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Amanpour
Interview with Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett; Interview with Former Iranian Ambassador to Germany and Princeton University Visiting Research Collaborator Seyed Hossein Mousavian; Interview with "Chokepoints" Author and Council for Foreign Relations Center for Geoeconomic Studies DirectorEdward Fishman. Aired 1-2p ET
Aired March 18, 2026 - 13:00 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
[13:00:00]
CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR, CNN CHIEF INTERNATIONAL ANCHOR: Hello, everyone, and welcome to "Amanpour." Here's what's coming up.
Everyone is a target, a stark warning from Israel as it goes after Iran's top officials and intensifies strikes on Lebanon. I asked former Prime
Minister Naftali Bennett about Israel's endgame.
Then, Tehran hits back hard at Tel Aviv, so how much are Israel's targeted assassinations destabilizing the regime? Former Iranian diplomat Seyed
Hossein Mousavian gives me his view.
Plus, still a major choke point, how the Strait of Hormuz blockade is strangling oil supply and the global economy. Author Edward Fishman
explains.
Welcome to the program, everyone. I'm Christiane Amanpour in London.
A vow of revenge from Iran as a funeral procession is held for top security official Ali Larijani, who was killed Tuesday in an Israeli strike. Tehran
has been ramping up attacks on Israel, with two pensioners killed in strikes on central part of the country, and almost 200 people hospitalized
in 24 hours. U.S.-Israel attacks on Iran's gas fields now could mean harder Iranian retaliation and further shock to the global energy market. Iran's
natural gas is almost all for domestic use for millions of ordinary people.
Israel continues targeting Tehran leadership in a bid to sow chaos, according to a senior intelligence official. Prime Minister Netanyahu hopes
that chaos will enable a popular uprising. The United States is also increasingly raising the specter of deploying ground troops, with a warship
believed to be carrying Marines and sailors from a base in Japan to the region.
Meantime, in Lebanon, at least six people were killed in Israeli attacks on central Beirut, according to the health ministry there. Israel has issued
new evacuation orders across Lebanon. More than a million people have already been displaced.
So, what is Israel's long-term goal? Naftali Bennett was Israel's Prime Minister until 2022, and he is joining me now from there. So, welcome to
the program.
NAFTALI BENNETT, FORMER ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER: Thank you.
AMANPOUR: OK. So, I've just laid out, I think to the best of what you all have announced and what we know, as the plan. And you've killed Khamenei,
Larijani, the head of the intelligence, on and on and on over the last three weeks. But the system, the government there still remains in place
and they are still firing missiles and the regime hasn't fallen.
Tell me, are you surprised? Because I know that there is quite a lot of surprise that this very targeted and accurate campaign hasn't done what you
hoped it would do yet.
BENNETT: No, our goal is to dismantle the threat. And the threat is the nuclear threat, the ballistic missiles and the regional terror. That's
Israel's goal to remove a threat that's been building for many years. And it's working very well. We are dismantling this big terror machine.
AMANPOUR: What will be the line that tells you that you have that it's done? Well, what is the end game? Because let me tell you what a former
head of the Iran branch of your own military intelligence told The New York Times. Decapitation has its limitations. I don't think we've scratched the
surface in the ability of Iran to find replacements who can take over for the people that have been decapitated.
That's happening. I mean, they keep finding replacements. And you've been doing this assassination policy for years on, you know, nuclear scientists
and the like. And so, what is -- where will you say that, OK, we've degraded enough, that's the end? What is the end?
BENNETT: When we see that on the three dimensions, the nuclear, ballistic and terror dimensions of threat has been all but, you know, pretty much
removed. And we feel that Iran cannot threaten us in the future.
[13:05:00]
AMANPOUR: Are you concerned, though, that just like, you know, in -- you certainly degraded Hamas, you degraded Hezbollah? You took out their
leaders. You took out leaders from -- you know, from Iran over the summer and, you know, other regional leaders. And yet, they keep refilling the
ranks. And some American intelligence say that, you know -- actually, a former American commander says that for every one killed, there's another
10 who are ready to take -- you know, to take up arms.
Again, are you looking for the regime to collapse? Are you looking for it to people to rise up? What are you looking for?
BENNETT: Look, the issue of the rise up, that's a decision the Iranian people will have to make. That's not ours to decide. We are very
considerably degrading the regime itself. The Basij, the terror police, the policemen that have been running after women who don't cover their heads,
et cetera, et cetera. But that's not ours to decide. We're focused on removing the threat to the region and the threat to Israel.
AMANPOUR: The Washington Post, as you probably know, has revealed a cable. It's a State Department cable from the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem. And I
just want to play this. You say it's not ours to say. But actually, Prime Minister Netanyahu did say after the killing of Ali Larijani, this is what
he did say. Let me just play this.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER (through translator): We are undermining this regime in the hope of giving the Iranian people an
opportunity to remove it.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: OK. So, he said it over and again that we're trying to do this to pave the way for the Iranian people to remove it. But I wonder what you
make of this cable. As I said, from the State Department to the -- sorry, to the State Department, from the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem, it says,
senior Israeli officials privately told U.S. diplomats that if Iranians take to the streets, quote, "the people will get slaughtered" because the
IRGC has still has the upper hand.
