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Amanpour
Interview With Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, Interview With Chatham House Middle East and North Africa Programme Director Sanam Vakil; Interview With Former U.S. Deputy Secretary Of State Wendy Sherman; Interview With Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Admiral James Stavridis; Interview with International Crisis Group Iran Project Director Ali Vaez. Aired 1-2p ET
Aired June 13, 2025 - 13:00 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
[13:00:00]
CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR, CNN CHIEF INTERNATIONAL ANCHOR: Hello, everyone, and welcome to "Amanpour." Here's what's coming up.
Strikes on Iran continues, as Israel plunges the Middle East into dangerous new territory. We ask key experts and insiders where all of this is headed.
First, I'll speak to the former Israeli prime minister, Ehud Barak. Then with Iran threatening to hold Israel and the United States fully
accountable regional expert Dr. Sanam Vakil joins me. And as President Donald Trump warns Iran to, quote, "make a deal before it's too late," I
get analysis from former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman. She was the country's top negotiator on the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement.
Welcome to the program, everyone. I'm Christiane Amanpour in London.
The Middle East and the world braces for retaliation after Israel launches ongoing strikes on military and nuclear targets inside Iran. The size and
scale of the attacks are unprecedented, 200 fighter jets dropping more than 300 various munitions, according to Israel, struck more than a hundred
targets across Iran.
Iran's highest ranking military officers are dead, as are a number of commanders and nuclear scientists. It's been the longtime mission of the
Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, claims the attack, quote, "rolls back a threat to Israel's survival."
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER: Today, our strong and courageous soldiers and people stand together to defend ourselves against
those who seek our destruction. And by defending ourselves, we defend many others and we rolled back a murderous tyranny. Generations from now,
history will record that our generation stood its ground, acted in time, and secured our common future.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: Now, Israel's military says the country needs to prepare for a prolonged operation as Iran's leaders vow retaliation. Here's the Iranian
president, Masoud Pezeshkian.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
MASOUD PEZESHKIAN, IRANIAN PRESIDENT (through translator): The government of Iran once again proved the aggression and barbarism of the Zionist
regime, and the government of Iran will not stay silent against the Zionist regime. A strong and categoric response of Iran will make the enemy regret
his actions.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: Iran is clear retaliation won't stop with Israel. Iran's mission to the United Nations posted this on social media today, the Israeli regime
and its backer, namely the United States, shall be held fully accountable for these blatant violations of international law and their grave
consequences.
Now, Ehud Barak was Israel's prime minister. He's been its foreign minister and chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces as well as minister of
defense when he directed Israel's 2007 attack on a nuclear reactor in Syria. Now, Barak says he sees a long and difficult war ahead, and he is
joining me now. Welcome back to our program.
Tell me what you see next and how you react to this, and why do you think it happened now?
EHUD BARAK, FORMER ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER: Well, it's happened now because our intelligence showed that the Iranians are accelerating their efforts to
overcome the last hurdle toward nuclear capability, namely the weaponization, it's called the creation of a real weapon, not just enrich
uranium. And you cannot wait too long before the Iranians will turn into nuclear power.
Beyond that, it's an increased pace of producing long-range heavy missiles, which when it comes in numbers of many thousands, it's become quite severe
independent sweat. I think that that's clear. And, you know, the first 18 hours is a great, impressive operational and intelligent success.
It's especially important to Israel because the same branches, the operational and intelligent failed so dramatically on October 7th, '23.
[13:05:00]
AMANPOUR: Yes. OK. So, again, avenging that terrible moment. But I want to ask you this, because you were an intelligence officer in the Israeli
military during the Israeli attack on the Osirak Reactor in Iraq, that was obliterated before it became operational.
In 2007, you were defense minister when Israel bombed a secret and hidden nascent reactor being built in Syria near Deir ez-Zur. And I wonder whether
you as prime minister had ever tried to bomb Iran and try to get the U.S. to agree with you, Iran's nuclear facilities? Because we know Netanyahu has
tried before.
BARAK: Look, when I was prime minister, the Iranians world in a very elementary state, just taking the uranium natural ore and trying to produce
what's called yellow cake. It was far, too far from anything, the concrete -- that pointed toward the nuclear military program. But I was also
minister of defense for Netanyahu after I defeated him in the election and became prime minister.
And at that time, in 2009, 2010, 2011 and mainly 2012, we considered very seriously, myself, Prime Minister Netanyahu, and another minister named
Lieberman, to convince the cabinet to launch an attack on the Iranian nuclear program. At the time we believed we can delay them by two and a
half to three and a half years, and that was worse, the operation.
