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Amanpour

Interview with Former U.S. National Security Communications Advisor and Former White House Official John Kirby; Interview with Former U.S. State Department Adviser and Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies Professor Vali Nasr; Interview with The New York Times Diplomatic Correspondent Edward Wong. Aired 1-2p ET

Aired April 02, 2026 - 13:00   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

[13:00:00]

(CNN U.S. SIMULCAST)

[13:15:00]

JOHN KIRBY, FORMER U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY COMMUNICATIONS ADVISOR AND FORMER WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL: The Iranians were able to close the strait, quite

frankly, in the first few days of this war without firing a single shot. Just the fear alone will make sure that insurance companies and shipping

companies are not willing to go through that very narrow strait, 21 miles wide.

And that fear is still there. And eliminating that fear is going to require an awful lot of resources, an awful lot of time. And even then, Christiane,

it's not going to be 100 percent foolproof. It just takes one drone or one mind to get through to shut the strait down for an immense amount of time.

CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR, CNN CHIEF INTERNATIONAL ANCHOR: So, that goes to the, you know, real crisis, the energy crisis the world is in right now. What do

you see as the possible outcome inside Iran? You've got, you know, the Iranians maybe degraded, but they're still, you know, using missiles and

drones.

You've got the Gulf Arab states very angry at Iran now. You've got -- you know, who knows again where this is going to end. What might happen? What's

your worst-case scenario for what happens inside Iran and might spill out?

KIRBY: My worst-case scenario, and we kind of already alluded to it, is that the administration, for whatever reason, pulls the plug on this. Look,

I mean, we could all argue about the wisdom of launching these strikes at the time and the way that they were done.

But now that we're in it, it's really important that the U.S. military be allowed to finish obliterating and degrading -- I shouldn't say

obliterating, degrading these military capabilities as best they can. So, what I worry about is pulling the plug early, leaving the regime still in

power, and it is still the same regime. There has not been regime change. Leaving them in power to continue to persecute their own population and to

be able to propagate terrorism and a threat to the region, and then where we are. We're simply back to, again, mowing the grass. So, I worry about

pulling the plug early and not letting the military finish its job.

AMANPOUR: And how do you see, in our remaining minute, the relationship between the Gulf Arab states, which are American allies, have American

bases, and Iran going forward, given what's been happening? And also, the relationship of America with those Gulf states. Will they keep having

American bases there, do you think?

KIRBY: All of this depends on what's left when it's all said and done. And if the regime is left in power, if that's the way this ends, then we are

definitely going to have to rethink our footprint in the Middle East, and so will our allies and partners who have hosted us in bases throughout the

region.

Because clearly, even a degraded, greatly diminished Iran, and there's no doubt about it they have been greatly diminished, can still lash out and

strike at civilian and military targets throughout the region. So, I think if the regime is left in power, if that's where this ends up, then we're

going to have to completely review our footprint in the Middle East and what that security posture looks like, and perhaps even our arrangements

and agreements with our allies and partners in the Gulf in terms of what sort of facilities the U.S. occupies and to what extent and at what scale.

One of the things that they did before they launched the strike was disperse American military power around the region. It's going to be

interesting to see when this is over, does that disbursement stay in place or do we re-aggregate where we once were? I don't see if the regime is in

power. I don't see how we do that.

AMANPOUR: I mean, that is truly reshaping the Middle East then in a way that presumably neither Israel nor the United States intended. We need to

take a break now, but thank you very much for your very unique perspective.

And stay with CNN. We'll be right back after the break.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[13:20:00]

AMANPOUR: Now, Iran's military says the U.S. and Israel face, quote, "lasting regret and ultimate surrender," while also denying that it's been

weakened by more than a month of war.

Despite Trump's claims of discussion with Iran, there seems actually to be no negotiations. And will there be any Iranian negotiators left to talk at

all? Adviser to the supreme leader and former foreign minister Kamal Kharazi has been the latest to be targeted, seriously injured in a strike

on a residential building where his wife was killed, this according to Iranian state media.