This at the same time as your prime minister is calling on the people to stand up. How do you justify it? And do you agree with that cable that's
that come from, you know, the U.S. embassy to the State Department?
BENNETT: Well, look, ultimately, Christiane, I believe that this regime will fall. I don't know when, though. It's a corrupt, old, disconnected and
incompetent regime, pretty similar to the Soviet regime in the '80s. So, ultimately it will collapse. And that would be good for the people of Iran,
for the region.
We cannot time this and we cannot. It's not a deterministic situation where if we take three or four specific actions, this will happen. It's an issue
of the Iranian public. But we are significantly damaging the whole terror apparatus, the whole Basij IRGC regime apparatus to make it as weak as it
will ever be, or at least in the near future. I understand it's not it's not easy. And no, I can't be here and guarantee that, you know, within days
the regime will fall.
AMANPOUR: Are you surprised, because there has been surprise expressed in Washington, at the level -- and even in the Gulf states at the level of
Iranian retaliation that does continue? Sure, you've degraded it, but it still continues. And the level of the checkpoint -- sorry, the chokehold
and the retaliation on the Strait of Hormuz and the very important, you know, oil transport waterway there.
Are you -- because certainly in the United States, again, there is very much concern about the spiking oil prices, the, you know, cost of living
going up and all -- you know, all the attendant, you know, whatever -- you know, the fallout from doing this kind of retaliation?
BENNETT: No, I'm not surprised. We expected and we knew that Iran is building a formidable war machine, terror machine, nuclear machine,
ballistic missile, missile machine. And that only magnifies the need or emphasizes the need to have acted when we did.
AMANPOUR: There are quite a few diplomats, certainly in the Arab world, who are concerned, who -- you know, who have a stake in the negotiations
that were going on before this war. Even there's reports now of European diplomats and national security officials who are beginning more and more
to come out and say that they believe that there was an endgame, a successful potentially, certainly on the nuclear issue, resolution
regarding negotiations that President Trump was into, you know, the indirect negotiations with Iran via the Omanis.
They -- many people are saying they believe that this was going in the right direction. I see you shaking your head because I know that Israel has
never believed in these negotiations.
[13:10:00]
But the truth is that there was no imminent threat from Iran. All the intelligence says that. Do you think that it was -- given what's been going
on now for the last more than three weeks, Israelis dying, Israelis, you know, being on the receiving end of missiles, allies in the Gulf, all these
people who signed the Abraham Accords with, et cetera.
Do you think that it's -- that this was the right way to go? I know it was a dream of Netanyahu's. He said it himself. My dream for 40 years has now
come true.
BENNETT: Well, you've asked a bunch of --
AMANPOUR: Yes, I know, but they're all wrapped up in one. OK. go ahead.
BENNETT: So, look, I understand the impatience. It's natural. But a threat that's been building for 40 years cannot be dismantled in 10 days. It takes
a bit of time. And if we have not acted now, we would have reached a point where the threat is just not manageable.
So, you're asking about an imminent threat. We were a responsible leadership doesn't wait for the moment that the threat is imminent because
by then it's too late. Let's take two historic cases of the Cuban Missile Crisis and North Korea. In 1962, when a threat was building on America's
southern border, America acted in time to prevent the threat from becoming unmanageable, whereas in the '90s, when North Korea was moving towards
becoming nuclear, the world didn't act.
So, do we want to adopt the Kennedy strategy or the '90s strategy? We want to adopt the Kennedy strategy and ensure that Iran does not become an
unmanageable threat.
AMANPOUR: I mean, look, you know, the Cuban Missile Crisis, there were actually missiles, you know, ready and aiming at the United States. It was
a real imminent threat. That was an imminent threat. And it was resolved diplomatically. That was 1962 when there were leaders, you know, who
believed -- and the U.N. was involved and believed in the power of negotiation.
But here's the thing, again, I'm trying to figure out how you see an end. Yes?
BENNETT: If I may, on that very point, Donald Trump sent his negotiators to negotiate with Iran. And I believe he meant to achieve a deal where the
deal is where they dismantle their nuclear weapons program. Kushner and Witkoff got there, talked to the Iranians, understood that there's totally
no beginning of a start because they saw the Iranians are adamant. Sometimes you start a negotiation and you see that there's zero chance. And
called up Trump, told him there's zero chance for these guys to dismantle the nuclear program. And he made the logical decision, which is to act.
That's all that happened here.
AMANPOUR: Right. But as I told you, first of all, you say nuclear weapons program, as you know, that there wasn't at the time or now an imminent
threat of nuclear weapons, despite what the U.S. say about building -- no, no, no, no. Hold on. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a
question.