We could not convince even the inner cabinet of our government and the democracy is not enough that we are convinced we have to convince the
majority. This time it's different. Different from the previous cases of the Osirak and the Assad kind of reactor, because both Iraq and Syria chose
what's called the plutonium trajectory toward weapon, which makes a precondition of having a reactor, which is always over the ground. So, it's
one target that once you destro it, it delays them by several years.
AMANPOUR: OK. So, that's interesting. Yes. Let me -- so, let me --
BARAK: The Iranians showed a different --
AMANPOUR: Yes, they did. So, what can your forces do? You are very familiar with what power Israel has. What can they do against the -- you know, the
majority of the Iran nuclear program? Apparently in Natanz, a lot of the centrifuges are underground. The Iranians say that damage has so far been
superficial. We've seen no BDA, Battle Damage Assessment, from Israel on that. And on Fordo, it's even more hardened and more underground. And we've
been told it can't happen without special U.S. mega bombs. Can you tell us?
BARAK: Yes. It's -- yes. In my judgment, it's not a secret that Israel alone cannot delay the nuclear program of Iran by a significant time
period, probably several weeks, probably a month, but even the U.S. cannot delay them by more than few months. It doesn't mean that immediately they
will have it, probably they still have to complete certain weaponization or probably create a cold nuclear device to explode it in, somewhere in the
desert to show the whole world where they are.
But it's clear to me in spite of all the impressive achievements until now, we cannot say that we delayed them significantly. As you mentioned, Fordo,
is a very -- it's probably beyond our capacity to really penetrate. And the reality is Rafael Grossi, the head of IAEA, say just few days ago that the
most sensitive elements of the Iranian nuclear military program are buried hundreds of yards underneath this surface in some remote deserted mines and
so on.
And because they already have about 400 kilograms of enriched uranium to 60 percent, which still had to be pushed to 20, to weapon grade, which is over
90, but that's an easy process. Could take place in any garage with enough advanced --
AMANPOUR: All right. So, what's the point then, Prime Minister? What is the point then of this mass bombing campaign? What is the point? If you're
telling me that they can potentially only damage by a month at worst and maybe a couple of weeks, what is the point? Then that is the strategy?
What's the goal here?
[13:10:00]
BARAK: It's problematic, but it still has a justification point of view of Israel. Instead of sitting idle, Israel feels -- our government feels that
they have to do something. Probably together with the Americans, we can do more. My judgment is that because Iran is already what's called threshold
nuclear power, the only way to block it is either to impose upon it a convincing new agreement or alternative open a full-scale war to topple
down the regime. That's something that together with the United States we can do.
But having said that, I don't believe that any American president, neither Trump or any one of his predecessors, would've decided. America didn't win
in Korea, didn't win in Vietnam, didn't win in (INAUDIBLE), didn't win Afghanistan.
AMANPOUR: Right.
BARAK: I don't believe that they're about to open a full-scale war over regime.
AMANPOUR: Right. Which really begs the question, Mr. Prime Minister, you've just listed the number of wars that America has not won. Your own country
is in a war that it has not won in Gaza. Yes, it's degraded Iran's capabilities. And now, it's done this, and it's going to go on for a while,
according to your new -- your prime minister, but it's also taken out the key, you know, layer of military leadership. What effect do you think that
will have?
BARAK: Look, I think that what the -- what Israel is -- will tell you is that, we did our part, we did whatever we can in order to delay, slow them
down, or coerce them into a more reliable, more convincing agreement. And Israel will tell you that the role to complete it is America, not our own.
And that's not simple.
America has a major role, even for Israel to continue the war for a longer time, for several months or so, we need the logistic depth of America. And
if they decide to operate, of course, their operational capabilities, which are much wider than Israeli capabilities.
But you know, I still bear in mind what happened with the Houthis. America announced a war on the Houthis, and after some four or six weeks, they
decided to leave. So, it's not true. We are entering the first 24 hours, as I mentioned, really impressive success beyond what anyone could guess, and
probably the success will continue. We are now destroying the production lines of ballistic missiles in Iran. But I have no illusion we should never
be allowed to be drifted into hubris or hubris kind of thinking that we are going to complete it on our own.
For sure Iranians will respond. It will be painful. There will be ups and down. And the end of the story, yet uncertain.
AMANPOUR: Well, yes.
BARAK: I think that the opportunity of our achievement should be used in order to put an end to the war in Gaza. To release all hostages, to decide
that we end the war in Gaza and to turn into the other possibilities of a new Middle East order, probably normalization with Saudi Arabia. It's not
easy to do it as we exchange blows with Iran.
But even the Iranian -- kind of the -- a live war, the intensive war I hope will end in several weeks. Will not drag to another year.
AMANPOUR: Whoa. Where in Gaza or Iran, several weeks?
