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Amanpour
Interview with Former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Kathleen Stephens; Interview with The Soufan Group Director of Research Colin Clarke; Interview with Former Counsel to U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Rattner; Interview with The Atlantic Staff Writer David Frum. Aired 1-2p ET
Aired December 04, 2024 - 13:00 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
[13:00:00]
BIANNA GOLODRYGA, CNN ANCHOR: Hello, everyone, and welcome to "Amanpour." Here's what's coming up.
In South Korea, the people fight back. After a shock announcement of martial law is overturned, has crisis been averted? And what does it mean
for the world? I'm joined by the former U.S. ambassador to Seoul.
Then, Syrian rebels make further gains despite Assad and Putin pushing back. We get the latest.
And --
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
STEVEN RATTNER, FORMER COUNSEL TO U.S. TREASURY SECRETARY: It is very hard to see what in this in this pile of policy ideas is going to have people,
four years from now, feeling they're better off.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
GOLODRYGA: Why there may be trouble ahead for the U.S. economy if Trump enacts his agenda. Christiane gets the details with Steve Raffner,
investor, economic analyst, and former counselor to the U.S. Treasury Secretary.
Then --
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
DAVID FRUM, STAFF WRITER, THE ATLANTIC: People may fear you, but they won't respect you, they won't trust you.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
GOLODRYGA: -- under Trump, could America become one of the world's biggest bullies? The Atlantic's David Brom thinks so, and he tells Walter Isaacson
why.
Welcome to the program, everyone. I'm Bianna Golodryga in New York, sitting in for Christiane Amanpour.
South Koreans may be sleeping a little easier tonight after the chaos of Tuesday, when an outpouring of people and politicians of every stripe
banded together to protect the country's hard-won democracy. Today, many are demanding the impeachment and resignation of President Yoon Suk Yeol,
after he sprung a surprise declaration of martial law late Tuesday night, calling in the military to the country's National Assembly, and leading to
these staggering images of a South Korean opposition leader hopping a fence to get inside and vote down the measure, something 190 South Korean
parliamentarians successfully and unanimously did.
The events have been a shock for South Korea's allies across the world, especially the United States, which has nearly 30,000 troops posted in the
country.
Joining me now to discuss what comes next is the former U.S. ambassador to South Korea, Kathleen Stephens. She joins us now from Washington, D.C.
Madam Ambassador, thank you so much for taking the time. What a whirlwind the past 24 hours have been and we still have likely weeks, if not months
before we have a real sense of stability in South Korea.
Parliament has submitted a vote on removing the president by either Friday or Saturday. To do so, they'll need a super majority, two-thirds of backing
of the country's 300 National Assembly, which would require at least a handful of the president's -- members of the President's own party to join
that vote. Do you think they will likely succeed in ousting him?
KATHLEEN STEPHENS, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH KOREA: Well, I think that it's going to be a close vote. Certainly, just to wind back a little
bit, I do think that a crisis was averted with the decision to rescind the martial law decree just a few hours after it was announced but it's left
President Yoon, and as you say, a very, very vulnerable position.
In the vote to nullify the martial law decree that the National Assembly voted in the dead of night with soldiers surrounding them, as you
described, they were joined by about 10 members of the president's party, the ruling party, including the leader of that party and other people from
the president's party, President Yoon's, not in the National Assembly, for example, the mayor of Seoul also immediately condemned the martial law.
So, given that, given the fact that the leading conservative newspaper in South Korea this morning called what Yoon did an insult to Korea's
democracy, I think that there will be some votes from the National Assembly -- in the National Assembly from the ruling party for impeachment. Whether
it'll be enough, they'll probably need about 10 or so, hard to call, but I'd say that President Yoon is in a pretty precarious position right now.
GOLODRYGA: Let's take a glass half full approach given the history of instability in the country and military rule up until just the last 40
years, the fact that we saw in the early morning hours thousands of Koreans take to the street, really a force of democracy at play in real-time across
televisions around the world. Was that, in the midst of all the chaos and instability, something that was at least somewhat reassuring for you to
watch?
[13:05:00]
STEPHENS: Well, for me, it was actually -- I would say it was somewhat inspiring. I bring a personal element to this before I was -- long before I
was ambassador to Korea. I was a political officer in Korea in the 1980s for six years as I watched a very tumultuous and not inevitable move
towards democracy.
So, seeing what happened over the last 24 hours here, yes, I actually take some hope from that, that -- the issue of people power in Korea is a very
interesting one. It plays out a little bit differently than in other countries. And it goes back deep into Korea's history even before the
modern era. But when people are on the streets peacefully protesting, it does have a big impact on what happens in the government. So, I think it is
something to watch.
And I do think that the fact that -- especially those scenes that that you showed at the National Assembly, where very heavily armed troops were sent
immediately to the National Assembly after this declaration of martial law by President Yoon, the speaker of the National Assembly asked them to step
back, and they did. And they allowed the -- and that's what allowed this vote to go forward. And then, you have this immediate response from people.
So, I think it was something that forestalled a real constitutional crisis. There's still obviously many difficulties ahead, but yes, I would say more
than half full. I think we did see some of the strength and resilience as well as the difficulties for Korean democracy altogether in the last 24
hours or so.
GOLODRYGA: Yes, and assuming we don't see a resignation from President Yoon himself, even if parliament does vote successfully by a two-thirds
majority to oust him, I believe then it goes to the South Korea's constitutional court to reaffirm that vote. But this all leads to the
question of how could this happen and how did no one see this coming?
