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Amanpour
Interview with U.S. National Security Council Former Director for Iran Nate Swanson; Interview with Former U.S. Special Envoy for the Northern Triangle and Led Negotiations with Cuban Government Under Pres. Obama Ricardo Zuniga; Interview with ProPublica Reporter Jen Fifield. Aired 1-2p ET
Aired April 23, 2026 - 13:00 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
[13:00:00]
CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR, CNN CHIEF INTERNATIONAL ANCHOR: Hello, everyone, and welcome to "Amanpour." Here's what's coming up.
President Trump issues a shoot-to-kill order against Iranian boats placing mines in the Strait of Hormuz, while at the same time saying there's,
quote, "no time pressure on holding new peace talks." Is this conflict escalating or in a stalemate? I ask former U.S. National Security Council
Director for Iran Nate Swanson.
Then, is Cuba Trump's next target? Will he follow through with his threats or seek a different path to regime change there as his oil blockade sends
the country into a humanitarian spiral? Former top U.S.-Cuba negotiator Ricardo Zuniga joins me to discuss the importance of diplomacy.
Plus, inside Trump's effort to take over the midterm elections, ProPublica reporter Jen Fifield talks to Hari Sreenivasan about her concerns for
election integrity.
Welcome to the program, everyone. I'm Christiane Amanpour in London.
Now, here's a shocking prediction. The United Nations says that more than 30 million people will fall into poverty even if the Iran war ends right
now because of soaring energy and food costs, while the White House is still sending out mixed signals on how to end the war, an extended
ceasefire while waiting for renewed peace talks, and a shot across the bow. Today, President Trump posted that he had ordered the United States Navy to
shoot and kill any boat laying mines in the Strait of Hormuz.
As for next steps in talks to resolve the war, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt had this to say.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
KAROLINE LEAVITT, WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY: The president has not set a firm deadline to receive an Iranian proposal, unlike some of the reporting
I've seen today. Ultimately, the timeline will be dictated by the commander-in-chief and the president of the United States.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: So, a standoff, a game of chicken, or is there a plan here? What's clear is the biggest global crisis over the Strait of Hormuz did not
exist before the U.S. and Israel went to war against Iran. And while President Trump argues the Iranian regime is diminished, experts claim that
a new, more hardline generation of leaders is now calling the shots.
Our next guest, Nate Swanson, isn't surprised. He served as the National Security Council Iran director days before the U.S. and Israel launched
their war. He warned that Iran would respond exactly as it has done. And he's joining me now from Washington. Welcome to the program, Nate Swanson.
NATE SWANSON, FORMER DIRECTOR FOR IRAN, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: Thank you for having me.
AMANPOUR: Can I just start by asking you, because this is interesting, President Trump posted a bunch of things today, including who is Iran's
leader? They don't even know who their leader is. I don't know who their leader is. I'm paraphrasing. But basically, who are we meant to be talking
to? Is that a fair call?
SWANSON: Yes, of course, it's a fair call to a degree, right? I mean, Ali Khamenei had been the supreme leader for 37 years and all decisions ran
through him. So, of course, there's going to be a political transition. But I don't think it means Iran can't make decisions and that they haven't been
unified throughout the course of this war, right? I mean, they've had a sole purpose, which is survival. But the fact that they're having
disagreements now on tactics, I don't think should be a surprise to anyone. And I think, you know, we have a small coterie of people making decisions,
and that's not surprising.
AMANPOUR: OK. In the big picture, also, it's been reported that -- and we've seen this, that basically, instead of empowering people who might
want to do, OK, a Delcy Rodriguez, it's actually the opposite. You know, it is a very hardline generation of IRGC leaders who are coming up and
essentially calling the shots. Is that what you think?
SWANSON: It's possible, right? So, it's very possible that Ahmad Vahidi and, you know, to some extent, Mojtaba Khamenei himself, will be this kind
of future generation of scorched earth IRGC leader that wants to have, like, a North Korea and the Middle East. But I don't think we know, right?