BARAK: No, no. In Gaza.
AMANPOUR: OK.
BARAK: It can be over in several weeks.
AMANPOUR: OK. Let me just stop you.
BARAK: I hope that Iran -- we will not develop into attrition war with Iran that might take a year or so.
AMANPOUR: OK. All right. Let me ask you about Gaza.
BARAK: I don't think that's better.
AMANPOUR: Let me ask you about Gaza, because I've had you on, you know, a lot about that and you have been critical of Prime Minister Netanyahu's
waging this war there. You and others have said that, you know, Netanyahu prefers the ongoing conflict to mask his political and legal troubles. And
you've called it and others have called it a war of deception.
One of your successors or predecessors, Prime Minister Olmert, said, you know, that this is now, you know, developing into a war of war crimes. And
a former defense minister, Moshe Ya'alon, wrote on X -- he wrote on X, that it's impossible to address the implications before the picture becomes
clearer.
You know, the -- basically, he's saying is -- he's basically saying that this -- there was a political motive as well for what's going on in Iran
now. Do you think that's at all possible?
[13:15:00]
BARAK: About Gaza, I already expressed my view that it's basically a war of deception. We don't need it. In fact, every passing months where the strong
Israeli army that showed its efficiency, effectiveness in Iran is unable to end the story with the Hamas after 20 months, it's the longest war in our
history. I think that it's not a real war. It should have ended many months ago, several months ago at least, and should be ended right now, especially
with the background on the possibility of attrition war with Iran and a long one. We don't need another war in Gaza at the same time
simultaneously.
AMANPOUR: Yes. Prime Minister Barak, thank you so much. There's a lot more to ask and we'll have you back. Thank you very much indeed. And we will be
right back after the break.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
AMANPOUR: Maintain unity and trust of the officials, that is the Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian's message for a shocked and fearful nation
after Israeli attacks killed at least 78 people, including its top military chiefs and at least six senior nuclear scientists. Iran has called in the
Swiss ambassador for a (INAUDIBLE). And a warning to the United States, accusing Washington of complicity in Israel's attack, saying the U.S. must
be held accountable as well.
Dr. Sanam Vakil is the director of Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House here, and she's joining me now here in the studio. Welcome
to the program. Were you surprised by the timing? And what is your analysis about all that sort of, you know, flack that was in the atmosphere
yesterday and the day before, Trump saying this, Israel saying that, suggesting that there may be, you know, peace talk -- not peace talks, but
nuclear deal talks going on? How do you read what was in the air, and only a few hours later this happened?
SANAM VAKIL, DIRECTOR, MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA PROGRAMME, CHATHAM HOUSE: I think the Israelis and the U.S. were clearly foreshadowing
something was coming, flights were being canceled in Iran and, of course, across the region, something was coming. And I think the Israelis certainly
have made clear they've been planning this for some time.
And the timing was right. It was planned to hit just after the IAEA's Board of Governors Meeting, where, of course, there have been very clear
indications that Iran's program seriously advanced, diplomacy is dragging, and they clearly made it an opportunity with President Trump who is
impatient and wanted a quick deal, and the Iranians played for time and didn't deliver.
AMANPOUR: Do you think they -- what -- they outsmarted themselves or whatever the right thing is? They just didn't -- they missed an
opportunity, particularly around this consortium. I don't know whether you've read deeply into it, but if you have, part of a deal that the U.S.
was offering was for Iran to be part of a regional enrichment and nuclear program?
VAKIL: Well, I think the Iranians carefully put together this negotiating team thinking that they could drag this along in order to extract
concessions. And they wanted more from President Trump, effectively some guarantee of their permanent right to enrich, which the president couldn't
quite deliver.
[13:20:00]
So, the regional consortium wasn't going to be an answer for the Islamic Republic that didn't trust the region and didn't trust the United States.
AMANPOUR: What do you think Israel's actual strategy or its goals were? You just heard a former defense minister, a former member of -- a senior member
of the Israeli army say that they're actually not going to be able to do what they think they could do in terms of disrupt, destroy, maybe set it
back -- I mean, he said a month. Honestly, I was shocked.
VAKIL: Well, intelligence estimates have indicated that for quite some time now. All of the reports, the planning, the war gaming that has been going
on for such a strike of this kind have clearly indicated that Israel isn't going to be able to meaningfully and independently take down Iran's nuclear
program.
So, I think there are a few options on the table. They're either trying to bring the United States on board, to do what they cannot do by themselves,
or they're trying to go for something more serious inside Iran, to break the system. Obviously, they've already humiliated the system, taking out
the clear and very strong chain of command in an embarrassing way, in a humiliating way. And then, you know, they want to foment unrest from
within. And that, of course, speaks and reeks of hubris, which, Ehud Barak warned against.