BENNETT: Let me interrupt you.
AMANPOUR: OK.
BENNETT: No, no. This is important because responsible leaders, if you wait for the threat to be imminent, it's too late. When is a threat
imminent? When they have a bomb? When they have 10 bombs? When the missile is on its way to Europe or America or Israel? Is that when it's imminent?
Precisely to prevent us from getting to that moment, we had to act now. It's such a logical thing that I think anyone who's decent should
understand that. If you wait for the last moment, it's too late. Just like what happened with North Korea.
AMANPOUR: So, I'm interested because you are confirming that it was an imminent threat at the time. But now, building on what you've just said, I
want to ask you, then, what is the next logical step? Because that highly enriched uranium, not quite yet at bomb grade, but the 60 percent that you
all said you remember in June, Israel, the United States said they had obliterated Iran's nuclear capabilities. But that highly enriched was
buried somewhere. If -- and that could be an issue, right?
So, what do you think Israel, the United States should do to get that 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium back? Otherwise, the problem remains,
the problem that you're citing.
BENNETT: Well, the nuclear program is much, much broader than just that particular batch of highly enriched uranium.
[13:15:00]
We're talking about thousands of centrifuges. We're talking about the weaponization program. program. We're talking about the ballistic missile
program. And if you dismantle everything, then ultimately, even that uranium is useless because you can't just shoot it, right?
A centrifuge is sort of like one of those lettuce dryer machines where it turns around, revolves, and you'd have to pour that 60 percent into
advanced centrifuges. But if we dismantle the whole thing, there's no program. The -- it is very important to extract that uranium out of Iran,
but it's part of a much broader element.
And we -- yes, we have to remove this threat. In fact, what we're seeing Iran doing now just proves that it could be much, much worse if we hadn't
acted because it wouldn't just be an oil blackmail. It would be a nuclear blackmail.
AMANPOUR: Let me just move on because there's other things to ask you, including about Lebanon, the other front that's been opened in this war.
And I know that, you know, there's potential or actual ground troops going in.
So, the leader of the opposition party, Yair -- sorry, Yair Golan, says, a deep military maneuver inside Lebanon without a clear political objective
will drag Israel back into the Lebanese quagmire and won't bring real security to the communities of the north.
Are you concerned, given Israel's previous experience and eventual decision to withdraw from Israel -- sorry, from Lebanon, that you could get caught
in another major, you know, quagmire, which leads to more deaths, more instability, more -- you know, more instability in that region? Because I
know you think, I know the strategy is to change the Middle East by essentially bombing all the threats that you perceive. But are you
concerned about getting back into a ground invasion, occupation and quagmire?
BENNETT: Well, you said something that is a bit unfair. Two things. You said there was a front that has been opened. It hasn't been opened.
Hezbollah started shooting rockets at us unilaterally. Secondly, it's unfair to say that we think that we want to bomb the Middle East to change
it. No, we don't want to bomb the Middle East to change it. We want security. That's all we want. We don't want a broader Israel. We don't want
anything. We want my children here in Ranana and up in the north to live. That's all we have. Our only goal in this tiny little country.
The problem is and the mistake that's been made for the past four decades is that we allowed threats to grow and grow to such a size that it became
essentially a ring of fire around us. And yes, it is painful to remove that ring of fire.
Hezbollah has taken Lebanon as a hostage. We have no war with Lebanon, but we certainly want to remove Hezbollah as a threat to our people. And this
will end when Hezbollah ends. It stops being a threat to our people.
AMANPOUR: Can I ask you about -- you say you don't want greater Israel, you don't want et cetera. But as you know, the occupied West Bank is still
under very, very large threat from within, from the settlers and from the security forces and from the idea of, you know, annexation by a different
name. That's what your critics say is happening.
I want to focus on this -- you know, this this family, the Odeh family, four members were killed. The mother, the father, two sons, age seven and
five. They were going out to buy clothes and sweets for aid. And the 12- year-old survivor, one of the boys said the soldier, IDF, dragged him out of the car by his hair, beat him and told him we kill dogs. And there was
no accountability or anything. And also, a lot of the settlers, as you know, have upped their attacks on Palestinian farms, land, homes, villages,
obviously since October 7th and even more since the beginning of this war.
So, is this a policy that the government approves? Is this a way to move Palestinians out or terrify them into leaving?
BENNETT: No. In Judea and Samaria, there's roughly half a million Israelis. The overwhelming majority of them are law abiding, good people,
decent people. And there's about 2 million Palestinians in the Palestinian Authority. There is friction. And in many, many cases, we see Palestinian
terror and killing Israelis. And we also see a small amount of violence against Palestinians. I have zero tolerance for any sort of illegal actions
against the Palestinians.
[13:20:00]
And it's been investigated. And I stand behind all investigations, because Israel is a democracy with rule of law. And I insist the law abides. But to
put it in context, there is a huge amount of terror against Israelis as well. And it's tough.
