I could look into that and get that to you as a follow-up.

BLUNT: I don't -- I don't know that there is. But I do know that if you get the approval to expand the perimeter and you don't have the assistance to do that, that's obviously a problem.

Why didn't you contact the third member of the police board, the architect of the Capitol, Mr. Blanton?

SUND: Thank you for that question, sir.

My conduit to the Capitol Police Board was usually through the House and Senate sergeant at arms. They were the ones usually have the communications with the department, especially law enforcement-related issues. They're both law enforcement, and also the fact that Mr. Stenger at the time as the Capitol Police Board chairperson.

But usually, outside the monthly Capitol Police Board meeting that we'd have, unless it was an issue specific to the architect, regarding, you know, building structures, something like that, my conduit was regularly the House and Senate sergeant of arms.

BLUNT: Why do you think the architect of the Capitol is on the Police Board?

SUND: As one of the voting members in providing oversight.

BLUNT: But apparently not enough oversight that you thought you needed to involve him in the conversation.

SUND: Like I said, my usual conduit was going through the House and Senate sergeant at arms. You know, that's already two people I've got to go to. You don't want -- you know, going to three. You know, in the future, I guess if that's something that is going to be -- you know, that we'll implement, then I will implement it.

But that's -- I was just following my usual course of action.

BLUNT: So, Mr. Irving and Mr. Stanger both.

Let's start with Mr. Irving. Why was the request for National Guard assistance not approved at the same time you approved the expansion of the perimeter? Mr. Irving?

I think you're muted Mr. Irving.

Now you're definitely muted. OK. Now you should be fine. Go ahead.

IRVING: Am I okay now?

BLUNT: You're okay now.

KLOBUCHAR: Yes.

IRVING: Thank you. I apologize for that.

Senator, I did not take the call from Chief Sund on the 4th as a request. Chief Sund called me to tell me that he had received an offer from the National Guard to provide us 125 unarmed troops to work traffic control in the perimeter of the Capitol.

[11:25:13]

Shortly after that discussion, I said, let's include Sergeant at Arms Stenger as chair of the board and another senior official with quite a bit of experience. The three of us talked it through. And during that call, the number one question on the table was did the intelligence support it? Did the intelligence support that additional offer for those 125 troops? And --

BLUNT: Did you -- did you discuss this with anybody except Sergeant at Arms Stenger and Chief Sund?

IRVING: No. It was just this one phone call, and during that call, we all agreed that the intelligence did not support the troops and collectively decided to let it go.

Michael Stenger then said, how about we put them on stand-by just in case and that's what we ended up doing. But from what happened --

BLUNT: OK.

(CROSSTALK)

IRVING: -- very satisfied that we had a robust plan, security plan that was consistent with the intelligence that we had at the time.

BLUNT: Mr. Stenger, why -- why did -- why did you think that -- that the troops were on stand-by?

They must have been standing way away from where we needed them if it took hours to get them here. What did that mean, they were going to be on stand-by?

STENGER: Well, I did when I spoke to the chief, when the chief were up to the -- this attempt to get the National Guard and apparently wasn't going forward, I suggested to him that we reach out. We knew the National Guard commander from his previous work in the Metropolitan Police Department and I suggested to reach out to the National Guard commander for a couple of reasons.

One of them was I had read in the paper or heard on the news that the National Guard in D.C. was rather reticent to engage with demonstrations at this time because of the issues that had arisen there in the White House demonstrations a month ago. And that -- that we needed to make sure that the National Guard was engaged in this and that they would be willing to --

BLUNT: But do you think you did make sure that they were engaged and would be willing? I'm going to have to go to another -- one more question here. Did you think they were engaged and would be willing if called on?

STENGER: Yeah, that is what I think -- what I asked the chief to determine from the general.

(CROSSTALK)

BLUNT: All right. Mr. Irving, you said in your testimony that when asked for National Guard assistance, you approved it. Mr. Sund stated that he asked for the National Guard assistance at 1:09 and you approved -- and it was approved at 2:10. Why would it take an hour to approve National Guard assistance on your part in that moment of crisis? Mr. Irving?

IRVING: Senator, from my recollection, I did not receive a request for approval for National Guard until shortly after 2:00 p.m. when I was in Michael Stenger's office. BLUNT: All right. Let me get that straightened out.

Mr. Sund, do you know when you asked for National Guard assistance? Was it 1:09 or was it 2:00 p.m.?

SUND: It was 1:09, sir.

BLUNT: One o nine, and who did you ask for assistance at 1:09?

SUND: It was from Mr. Irving. I believe he was in the company of Mr. Stenger at time as well.

BLUNT: And, Mr. Irving, why would you not remember that?

IRVING: Senator, I have no recollection of a conversation with Chief Sund. At that time, I was on the floor during the Electoral College session. And my conversation with Chief Sund in that timeframe was shortly before 1:30 when I recall he was describing conditions outside as deteriorating.

He may, in fact, be submitting a request and I carried that forward and that was as much as I could tell you. I have no phone record of a call from Chief Sund. The first record --

(CROSSTALK)

BLUNT: Did you -- did you discuss that -- that request at 1:09 or whenever you got it with anybody else? Or did you and Mr. Stenger make that decision then?

IRVING: No, I did not get a request at 1:09 that I can remember. The first conversation I had with Chief Sund in that time frame was at 1:28, 1:30. And at that -- in that conversation, he indicated that conditions were deteriorating, he might be looking to -- for National Guard approval and approval.