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Amanpour
Interview with Lebanese Justice Minister Adel Nassar; Interview with University of Oxford Associate Professor in History and Politics of Iran Maryam Alemzadeh; Interview with Lawrence Technological University Assistant Professor and Iranian Political Analyst Mostafa Daneshgar; Interview with The Atlantic Staff Writer Vivian Salama Interview with . Aired 1-2p ET
Aired March 11, 2026 - 13:00 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
[13:00:00]
CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR, CNN CHIEF INTERNATIONAL ANCHOR: Hello, everyone, and welcome to "Amanpour." Here's what's coming up. The widening Middle East
war is creating a humanitarian crisis in Lebanon as Israel ramps up its strikes against Iran and Hezbollah. The Lebanese Justice Minister joins me
for an exclusive interview.
Then, both Iran and the United States claim to be launching their, quote, "most intense" operations yet. Iranian political analyst Mostafa Daneshgar
and Revolutionary Guard scholar Maryam Alemzadeh join me.
Plus --
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
VIVIAN SALAMA, STAFF WRITER, THE ATLANTIC: They are definitely leaning toward an in-and-out scenario. Now, easier said than done. I'm someone
who's covered the Middle East for 15 years. I know that these conflicts can spiral out of control almost overnight. This is already looking that way.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: -- Atlantic staff writer Vivian Salama speaks to Walter Isaacson about the dangers of America getting into a war with no clear plan to end
it.
Welcome to the program, everyone. I'm Christiane Amanpour in London.
The U.S.-Israel war on Iran is expanding, and regional leaders and aid agency are warning that humanitarian disaster is looming as well. In Iran,
Israel hit a residential area in the capital overnight, as well as places in the north. The U.N. says it is seriously concerned about the health of
the people there. After strikes on Tehran's oil depots this weekend led to toxic oil-filled rain falling on people across the city.
In Lebanon, Israel is pounding southern Beirut, going after what it says are Hezbollah targets. There were more mass evacuations from there, and
nearly 700,000 people have already been displaced. The Lebanese government has reportedly asked Israel to pause its attacks and start some
negotiations, but Israel, it says, has refused.
As this war expands, global trade and energy are also under increasing threat. The U.S. says it has destroyed Iranian ships being used to lay
mines in the Straits of Hormuz, a vital route for global trade, which usually transports a fifth of the world's oil. It's a resounding message
from Iran that in this asymmetrical war, attacks by the U.S. and Israel will not go unanswered.
Now, Adel Nassar is Lebanon's justice minister, and he's joining me from Beirut. Minister, welcome to the program.
ADEL NASSAR, LEBANESE JUSTICE MINISTER: Thank you for having me.
AMANPOUR: OK. There's a bit of a delay, but I'm sure everybody understands that. Can I just first ask you to give me some clarity on what I said was
your government asking Israel to have some negotiations over this, and Israel saying not right now. Can you fill me in on that?
NASSAR: There was a decision from the council of ministers, and this decision opened the door for negotiations. For the time being, I'm not
aware personally from any positive answer regarding a possible negotiation.
BROWN: OK. So, what would you say is the state of the war, they say, against Hezbollah in your country? What is the humanitarian fallout? Is
Hezbollah still standing and fighting? Tell me where we are a few days into this war on your country.
NASSAR: As a result of the current war, there is -- there are around 570 killed, more than 1,400 injured. The number of displaced, you are talking
about 800,000, but in reality, these are only the ones that have been registered, and I foresee that the number is really higher than this. There
are, therefore, a real dramatic situation in Lebanon, and the civilians are suffering a lot. The country is suffering from huge damages, and the
schools are closed, and the current situation is very difficult.
[13:05:00]
AMANPOUR: So, UNICEF also says that Israel's strikes have killed more than 10 children so far every day. Let me play for you this displaced woman from
south Lebanon, what she's saying about her situation. Here's her words in translation.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
REEM HUSSEIN, DISPLACED FROM HOME IN BEIRUT SUBURB (through translator): There is such a big difference between sitting comfortably in your own
home, cooking your food, when no one tells you to get up and leave, when no one speaks harshly to you. Now, the difference is very big, very big. Do
not look at me. The difference is huge. The difference between sleeping in your own bed and sleeping on the ground.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: So, how are you coping, you as a government, coping with the humanitarian crisis? What can you do? Can you support people like her in
the street?
NASSAR: You can imagine that it is very difficult. Everything was very sudden. Unfortunately, the government has to cope with a huge number of
displaced. The government is providing shelters, providing 100,000, if I'm not mistaken, of hot meals to the displaced per day. The situation is very
difficult because the resources are not very high.