So, let's bring in Vali Nasr now, a renowned Iran scholar and former advisor to the U.S. State Department. Vali Nasr, welcome back to the

program.

VALI NASR, FORMER U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT ADVISER AND PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY: Thank you. Thank

you.

AMANPOUR: So, as you're watching all of this unfold, let me first ask you about the possibility for any talks. You've been a diplomat. What are you

making, even though Harazi himself, and he's been seriously injured, was targeted, wife killed? Do you know what role he might have been playing in

any negotiations headed going forward?

NASR: Well, we don't know what his direct role was, but Iran has said that he was involved in the talks. He's a former foreign minister. Ultimately,

Iran's diplomatic position will be managed by a team around the new supreme leader. And he's an adviser to the supreme leader. And targeting him, who

has been retired for a long time now, and he's not an active member of Iran's ruling government, unless it was by mistake, or it's just wanton

killing of whatever leader of Iran the Israelis can lay their hands on, must have had to do with the role that he had in the negotiations.

AMANPOUR: And what to you does this signal? Because we heard the Trump -- from what you heard from President Trump last night, did you see any route

or any opening for talks, or do you think it was just escalation?

NASR: Well, I think what I took from his from his speech was that he's very frustrated and he's cornered at 30 days after the war has started.

He's feeling pressure domestically, and he felt that he needs to explain to the American people why the United States is where it is.

And he has only three choices before him either is to escalate by ground invasion of Iran, which he didn't refer to at all last night in any way,

which suggests that he would view that as worsening the war, or that he just abandons the whole war and says, I'm done. I'm claiming victory. I'm

leaving whoever wants to open the Strait of Hormuz. They're welcome to do it, which he might end up doing, or he has to negotiate an end to the war

with Iran.

The problem with abandoning the war and just leaving is that first of all, Israel may not do so. Secondly, that does not open the Strait of Hormuz,

nor will it actually de-risk the energy markets and the global economy, which would view that the war is ongoing and may resume at any point in

time. So, it does not reduce the price of oil or calm economic nerves, which then leaves the only avenue that's open, which is a conversation with

Iran.

We know that the Pakistanis have been going back and forth between Vice President Vance on the one hand and leadership in Iran. Each side has

presented to Pakistanis their terms for ending the war and what they're looking for afterwards. I don't think they're close at all. And President

Trump is basically saber rattling and attacked a variety of sites today in Iran, including a major bridge as a way of putting meat on the bone of his

threat to send Iran back to the Stone Age.

[13:25:00]

But in a way, he doesn't have many options here. And he needs to bring Iran to the table, and saber rattling is not going to do it. So, at some point

in time, he has to get serious about negotiations.

AMANPOUR: You mentioned the Stone Age, and it's a comment that really has stuck in the craw of a lot of Iranians, both inside and outside.

Strategically, what kind of effect do you think that terminology, that kind of offensive language does create? What kind of effect?

NASR: Well, there is an effect on the people. In other words, whether they're inside Iran, outside Iran, it's a moment of clarity that this is

not a war against the Islamic Republic. This is not a war over a nuclear issue. This is a war on the country and on its people.

And aside from the terminology, when you bomb bridges, when you bomb the oldest healthcare institution in Iran, which provides vaccines, et cetera.,

you're no longer fighting the Islamic Republic. You're really fighting the Iranian people. So, that actually means that there would be a stronger

rally to the flag and would make the Islamic Republic much stronger in confronting the United States.

But strategically also, what is being heard here is that America's goal is to make Iran into a failed state. This is not just threatening the

government to come to the table. What President Trump has basically mentioned is that my goal is to turn Iran into Libya, into Syria, into

another failed state in the Middle East. I'm going to bomb their bridges, their roads, their electrical and power infrastructure. And I'm going to

basically make it impossible for the country to function and provide services to its people.

So, there's no two ways that in a moment of frustration, he basically has decided that he cannot topple the Islamic Republic. He cannot make it

break. So, he's basically lashing out against the country itself.