AMANPOUR: We're going to have to continue that part of the conversation, because it's a much, much bigger story. And I will come back to you on
that, because there is a lot of law breaking going on there by the settlers. And the security forces are not stepping in and protecting the
victims of this. So, I know your point. You've just made it. And we'll continue that part of the conversation.
Just quickly before I say goodbye, how long do you think your war on Iran will take? What do you think?
BENNETT: You know, I wouldn't put a point on the calendar. It ends when the threat ends.
AMANPOUR: All right. Well, that is a difficult red line to see. And we will come back to you. Thank you very much, Naftali Bennett. And stay with
us, we'll be right back after the break.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
AMANPOUR: Now, as we've mentioned, Israel says it's killed Iran's intelligence minister, Esmaeil Khatib, in a strike on Tuesday. It is just
the latest in a string of assassinated Iranian officials. And yet, despite the bombs and the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, remaining in the
shadows, the regime still appears intact. And in fact, it is increasing warnings and intimidation towards anyone inside Iran who might come out to
protest the government.
My next guest knows the inner workings of this regime all too well. Seyed Hossein Mousavian served as a diplomat and nuclear negotiator for the
Islamic Republic. And he's joining me now from Princeton, New Jersey to discuss where he sees all this going. Welcome back to our program.
SEYED HOSSEIN MOUSAVIAN, FORMER IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO GERMANY AND VISITING RESEARCH COLLABORATOR, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY: Thank you, Christiane. Thank
you for having me.
AMANPOUR: So, I don't know whether you were able to listen to our previous interview with the former Israeli prime minister. But where do you think
this policy of, as they call it, you know, decapitation, elimination, essentially cutting the head off the snake, as they would put it. Where
does it leave the Iranian leadership right now?
MOUSAVIAN: It really depends to the end state of strategy of President Trump, the United States and Israel. On the U.S. side, what we have heard
during the last days, very publicly, officially, you have heard a lot of this strategy. The aim of attacking Iran was regime change.
You had an official from White House, director of energy, publicly said the goal was to control Iranian energy. You had Senator Graham saying that
after regime change, we will have tons of money. Therefore, it seems at least part of the establishment is looking for regime change and Iranian
oil and wealth. If this is the case, I think we are going to have endless war. But Israeli objective, I think, is different than the U.S.
[13:25:00]
You heard Prime Minister Netanyahu very clearly, very officially, very openly said he is following the strategy of greater Israel. And you had the
ambassador, United States ambassador to Israel, which very openly said Israel has right to occupy other Middle Eastern countries. Therefore, based
on what the Israeli prime minister and official said, the main objective of Israel is greater Israel. Therefore, they are not convinced even about
regime change in Iran.
As Alan Eyre, the former Persian spokesperson of State Department said, he said Israel is not convinced about even disintegration of Iran. He is after
the total destroying Iran.
AMANPOUR: OK. So, let me -- I know -- Mr. Mousavian, hold on one second. I just need to ask you a question here. I want to ask you about where --
because I consider you somebody who is essentially, you know, close enough to be part of the current government there. So, the resilience of it, how
do you account for it? Because I want to play a soundbite from Iran's foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, who spoke to Al Jazeera about the
decapitations and about how the regime is still operating.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
ABBAS ARAGHCHI, IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER (through translator): I do not know why the Americans and the Israelis still have not understood this
point. The Islamic Republic of Iran has a strong political structure with established political, economic and social institutions. The presence or
absence of a single individual does not affect the structure. Of course, individuals are influential and each person plays their role. Some better,
some worse, some less. But what matters is that the political system in Iran is a very solid structure.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: So, Mr. Mousavian, how solid -- first of all, do you agree with the foreign minister? And these are very top leaders now who've been
assassinated, very top, from your supreme leader to the head of the intelligence, to the head, you know, the national security official, Ali
Larijani. How much more can the government there tolerate in terms of targeted assassinations?
MOUSAVIAN: First of all, about the resilience, Christiane, I think the world already is somehow surprised. During past 20 days, Iran has
demonstrated significant resilience. The American-Israeli assumption was that the regime would collapse 48 hours, maximum 72 hours after they
assassinate number one, the supreme leader, and about 50 very high-level security military officials.
But Iran retaliated just three hours after the assassination of the leader and the officials attacking the U.S. military bases in the region,
attacking Israel. And during last past 20 days, you have seen how powerfully they are retaliating.
I think perhaps Israelis and Americans, they should have already studied the history when Iran resisted eight years, Saddam invaded Iran. The U.S.,
Europe, Soviet Union, China, India, all regional countries, they were supporting the aggression of Saddam, and Iran was alone. And for eight
years, Iran alone resisted. And Saddam is over 20 years, Saddam is gone.