However, despite all these problems, there is a full mobilization of the government in order to address the needs as much as possible. The needs are
huge and the problems are huge. However, the government is working day and night to be able to cope with these huge difficulties.
AMANPOUR: And this, of course, is on top of the last Israel-Hezbollah war where apparently 4,000 people were killed in Lebanon. The World Bank says
it caused $11 billion in damage to your country and more than a million were already displaced.
But now let me ask you about the central issue here, and that is the continued activity of Hezbollah and Hezbollah firing at targets inside
Israel in the opening days of Israel and the U.S. war on Iran. Now, your government is taking quite a hard line on Hezbollah. Your president has
said there's a ban, he's announced a ban on all Hezbollah military actions, but they're still fighting. So, what can you do? I mean, how -- first of
all, what can you do to stop them right now?
NASSAR: What is important at the beginning is to explain a little bit that after a long period of time where Hezbollah was installing all its military
infrastructure, this government was appointed one year ago, and this government took a first decision through the governmental declaration that
has been presented to the parliament where it was clearly stated that the monopoly of the strengths must be given only to the state, and this is a
condition to build a state.
So, this first decision was taken through this declaration, and the declaration was approved by all the ministers, including the ministers
close to Hezbollah, and this decision was also presented to the parliament, and the government was granted the confidence of the parliament with MPs
pertaining to Hezbollah. The government was granted the confidence.
Then the government took another decision to start implementing the monopoly of the strengths in the hands of the states through the army's
action. The army provided a plan, and the plan was ongoing before this war erupted.
AMANPOUR: OK.
NASSAR: And also, after that, there were strikes coming from Israel, and Israel was taking as a pretext the presence of the military infrastructure
of Hezbollah, but the position of the state is that in order to build for internal reasons and for the interest of Lebanon, it was very important to
implement the monopoly of the weapons.
Hezbollah was complicating the process. Hezbollah did not cooperate as much as it should in this process, and by not cooperating, it was clear that
Hezbollah was offering also pretexts for Israel to strike on Lebanon, and when Hezbollah took the unilateral decision to launch rockets against
Israel, they gave also the pretext to Israel to start a large war. So, we were in a process of strikes, and now we are in a full war.
It is clear that in order for Lebanon to be able to face Israel in the diplomatic field or in diplomacy, Lebanon needs to have the decision of war
and peace and to be -- to have the monopoly of strengths within Lebanon.
[13:10:00]
This is a requirement that we consider as a government needed for the sake of Lebanon, for the interest of all the population of Lebanon, and we
consider that Hezbollah's action is an obstacle for the government of Israel to be able to take all appropriate actions to defend Lebanon's
interests.
AMANPOUR: OK. So, you're making a passionate case for your sovereignty and your dominance as the state rather than being sidetracked and dragged into
all these wars by a local militia, i.e., Hezbollah. But the thing is, you yourself called for the arrest and the prosecution of the Hezbollah
secretary-general, Sheikh Naim Qassem, but your cabinet chose not to move forward with your proposal.
Why did you call for his arrest, and why doesn't your cabinet support that call if you say the government is united for, as you call it, a monopoly,
but I suppose to be a sovereign state and not get dragged around by Hezbollah?
NASSAR: Today, in the government, the decision to have the monopoly of the strengths is an irrevocable decision. The problem is that we are suffering
from accumulation of problems for 30 years. So, today, the government is taking the appropriate steps in order to achieve the full sovereignty of
the government and the state, and therefore to dismantle the Hezbollah military infrastructure.
Despite that, it is clear also that the army started the process, and the government will continue step by step to get to the appropriate result,
which is, I say it again, not to serve any foreign interest, but to build our own state. And anything Hezbollah could do to prevent the state to be
built in the interest of all the citizens will have to be opposed.
Now, we can study the steps to be taken in order to make sure that we are taking the appropriate steps and to support also our Lebanese army, because
the Lebanese army is one essential element to be able, or to say even the essential element, in order to be able to have the sovereignty of the state
over all the territory.
AMANPOUR: OK. So, I hear you. Yes. Let me just ask --
NASSAR: We are committed to that first, to the Lebanese citizens, because it is the way to protect all Lebanese citizens, wherever are their
political beliefs, wherever are their religious beliefs, because at the end of the day, the state is to serve all the citizens and to protect all the
citizens.
AMANPOUR: So, look, you just talked about the army and the sovereignty of the state. We hear a report that last week the army arrested three
Hezbollah members who were found transporting weapons, and a military judge, i.e., an army judge, fined each about $10 and then released them
without jail.