And yes, the United States can pulverize any country in front of it. It has the firepower to do so. But there are consequences under international law

in terms of what he leaves behind, in terms of the legacy that it creates in the Middle East as a whole, that one has to also consider. This is

really wanton violence against the country and its people.

AMANPOUR: Vali, the president, and I was really stunned to find this piece of video and audio, was having a different discussion from the White House

with a different audience to the National Address earlier. And he let slip or just intended to say that he had predicted that the war would take three

days. Now, that is very Putin-esque, right, about the war against Ukraine. And it was what people thought about Ukraine. And we know four years later

where we are.

What did you take from, A, Trump admitting that and making that prediction, and B, what it might signal? I mean, does that mean endless war till you

actually get to where you think you want to be?

NASR: Well, I do believe that. I believe that he thought it would be very simple that he would kill Iran's supreme leader. Somehow he was the only

obstacle to Iran changing course, that there would be a Venezuela scenario afterwards. There'd be a new regime coming forward to sign a deal with him

and that the entire Islamic Republic could collapse very quickly.

He definitely did not expect that he would be in a war 30 days on, that the Iranians would actually open a front on global energy in the Gulf,

completely surprise the United States in a way that it hadn't anticipated, and would create a situation in which the United States can escalate

against Iran, but it cannot prevent Iran from escalating against the global energy markets.

So, it means that he had really not planned for anything long-term. And now, he faces a conundrum. He faces a moment of truth that either he goes

down a Vietnam path, keep escalating, putting boots on the ground, ending up in another trillion -- multi-trillion dollar forever war, or that he has

to find a way to get out.

And that is very uncomfortable for him because ironically, Iran has ended up being the first country in his second term that has really stood up to

him. And it's frustrating his plans. They're not coming to kiss the ring. They're not bowing. They're not being broken. And he's escalating pressure

on them and they're still there. And he basically, his usual playbook is not working out here. And that's the reason why we're seeing him constantly

talking to himself.

In one meeting, he says one thing, then he says something else. Then he lashes out in anger. He lashes out at the Europeans. He tries to spread the

blame. All of it indicates that this is a leader that has lost the plot, that his strategy hasn't worked, is finding himself in a place that he

didn't expect to be.

[13:30:00]

AMANPOUR: You know, interestingly, you describe this shifting rhetoric, contradictory rhetoric from the United States. It's been absolutely

straight on in terms of decisions and actually interesting communication from the Iranian leadership. Even, and I'm going to play this, the now

seriously injured former foreign minister Kamal Kharazi told our Fred Pleitgen when he was the first and exclusive team into Iran in the first

week of the war. This is what he said when asked about, you know, how it went. And this is in the first week of the war. Let's listen.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

KAMAL KHARAZI, FORMER IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER: I don't see any room for diplomacy anymore because Donald Trump had been deceiving others and not

keeping with his promises. And we experienced this in two times of negotiations that while we were engaged in negotiation, they struck us.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

AMANPOUR: So, that's referring to June and February when they really thought, the Iranians, that they were in a negotiating process and then

they were struck.

NASR: Exactly. And I think you could add him being hit as well, added a third time. Now, it's one of the reasons that President Trump is finding it

very difficult to deal with Iranians right now is because they don't trust even talking to him about a deal because they think this might be a ruse.

People in Iran actually say that the whole purpose of trying to organize a meeting between Americans and Iranians in Islamabad is to smoke out the

Iranians out of their hiding places so they can kill them.

And so, that -- so President Trump also has to deal with the legacy of distrust that he himself has created. And also, the Iranians are asking for

guarantees because they signed a deal with the United States in 2015. He pocketed the gains that the United States got out of that deal, came out of

that deal. The Iranians want to make sure that if they sign a deal now, three months from now he will not go out of the deal again.

So, the problem is not that the Iranians don't want to talk. I think any -- every war ultimately has to finish diplomatically. The problem is that the

distrust that he has created is so huge that he has difficulty trying to find a way to actually get the Iranians to agree to terms and sign a deal.

And he doesn't know how he would give those guarantees to them to do so.