AMANPOUR: But the question is, is it reasonable and is it realizable? You know, some have stated the obvious that all these military commanders
who've been taken out, I mean, from across the board, this lot, has completely collapsed the chain of command militarily. I don't know how
quickly they can reinstitute it.
We remember that in Trump 1.0, he ordered the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the Quds Force commander. We know that, you know, around the
proxies have been decimated. What kind of defense can Iran put up?
VAKIL: Well, first of all, I don't think the chain of command has collapsed. Iran is an institutionalized state and there is a structure and
they've quickly tried to replace the key individuals across the system. They're taking time to respond because I think, of course, the key figures
that would have mounted that response were taken out. And so, they need time.
Of course, they're under continuous strikes. Strikes are still underway in Tehran and around the country. And so, I think they need a few days to
consider how they will respond. There will certainly be a military response for Iran. Iran cannot climb down and walk away from this.
AMANPOUR: You remember it did that but many months after the last Israeli strikes a year ago, and its responses didn't achieve much. I mean, they
were, you know, pretty much stopped across the board. I mean, Iran was, some people say, revealed as defanged, revealed as maybe even a paper
tiger. I don't know.
VAKIL: Well, they are the weaker party, and we know this, they know this. They don't have conventional capabilities. Israel has clear military and
intelligence dominance. They've deeply penetrated the Iranian system.
AMANPOUR: And obviously a nuclear weapons program.
VAKIL: Of course.
AMANPOUR: With some estimate about a hundred nuclear weapons undeclared. That's --
VAKIL: Of course.
AMANPOUR: That is the way it is.
VAKIL: Of course. So, they are the weaker party. And it's unclear what they can do to inflict or how they can inflict damage and walk away with the
system intact, with their dignity intact, with their legitimacy intact. And you know, perhaps find a way back to the negotiating table, which President
Trump thinks is in the cards as well.
AMANPOUR: They obviously want regime change. I mean, this is something that certainly Netanyahu has been, you know, wanting to do for -- his entire
time in office. What do you think is the situation inside the country vis- a-vis the people? Because we've -- they're under deep, deep duress. Energy is terrible. The financial system is terrible, medicine, everything's
massively expensive. They're really -- you know, it's shocking if you go deeply into what they're suffering in terms of a complete economic
crackdown and pain. What do you think might happen?
VAKIL: I think the system, the regime, the economy, the infrastructure, it's brittle. But I don't think that in this moment, with missiles and
drones flying over Iran, that there's going to be this, you know, phoenix rising and Iranians are going to take to the streets in an organized
military way to take down the regime.
There are scenarios that could emerge if this becomes prolonged. Certainly, you could see the military chain of command asserting more authority, and
that's not a positive outcome. You want to further militarize Iran's system away from a religious system to a military one. It's not going to lead to a
peaceful outcome, I think for Israel or for the broader region or for the Iranian people. I think that it much depends on how things play out.
[13:25:00]
And Iranians have the experience of living through a protracted warm, from 1980 to 1988, at a time where the revolution had just occurred. And I think
that the system is just going to try to hunker down, play for time, and play for Iranian nationalism and wait this out as best as they can. But
this is a really clear dangerous moment for Iran. There are no really easy exit ramps. There are no real allies for Iran either. So, it's very hard to
see how they walk back and walk down from this.
AMANPOUR: And do you think the worst-case scenario could happen, that Iran has now, as you say, you know, been dealt all these setbacks, the
indignity, the assassinations, the -- you know, clearly free skies for Israel or whoever else wants to go bomb its facilities? Do you think that
they -- the worst-case scenario could happen? That right now it does not have a nuclear weapon, according to all the inspectors, but that it might
drive, its program even further underground, metaphorically, no inspectors, complete -- you know, cutting itself off from any kind of international
regime and actually go for the bomb?
VAKIL: Well, that's certainly what -- these are the non-military scenarios that, again, have been publicly discussed from the IAEA, you know, into the
analytical community, Iran has very clearly started to invest for quite some time in its underground facilities. They've probably already moved
centrifuges and the like away. They could kick out inspectors. On top of it, they can leave the non-proliferation treaty. And then from there,
obviously, it's going to take months, not days, to weaponize. But then we are going to be at a point of no return. And Israel's aim on preventing
Iran's, you know, so-called weaponization is going to become a reality.
So, it's very unclear right now if this attack is going to address Israel's security dilemma and lead to the weakened Iran that the United States, the
region perhaps are hoping for. And it's certainly very unclear that it's going to deliver that big deal that President Trump is calling for.