Is it just tough talk from the army? And apparently, according to CNN producer, you're the one who ordered an investigation into this judge who
issued the sentence. So, what's wrong with that picture? As you say, your court between Israel and Hezbollah and Lebanon, you know, the state suffers
and the people suffers.
NASSAR: OK. As you may understand, as minister of justice, I will not comment on judicial decision and I will allow the proper institutions to
address whatever is within their own jurisdiction. What I can tell you from the reading of the decision and putting aside the importance or not of the
sentence is that this decision considered that whether the person holding weapons pertains to Hezbollah or not, he is in breach of the law.
And this means that the decision, not in terms of the sentence and whether it is an important or not condemnation, I don't want to comment on that and
I will not comment on that.
[13:15:00]
However, from this decision, the persons who were arrested raised the issue that they belong to Hezbollah as being a line of defense and despite that,
the decision was to condemn. Whatever is the amount or the terms of the condemnation, I don't have a comment to make in the media about that.
However, what I can tell you is that now it is clear from the court decision that one cannot raise the fact that he pertains to Hezbollah to
consider that he is entitled to hold weapons or to transport weapons.
AMANPOUR: Can I ask you personally, do you feel safe talking out? I mean, Hezbollah is known to exert its own justice, let's say, its own whatever
you want to call it, I don't want to use bad words here, against people who disagree and speak out against them. You saw what happened to Prime
Minister Rafic Hariri. Do you feel safe taking them on?
NASSAR: First of all, I will certainly not use the word justice or its own justice. I think we shouldn't put the name justice in your sentence if you
allow me to say that.
AMANPOUR: No, but you're right, I misspoke using that word.
NASSAR: OK. On the other hand, let's say that when we are in a specific position, we have to take the stand we believe in, in the interest of the
state. And again, I can tell you that today what Hezbollah is doing is in full breach of the law, in full breach of the commitments of the government
towards its own population, its own people, to stop having a parallel movement making decisions regarding war and peace and engaging or dragging
the full country into regional conflicts.
If you want to assess into a political analysis based on declarations made and positions taken, it seems that Hezbollah is acting as if it wants to be
in a front position in the regional war between Israel and the U.S. on one side and Iran on the other side, while the interest of Lebanon and all the
people of Lebanon is to stay away from regional conflicts.
We are a small country. We are a country having various numbers of communities. We can be a model of coexistence, and we should be a model of
coexistence, and we should be a model of peace for the world and not to be dragged into the wars of the others.
AMANPOUR: OK. So, I want to end on what their action means for you as this small country that should be a model of peace, because right now Israeli
officials are warning that Lebanon, their action in Lebanon, could even continue beyond the war in Iran if that ever ends. This is what Israel's
finance minister and well-known hardliner, the extreme rightist, speaking in northern Israel today, said. This is Bezalel Smotrich. Take a listen
now.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
BEZALEL SMOTRICH, ISRAELI FINANCE MINISTER (through translator): We are now on the northern border after the IDF instructed all residents of the
area to evacuate. You wanted to bring hell upon us? You brought hell upon yourselves. The Dahieh will look like Khan Younis. Our northern residents
will live in quiet, peace, and security.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: Right. Well, that's a couple of days ago, a few days ago, and he's essentially saying, you're going to -- you know, the southern part of
Beirut there, the Dahieh, could look like Khan Younis, which was leveled by the Israelis during their Gaza campaign. Do you worry?
NASSAR: I am certainly worried, and I am certainly concerned. It is clear that I am not expecting Israel to take nice positions towards Lebanon. They
never did. It is not the issue. The real problem is that we have to control our own country, and it is not acceptable that a Lebanese movement,
whatever are its former links to other countries, Iran namely, should stop having these links and should act totally differently. The position of the
government of Lebanon is clearly to ban any military activity outside the state. This is a final commitment.
Again, I am saying that, irrespective of the position of Israel, I am saying that because it is our duty to protect our people, our population,
and moreover, any diplomatic move Lebanon wants to make, in order to be efficient, Lebanon must control the right to go to war or to go to peace.
[13:20:00]
This has to be in the hands of the government of Lebanon and certainly not in the hand of a movement that is acting unilaterally without taking into
consideration the interest of all the country.
AMANPOUR: All right. Minister Adel Nassar, thank you very much indeed for joining us on that. And stay with us, we'll be right back after the break.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
AMANPOUR: Tehran says it has launched its, quote, "most intense and heaviest operations" since this war began. It has reportedly been laying
mines in the Strait of Hormuz, effectively shutting the global waterway, which is crucial for the world's oil economy.