I mean, we know President Biden has invested a lot of political capital, a lot of time in his pivot to Asia by investing heavily in the U.S.
relationship with South Korea. He was traveling in Africa at the time yesterday, but it was notable that it took several hours for the White
House to really put out a concrete statement in response to what was unfolding. What do you make of that and the fact that there didn't seem to
be many warning signs at all as to what would unfold?
STEPHENS: Right. Well, I mean, I think Washington was blindsided by this, as was all of South Korea outside of President Yoon's very, very small
circle. In fact, many people in his military and his government also did not know this was coming.
So, part of the answer is, and this is -- I think that this was a rather impulsive, if I may say, act by President Yoon that he took a, you know,
high risk and a risk that it looks like he's going to pay a pretty high price for having taken.
But certainly, I think, in Washington, in the U.S., people were well aware that President Yoon's popularity or polling is pretty low. He's struggled
with the fact that the National Assembly is strongly in the opposition party's hands ever since the April National Assembly elections this year.
He's a lame duck. He's been struggling with a long-term doctor's strike. But I think Yoon himself did this rather impulsively out of frustration
consulting with a very isolated group. And it caught everyone, including Washington, by surprise.
That said, I think Washington and, you know, the administration did, you know, make clear that they hope this went forward, according to rule of
law. I think very relieved, obviously, that President Yoon pulled back so quickly. But now, it's going to be watching a lot more closely what
happens.
GOLODRYGA: Yes.
STEPHENS: I'm sure there's also, you know, a little bit of regret that President Yoon, who has been a good partner for Washington, for the Biden
administration and strengthening the alliance's relationship and working together is in this kind of trouble. but that said, I would also say, as
someone who has seen U.S.-Korea relations through thick and thin and also through peaceful transfers of power or across the political spectrum for
the last 30 plus years, the alliance is very strong, and that's shown in public polling in both countries. It's shown in the positions of the
respective parties, notwithstanding their polarization on other issues, support for the alliance, the U.S.-South Korea working together on a
variety of fronts, not only security front and so many other areas. It really is one of the few, I would say, bipartisan agreements in South
Korea. And dare I say, I hope in the United States as well.
GOLODRYGA: And hopefully, even if the democratic process goes forward unimpeded now, there will likely be elections sometime soon, sooner than
the last time that we saw a president in that country impeached. And we should note that that president, that what led to the impeachment was a
case prosecuted by President Yoon himself. That took six months to ultimately elect a new president. It looks like things could move swifter
here and quicker.
[13:10:00]
But there will likely be an opposition, the Democracy Party in power in the presidency, which would have significant foreign policy implications for
the United States as well. As you've noted, President Yoon invested heavily in the relationship with the United States. He reached out to restabilize a
very icy relationship with Japan. And focused -- his alignment was really with that of the United States in terms of taking on North Korea. And we
should also note, arming Ukraine as well.
Do you worry at all about what a change in leadership and party and leadership policy could mean for all of those areas?
STEPHENS: Well, I think that what serves the U.S. best, if you like, and the U.S.-Korea alliance and relationship in all these areas where we do
have such a close relationship is that the leader in power in South Korea be someone who enjoys a strong democratic mandate and legitimacy within the
context of South Korea's political environment. And with that, I think we found over time that we do work together very well, because, as I said, I
think that there is a sense of shared understanding in South Korea, particularly given the current geopolitical climate, the pressures from
China, all the rest of it that we really do need to work together and deepen the alliance.
That said, I don't want to under underestimate the challenges that lie ahead for Korea and some of the strains that can cause sometimes in
continuity of policy. And of course, we're going to have our own transition here as well.
But I would say, just to say a little bit more about what that transition, you're right. If the National Assembly votes to impeach President Yoon,
then it goes to a constitutional court. The court would have to vote that he be impeached before he would then lose office and there would be an
election. And as you say, that could take some months.
In the interim, the acting president would be the sitting prime minister who is very well known to the United States. His name is Han Duck-soo. He
has been prime minister now twice. It was my counterpart in Washington when I was ambassador in Seoul, former minister of finance, definitely a safe
pair of hands. So, I think there would be continuity, although, obviously, you need to have an election. You need to have a leader.
That said, my other comment would be, I would -- I do not take it as a given that in a presidential election, whenever the next Korean
presidential elections had that a certain party would win. All the parties have their problems, have their challenges, and it's not clear to me at all
how that would come out.
GOLODRYGA: And as you said, we have an upcoming transition of our own here in the United States as well. Kathleen Stephens, thank you so much for your
time. Appreciate it.
Well, we turn next to Syria, where rebels are pressing forward into the Hama region after taking the country's second largest city of Aleppo. The
surprising offensive reigniting a largely dormant war. As you can see on this map, government forces still maintain control over most of the
country, but the new assault has put Assad and his allies, Russia and Iran, on the back foot for the first time in years.
Let's get the latest on what this means with Colin Clarke. He's the director of research at Suphon Group, a global intelligence and security
consultancy. Colin, welcome to the program. As we noted, things have been pretty muted there in the conflict, frozen is probably a better term, since
2020. Has this eruption now from the insurgent fighters, has this -- in the rebel fighters, has this surprised you at all, especially -- not to draw a
comparison with South Korea, but this also last week caused a lot of surprise around the world.
COLIN CLARKE, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH, THE SOUFAN GROUP: Thanks for having me, Bianna. Indeed, it was surprising. There's been murmurings of a
mounting rebel offensive. The Turks, in some ways, who support some of these groups that make up part of this kind of broader rebel alliance had
been trying to hold back and restrain as they tried to, you know, push forth some diplomatic maneuverings with the Assad regime.