AMANPOUR: Sanam Vakil, thank you so much.
VAKIL: Thank you.
AMANPOUR: In an increasingly dangerous world. Now, Republican U.S. House Speaker Mike Johnson posted, Israel decided it needed to take action to
defend itself, they were clearly within their right to do so. While his democratic counterpart, Hakeem Jeffries, called out White House failures to
deliver on diplomatic promises in the Middle East and elsewhere. President Trump insists the U.S. was not involved in the strikes, but he is the first
American president to allow an Israeli prime minister, in this case, Netanyahu, to do what he's wanted to do for decades. And says that he spoke
several times to Netanyahu before and after the strikes.
So, what will the attack mean for America's national security? As deputy secretary of state, Wendy Sherman, was lead negotiator with Iran for years
over the 2015 nuclear deal, or JCPOA. And she's joining me now from Massachusetts.
Wendy Sherman, welcome back to the program. What is your immediate reaction? You've heard the conversations from a former Israeli prime
minister, from our colleague here, the Iran expert at Chatham House. Is this going to work? Is this attack going to work, you think?
WENDY SHERMAN, FORMER U.S. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE: You know, Christiane, as I was listening to both those conversations, I thought about the
reaction that we all had at the beginning of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. And the shock and all moment when we all thought that the U.S. was going to
really compel everything to happen in the way we wanted to. And then, of course, things started to unwind in a very different way.
So, I think we still are at a place where we don't know how this will all play out. And we all need to be circumspect. There's no question that
Israel has done a lot to decapitate military, but I agree with your last guess that they will quickly replace these people.
I think you know as well, if not better than I, that every time a country is attacked, it creates a nationalist fervor and we're seeing that on the
streets of Tehran today, in the death to Israel, the death to America. And I think the thing of your prior conversations, which shocked me the most,
is what shocked you as well with former Prime Minister Ehud Barak saying this would only set them back one month. I realize that without really
destroying Fordo, that is probably true.
[13:30:00]
But if they are able to encourage the U.S. to get into this, Fordo could be destroyed. All of this is to say we are at a dangerous moment. I'm sorry
that diplomacy did not work. But I think that if Donald Trump had not withdrawn from the original joint comprehensive plan of action, we would
not be here.
AMANPOUR: Oh, I know. I mean, honestly, it just beggars' belief. And now, President Trump has told Axios that he thinks these Israeli strikes could
make Iran be more serious about negotiating. You have sat in the room with them. You've negotiated for years. What do you think? I mean, given that
they are in a weakened position now.
SHERMAN: There's no doubt they're in a weakened position, but they are a resistance country, a resistance economy. That was the whole point of the
1979 revolution. I think this probably incentivizes what I call the hard- hardliners in Iran to go actually for a nuclear weapon.
I know that there are some analysts out there who believe that since Israel can't completely get rid of the nuclear program but can obviously create
great blows to it that eventually Iran will have to get back into the negotiating room and that may they may have to agree to a dismantlement of
their program. I think we're a long way from that point. This is not who Iran is. I wish that were the case. I do not see it happening.
AMANPOUR: And just quickly before I get into the nitty gritty of negotiations. They -- also, Israel believes that it would potentially be
able to affect regime change, maybe on its own or with the U.S. or whatever. Do you think that's likely at the moment?
SHERMAN: I don't believe that's likely at the moment. As I said, I think countries come together even if they don't initially agree, when they are
attacked by outsiders. The regime is quite good at oppressing its people. The U.S. is not into regime change. President Trump definitely doesn't want
that, didn't want war, and we don't know whether the 40,000 American troops in the region will be attacked. We don't know whether there'll be acts of
terror even here in our own country. There's a lot to unravel here, I hope in a positive direction, but I think it is a very dangerous moment for all
of us, for the region.
Oil prices are already up. They may likely go higher. That's not good for our economy or the world economy. This is a very tough moment.
AMANPOUR: And then, it takes creative leadership, right, to try to come to these deals that President Trump says that he wants to come to. I want to
read you what he said -- what he wrote, I gave Iran chance after chance to make a deal. I told them in the strongest of words to just do it, but no
matter how hard they tried, no matter how close they got, they just couldn't get it done.
I wonder if you could pass that for me. But I'm also sitting here thinking, since the inauguration in January, Trump has said that he's going to end
the Gaza War, that he's going to end the Ukraine War, Russia's attack on Ukraine, and that is somehow, you know, going to get the Nobel Peace Prize
and try to get another deal with Iran. Every single one of those situations have gotten worse since Trump has been in office. Every single one of them
has been accompanied by this kind of language, I'll do it in this amount of time. And then, if they don't do it, it's their fault, not my fault. So,
how does this work?