At the same time, President Trump's former Iran adviser, Elliott Abrams, tells me the war will either end with a popular uprising or within a couple
of weeks, when President Trump announces that all his objectives have been met, which Abrams says is the most likely scenario now. And Trump himself
today told Axios the war will end, quote, "soon."
This is all happening as Iran's new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has still not been seen in public days after being appointed. Sources say that
he was injured on the first day of the war and has a fractured foot and minor injuries.
For more on the system driving Iran's war strategy, I'm joined by the Iranian political analyst Mostafa Daneshgar and Maryam Alemzadeh, associate
professor in history and politics of Iran at Oxford University and an expert on Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Welcome to both of you.
I want to ask you first, Ms. Alemzadeh, Professor, because we just heard from Lebanon's minister of justice, and he basically told me that he
believes Iran will fight to the last Lebanese for their own interests. And I asked him whether the Revolutionary Guard had been significantly, you
know, diminished. And he said no. So, what do you think the strength right now of the IRGC is?
MARYAM ALEMZADEH, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR IN HISTORY AND POLITICS OF IRAN, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD: Hello and thank you for having me. I almost fully
agree. The strength of the Revolutionary Guards has not diminished significantly because this organization was established and grew in a way
that was not reliant on its top leadership.
The decapitation both of Ayatollah Khamenei and the top military commanders has little effect, if any, on the very vast network, the capillary, the
penetrated network of branches and stations and bases that the IRGC and Basij together with other state-sponsored organizations have. They have
been built and trained to act spontaneously, independently. They are good at operating ad hoc, thriving in chaos, and the history of the IRGC
actually approves that.
And I also agree with the justice minister that Iran, the Islamic Republic, does not care about the Lebanese cause, the Palestinian cause. It is all a
tactic for self-preservation.
AMANPOUR: Well, that's very interesting. So, to you, Mostafa Daneshgar, then, do you think that the aims that you were hoping for, and certainly
many in the diaspora and elsewhere inside Iran, that this action, which many have celebrated inside Iran, will lead to an uprising?
[13:25:00]
I ask that because, as you know, I asked Elliott Abrams, I said, how is this going to end? He said either with an uprising or with Trump declaring,
you know, he's won and ending the war. What are you thinking right now?
MOSTAFA DANESHGAR, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, LAWRENCE TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY AND IRANIAN POLITICAL ANALYST: Hello, and thanks for having me. I think
two lines in parallel are weakening the Iranian regime now. First is the air campaign that is handled by U.S. and Israel. In parallel, people and
protesters in the street, they can apprise at any moment. I disagree that IRGC is not weakening now.
They are weakening, and we can see the indicators. You can see they cannot defend the air, and the U.S. and Israel army can target wherever they want,
whatever they want inside Iran. They targeted Iranian supreme leader easily, easier than any other thing.
So, I think this campaign, this air campaign, besides the people, the protesters, and the people, they are in anger from their country, from the
massacre that happened in January 8th and 9th. So, they will, at some moment, they can take over the government. This can lead to the collapse in
the political system, political structure, and lead to people to feel that they are secure. Then they can take the protest to the street one more
time, one more time.
So, there is -- I think there is a big chance for that. I'm not totally sure, and there is not certainty in politics, as you know. But this air
campaign makes the repressive apparatus of Iranian regime, Islamic Republic, state, weaker than any other time.
AMANPOUR: Yes, well, I'm sure that is true, Maryam, right? I mean, it's definitely been weakened. It's been slammed from the most powerful
militaries in the world. And in any event, Iran was never going to be able to win against a joint Israel-American campaign. But how do you think, for
instance, the naming of Mojtaba Khamenei is going to affect the prosecution of this war? And they're still being quite defiant, well, very defiant. I
mean, people -- you know, leaders there are saying, no, we're not going to negotiate, and we're going to cause Iran a lot of, rather the West and the
world, a lot of economic pain.
ALEMZADEH: No, I totally agree that I did not mean to undermine the effectiveness of the air campaign. Yes, the air defense system might be
down a lot of Iran's classic, as in like regular army, naval force, and some of the IRGC boats might be down.
But in my view, that's never been the strength of the IRGC. The strength of the IRGC has been its penetration into the country, into its farthest and
deepest corners. And that is, to a large extent, still intact. That's why I'm not too optimistic that even if this war leads to a point of state
collapse, and there's like some, like at least temporary ceasefire where bombs are not falling and people can come out of survival mode and take on
the streets again, which in my opinion has also, like the likelihood of it, has also been reduced by the war, even if that happens, it's not going to
be an easy takeover for the protesters, who I believe are the majority of the population now, because the weapons are still in the hands of the IRGC
and Basij, and they do not need the more advanced equipment that has been destroyed to some extent in order to repress a popular uprising.