Therefore, I think they will be able to continue their resilience, their resistance at least for months to come. And about the assassination
strategy with Israelis, now they are leading. If you go back again, Christiane, to history, after Revolution 1979 up to the U.S.-Israeli attack
on Iran in 2025, thousands of Iranian officials have been assassinated, thousands.
And during eight years war, after war, under different circumstances, but we have never seen regime collapse or dysfunctionality, I mean, the
disintegration of the system. And after the first U.S. attack, 2025 up to now, I think more than 200 officials have been assassinated, but you see
still the system is intact.
[13:30:00]
Therefore, I really don't believe the assassination strategy would bring regime collapse. Perhaps it could be more counterproductive for Israel and
for the U.S. because during past 20 days, you have seen the Iranians have been united.
They are worried about the security and stability of their country, especially when they have seen hundreds of homes, hospitals, schools, even
historical monuments have been destroyed by the attack. Now, they are very much concerned about the security and stability. That's why they have been
united. They are in the streets, thousands of people, every day they are in the streets in order to defend the integrity and sovereignty of the
country.
But having said that, Christiane, we should not make a mistake. Majority of Iranians, they are not satisfied with the social and economic situation of
the country.
AMANPOUR: Right. I was going to ask you about that.
MOUSAVIAN: This is an attack --
AMANPOUR: I was going to ask about that.
MOUSAVIAN: Yes. I mean --
AMANPOUR: No. Let me let me ask you a question, because this is crucial, right? It's crucial. And nobody's answered it. You say unity, you know
perfectly well that there is a cadre of Iranians inside Iran and outside Iran, the majority, who are celebrating. They are celebrating because they
think this is an opportunity to be liberated from 47 years of cruel and ruthless repression by the regime.
Most notably, as you say, they have legitimate, you know, complaints about social restrictions, about the economy, about everything. And yet, they
were brutally crushed in January. This is a very different dynamic now to all the things that you've told -- you've been telling me about.
What -- I mean, Iran can never meet their -- this government can never meet their needs, can they? I mean, why should these people want to see the
continuation of a government that for 47 years has crushed them to the point that they are celebrating being bombed by foreign countries?
MOUSAVIAN: We need to have a distinction on two issues. One, the fact that majority of Iranians, they are not satisfied with economic and social
situation of the country, about the inflation, about poverty, about corruption, about dysfunctionality of the system. And they are asking for
major, major reforms and a better life. No doubt about it, no question.
But when the issue -- when the nation is faced with foreign attacks, threatening the integrity and sovereignty of the country, they have already
united and now they are united in order to defend the integrity of their country.
AMANPOUR: You told me that. I want to -- I understand, but I want to ask you the day after. Let's say this government stays in place. I already read
that the president has called in members of the IRGC, the Revolutionary Guard, to say, how are we going to meet the demands of our dissatisfied
people? And even if we survive, they are going to protest again and they are going to want change.
So, who's going to come out the winner if this regime stands? If it's the military, IRGC, it's going to be very tough on the people. And Iran doesn't
have the wherewithal to actually meet the legitimate needs of the people, the economic needs of the people, nor do they necessarily want to have a
theocracy. So, how do you see the day after?
MOUSAVIAN: I believe if the war is finished today, the problem for the Iranian government, Iranian establishment, would be at least double or
triple compared to the before war, because they have already the economic problems, sanctions, inflation, depreciation of Iranian currency, a lot of
problems before the war. Now, they have the damages, the destruction of a big part of the country after the war.
Therefore, this would be a double burden of the Iranian establishment. I really cannot imagine they can sustain the type of governing system which
they have been doing during the last two, three decades. And if the war is going to be finished tomorrow, they need substantial reforms in order to
satisfy the people domestically and in foreign policy. They have to solve the problem with the regional countries.
[13:35:00]
They need to have a compromise with the U.S. They need to end the hostility with the United States and vice versa. The U.S. also need to end the
hostility with Iran in order to lift the sanctions. Otherwise, Iran would have much more problem after the war.
AMANPOUR: I mean, that's a huge, huge if. I know that you're part of the system. Do you think -- well, already the system there is threatening
people, don't come out, orders shoot to kill, you know, internet is cut. All of these kinds of really ruthless and repressive measures are in place
right now. Do you think that system is ready to do what you've just said? You know, major reforms to satisfy the needs of the people?
MOUSAVIAN: You know, Christiane, you -- perhaps you remember I was arrested in 2007 and I was jailed because I was opposing Ahmadinejad
foreign policy on nuclear, on a lot of issues. And you may don't know, I have had another prison sentence in 2000 -- 2022, and I have not been able
to go back to my country about four or five years. Therefore, I have my own problem with the system more than many Iranian diaspora outside.
But I'm talking about the national interest of Iran, national interest of the U.S. The current war is neither in the national interest of the U.S.
nor Iran, nor the region. Therefore, we need diplomacy and we need perhaps a very influential mediator to come to bring an end, a compromise between
Iran and the U.S. I'm talking about what is really vital. I really don't know whether this war would end or not. I don't know even if the war would
end, the governing system of Iran would go for reforms.