SHERMAN: I think your talking points are exactly right. This is really the weakest, strong man in the world. He pretends to be someone who can get
things done in a day's time. And of course, all of these things take more time. And he's basically had one person, Steve Witkoff, a successful
businessman, but someone who's new to diplomacy, doing all three of these things. It is absolutely impossible.
He has gotten rid of generals. He has gotten rid of virtually all the ambassadors in the region. He's only replaced the ambassador in Israel. He
has gotten rid of many people in the State Department. The tools of diplomacy, including foreign assistance. And many diplomats all around the
world. There is no national security adviser except an acting one, Marco Rubio, who happens to be secretary of state. It's pretty hard to get all of
this done with that kind of a scenario.
[13:35:00]
I know Americans are tired of wars around the world. They would rather have a peaceful outcome, but Donald Trump has shown he doesn't have the ability,
the patience, the tools, or the wherewithal to do any of this.
AMANPOUR: Can we just flip back to the JCPOA, the nuclear deal? You know, many people thought it was an OK, good, but not perfect arms control
agreement for the time. Other people thought it was awful and that it should never have been done and you can never, you know, do that kind of
thing. What can you tell us about how hard it was to achieve even that and what it actually brought in terms of security and surveillance of a program
while it was operational?
SHERMAN: Well, the negotiations, the really pecan, the very important negotiations took about 18 months. Once there was a short-term agreement
between the United States and Iran to create this -- that long negotiation was supposed to take six months, it took 18 months. Yes, it was not a
perfect deal, but it gave us a long timeframe, not only to very much constraint Iran's enrichment program, their stockpile, what kind of
centrifuges they could use, what kind of research they could do.
But very importantly, the International Atomic Energy Agency had the most stringent monitor and verification capabilities, not only electronically,
but people on the ground. All of that will be gone now. Iran will kick out any inspectors. Get rid of any monitoring and verification. We will not
have eyes on what is going on in Iran. They will seek to go underground and in secret. It will be very difficult the next round that Israel tries.
We'll see where this all goes, Christiane. But negotiations can -- of this detail, of this complexity cannot get done in two months' time.
AMANPOUR: And very briefly, because we're almost out of time, you know these negotiators on the Iranian side. Do you think they overplayed their
hand when they were offered whatever Trump offered them?
SHERMAN: I don't think they were overplaying their hand. They thought they were in the midst of a discussion of a negotiation of a back and forth, of
Asarati (ph) who led the negotiation, who was my counterpart during the JCPOA, is very smart, very tough. We'll see where it all goes from here.
AMANPOUR: Yes. Well, thank you so much for your expertise. You were in the room. Wendy Sherman, thank you very much. And we will be right back after
this short break.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
AMANPOUR: Now, as we discuss, it's likely Israel's attack was months, even years in the making with reports that Israeli intelligence established a
military base in Iran and stockpiled drones long before they were used during the strikes. Our next guest has been sounding the alarm about an
impending showdown for months.
Just last week, former NATO supreme allied commander, James Stavridis, laid out exactly what an Israeli assault on Iran's nuclear program might look
like. And he's joining me now. Welcome to the program, Admiral. So, what -- is this like what you laid out?
[13:40:00]
ADMIRAL JAMES STAVRIDIS, FORMER NATO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER: It is. And frankly since I wrote that piece, our Ukrainian friends launched an attack
that, in some ways, has some similarities because in both cases, Christiane, it was all about trade craft, deep penetration of an opponent,
and clever approaches, new ideas. So, I look at the Ukrainians and the Israelis and see a lot of similarities in these two operations.
AMANPOUR: Do you mean the infiltration, the transporting of drones inside the enemy land, according to them? Is that what you mean?
STAVRIDIS: That is exactly what I mean. And as, as you know, well, as a Greek American, I'm required to work a Greek myth or legend into every
conversation. It's a bit of a Trojan horse. And in both cases, suddenly springing forth our warriors, in this case, drones, and really remarkable
results in both of these operations.
AMANPOUR: Do you -- who do you think were those Mossad operatives? Who -- they sent video out, obviously, Mossad. And you saw this black and white
grainy, you know, nighttime video. Do you think they're locals who they have recruited?
STAVRIDIS: A great question for you to ask someone from the Mossad. Ideally, yes. And I think there is a resistance inside of Iran. My guess is
if you're going to do that kind of deep penetration, you're going to have to have native speakers, people who are really deeply embedded in the
culture. I think probably the case for the Ukrainians inside Russia, and I think for the Israelis inside Iran.
But here's the bottom line, Christiane. Israel's been preparing for this for decades. They know the Iranians are relentlessly pursuing a nuclear
weapon and they're just not going to permit them to obtain one. This is the first stage, and I think making sure that never happens.