And Mojtaba Khamenei's appointment, I think it first signals a hardliner pose for the continuation of the war. But I think when and if this war
ends, it's not necessarily a signifier of hardliner policy. He is basically the IRGC's person. He obeys the IRGC, not the other way around. So, if the
IRGC decides to take a more pragmatic, more conciliatory route, if it does, I think Mojtaba Khamenei will be no hurt. If the IRGC decides to take a
more pragmatic, more conciliatory route, if it does, I think Mojtaba Khamenei will be no hurdle to that.
[13:30:00]
AMANPOUR: Wow. That's interesting. Professor Daneshgar, I hear what you're saying. Are you concerned that, for instance, the head of the national
police and some IRGC commanders have gone on state media and essentially over these last, you know, certain two weeks of war have told people to
stay at home, have indicated that they would be traitors betraying their country at the behest of what they call enemy armies, and say that the
shoot-to-kill orders are already in place. What does that say to you about the likelihood of people being able to come out?
DANESHGAR: Yes, this is the clear and this is the significant indicator that they have a concern about the chance and the room that is open now and
the likelihood that people appear again at the street and the uprising happens again. This is a very strong indicator about their concern. And the
reality is hundreds of repressive apparatus stations and institutions are targeted for the past 12 days of the war.
So, it is a big deal for them. They are scared that the situation gets out of control at any moment. So, that's why they are threatening people and
ask them or I would say begging them to stay at home and they use whatever they have in their hand, what remains in their hand, to stop people to come
and respond to call for the street.
AMANPOUR: So, let me play -- from what you are saying, let me play what the IRGC commander said. He is also a -- well, a former IRGC. He is a
politician. Let me play what he said to exactly what you are saying there.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
SALAR ABNOUSH, FORMER IRGC COMMANDER AND IRANIAN MP (through translator): Today, anyone on Iranian soil who lets a sound out of their throat that
displays enmity toward the regime in order to shoot them has already been issued.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: So, to your point, but what also then about the hope, certainly amongst a lot of diaspora, I think also Israel, the United States maybe,
hoped that weakening the IRGC and weakening the system would lead to defections and cause sort of a toppling from within. We haven't seen that.
Professor Daneshgar, what do you anticipate?
DANESHGAR: There are some signs for that. Listen to what you've just played. He said, we gave an order to the forces to shoot the protesters by
themselves without they need any extra order. There is signs that the communication in the chain of command is disconnected, is interrupted by
this air campaign. And we have a lot of lust in the chain of command of IRGC. So, at the moment of confrontation in the street between the people,
protesters, and IRGC, they are not as united as before at 8th and 9th of January. So, this is the hope.
Plus, now we have an alternative that people called his name, chanting for him, Prince Reza Pahlavi. So, this increased the chance. And in the footage
that you just played, in other part of that, he says he started to curse Reza Pahlavi and say bad words to him.
So, they think the most important threat to the regime now is protesters in the street, air campaign that is weakening the IRGC, on top of that, the
alternative, the active alternative that people can get to the consensus around him.
AMANPOUR: OK.
DANESHGAR: So, this is the major threat that threatened the existence of the regime and can lead to the collapse at any moment.
AMANPOUR: OK. So, that's a point of view that many have had, right? Describe for me what the IRGC is, Maryam. It's not just an army. It's got
its tentacles in every which way, right? And even if the theocracy was toppled, tell me what you see if there is a collapse and how strong they
are in terms of other parts of controlling the system in Iran.
ALEMZADEH: Sure. The IRGC started as a defender of the revolution, as vague and intransparent a concept as it is.
[13:35:00]
And it's significant because it was in rivalry, basically, with the regular army and the police that existed, like the pre-revolutionary army and the
police that survived the revolution. So, it was with the excuse of defending the revolution itself, not the country, not domestic security and
order, but the revolution.
So, this vagueness, this informality around both the organization and its ideology has been a defining factor of the IRGC from day one. It translated
organizationally into an institution that is very decentralized, very prone to direct action. It was actually prone -- this tendency was
institutionalized within it through the multiple rounds of chaos that it grew out of. The early --
AMANPOUR: But it's got -- it's an economic force. It's a real estate force. It's, you know, very, very corrupt as well, right?
ALEMZADEH: Yes.
AMANPOUR: I mean --
ALEMZADEH: There's -- yes, there's that too. But what I wanted to say is that, like, it has -- it is trained in thriving chaos, and the current war
is actually another opportunity for it to become more relevant, to become the force that can handle this chaotic situation that a classic army would
not be able to stand. Let alone, yes, their hands in -- their heavy hand in economy, in politics, in any and every state office and, like, public
office, civil office that Iran has.