AMANPOUR: Are you surprised by the fact that Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, who is the speaker of the parliament and is pretty much, you know, since others

have been assassinated, has taken a bit of a lead in the sort of day-to-day running, it seems, of the country. He keeps tweeting, or rather posting on

X, to the U.S. and to Trump in very colloquial language. Like it's either ChatGPT or they -- he's got some speechwriter.

But let me just quote you this, for instance, the latest. This is Ghalibaf saying, let me tell you something straight from the gut. Iranians don't

just talk about defending their country, we bleed for it. We've done it before, and we're ready to do it again. You come for our home, you're going

to meet the whole family, locked, loaded, and standing tall. Bring it on.

I mean, that is, you know, very vernacular in language that clearly Americans understand.

NASR: No, absolutely. Again, you know, I think he has a very good team. The people in Iran who work on these things in IRGC and the government are

very good. They're very knowledgeable about how to engage the United States and the Global South in language they understand. They learn from the

Palestinians during the Gaza War. It is not ChatGPT.

I think what we have to learn now after 30 days is that you should not underestimate the Iranians, just like the United States underestimated what

they might do in the Gulf, they should not underestimate them on the information warfare side of things either. They have proven to be very,

very effective in getting their message out not only to Americans but to a larger population around the world through varieties of videos, using

social media, TikTok, Instagram, X.

And they are basically trolling, if I might say, President Trump. They are -- pointed to the fact that they are still there, that they are fighting

and they're resisting, and that they're not going away. And I think they're treating information essentially as another front in which they're going to

push back against President Trump and his efforts to justify this war.

AMANPOUR: Vali, have you been noticing online or in any of the deep dives into the Iranian communications during this war whether there has been any

recognition inside of Iran that, in fact, they can't continue like this, that even if the regime stays, they have to change? Have you heard anything

coming out of, for instance, the former President Rouhani or anything like that?

[13:35:00]

NASR: I think the sense is that it is too soon for them to think about after the war. They're in the middle of the largest war, perhaps, that they

have faced since the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. And this one, in some ways, is much more dangerous and already might be more costly than that

war. So, this is not the time to decide, you know, how politics and economics will work later.

But I think there is a sense in Iran that they're fighting the world's premier superpower, they're fighting the Middle East's most efficient and

lethal military, and that they are alone in this fight. And they have to pull together and they have to execute their strategy very methodically.

And they believe that they actually have a strategy that has worked. They are obviously being punished heavily by the bombings. It's destroying the

country in many levels. But they have not put the United States on the back foot when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz and to the Gulf and global

energy.

And that they think that, in the end, they have greater endurance than Donald Trump has. That's what they're betting on. And that the United

States, and particularly Trump, will be ultimately short of breath. And what -- if they were to listen to last night, I think they would feel

vindicated that this is a president that basically is lashing out, is frustrated, doesn't have a strategy, doesn't know what to do, and is not

actually in command of the war.

He can punish Iran, but he cannot change the direction of this war right now. The threat to send Iran to the stone age does not change the direction

of the war.

AMANPOUR: Vali, Trump also essentially said the, you know, 400 kilos of highly enriched uranium is untouchable, and if it does get touched, we'll

just keep bombing. So, signaled that he's leaving that. Said that the Straits of Hormuz will essentially open itself. So, signaled again that he

wasn't going to do that.

He's been really knocking back allies. President Macron came out and said, this is not a TV show. This is serious war and peace, and we have to get

serious about this. Damaging allies' interests now, according to many of them, their economic interests.

But I don't know whether you heard John Kirby before you say that if the regime survives, the entire arrangement between the U.S. and its Gulf

allies, including its bases there -- sorry, we've only got 10 seconds, might have to be revisited. Do you see that?

NASR: Yes, I think the Gulf -- we cannot look at the past as a model for the future of the Gulf. Everything about the Gulf has changed, whether this

regime survives or doesn't survive.