AMANPOUR: So, Admiral, what do you think then is the U.S. role? I mean, you're clearly -- you believe that Israel can achieve what it says it's set
out to achieve. You heard -- well, I'm telling you that the former Israeli prime minister earlier on the program thought that it would not set the
program back by a huge amount of time because they couldn't get to Fordo unless the U.S. came in, and that's the main part. And Natanz is
underground, all of those big names that we know of. So, what do you think this round could achieve and what should, in your view, the United States
do?
STAVRIDIS: I think this round, when the Israelis are done, let's say five to seven days from now, will probably push the program back 12 months a
year perhaps, maybe a little bit less, maybe a little bit more. To really destroy the program, you have to get after the -- as you alluded to, the
deeply buried and utterly hardened targets way beneath the Earth. To do that, you need the bunker busting bombs that U.S. strategic bombers can
carry, think B-2s. And if you brought those into the fight, you could probably knock the program back two years, maybe a bit more than that.
But here's the problem, Iran, unlike Israel, is huge. It's two and a half times the size of Texas for the Americans in the audience, and it is also
mountainous, unpopulated in many parts. I can say with some certainty that there are other sites about which we just don't know. My old boss, Don
Rumsfeld, would've called those known unknowns. And there are unknowns out there.
So, this is why I think it is important, as Wendy Sherman, my good friend, was saying, to try to get the Iranians back to the negotiating table. And
this series of strikes may function as a bit of a wakeup call, get them back to the table, drop the idea of enrichment, and maybe we can craft some
kind of diplomatic way out of the war fighting.
AMANPOUR: What do you think could be a diplomatic way out? I mean, they say enrichment is their right and it's a red line. And to be honest with you,
you know, it wasn't the initial Trump parameter. At first, he said, the red line is a nuclear weapon. They cannot have a nuclear weapon. OK? The whole
world agrees to that. Iran says it doesn't want a nuclear weapon. But then they moved the goalposts, right? And they said no enrichment at all, which
departs from normal negotiating parameters. So, what do you think is a possible deal under these circumstances?
[13:45:00]
STAVRIDIS: Well, if I were advising the ayatollahs, which I assure you I am not, I would give them a saying we have here in North Florida, not the most
sophisticated part of my nation, but the saying is, sometimes you got to be for what's going to happen anyway. Meaning, at this point in time, the
Iranians have the weakest hand of cards they've had in my professional career going back 40 plus years. They just don't have a lot of cards to
play. And as a result of that, they ought to take the current deal, which is no enrichment, but we will give you enriched uranium for your peaceful
program, which they say is all they want anyway. So, what would be the problem with that?
And I have seen a creative idea about building an enrichment facility potentially on an island in the Arabian Gulf, running it jointly with
Iranians and Arabs. You know, there are a number of creative ways around this that could be face saving for the Iranians. But at the end of the day,
they don't have a lot of cards to play, and I think the deal on the table is the best they're going to get. It's kind of last exit before the tunnel
for the Iranians. I hope they realize that.
AMANPOUR: And on the other hand, even the former Israeli prime minister pointed out that Israel has not been able to win a war against Hamas in
Gaza. You know, to the contrary. And so, much civilian casualties. I mean, just absolutely appalling situation going on there. Barak said he didn't
want to see a 20-month war of attrition with Iran. He also pointed out that the United States hasn't won a war for quite a long time. You've been NATO
commander and you know that. You've mentioned Don Rumsfeld, Iraq was a disaster for you and for those who were involved.
So, how many cards do Israel and the U.S. have to play in terms of a constructive, you know, outcome?
STAVRIDIS: Well, first and foremost, the big card the U.S. and Israel have to play here is the military card is a hard power card that would be
ultimately quite devastating to Iran. Look, let's hope we don't get there and let's come up with a diplomatic set of outcomes.
And yes, you are correct. Israel's a small nation of 10 million and they don't want to get into a war of attrition with an enormous country, with a
population of 80 million. And so, yes, it's -- there are some challenges for both sides in this equation. But I think, on balance, if you offered a
package to the Iranians of some sanctions relief alongside no further military action, but they have to give up the ability to enrich uranium,
and therefore, by definition, the ability to have a nuclear weapon, I think that's a construct that ultimately could result in a reasonable outcome
here. If not, we're going to end up where John McCain was bomb, bomb, bomb, bomb, Iran. Let's avoid that.
AMANPOUR: Well, on that happy note, Admiral Stavridis, thank you very much indeed for joining us. And for more on this, let's bring in Ali Vaez. He's
director of the Iran program at the International Crisis Group. Ali Vaez, welcome. I don't know how much of the conversation you've been listening
to, but it's been really interesting getting this expert, you know, views on what's going on.