And I don't think, actually -- because they are used to not working with a clear chain of command. They are used to, like, what military sociologists
call small-group cohesion. Their cohesion comes from their small groups. They know each other. They have a very organic relationship with each
other. So, I don't think that the current hits that they have taken, for sure, has weakened them in that regard.
AMANPOUR: Let me ask you, Professor Daneshgar, in our final minute, are you concerned with what we're hearing from inside Iran and maybe even some
in the diaspora that the attacks on Iranian civilians, whether it's accidental or not, the attack on the depot with, you know, the toxic rain
and oil falling down, the damage to really important cultural heritage, is beginning to frighten them and question whether this actually is a war
against just the regime or is it against all Iran and all Iranians? Are you concerned about that shift in opinion? In 30 seconds.
DANESHGAR: I think if the war takes longer than it should be, yes. But at this moment, the answer simply is no, because the people put the blame on
the government, on IRGC, because their policy on eliminating Israel and anti-Americanism put the country and brought this war to our country.
So, they are blaming the Islamic Republic regime at this moment. But if the war takes longer than it should be, yes, this shift may happen. But I don't
think it will take that long.
AMANPOUR: OK. Well, I appreciate you being with us, Professor Daneshgar. Maryam, as well, thank you very much. Alemzadeh, thank you. And you're
writing a book on the IRGC.
ALEMZADEH: I am.
AMANPOUR: Yes. Thank you both very much for joining us. And we'll be back after this short break.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
[13:40:00]
AMANPOUR: As we discussed earlier, the prospect of real regime change in Iran soon is questionable. Yet, President Trump has been touting the
January capture of Venezuela's dictator, Nicolas Maduro, as, quote, "The perfect example of an intervention gone right." Now, he's suggesting that
Cuba may be next.
Vivian Salama is a staff writer at The Atlantic, and she has been reporting on the Middle East for 15 years. She gives Walter Isaacson her analysis on
Trump's actions in Iran and in Latin America.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
WALTER ISAACSON, CO-HOST, AMANPOUR AND CO.: Thank you, Christiane. And, Vivian Salama, welcome to the show.
VIVIAN SALAMA, STAFF WRITER, THE ATLANTIC: Great to be here.
ISAACSON: What is your understanding of why President Trump launched the attacks on Iran? What was the plan there?
SALAMA: I think there's been a lot of buildup. Certainly, he has believed for some time that nuclear talks were basically going nowhere. He has long
condemned JCPOA. He obviously pulled out of it, the Iran nuclear deal, that is. He pulled out of it in his first term in office. And he has since sort
of toyed with the idea of renegotiating with Iran, trying to get them in line. Their enrichment activities have grown over the past few years since
the U.S. withdrew from those -- from the JCPOA.
So, he was really looking for a solution of some kind, either that they would be able to force the Iranians' hand in negotiations, particularly
since last year the Trump administration launched strikes on a number of nuclear facilities in Iran, there's a debate even within the administration
about how effective those strikes were, but they believed that at least it weakened their hand a little bit. Israel's also war in the region with a
number of Iranian proxies, the Houthis, Hezbollah. That also played a factor into it.
ISAACSON: Well, what about the thing that Israel forced the hand?
SALAMA: Yes. So, then there is that. I mean, as far as the exact timing goes, Bibi Netanyahu has made no secret that this is a dream come true for
him. He has believed for some time that regime change is absolutely imperative in Iran. President Trump himself has sort of wavered on that
question. You know, if the clerical leadership of Iran were to sit at the table and make a deal with President Trump, I don't think that he would
have walked away from that.
ISAACSON: Well, suppose that the ayatollah's son consolidates power. What possible end games are there?
SALAMA: At this point, you know, I think it remains to be seen exactly how this could play out, except that the Iranian leadership finds itself backed
into a corner and so significantly weakened, its hand so significantly weakened that it has no choice but either to surrender and/or negotiate.
And that is what the administration is certainly hoping for. They want to see that kind of a solution, especially as President Trump dangles this
possibility of ground troops being needed to be able to kind of see their objectives through.
Now, I want to emphasize what the objectives that they keep putting out are, whether or not, you know, that is ultimately where it takes the
conflict or not. But they say they want to denigrate Iran's nuclear capacity. They want to take out its missiles. They want to take out its
Navy. And President Trump in a press conference this week saying that the Navy has pretty much been annihilated. And then lastly, target the proxies
that are in the region.