When those failed, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which is the largest of the rebel groups and probably the most powerful, pushed forth, and it was almost as
if Ankara was then trying to play catch up with Abu Muhammad Jilani and HTS. And so, we're in a situation now, you referenced Hama where, you know,
these -- the rebels are on the march on the Assad regime is growing increasingly concerned, as are its external patrons in Moscow and Tehran.
GOLODRYGA: So, what are the consequences of gaining control of not only Aleppo, but if they do ultimately gain control of Hama as well?
CLARKE: Well, look, they're, you know, carving out a bigger chunk of territory within Syria. And with that, they're actually putting a lot of
resources, effort and energy toward governance. We've seen them attempting to take concern for civilians. We've seen them attempt to provide various
services to local populations. This is really smart politics on the part of HTS. It's something that they've learned from the mistakes of the Islamic
State, watching how ISIS had alienated local Syrians. They're trying not to replicate that. And in many ways, they're hoping to acquire more legitimacy
than the Assad regime has.
[13:15:00]
GOLODRYGA: Yes, and we should note HTS, as you noted, its connection with ISIS also splintered off of Al Qaeda back in 2017 and had been on the U.S.
terror watch list as well, but there's been an evolution. I mean, the terror list as well, there's been an evolution of not only the group, but
especially its leader. This may have been a surprise insurgency that we saw last week, but it was one that appeared to be very well planned and
prepared for.
What do you make of this change in demeanor and this approach of sort of welcoming all of the different sex in the region there, specifically
reaching out to Christians, saying that they're not a threat to them? Is this something that you think is lasting? Is this a facade? What more do we
know about the leader of this group?
CLARKE: Yes. So, again, smart politics on behalf of Abu Mohammad al- Julani. There's pictures of him today in Northwest Syria, almost looking like a Castro type figure of modern day revolutionary. You know, whether or
not this group is actually moderated compared to its past, it seems so, but I would just like to say, if you're moderate compared to Al Qaeda, you're
still pretty extreme, right?
These aren't an army of Jeffersonian Democrats marching through the Syrian countryside. There's still some really bad individuals among this group.
So, while the Assad regime is deplorable and odious in many ways, let's not pick sides. And I see this kind of false -- you know, this false debate
taking place online of, well, HTS isn't that bad. They're better than the Assad regime. We don't want any terrorist group controlling large swaths of
territory because typically when that happens, we see external operations against the west emanating from those areas.
GOLODRYGA: Yes, Assad is the brutal dictatorship that, that we know now. It's -- and you can sort of go back to the saying that the enemy of my
enemy may very well still be an enemy, and that seems to be the approach from the U.S. at this point, others in the region, including Israel, are
cautiously watching things unfold.
Russia and Moscow says it is still backing Assad and his military. But how spread thin is Moscow at this point? They withdrew their troops once they
invaded Ukraine for the second time in 2022. We know that Iran has been hurt significantly with its proxy Hezbollah essentially being decimated in
terms of the number of fighters that can participate in Syria as well. Where does this leave Assad?
CLARKE: Yes. So, exactly. The Kremlin is propping up Assad because it's concerned about its own military assets. Bases at Tartus and Latakia. The
Iranians, they're concerned about resupply routes to Hezbollah. This is all part and parcel of what we call great power competition.
Various entities sponsoring their own kind of proxy groups. They have their own national interests. And even with the alliance of Assad, the Kremlin,
and the Iranians, those priorities don't always rack and stack the same way. They each have their own different interests in that country. It's
more of a marriage of convenience for right now.
The trip for the United States and its allies will become, you know, how do you kind of deal a blow to that trio, Assad, Russia, and Iran, without
empowering violent nonstate actors like HTS? Not an easy needle to thread and it's certainly going to be at the very top of the Trump foreign policy
team's agenda you day one when they take office.
GOLODRYGA: If we spend a lot of time focusing on Assad and his backers, that being Russia and Iran, who do we know in terms of the primary backers
for HTS? Is it Turkey? And if it is, what is Turkey's ultimate objective here?
CLARKE: Well, Turkey certainly supports other rebel groups there based on some of the equipment that HTS has been seen with, I've got my suspicions
about how they acquired that or how they obtained that. Certainly, there would be kind of rhetorical support and the Turks are really -- you know,
their objectives are multifold. One, they want a buffer between Turkey and Syria, you know, to kind of blunt the blowback from terrorist groups.
They're very concerned about the Kurds, particularly in the northeastern part of the country.
And then, Turkey has taken in millions of Syrian refugees over the course of this conflict. The Syrian civil war, of course, kicked off in 2011. So,
the Turks have a laundry list of their own priorities. And I think all of these actors, both state and non-state, are all jockeying for position
right now. These next six to eight weeks will be pivotal before the Trump administration takes over on everybody's trying to kind of cement their own
gains and use those gains as potential leverage.
[13:20:00]
GOLODRYGA: All right. We'll be watching, as you said, really crucial weeks ahead. Colin Clarke, thank you so much for joining us with your expertise.
Well, in a matter of weeks, as we noted, Donald Trump will take office again. And though there are Americans still feeling the sting following
record inflation, many economists say the president-elect is inheriting a fairly strong economy and booming jobs market. But will it last? Well, if
Trump's tariff heavy agenda is enacted, there are real concerns that Americans could be in for a rough patch.
Christiane discussed the implications with investor and analyst Steven Rattner, who previously served as counselor to the Treasury Secretary and
led the Obama administration's successful efforts to restructure the automobile industry.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR, CNN CHIEF INTERNATIONAL ANCHOR: Steven Ratner, welcome to the program.
STEVEN RATTNER, FORMER COUNSEL TO U.S. TREASURY SECRETARY: Thank you.