AMANPOUR: On that note, Vali Nasr, thank you so much for joining us. And we'll be right back after this short break.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

AMANPOUR: Now, as we've been hearing, America's shifting objectives for its war with Iran are giving the world whiplash. But what's behind the

uncertainty? Well, New York Times diplomatic correspondent Edward Wong says it's all part of the president's destroy and deal doctrine. And he's

joining Walter Isaacson to explain and also about China's increasingly complicated role in the Middle East.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

WALTER ISAACSON, CO-HOST, AMANPOUR AND CO.: Thank you, Christiane. And, Edward Wong, welcome back to the show.

EDWARD WONG, DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT, THE NEW YORK TIMES: Hi, Walter. It's great to be here.

[13:40:00]

ISAACSON: Let me ask you a broad-brush question about the year and a half or so we're about to see of the Trump administration. You had Greenland,

you had him making that big obsession, and then kind of backing off. Likewise, President Maduro in Venezuela, he goes in, has a regime change,

doesn't embrace the opposition, however. Now, we've seen this in Iran where he's going back and forth.

Is there some method in this madness that maybe it's the art of the deal and he's very transactional? Is there a Trump doctrine or is it just

improvisation?

WONG: I would say it's mostly improvisation. I remember speaking to a very senior official who worked in the first Trump administration when I was

doing reporting for an article and this official, now a former official, said that, you reporters, you journalists and analysts like to somehow draw

a picture that connects all these dots in Trump's policies and says, oh, here's the strategy that he's pursuing. But in fact, from here inside the

administration, what we're seeing is just day-to-day decisions, ramblings, you know, off-kilter remarks, and lots of waffling depending on the

president's impulse of the day.

And so, he said that that's what we should keep in mind when we're assessing Trump's remarks and what he's up to. And I've kept that, his

advice, in my head ever since then. I think that's important for all of us to remember.

I do think, though, that when we look at Trump's foreign policy in the second term, there are some broad things that we can say are consistent and

thus paint a picture of how Trump thinks about the world and about America's role in the world.

One is that I do think Trump thinks -- you know, whether he explicitly thinks in these terms in his head or not, that the idea of empire is a good

one, that America and other Western nations were in their greatest glory when they exercised coercive control over countries around the world, and

that Trump would like to do this again. I think that's been borne out very clearly by his policies, and that includes acquiring territory.

The other thing I think that we're seeing that is, in terms of this exercise of American coercive power and military power overseas, he is very

happy to bomb countries, to send forces into a region, to send, in the case of Venezuela, to send U.S. ground troops in to seize the leader of a

country. But he also shies away from this idea of nation-building.

And so, what I see is him seeking regime compliance rather than regime change around the world. And I call it a doctrine of destroy and deal, that

he's going to destroy parts of countries in order to get them to submit, and then he's willing to make deals with a level of leadership that he

thinks will comply with him or that will obey him once he's gotten rid of the tier of leadership above them. So, I think that that's a very

consistent action we're seeing. And Iran, even though he talks about regime change, in reality, there has been no regime change. And in fact, he's

seeking someone in the current leadership that he can do a deal with.

ISAACSON: Well, do you think some of the people in the administration actually buy the fact that we got a good -- I mean, a regime change?

Because it's certainly a more hardline regime led by an ayatollah.

WONG: Well, Pete Hegseth said very unequivocally that the regime has changed in Iran. Hegseth has usually stuck to Trump's talking points. On

the other hand, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who's also the White House National Security Adviser, has been very skeptical of whether there has

been real change in Iran. I think that comes across in his public comments.

He said in several recent interviews that the problem with Iran is what he calls the radical Shia clerics that run it. He uses the present tense when

talking about them, meaning including the current leadership, the one that is now in power after the killings of the supreme leader and his top aides.

And Rubio has made the assertion that the U.S. has to completely degrade Iran's conventional weapons capabilities because the current leadership

can't be trusted. The current leadership is essentially an adversary. And so, the U.S. has to take those measures.

And so, it's clear, I think, that Rubio is much more skeptical than Trump or Hegseth that there has been regime change in Iran.