And so, that is what they continue to emphasize is their core mission at hand. They don't like to talk about regime change, except President Trump
likes to tap dance and flirt with this idea of regime change and say, yes, at this point, I think it's time for regime change in Iran. Obviously, he
kind of he tends to kind of flip flop on some of these issues, as do a number of people in his administration. And so, that's why we have to kind
of wait and see how it unfolds.
ISAACSON: You talk about the need to degrade Iran's proxies in the region, you just call them. And, of course, the main one is Lebanon and the Iranian
proxies in Lebanon. And that seems to now be a second front in this war, or at least for Israel, which is attacking there. Tell me how this is going to
play out. And is the U.S. going to open a second front or could it in Lebanon against Iran's proxies?
SALAMA: So, far, my understanding is that they are very reluctant to open a second front. They will defend Israel, if need be, with limited
targeting, which we've seen, you know, in recent years as well. But they're very reluctant to open a second front at this point, particularly since the
war in Iran already is so grossly unpopular here in the United States, even among many in the president's base.
[13:45:00]
They would rather kind of get in and out and do this as quickly as possible, also just because we are in a midterm election year. And a lot of
that hangs in the balance also because energy prices are rising. And that is also really placing a lot of pressure on the Republican Party. So, for
those reasons, I think they are definitely leaning toward an in and out scenario.
Now, easier said than done. I'm someone who's covered the Middle East for 15 years. I know that these conflicts can spiral out of control almost
overnight. This is already looking that way. Israel has sort of made it its mission to try to complete what it started a few years ago and go after
remaining cells of Hezbollah that have created any kind of trouble for Israel now that's their positioning of it.
But, of course, we see civilian sites being targeted as well, which is very troubling and could also open the door for a wider conflict. And so --
ISAACSON: But wait. You just said something a moment ago about it could spiral out of control, and that's what we're seeing now. Is this really
spiraling out of control? And what do you mean by that?
SALAMA: Well, you already see Iran launching attacks sort of haphazardly around the region, even beyond the region. I was reading that Azerbaijan
got missiles. I mean, I don't have the list in front of me right now about all the countries that have gotten hit one way or another. Some of it, of
course, was just, you know, misfires and things like that, but others were deliberate.
And certainly, Iran is already going after U.S. allies in the region, its Arab allies, targeting sites in massive numbers. I mean, in the hundreds
per day sometimes in places like the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain and Qatar and Saudi Arabia. These are countries that obviously have very close
ties with the United States.
Some of them host military bases, U.S. military bases there, and this is partially why they're being targeted. They are also no friend to Iran. They
were very much on board for containing Iran's nuclear program and kind of getting it in line.
But on the other hand, they did not want to get dragged into this conflict. I was talking to Arab officials and I wrote a story before this conflict
began about Arab allies declining the Trump administration's request to have them use their military bases because of that exact reason.
ISAACSON: So, you don't put much stock in the idea that the Saudis helped push this attack on Iran as well?
SALAMA: I don't think that they're crying for the ayatollah. I definitely think that they like to see some limited strikes. However, all the
officials I talked to believed that a broad conflict like the one we are seeing now was only going to create tension and destabilize the region,
obviously destabilize energy markets. And that's what we're seeing, whether it's a short-term or not. Unfortunately, I don't have a glass ball, but
we'll find out.
ISAACSON: You had a great piece in The Atlantic about a week ago called "All Eyes on Cuba," which is a great headline and great piece because it
said, OK, after Venezuela, after all this, you have a president who is kind of liking regime change. I think President Trump said that we achieve a
historic transformation in Venezuela. We're also looking forward to the great change that will be coming to Cuba. What does Trump want to achieve
there?
SALAMA: Well, I'm sure I don't have to tell you, Walter. Cuba has probably haunted seven decades worth of presidents of both parties. Finding a
solution to Cuba, to the Cuba problem, and what I mean by that is, again, this perception that there's a communist regime at the doorstep of the
United States that would be a perch for countries like Russia or once upon a time the Soviet Union and China to be able to spy on the United States
because it would be more sympathetic to their ideologies and not the U.S., that has haunted presidents of both parties.
And President Trump is no different, except that circumstances are now different because for the past two or three decades, Cuba has largely been
propped up by Venezuela, Venezuelan oil specifically. I wrote about the history of it, this alliance between Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez, who was
the predecessor to Nicolas Maduro, the one who sort of flipped Venezuela from a democracy to a more socialist nation. Cuba needed Venezuela because
it had just lost the Soviet Union when the Soviet Union collapsed, and it needed a benefactor to help it.
And Venezuela stepped in, started shipping oil. Cuba would respond with doctors and, you know, other assistance, including intelligence sharing.
All of that is gone now, with Nicolas Maduro being toppled, and Nicolas Maduro definitely carried on that tradition with Cuba.