But what I say, if the war is ended today, the system needs huge reforms in governing system. I mean, they need functionality. They have been really
dysfunctional and they need big changes in foreign relations. This is what I'm saying.
AMANPOUR: All right. I appreciate it. Thank you very much, Mr. Mousavian, for being on with us. Thank you. And we'll be right back after this short
break.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
AMANPOUR: Now, for the first time since the war began, Iran says the U.S. and Israel have targeted parts of its oil and natural gas facilities,
causing prices to spike. This is the world faces the biggest energy supply disruption in history following Iran's blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.
Our next guest knows this major passage well and highlights its geographic choke point in his book. Former State Department official and author Edward
Fishman speaks to Walter Isaacson about the impact of U.S. military intervention in Iran on the global economy.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
WALTER ISAACSON, CO-HOST, AMANPOUR AND CO.: Thank you, Christiane. And, Edward Fishman, welcome back to the show.
EDWARD FISHMAN, AUTHOR, "CHOKEPOINTS" AND DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR GEOECONOMIC STUDIES, COUNCIL FOR FOREIGN RELATIONS: Thanks so much for having me on
today, Walter.
ISAACSON: Your book, "Chokepoints," talks about two types of choke points, geographic ones and economic ones. Let's start with the most famous
geographic one, the Strait of Hormuz. Explain to me what's happening in the Strait of Hormuz and whether the Trump administration should have figured
that out earlier.
[13:40:00]
FISHMAN: So, Walter, the Strait of Hormuz is by far the world's most important maritime choke points. Of all the choke points, whether it's the
Panama Canal or the Straits of Malacca or the Bosporus, the Strait of Hormuz takes the cake. And that's because 20 percent of global oil supplies
on a daily basis before this war went through that narrow waterway, and about the same in terms of liquefied natural gas. And so, what we're facing
now, because Iran has effectively closed the Strait, is a dramatic shock to the global energy system. In fact, the International Energy Agency, the
IEA, has said that this is the largest disruption in the history of the world oil market already, and we're only two and a half weeks into this
war.
I think the thing that surprised the Trump administration and, by the way, the markets, and really confounded many analysts, is that the assumption
was that if Iran were to close the Strait of Hormuz, they would actually have to physically block it. They would have to lay thousands of sea mines
that made sailing through the Strait impossible for anyone, including Iranian vessels themselves.
And I think the assumption was that Iran wouldn't do that, because if the Strait of Hormuz was mined so heavily, even Iran's own oil tankers couldn't
get out of the Strait. And of course, Iran depends on selling oil to run its economy.
What Iran has showed is that just by virtue of using low-cost drones, and Iran has become one of the world's leading producers of these drones
through their Shahed program, they can disrupt shipping. They've only attacked a bit over a dozen ships. And, you know, before the war, as many
as 100 ships, commercial vessels, would go through the Strait of Hormuz on a daily basis. And just by attacking about a dozen or so, they've been able
to change the risk calculus of the entire shipping industry.
ISAACSON: Well, President Trump was saying our NATO allies should help, but what about our NATO allies, like I think Italy is doing in France, who
may want to have discussions with Iran, and maybe their ships get through?
FISHMAN: Yes. I mean, there have been reports that both the French government and the Italian government have reached out to the Iranian
regime, asking whether their ships could get through. And I think this is only going to continue. You know, in some ways, it's remarkable that oil
hasn't gone even higher.
We're already in the hundreds, but I think if this lasts for weeks, we could easily get to $150, even pushing to $200 a barrel. The all-time
record set during the financial crisis back in 2008-2009 was around $147 a barrel.
So, we are -- this could get a lot worse if the crisis continues. And I think so long as this Strait is closed, I expect many more countries, even
beyond the ones that have been publicly reported, are going to reach out to the Iranian government to see if they can cut a separate deal.
ISAACSON: You know, your book is not just about geographic choke points. You have a really interesting concept you've developed historically on
economic choke points. Why don't you tell us what those are?
FISHMAN: Sure. So, throughout history, we really have focused on these geographic choke points. And, you know, a big reason why the Ottoman Empire
was able to be so powerful for as long as it was, was that they controlled the Bosporus, which, you know, to this day is such a critical maritime
choke point.
But what happened in the 1990s, when the Cold War ended and you had China and Russia enter the global financial system, enter transnational supply
chains, you had the creation of these invisible choke points. These parts of the global economy where one country has a dominant position, and there
are few, if any, substitutes.
So, if you think about it, the dollar, which does kind of function as the lifeblood of the entire global financial system, you know, 90 percent of
all foreign exchange transactions happen in dollars. That provides the United States with a choke point over the global financial system, similar
to the one we see playing out right now in the strait of Hormuz over the global oil economy.