ISAACSON: Well, that's really interesting, because there does seem to be some light between Rubio and his clear objectives for the war and President

Trump's objectives for the war. Is there some daylight between them?

[13:45:00]

WONG: I'm not sure there's daylight as much as Rubio wants to present publicly a list of war aims that Trump can credibly say the U.S. has

achieved and so can declare victory and pull U.S. out of combat operations in the country if he chose to do so. So, I think that Rubio is playing a

certain role in the U.S. and the U.S. here.

And Rubio, just this week, listed four very concrete war aims. They're all centered around Iran's conventional weapons capabilities. It includes

degrading or destroying the Iranian Air Force, their Navy, what he calls severely diminishing their capability to launch missiles, and then also

destroying factories that produce those weapons.

So, the U.S. can, I think, at this point, credibly claim that it, along with Israel, has accomplished most of those goals. And so, Trump could

essentially hang up a mission accomplished banner if he chose to do so. But Trump himself has been all over the map on his war goals. He has said

things from we want to eradicate their -- you know, their nuclear stockpiles, which could involve sending in ground troops to seize highly

enriched uranium. He has also said we want to do regime change and we've done regime change. So, that's probably the most ambitious goal. And as

I've said, not many people who look at Iran today think that there has been regime change.

ISAACSON: In the past week or two, Trump has said, oh, yes, we're having talks. We're not having talks. And Pakistan was involved in some of those

talks. To what extent was there some truth to that?

WONG: Well, there is a passing of messages between the two countries. It's mostly being done via intermediaries. And Pakistan is one of them. Pakistan

has a high-ranking official who is General Munir, who is in touch with military officials in Iran. And right now, we think that military officials

in Iran essentially hold much of the power in Iran, even though the son of the former supreme leader is currently named as the top leader in Iran.

And so, that's a channel that is open. The U.S. is relaying messages via Pakistan. Iran is doing the same. And we've recently seen Pakistan go to

China and ask for China to help act as a mediator in this. And China and Pakistan have then put out a five-point joint statement saying that there

needs to be an end immediately to hostilities in the region.

ISAACSON: So, China's involvement is very interesting here. Has this whole thing made China more of a player on the stage? And what will this mean if

and when President Trump is scheduled to go to meet with President Xi in a month or so?

WONG: Well, China, as we know, is a country that is somewhat close to Iran. I wouldn't say that they are ideologically aligned, but it's the

biggest purchaser of oil from Iran. They share commercial and military ties. And it's also Pakistan's closest ally. So, there is a confluence of

interests here.

And China stepping to diplomacy is an interesting development. I think China has made some efforts to get involved in Middle East diplomacy in

recent years. It often tries to stay away from conflicts in the Middle East or other parts of the world because it feels that that might work against

its interests. And I think it's seen how the U.S. gets involved and entwined in these conflicts in the Middle East, often because of decisions

by American administrations. And it says it doesn't want any part of that type of scenario.

But when it feels that there is an end goal that can be achieved with China's help, it does step in. A few years ago, during the Biden

administration, we saw that China came in to help Iran and Saudi Arabia finalize a diplomatic opening after those two countries have been

negotiating for several years on this opening. So, China does take an interest when it feels it might be able to accomplish something.

And so, I think it's interesting that China is now partnering with Pakistan to try and push for negotiations towards a ceasefire. And also, in their

five-point statement, they're pushing for an opening of shipping across the Strait of Hormuz, which, as we know, is probably the thorniest issue right

now in the conflict. The fact that the Iranian military, in order to exert leverage, has essentially closed off the Strait by threatening ships with

attacks if ships carrying oil and gas go across the Strait. Iran does allow certain ships to go across if they're Pakistani-flagged, for instance, or

if they're bound for China.

[13:50:00]

So, China has been getting energy supplies from Iran. But at the same time, the closure to most ships of the Strait has really sent energy markets

around the world into turmoil. And I'm sure all your viewers who go get gasoline for their cars have noticed this. So, I think China and Pakistan

both have vested interests in trying to get the hostilities to end as soon as possible.