AMANPOUR: I want to ask you, because you wrote a quite an important article about the economy under the next Trump administration, Trump 2.0.
Now, first, I want to ask you about policy being personnel. As you know, quite a lot of the national security and intelligence and foreign policy
appointees have drawn some controversy, but many believe that the economic picks are more traditional Republican.
Let me just put these to you. For instance, the financier, Scott Bessent as treasury secretary, conservative economist Kevin Hassett to lead the
National Economic Council. Are those good choices?
RATTNER: Let me say two things about that. First of all, from a -- on a personal level, in terms of some of the issues that some of the other
nominees on the national security side are having, as you noted, I don't think that's the case here. I think all of his economic appointees,
including Howard Lutnick over at Commerce, you know, are people of integrity and good moral principles and actually qualified for their jobs,
importantly. So, that's -- that is noteworthy.
The second thing, on the policy side, I would say that these people are less extreme than some of the other choices he might have made in terms of
people who would be unbelievably aggressive toward China or unbelievably pro-tariff or favoring things like even the gold standard, all kinds of
pretty far out ideas. These are much closer to the norm, but I would say they're still the same, that, for example, they're in favor of things like
tariffs, which I would not describe as a mainstream Republican position.
The Wall Street Journal, for example, has been quite hostile to tariffs. So, I think it's better than it could have been, not quite what we might
have liked in a perfect world.
AMANPOUR: So, let's talk -- let's just talk about tariffs, because it's -- you know, Trump himself, I think he told the Wall Street Journal or he told
a rally that tariff -- he loves that word. It's the best word in the dictionary. And true to his rhetoric anyway, he has threatened to slap
massive tariffs on not just his neighbors, North and South, with whom he negotiated a new trade deal last time around, but as you mentioned, China
and even more on China than before. And he has potentially targeted Europe as well.
I just spoke to Former Chancellor Angela Merkel, and this is what she said about the potential boomerang effect of tariffs.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
ANGELA MERKEL, FORMER GERMAN CHANCELLOR (through translator): President Trump always said to his voters, also during his first term in office, that
he will have a better life due to him, if they vote for him. So, there are very good reasons to look at the world being sort of linked by all of these
different bonds. And the United States doesn't have all of these raw materials and raw resources that they need for production on their own.
They need the rest of the world for this.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: So, Steven Rattner, what do you think -- given the U.S. needs, for instance, so many minerals and other things from China, what do you
think the effect of massive tariffs on China would be for the Americans and the global economy?
RATTNER: Well, first of all, the quote about it being his favorite word in the dictionary, I should mention, came in an interview that he gave to John
Micklethwait, the editor in chief of Bloomberg News, a colleague of mine who coincidentally I had lunch with today. So, I am fresh up on that whole
line of discussion.
I think any serious economists would tell you that, in general, tariffs are not a good thing, that globalization, free trade, whatever you want to call
about -- call it, going all the way back to the days of David Ricardo and comparative advantage and things like that should make everybody better off
if they specialize in the things that they're good at.
The challenge is that you do have countries that are not free traders, China being certainly the poster boy for it. So, I think you would
distinguish -- I would distinguish between Trump's idea that tariffs generally are a good thing. I think they're generally not a good thing with
the idea that there are some selective places that one might want to use tariffs when you're dealing with people who are not playing by the rules,
so to speak.
So, he has talked about things like a 10 percent tariff on everything brought into the United States. Even -- he's even mentioned 20 percent on
everything brought into the United States. That's crazy.
I do think from Trump 1.0 and even a little of what we're already seeing in 2.0, Trump is a negotiator. He's a real estate guy. He does deals. And the
way he does deals, and everybody does them their own way, is he starts with a really extreme position and then scares the hell out of who's ever on the
other side of him and then gradually walks back. That was an experience of 1.0.
And so, if I want to be optimistic, and I'm not sure whether that's justified, but I'm going to be optimistic for the moment, I would say that
in the actuality, the tariff thing will end up being much less than what he's saying, and probably some in boundaries that we can live with.
AMANPOUR: So, I want to ask about that because you state an absolute fact that China does have a huge number of unfair practices, whether it's
stealing intellectual property or, you know, the dumping of various commodities and things like that.
And Rush Doshi, who was, as you know, Joe Biden's adviser on China and for Trump -- for Obama a little bit as well, he said he was so eager for a
China trade deal, Trump, that he took a bad deal, essentially agreeing to keep imported Chinese manufactured goods while exporting American
commodities to China. And Doshi called that a time-tested recipe for industrial decline. What's your analysis of that?
RATTNER: I think the right answer is that the tariffs with -- against China under 1.0 didn't really accomplish anything. They didn't really
create a lot of American jobs and the jobs they created by many, many analyses that have been done caused cost a huge amount of money per job
when you add the cost of the higher prices that are paid, by the way, not - - remember, tariffs go on the imported goods, but they raise -- and this is the -- this is part of the rationale for tariffs, they raise the prices of
domestic goods because domestic people then can. And so, it raises the prices of everything that has subject to a tariff, not just the Chinese
goods itself.
So, in any event, I think the record is pretty clear that it created not many jobs and they came at a very high cost. And that meanwhile, the
Chinese never lived up to their end of the bargain. They didn't buy the quantities of soybeans and other things that they said they were going to
buy. So, there's really nothing particularly good to say about the example of Trump tariffs 1.0 to China.
I think the challenge of China right now is they are -- they do -- they still do not play fair, but I think unfortunately the horse is kind of out
of the barn. We have given up so much of our manufacturing capacity in many, many industries to China that I just don't see us -- I don't see any
set of policies that's really going to bring it back.