Last year as well, we saw that China possesses a similar choke point over rare earth minerals, these minerals that are critical from everything from
producing missiles and drones to normal electric vehicles here in the United States. China was able to show that by withholding exports of rare
earth minerals, and they refine about 90 percent of the global supply, within a few weeks, Ford had to shutter one of its factories for its
Explorer SUV. And so, that's the type of control that these invisible choke points, like the dollar, like China's rare earths, have given great powers
today.
ISAACSON: Well, you talk about the dollar being an invisible choke point. Could the Iranians say, we'll let ships through if they are trading in,
say, the Chinese currency instead? And that would undermine our power with the dollar?
FISHMAN: Look, I think the Iranians have quite a bit of leverage right now. I think that they can demand quite a bit to allow ships through the
Strait.
[13:45:00]
I think one of the big misconceptions that I hear sometimes talked about in the U.S. is that, you know, Trump could do a TACO, this acronym, Trump
Always Chickens Out. We've seen that with tariffs, when Trump has imposed big tariffs that have led to a stock market correction in the United
States, he's oftentimes just suspended them for, you know, 90 days or 180 days.
The difference here is that with tariffs, Trump unilaterally can suspend the tariffs. But with the Strait of Hormuz, even if the U.S. were to say
today, we're no longer going to be attacking sites in Iran, the Iranian government could say, well, wait, we want more. You know, we want, you
know, for instance, oil to be priced in RMB. I think a more likely ask would be for them to ask the U.S. to pick up and leave their bases in the
Gulf, right?
I mean, the Iranian government has said multiple times that the bases that the U.S. has in the Gulf region have been used as launchpads to attack
Iran. And so, my guess is if the U.S. were to -- if Trump were to take that move today and say, the war is over, the Iranian government may actually
ask for more.
ISAACSON: How did sanctions get organized under President George W. Bush and then President Obama?
FISHMAN: I'm glad you asked this because I think there's an interesting analogy to what's happening right now in the Strait of Hormuz. So, in 2005,
right after George W. Bush was reelected, the U.S. was fighting two wars, right? Afghanistan and Iraq. Neither was going very well. And to make
matters worse, the casus belli, the reason we got involved in Iraq, was ostensibly because Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass
destruction.
Well, right when Bush was re-elected, a survey group came out and said, well, Saddam didn't actually have WMD. And to make matters even more
awkward, just around that time, Iran elected a populist hardliner, a guy named Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as their president, and he immediately
supercharged their nuclear program.
And so, the United States was fighting a war against Iraq to get rid of a fake nuclear program, whereas right next to Iraq, there was a country that
was multiple times larger, more powerful, that was actually developing industrial-scale nuclear capabilities. And so, it put George W. Bush in a
bind because he didn't want to launch another war in the Middle East. And he didn't think sanctions could work because the old paradigm for sanctions
was that you needed full support at the U.N. and you needed to be willing to use a naval blockade, and there was no support for either of those.
Well, thankfully, there was a gentleman at the Treasury Department named Stuart Levey, who was the first Treasury Undersecretary for Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence, who took Bush's skepticism about sanctions as sort of a personal challenge. And he tried to think, is there a way that we can
actually innovate sanctions and put more pressure on Iran?
And there was one day he was in Bahrain, actually at a hotel eating breakfast, flipping through the Financial Times, when he came across an
article about a Swiss bank that had cut ties with Iran of its own volition. And a light bulb went off in Levey's head, where he realized, maybe I don't
need to persuade the entire U.N. to block trade with Iran. I could just manipulate the risk calculus of the private sector. I could go to banks in
London and Frankfurt and Singapore and Hong Kong and Dubai, bring with me dossiers of declassified intelligence showing them how Iran oftentimes was
using their banking networks to fund their nuclear program and persuade nine out of 10 of them to cut ties with Iran of their own volition.
And for the one out of 10 who refused to cut ties with Iran, he could threaten to cut them off from the dollar, basically say you have a choice.
Either you keep doing business with Iran or you continue to have access to the dollar, but you don't have both.
And that actually was the key. That is how U.S. sanctions have worked ever since, manipulating the risk calculus of the private sector, which is very
much what Iran has done by just targeting a few ships. It's been able to manipulate the risk calculus of the entire shipping industry in the last
two weeks.
ISAACSON: President Trump, who's not a big believer in sanctions, actually imposed sanctions on Russia and Russian oil and even on, I think, tariffs
for India for buying Russian oil and on the two biggest oil companies in Russia. And now, he's lifted those sanctions. Explain whether those
sanctions made sense in the first place and what will happen now that he seems to have just lifted them.
FISHMAN: Yes. So, I would agree that Trump has never been a big believer in sanctions on Russia. I think his interpretation of the Russia-Ukraine
war is quite different, I think, from mine and many others, which is that Ukraine actually bears a lot of the blame as opposed to Russia.