ISAACSON: What does all this pretend for the President Trump-scheduled summit with President Xi? What do you expect to happen there?

WONG: Well, I think that when Trump goes to meet with Xi, in Trump's mind, he would like to have leverage over China. He started a trade war with

China, as you know, his second major trade war with China. And it really caused chaos in global markets. It was a tariff war, just like he imposed

tariffs on allies in other countries. But it had a much bigger impact on markets because of the fact that China is the world's second-largest

economy. And America's biggest trading partner.

And so, he wanted to basically pummel China to get what he considers to be better trade terms. But China called his bluff and said, we will limit or

stop the export of processed rare earths and critical minerals to the U.S. if you go ahead with this. And so, Trump backed down and he called a halt

to that trade war. So, he wants to have leverage going into a meeting with Xi.

He sees China as an economic rival. He doesn't see it as a strategic rival, in my opinion. He hasn't talked about its military technological advances.

He doesn't talk about its system of governance and whether that's a challenge to U.S. influence and power overseas. He talks in very positive

terms about Xi Jinping. He says Xi is a very good friend. He has talked in terms that shows admiration for actually the authoritarian system that Xi

runs. And so, I think he wants to be seen as an equal to China on trade. And that's essentially his main goal.

But the Iran war and the fact that the U.S. is mired in this conflict in the Middle East and the fact that it has caused chaos in global markets

actually gives him less of a hand to play in talks with China, because I think that he goes into this summit probably more cautious than he would

otherwise. If he threatens to escalate or restart the trade war, then I think China might call his bluff on that.

He knows that the markets depend on his every move at this point, whether it's in Iran or China. And I think he wants to reassure markets that there

won't be more turbulence going ahead. So, I think that in a way constricts the type of arguments or assertions that he can make in the summit with Xi.

ISAACSON: At the very beginning of this war, Trump talked about six weeks as being something he wanted to talk about. Well, it's been about six

weeks. Do you think this was always part of his plan?

WONG: Trump has been all over the map on stating when the war would end and how long it would take. I mean, he said six weeks. At one point, he

said, early in the war, he said, we're well ahead of schedule and there'll be another couple of weeks. And that was, you know, more than two or three

weeks ago. So, people who've observed Trump's statements have said he often says two weeks, like two weeks is a time frame that he often throws out

there. And things very often take longer than the two weeks that he cites. So, we should approach the timeline that he lays out with some skepticism.

And of course, as we know, when the U.S. got involved in wars, started wars or supported wars in other places, U.S. officials would often say, oh,

we'll turn the corner in a couple of weeks or in a month or so. And of course, those turn into many months and then many years. And American

leaders and American politicians don't seem to really have learned a lesson from those previous statements.

ISAACSON: Edward Wong, thank you so much for joining us.

WONG: Thanks a lot, Walter.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

AMANPOUR: And finally, a historic blast off. The Artemis II successfully launched this week. And for the first time in 50 years, a crewed spacecraft

is en route to the moon on a 10-day mission taking the astronauts further from Earth than any human has been before. So, far, so good. For the first

24 hours, the team completed a key maneuver, setting the space vessel on its path without a hit.

Now, space travel is just irresistible for most mere mortals, cemented, of course, by the Apollo missions that landed men on the moon, including

inspiration for Tom Hanks, whose London exhibition, Moonwalker, previewed Artemis and reflected on Apollo.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

TOM HANKS, ACTOR: For myself, when I was 13, the Apollo missions were this example of -- it was an evolutionary place in the consciousness of

humankind because the only reason to go to the moon was because we're human beings and we desire to figure out what is on the other side of the hill.

And that affected me very much then. And if we're human beings, do we not have to remain curious?

(END VIDEO CLIP)

AMANPOUR: Curious indeed. And with the last lunar venture back in 1972, it is no wonder that thousands of people gathered to watch the new mission to

the moon from Cape Canaveral in Florida, a liftoff to lift all of our spirits.

And that is it for now. If you ever miss our show, you can find it wherever you want. Thank you so much, and goodbye from New York.

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