AMANPOUR: You know, a lot of economists feel also that tariffs could cause, you know, again, massive inflation and even potentially, you know,
all put together. There could be even a global recession. I don't know what you think about that. But because Trump has promised the average American a
better standard of living, more, I guess, better paying jobs. I want to know what you think his policies will do for those people who voted him for
that reason, like small businesses and others. How are they preparing and what are they expecting?
RATTNER: The problem with what Trump has said so far are going to be his policies in 2.0 is that it's not obvious to me and I think, frankly, to
pretty much any many mainstream economists how they are going to accomplish his objective.
We talked about tariffs. They're going to raise prices for all consumers and perhaps create a few jobs for a narrow slice of people, but on balance,
make people worse off. His tax plan, which he wants to extend, is regressive. Meaning that it helps people at the top more, not just in
dollar terms, but in percentage terms, as somebody at the higher end had a higher increase, a larger percentage increase in their after-tax income
than someone at the bottom. That is obviously not helping people in the middle.
The mass deportation of immigrants might raise wage rates at the bottom in that lower tier of jobs for a while, but it is going to significantly slow
economic growth in this country where we have not too many workers, but too few workers. That is not going to help the person -- the average person who
voted for Trump. Getting rid of all of our -- or many of our regulatory policies, antitrust policies that create competition and things like that,
not going to help the average person.
[13:30:00]
So, it is very hard to see what in this of policy ideas is going to have people, four years from now, feeling that they're better off. And that's
unfortunate. I -- you know, we should all wish for success here, but it's a little hard to see based on what we know so far.
AMANPOUR: Why do you think then that given what you've just said and given that this American economy, as your friends at Bloomberg and The Economist
and everybody have said, is the envy of the world and I think that the Biden administration did a lot of legislation that was aimed towards
working and middle class.
I understand the cost of living, but why do you think they were not able to make the message get through to people that you're just making right now?
RATTNER: I think because, Christiane, it was really embedded in just a few words of what you just said, because of inflation and all that, the cost of
living, I think, were your words. The fact is that, unfortunately, inflation has taken a significant toll on the average American, and it is
just a fact that the average American's inflation adjusted wages over the four years of the Biden administration really did not move up by any
meaningful amount.
And so, we can talk all we want about the Inflation Reduction Act and Clean Energy and Chips Act and semiconductor plants in Texas -- in Arizona,
rather, and all this kind of stuff, but the average American sitting, you know, in Peoria, Illinois, watching the price of groceries go up doesn't
really resonate with him or her. And that really was fundamentally I think the economic challenge anyway of the Biden administration. You know, he
tried to sell Bidenomics at one point. But you know, to use an old American saying, you know, the dogs weren't eating the dog food. It just didn't
really work.
AMANPOUR: I just wonder what -- despite everything we're saying, and despite the result of the election, what you make of these blind tests, so
to speak, that YouGov and The Washington Post did? Let me just read off some of these. Basically, that that they put a whole bunch of policies
together, Kamala Harris' and Trump's without naming what -- whose they were. And Harris' came out as, quote, "vastly superior." And they were
consistently more popular by these groups who put these ahead.
Why do you think then, as soon as the policies were attached to a name Trump got by far more marks, higher marks?
RATTNER: It's a great question. And as an economic guy, I do think that most elections are about economics. And I think this election was to a
considerable degree, but not exclusively. I think the other two issues that really, really hurt the Democrats, aside from all the commotion and turmoil
over Biden's running, he's not running and so on and so forth, but the two other issues I think that really hurt the Democrats were immigration, which
frankly, the Biden administration just got wrong. They were on the wrong side of it going in. And the American public reacted very, very negatively
to that. And then, they walked it back, but it was frankly kind of too late.
And lastly, what I'll call the social issues, you can call it woke-ism or whatever you want to call it. But one of the most effective ads that the
Trump people ran during the campaign was something where it said -- they said something to the effect of she's for they, them, and that -- they and
them, I'm for you. And it was a reference to transgenders, to transgender bathrooms, to all this stuff. And another ad they ran about the fact that
the government pays for transgender transition surgery for people in prison. They -- it was an incredibly effective ad.
I think America -- I think the needle on sort of woke-ism, again, for lack of a better word, has moved significantly and the Democrats and the Harris
campaign just could not could not catch up to where the American public was going on that issue.
AMANPOUR: I mean, just to be clear that whole transition surgery, et cetera, was also a fact under the first Trump administration. It just
happens to be a law in many places, but I get your point. What I kind of want to end up asking you is, a lot of economists are beginning to write
about how democracy won't survive in a place like America if it is constantly such an unequal society that, you know, it just -- there was
this quote whereby, you know, they said it was an economic expert who said, it's amazing that so many of the wealthy in America backed the Harris plan
to, quote/unquote, "redistribute," you know, the money or the resources to people, whereas the Trump administration's policies will likely, as you've
said, benefit mostly the elite and the rich, et cetera.
At what point does this growing inequality have to be addressed? And do you think it can be addressed under Trump 2.0 with his policies?
[13:35:00]
RATTNER: I've been writing about income inequality for 30 years and it has only gotten worse pretty much, few deviations, but essentially, only gotten
worse for 30 years. And it is an existential problem. I am optimistic enough not to believe it will necessarily bring down our democracy, but
it's grossly unfair. It creates two classes of multiclass Americans, and it needs and should be addressed.
And I do think that some of the things that were done under the Obama administration and certainly Obamacare, for example, and under the Biden
administration have helped at the margin, but it's a huge problem. And there's nothing -- there's literally nothing in the Trump plan that I'm
aware of that would address this issue. And as I said, there are some things that would actually make it worse.