Setting that aside, last year he did start imposing some pressure on Russian oil. First, in August, he imposed really steep tariffs on India,
ostensibly because India was buying Russian oil, although I know there were other concerns he had around Prime Minister Modi's refusal to negotiate him
for the Nobel Peace Prize.
But then the real key, Walter, came two months later. So, in October of last year, the Treasury Department imposed sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil.
These are the two biggest oil companies in Russia. And they also said that anyone transacting with Rosneft and Lukoil could be sanctioned by the
United States. They could be cut off from the dollar.
[13:50:00]
Well, immediately, these big refineries in India, like Reliance, said, we can't afford to lose access to the dollar. And so, they started immediately
cutting back their purchases of Russian oil. The Indian refineries went from buying around two million barrels a day down to one million barrels a
day at the beginning of this year. So, a really rapid cutback on Russian oil. And then, of course, there's the sanctions on India, which I think
declined. And we had a situation where Russian oil was selling at about a $30 discount to the international benchmark.
So, for instance, if Saudi Arabia was selling oil for $65 a barrel, Russia could sell molecularly identical oil for $35 a barrel. So, you can just
imagine the hit that that was happening, that was giving to the Kremlin in February of this year. So, just a month ago, the Russian government had the
single worst month they'd ever had for oil revenues.
And so, they were under significant pressure because of these sanctions. I think because of this oil price spike, the Trump administration has
completely undone that policy. And just two weeks ago, they eased sanctions on India's purchases of Russian oil.
And then last week, they actually expanded that such that now anyone in the world can buy Russian oil without a threat of U.S. secondary sanctions. And
what that has meant is that Russian oil, which was previously selling, like I said, at a $25, $30 discount, is now actually selling at a premium to
global oil benchmarks because Russia is one of the big producers that actually doesn't rely on the Strait of Hormuz. This has led to a windfall
for the Russian government on the order of $150 million to $200 million each day.
So, unfortunately, I do think that this has taken a huge amount of leverage off from Vladimir Putin and made it much harder for us to actually push him
to agree to a just peace in Ukraine.
ISAACSON: Have sanctions ever worked, though, against Russia?
FISHMAN: I think we need to be realistic about what sanctions can achieve. And I've always said that changing Putin's calculus may be too high -- too
tall of an order. And if you define the goal of sanctions against Russia as attrition, basically weakening the Russian military-industrial complex to
make it harder for Putin to execute his imperialist agenda, sanctions have certainly worked.
And I think this is the thing we don't often think about is, well, what would the Russian economy look like today if there were no sanctions? The
Russian economy would be far more robust, far more wealthy. They'd have a far more fearsome military-industrial complex than they would otherwise
have. And so, even though sanctions haven't delivered this brass ring of a peace deal in Ukraine, I still think, on balance, they're doing a lot more
good than harm.
ISAACSON: Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright used to talk about arrows in the quiver that we had in terms of foreign policy, obviously
military, but then economic ones that you described, and sanctions, and eventually soft power and all. Over the past 10, 15, 20 years, thanks to
you and Stuart Levey and others, the economic arrows have become more important. Are we now beginning to see the end of that?
FISHMAN: So, I think there are two reasons that really led to the rise of sanctions in U.S. foreign policy. One was the creation of these choke
points, the fact that with globalization, the United States could impose really substantial economic pressure on any other country in the world
without the use of military force, without a naval blockade. All it takes is signing a document in the Oval Office to cut off a foreign bank or
company from the dollar. You don't have to, you know, blockade a port or put a siege on their cities.
I think the other factor was that in the wake of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the political support in the United States for the use of
military force has just totally evaporated. I think what's happened over the last year with Trump's operation to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities last
year, Operation Midnight Hammer, and then, of course, the really spectacularly successful Maduro raid at the beginning of this year.
Trump, in some ways, I think, had this maybe exaggerated sense of the competence and sort of power of the U.S. military. And in some ways, I
think maybe temporarily, Washington forgot the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, that it's much easier to start a war than to end it on terms
that are advancing U.S. interests.
So, I do think in some ways we were creeping in that direction, but I do suspect that we all now are very viscerally aware in the United States and
around the world of the very significant collateral damage that military campaigns can have.
And so, I expect that one consequence of this Iran war is going to be a renewed focus on the use of economic warfare, both by the United States and
by countries like China around the world.
ISAACSON: Edward Fishman, thank you so much for joining us.
FISHMAN: My pleasure. Thanks for the great conversation.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
[13:55:00]
AMANPOUR: And finally -- what you just heard is the whale song of a humpback from over 70 years ago. According to researchers at the Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution, it's likely the oldest known recording of these haunting sounds, captured near Bermuda on March 7th, 1949.
It was discovered on a fragile but incredibly well-preserved disc, slotted into this simple office dictation device that was used for recording.
What's striking is how much quieter the ocean was back then compared to now, helping marine scientists better understand how the soundscape has
evolved and the impact of human activity on the survival of these gentle giants.
That is it for now. Thank you for watching, and goodbye from London.
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