So, first and foremost, you know, the Iranian system, the people. Do you think that this could drive them into getting real about a nuclear deal
with the United States?
ALI VAEZ, DIRECTOR, IRAN PROJECT, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP: It's good to be with you Christiane. Look, the reality is that Iranians were reluctant
to negotiate with a gun to their head. Now, the gun has been triggered, basically. And I feel it will be very hard for the Iranian leadership to
agree to come to the table now and to concede and make and agree to President Trump's terms.
The more likely scenario is that the talks are over for now, and Iran might decide to withdraw from the nonproliferation treaty and move towards
weaponizing its nuclear capability. I think that is a likelier scenario if this conflict continues to escalate.
AMANPOUR: And what do you think? And you must have been, you know, trying to figure out what the consequences would be of a prolonged attack, as
Israel says, but also of the decapitation of the military high command across the different disciplines, and the scientists, of course. Israel has
been killing scientists for many, many years now. But what do you think the impact on the regime is?
[13:50:00]
VAEZ: So, first of all, it's very interesting that the Iranian leadership learned almost nothing from the playbook that Israel deployed in Lebanon
last year to decapitate Hezbollah. This is more sophisticated, more elaborate, but it is more or less the same thing. And it's really stunning
that Israel could eliminate the top brass of Iranian military in its opening salvo in these strikes.
But the difference between Iran and Hezbollah is that Iran is a state, not a non-state actor. Its leadership has deep roots and the supreme leader has
already replaced most of the military commanders. But without any doubt there is a degree of fear and paralysis in the system because they knew,
but now they felt it in a way that is very different than before, of the degree of Israeli intelligence penetration into this system.
But I think now decision making is probably partly paralyzed. We don't know how much of Iran's offensive capabilities have been destroyed or hampered
as a result of Israeli operations. And by the way, not just overt military action, but also covert action and cyber-attacks. And so, it's very hard to
be in a decision-making position in Tehran right now.
AMANPOUR: Well, I was going to ask you, you sort of answered my next question, which is going to be, how do you envision retaliation? Because
one of the generals who was killed just the day before he was killed, Salami, the head of the Revolutionary Guard, he said, if it's going to
happen -- and they had a feeling, because they said it on Thursday that this is going to happen, and our retaliation is going to be even stronger
than it was the previous time.
What do you think they, they can do? Because even the previous time it didn't amount to a huge amount.
VAEZ: Well, they have no good options. But you know, the reality is, again, if we look at experience with Hezbollah last year, I think one of the
lessons is that it will get too late too quickly if you don't move to use your assets before Israel is able to destroy them. So, time is not on the
side of the Iranian leadership. If they are to retaliate, they would have to do it as soon as possible.
Their option of choice most likely is a massive ballistic missile attack on Israel. The risk with that option is that if it results in casualties,
especially American casualties, let's remember that there are 700,000 Americans who live in Israel, then you risk not only inviting a much more
devastating Israeli attack, but also you risk that that attack will be joined by the United States. And if the Iranians don't respond, they're
basically signaling to Israel that it can continue eliminating the leadership, eliminating the infrastructure, and destroying their nuclear
program, and sets a terrible precedent for this regime. So, basically, the Iranian leadership has no good options in front of it.
AMANPOUR: And of course, there are Americans, not just in Israel, but in military bases all around the region. And those, you know, could be
targeted as well. Can I just ask you what -- just paint a picture of the conditions of life inside Iran right now for the ordinary, average person,
because the pressure of the sanctions seems to be, you know, really at an explosive level.
VAEZ: So, as you know, Iranians have thick skins. And I've been talking to friends and family in Iran today who are much less worried than I am
looking at the situation from outside. But the reality is that life has been very, very tough in Iran and in the past few months. The economy is in
dire straits. The Iranians are struggling to even keep the lights on. There are serious energy shortages. And these attacks are likely to make a bad
situation worse.
But even a scenario of economic collapse in Iran doesn't necessarily mean the collapse of the political system as well. One of the key issues to pay
attention to right now is the fact that unlike in Syria or in some other cases, there is really no viable alternative to this regime inside or
outside of the country.
So, a collapse an implosion of the regime is more likely to result in civil strife than a transition, a peaceful transition to some sort of a more
moderate political order in Iran.
[13:55:00]
AMANPOUR: Ali Vaez, thank you so much indeed, from the International Crisis Group.
And that is it for now. If you ever miss our show, you can find the latest episode shortly after it airs on our podcast. And remember, you can always
catch us online, on our website, and all-over social media. Thank you for watching, and goodbye from London.
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