Tariffs are regressive. They're paid proportionally more by lower income people. His tax cuts are regressive. His deregulation of business cannot
possibly help with income inequality. And we can keep going down the list, but I don't believe you're going to see any progress made on income
inequality in the next four years, and that is a loss for this country.
AMANPOUR: Indeed, and probably just increases the pool of highly dissatisfied citizens. That's for another time. Steven Rattner, thank you
so much indeed for joining us.
RATTNER: My pleasure. Thank you.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
GOLODRYGA: Well, with Trump's inauguration on the horizon, pressing conversations continue around the president-elect's policies, both at home
and abroad. David Frum is a political commentator and former speechwriter for President George W. Bush. And in his latest piece for The Atlantic,
"America's Lonely Future," he warns that the U.S. could become a global bully. He joins Walter Isaacson to discuss.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
WALTER ISAACSON, CO-HOST, AMANPOUR AND CO.: And, David Frum, welcome to the show.
DAVID FRUM, STAFF WRITER, THE ATLANTIC: Thank you.
ISAACSON: 80 years ago, at the end of World War II, the United States helped set up a world order that was involved with economic cooperation
coming out of the Bretton Woods Agreement. It was a defense alliance against tyranny, like NATO, and international order, as in the U.N. Now, in
your Atlantic piece, you say all of that is threatened. What worries you the most?
FRUM: Well, Donald Trump is often described as an isolationist, but that's not really true. And that's not the way he's different from all of his
predecessors, from Franklin Roosevelt through Ronald Reagan forward. Trump isn't an isolationist in the sense that he's indifferent to the rest of the
world, or he doesn't have business dealings in Azerbaijan. He's very much involved with the rest of the world.
The difference is, since the Second World War, since the Great Depression, American leaders have understood that America finds its own prosperity and
its own security by cooperating with strong allies. The Trump view is essentially predatory. It's a predatory view of the world, not an
isolationist view.
Allies -- the United States should have -- not allies, but subject nations. They should pay tribute instead of cooperating. He's very clear. He talks
to other countries, I want you to pay me. And of course, instead of free and open trade, we should have high tariff walls protecting American
markets in order to forcibly force move industries of the future from friends to the United States.
ISAACSON: But part of that notion, as you say, with having high tariff walls and move industries back to the United States, it does seem that a
criticism of this world order was that globalism gutted the manufacturing and the jobs of this country.
You say in your piece that trade mutually benefits all nations, but sometimes it doesn't, it seems to me, that after China gets into the WTO,
we lose our industrial base. Why am I wrong on that?
FRUM: Well, first, China is -- let's bracket the China case a little bit, because the argument that was used about China was used before that about
NAFTA trade with Mexico, about trade with the eastern rim with countries like Taiwan and South Korea. Through all the years since World War II,
there have been constant complaints we're losing things because we trade freely with others.
And yet, over that time, the United States has become astonishingly richer in all kinds of ways and we have become richer in tandem with others
because they have become richer, too.
ISAACSON: Well, let me halt there because you say we're astonishingly richer, but a lot of people got rich in the finance industries and
everything else. But people who went to the early morning bus to go to work, they got left out of this.
FRUM: You know, I don't think people have good memories of how poor this country was until very, very recently. We didn't become poor when Americans
left the farm for the factory, and we don't become poor when people leave the factory for the office, and we don't become poor because Americans are
not mining coal underground.
Donald Trump often -- one of the reasons he appeals to older voters is his vision of the economy is from 50 years ago. It's tires, it's rubber, steel,
cars. Those are the industries that are always most present to him. That's one of the reasons he's so mad at Germany, is because Germany totally
dominates nowadays in the industries of the 1970s and 1980s.
[13:40:00]
Now, if you talk to actual Germans, they will tell you our biggest problem as Germans is we are totally dominant in the industries of the 1970s and
1980s. We're not doing so well at medical imaging and artificial intelligence, but we're -- you know, we're all there or whatever it was
that made Henry Ford rich.
And I think one of the things that we are all in danger of in the aftermath of Trump shock is indulging myths that Donald Trump has sold. And when we
try to tell people these myths aren't true, we'll be told, well, many people believe them and you can't contradict the myths that people have
that the United States is poor and going backwards and that there's something magic, there's something magic about making steel ingots and a
country can only be prosperous if it is prosperous in the way it was prosperous in 1975.
ISAACSON: Then explain to me why there's been a backlash, a populist backlash, not just represented by Donald Trump, but around the world
against this system of globalism that left a lot of workers behind.
FRUM: Again, I don't agree with you at all, and I won't take time with facts and figures about why it is not true that workers are left behind,
but there's -- you are certainly right, there's been a backlash against globalism across the developed world.
So, one of the questions you have to ask, and I challenge people all the time, if you're trying to understand why in every country there's this
backlash? You need a cause that is common to every country. Germany, which has been a powerhouse of exporting manufactured goods, also has a
reactionary populous movement.
So, if exporting a lot of manufactured goods was the way to prevent having a nationalist populous movement, you'd expect there wouldn't be one in
Germany. But there is one, a powerful one. What all the developed countries have in common are, I think, three things. First, the aging of the baby
boom generation, that huge generation born after the Second World War. They began entering their '60s in 2010, which is exactly when these movements
began to get going, because these people came to the retirement force.
And then here's the second cause, they came into the into retirement at exactly the moment there was a global financial crisis that left many of
these baby boomers poor in their 60s than they thought they would be before the financial crisis. And the last thing, and this is the thing that we
have in common, unlike the trade balance in common with every developed country is migration on a scale that has never been seen in the history of
the world.