[13:50:00]
Removing Nicolas Maduro and forming a blockade in the Caribbean has essentially cut off those economic lifelines to Cuba. Now, Cuba's economy
was already struggling. It has been for years. Mismanagement by the government, COVID, all these things complicated their ability to kind of
thrive at a basic level. But that oil, that oil line that came from Venezuela was so crucial, and it's been cut off.
ISAACSON: And what does the opposition in Cuba look like?
SALAMA: The opposition in Cuba looks a lot like the opposition in Iran, interestingly. It is disorganized, scattered, most in exile. You know,
experts who have followed Cuba very deeply, more than me, have told me that it's virtually nonexistent at this stage. There is no clear leader. And
that's the big difference between Venezuela and Cuba, is that there isn't just a clear leader where they can point to and say, OK, the opposition is
strong. We have a fallback if negotiations don't work.
Now, of course, that didn't end up, it didn't play out that way in Venezuela. Nicolas Maduro's regime is still in power, ironically, his vice
--
ISAACSON: Did that happen in Cuba?
SALAMA: It's possible that it could happen in Cuba. Interestingly enough, we know that Secretary of State Marco Rubio is speaking with the grandson
of Raul Castro, Fidel Castro's brother, who led the country for a while, but he's 94 now, so he's enjoying his retirement somewhere. He's speaking
with Raul Castro's grandson, and they are trying to see if a negotiated settlement could work, if the Cuban government would be willing to sort of
make peace with the United States.
And I can tell you they're watching what's happening in the world very closely. What happened to Nicolas Maduro, I mean, I can't tell you -- it
struck fear into the hearts of foes and allies alike because he was virtually plucked from his bed, put on a ship, and then a helicopter and
sent to a New York City courtroom, a president of a sovereign nation, and they did so bypassing Congress.
So, that was an eye-opener, and certainly for the Cuban regime, which thinks, you know, if he could do that in Venezuela, of course he could do
that to us, too.
ISAACSON: Well, let's put this in historical perspective. You know, a century ago, the United States used to go around doing regime changes,
whether it be Latin America, Asia, and then, of course, over the 20th century in Iran and many other places. Those did not tend to end well. Why
is this whole new spate of regime changing? Do you think there's a good chance that it could end as badly as the previous spate?
SALAMA: Walter, just last week I wrote about the 1953 attempted CIA coup or the CIA coup. It was not attempted. It was actually a successful CIA
coup in Iran by Dwight Eisenhower. And what was a successful coup at the time ended up having repercussions years later -- decades later, I should
say, with the Iranian revolution, which was rooted in part by who the U.S. put in power after that coup.
And so, in this case, hindsight is not 20-20. I have been on television talking about this and I've been talking to experts about this, that, you
know, unfortunately, history has shown that regime change operations don't always go very well, and especially if a foreign power is dictating who
should run that country and the people have limited say in that.
And so, President Trump has been very careful in terms of kind of emphasizing that the people should be the ones to choose. But, of course,
the people in this case did not choose Delcy Rodriguez, Nicolas Maduro's vice president, and she, for now, is the caretaker, government leader of
Venezuela because she's the one who's working with the U.S. Whether or not they hand power to the opposition groups who did legitimately win elections
in Venezuela, that -- we're not sure if that's going to happen. We keep asking the administration that. We don't get a clear answer.
I think they seem to think that stability needs to come first in the country before you can have a referendum or an election, where then you
kind of do it all over again. But it's very unclear how this is going to play out at this stage. Obviously, it's only been a couple of months in
Venezuela. We're watching things unfold in real time in Iran. So, it's hard to really predict how it would go. But given what you were just saying,
history has not kind of been too kind to operations of this nature. And so, we have to hold our breath and hope that this is different. But it's hard
to imagine.
[13:55:00]
ISAACSON: Vivian Salama, thank you so much for joining us.
SALAMA: Thank you.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
AMANPOUR: And finally, windows shattered and heritage destroyed. The U.S.- Israeli war with Iran is tearing apart centuries of human history. The blast wave of a nearby Israeli airstrike has hit historic landmarks in
Isfahan, including the 17th century Chehel Sotoun, or 40 Pillars Palace. This news follows the damage to the Golestan Palace in Tehran and UNESCO's
warning of the risks facing Iranian cultural sites.
While at the Vatican, Pope Leo issued a message of concern for humanity in his latest St. Peter's Square audience, mourning a priest who was killed in
strikes in southern Lebanon and lamenting the death of children and civilians in this war. The pope is calling for this to end and doubling
down on his prayers for peace.
That's it for now. Thank you for watching, and goodbye from London.
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