And that has started again 2010. And that's a product of global prosperity too. Now, the reason so many people are on the move is not because there
are so many more desperate people, it's because there's so many more people who can afford $10,000, $20,000, $30,000 to pay a human trafficker to bring
them to a place where they could -- as a rational investment, try to get a better life.
And if a few of these highly motivated people come, it's better for them and better for the receiving country. But if a lot of them come, it becomes
very stressful. And that's the thing that the United States, Britain, Germany, Canada, France, all the countries have in common, is the migration
experience, not the trade experience, which varies so much from place to place.
ISAACSON: Then do you feel that maybe we let in too much asylum seekers and migration, whether it be in France, England, United States?
FRUM: For sure. I think one of the reasons that the Democratic Party in particular has turned toward protectionism, and it must be stressed that
while Donald Trump was the most protectionist president since Herbert Hoover, Joe Biden was the second most protectionist.
It's because -- when Democrats confronted the real problem, immigration, they didn't want to face it. So, they chose a problem that made them much
more comfortable, trade. Because trade allowed them to -- the remedies for trade were things that many Democrats liked, a much more statist economic
policy, more protection, more government investment. They love doing that. And so, if that was the problem, then they have the answer. If the problem
was immigration, they didn't like it.
ISAACSON: Let me read you something from your piece. You say that other great powers, China, India, Russia, face suspicious and even hostile
coalitions of powerful enemies. And then you say the United States is backed by powerful friends. And yet, as I look at it now, we've done
something that we've avoided for 50 years, which is push Russia and China into more of a partnership. And India seems to be leaning in that
direction, and Iran. We have some of the biggest countries in the world aligned against us now. So, why has this order something that Donald Trump
should protect?
FRUM: Well, the India, Russia or Soviet Union military lines goes back to the 1960s. This -- it is not a new thing, but there's been a lot of defense
cooperation between India and Russia, or this predecessor, the Soviet Union. And that has very little to do with the United States and a lot to
do with the fact that India and China fought a war in 1962 and the Indians lost.
[13:45:00]
And ever since then, they have looked to China's other powerful neighbor, first, the Soviet Union and now Russia, as India security partner. And it's
an example of all these countries have very unfortunate geography. India has Pakistan, it has China next door. China is surrounded by -- of course,
there's no country in the world the same size as China, but countries that mistrust China from Vietnam to -- on its naval borders, the Philippines,
Japan, of course, the Soviet Union and Russia above.
And it's not true that the United States pushed India -- sorry, China and Russia closer together. Russia decided all by itself to engage in a massive
act of aggression against its neighbor Ukraine. The worst act of aggression on the European continent since 1945. Vastly bloodier than even the
Yugoslavian civil wars of the 1990s.
That aggression has been checked, not completely successfully, but surprisingly successfully. And in desperation, Russia has turned to another
great power adversary of the United States, China. What all of this demonstrates is the ever-greater importance of the relationships that the
United States does have.
ISAACSON: You talk about the need to protect this international order. You were an adviser to George W. Bush, and you've been a long-time part of that
Republican wing that was very internationalist, and in the sense of President Bush, the younger, in favor of promoting democracy as part of it.
And yet, it got us into wars like Iraq and other places that some people, especially voters these days are saying, well, calling them forever wars.
Explain to me how you would defend that.
FRUM: You know, you will never come up with a valid judgment on anything if only do look at one side of the books. If you only look at the debits
and never the credits. So, the most important achievement of the United States in the past -- in foreign policy, in the past three decades has been
something that not a person thinks about until I remind you right now.
When George H. W. Bush came to office in 1989, his over -- as the Soviet Union was cracking up. His overwhelming, overriding concern was that the
50,000 nuclear warheads in the Soviet Union would come loose and would end up in the hands of rogue states or terrorists or be used by a desperate,
failing Soviet Union or Russia. And the United States, with allies, used an enormous amount of resources to create a post-Soviet regime that was so
secure that not one of the 50,000 warheads went astray. It was the most astonishing success in American foreign policy since the Marshall Plan.
The former weapons of the Soviet Union were converted into fuel for nuclear power plants, not just in the United States, but in France and other allied
nations too. And they -- and the allied nations wrote the checks to employ those scientists and to secure those nuclear weapons. And it's completely
forgotten.
After 9/11, the United States embarked with many allies to try to bring security to Afghanistan and Iraq. And those endeavors were not successful.
And that's -- you know, that's true. And that's something that, you know, we should study why it wasn't successful. Were we overambitious? Did we
under deliver? What exactly went wrong? And it's really worth pondering. And I've spent a lot of time thinking and writing about those questions.
The fact that some of our international commitments did not go well should not make us forget the other international commitments that went so well
that they are the most important things in American history since the Marshall Plan.
ISAACSON: You posted recently on X that we are headed toward a U.S. constitutional crisis vastly bigger than Watergate. Why do you say that?
FRUM: Well, the score, the center of the Watergate crisis was that President Richard Nixon got involved in a political scandal, either he
ordered or people working for him, burglarized the Democratic Party headquarters.
Now, this is not something that had never happened before in American politics. It had happened before. But when the Nixon people were caught,
Nixon's response was to try to mobilize the FBI and CIA to shut down the investigation of the burglary. That was Watergate, not the burglary itself.
Other presidents have done similarly bad things but the -- this mobilization of CIA and FBI for political ends, but it failed. It
completely failed. Neither agency would cooperate. When Nixon tried to install a stooge as head of the FBI, the agency rejected him. And the deep
throat leaks came from people at the FBI who said you can't put a stooge director in at the top of this agency to protect you from your own
wrongdoing. Nixon was unsuccessful. Nixon never got to see the tax returns of people he wanted to see. He asked for them. He never got them. The agent
-- the agencies refused to deliver them.
So, when I say it's bigger than Watergate, what Trump wants to do is take control of, especially the FBI, but also other security agencies and use
them as arms of his personal power. Nixon failed. Trump is on the way to succeeding. Nixon did it secretly. Trump is doing it publicly. Nixon was
opposed by his own party. Trump is supported by his own party. So, it is the same predicament we faced in the 1970s, but this time, bigger and more
dangerous and more likely to succeed.
[13:50:00]
ISAACSON: You talk about, in your piece, the personal corruption of Trump's family or the money that may be going to them. But explain to me
now, is that undermined, that argument, by President Biden's pardoning of his son, Hunter Biden?
FRUM: It's not -- the argument is not undermined, but his credibility is hurt for sure. Because when I'm trying to explain to people why it's wrong
that the president own a hotel in the center of Washington and ask every guest who comes into his Oval Office, did you stay in my hotel last night?
And when the president refuses the FBI request to demolish its obsolete headquarters and replace it because there was a risk that the FBI
headquarters would be replaced by a hotel that would compete with his, I can explain all of that, but it doesn't help when the people defend who
Trump and say, yes, but what about Biden and his son? Right? Yes, you can say, look, that's not as bad. It's a blot on an otherwise very honest
career, but it doesn't help. And that's why it was so wrong for President Biden to do it.
ISAACSON: Your piece in The Atlantic is about something even larger than the things we've just discussed. It's about what the idea of America is.
And you talk about the great metaphor of a city on a hill. It comes from Jesus' Sermon on the Mount, but it's also John Winthrop, when the pilgrims
first come to America, he gives a sermon of, we shall be a city on a hill. And then, it's Ronald Reagan's trope throughout his presidency and to the
end of his presidency.
I think in his farewell address you quote him as saying, "How stands this city on a hill?" How would you answer that question?
FRUM: For millions of people around the world, whenever they're -- America's criticized all the time, there are all kinds of things about
American life that people don't like from, you know, fast food to Mickey Mouse to, you know, many mistakes in American foreign policy. There are a
lot of things to criticize. And yet, when the chips are down and people are in trouble, all over the world, they look to the United States as the
answer. It is this golden light of what is possible, even if we don't always live up to it.
Because even when we don't live up to it, we believe we should. And that's Reagan's metaphor. Reagan subtly changed the meaning of the city on the
hill. When Jesus used it, when John Winthrop meant it, they meant because the city was on a hill, it was very visible. And therefore, everyone had to
be on their best behavior at all time. Reagan had that suggestion of pride and beauty.
But Donald Trump very much sees the United States as like other nations, only maybe worse. When his friend Bill O'Reilly in a TV interview asked
him, is Putin a killer? Trump answered, we're not so innocent either. Now, in some very, very deep way, that's true, we're not so innocent. In the
United States, sometimes to protect the things that Americans have to protect, American presidents have done some rough things, and some of those
rough things do not stand up to scrutiny. Other rough things do stand up to scrutiny. And yet, we still say they were rough.
But they -- the belief has always been when we depart from our ideals. We understand that we're doing it and we don't compromise the ideal itself.
And maybe we apologize later, or maybe we make an excuse, but we understand this is where we fell short because this is -- over here is where we're
supposed to be. Donald Trump is the first president since Roosevelt, maybe for a long time before that, who has no sense of the United States as owing
anything to the rest of the planet. No sense of it being an example, no sense of it being something that should be admired. He wants to dominate
through force and power. And the problem is no one, no one is that powerful to dominate the whole world.
The United States has been strong because it is trusted. The United States is strong because it has friends. And if you become just another big empire
like China, like India, like the way Russia was before Putin wrecked it in the Ukraine war, people may fear you, but they won't respect you. They
won't trust you.
ISAACSON: David Frum, thank you so much for joining us.
FRUM: Thank you.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
GOLODRYGA: And finally, a respite in a tireless fight for freedom. Take a look at these new images of Iranian activist and Nobel Prize winner Narges
Mohammadi leaving hospital to spend 21 days at home. Making a rallying call, women, life, freedom. The famous chant of the protest that shook the
regime in the wake of the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022.
It's a short break that comes as Iranian authorities allow her to leave prison to recover from surgery. A decision her family has called too
little, too late. She has spent most of the past two decades behind bars accused of acting against national security and spreading propaganda
against the Iranian regime. Accusations she vehemently denies.
Earlier this year, Christiane spoke with her daughter, Kiana Rahmani, who has been campaigning for Narges to truly come home.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: Kiana, do you think you and your brother will see your mother again?
KIANA RAHMANI, DAUGHTER OF NAGES MOHAMMADI (THROUGH TRANSLATOR): Right now, we are trying to launch a campaign to free Narges, meaning we want
Narges Mohammadi to be released, so she is free. Personally, I hope she is released, and I do think it will happen. I have to try and believe with all
my heart.
[13:55:00]
To see her one day, physically, in front of me, sometimes I do get pessimistic about that. It feels impossible at time, but I have to hope.
So, I hope to see my mother at least once again in my life. I can't know this, but I do have to believe that my mother will be released.
And I think if we all work together, there is a chance that she will one day be free.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
GOLODRYGA: A powerful, very strong daughter, just like her mother. Well, that is it for now. Thank you so much for watching and goodbye from New
York.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
[14:00:00]
END