I mean, it's also possible that Ghalibaf, you know, who is also a former IRGC, has a different vision.
[13:05:00]
So, it's possible we end up in a much worse situation, but I think it's way too soon to make that conclusion definite.
AMANPOUR: OK. So, with President Trump's post threatening any boat that places mines, what is the main issue, do you think? Certainly, there's no
trust between the two sides. Iran -- let's just ask you about that, because you worked for the Trump administration. You're a career civil servant. You
worked on this issue right up through the summer and, of course, around the time when Trump and Netanyahu did the 12-day war. And preceding that, by a
day or two, there had been negotiations with Iran.
So, tell me how those negotiations were going that you know about, and what is the effect of going to war while negotiations are underway?
SWANSON: Right. So, look, I mean, there has never been trust in the U.S.- Iran relationship throughout the entirety of, you know, the Islamic Republic's history. But it definitely got worse after last June, right? I
mean, I think at least there was a belief within the Iranian system that by being engaged in a process seriously, that would, you know, forestall a
military attack. Now, Iran can't make that, you know, conclusion anymore, and it's happened twice now.
So, I mean, the trust was always low, but I don't think it's ever been lower than it is right now with President Trump in particular.
AMANPOUR: So, Iran has put very, very clear at the top of its list of demands, countering America's demands, I do a shorthand, security
guarantee, i.e., a pledge from Israel and the United States, or United States and Israel, not to attack it ever again. Is that reasonable? And if
it did, you know, demand that, what would it be asked?
SWANSON: I think it's understandable from Iran's perspective, right? Without that, they're going to be attacked every six months in perpetuity.
It's like this concept of mowing the grass, right? This is the Israeli strategy. So, I think this is obviously, and somewhat understandably,
Iran's number one goal. I guess I would argue though that they sort of achieved it in a way, by utilizing the Strait of Hormuz in ways that it's
never been used before.
I don't think any president would walk into a conflict the way, you know, President Trump walked into this one, knowing that there's going to be
significant ramifications in the future that happens. So, I think in some ways, the irony of this whole war is that although Iran has kind of been
beaten badly militarily, you know, they've reestablished deterrence. So, in some ways they have their security guarantee. And so, you know, that should
help us get out of this war quicker knowing this is in fact reality.
AMANPOUR: OK. What about a pushback that actually now that the United States has blockaded their ports, now the U.S. has seized the initiative in
those waters and is squeezing an already desperately weak economy and could lead to the kind of crisis that would see the economy totally collapse?
SWANSON: Right. I mean, it's fair. I mean, that's a good point. And I don't discount the pain that they're going to feel on this over the long-
term. I mean, it's a big deal. But I think ultimately, it's kind of a test of wills between the U.S. and Iran. I mean, the U.S. thinks, and they've
thought throughout the entirety of this Trump administration, and specifically the war, they put enough pressure on Iran, Iran will
capitulate. It hasn't happened. Will it happen now because of the blockade? I'm personally skeptical, but we'll see.
But I think Iran's calculation on the other side is that, you know, they can endure more pain than the U.S. can, and ultimately Trump will blink.
And so, you know, it's ultimately going to be a test of wills on this and who's going to win out. And, you know, both sides are playing a game of
chicken game right now.
AMANPOUR: And on the other big issue, of course, is the nuclear issue. President Trump talks about nuclear dust. It's obviously not dust, but it's
a different thing. Apparently, it's 400 kilos of highly enriched uranium, which has been made into gas, which are in canisters, which are probably
buried somewhere because of previous bombardments.
What do you think is a reasonable way out of that? Because there have been several proposals. Obviously, the U.S. wants it out, and presumably either
the U.S. keeps it or some other country keeps it. The Iranians don't want to do that, and they want to dilute it, at least that was a suggestion by a
former foreign minister, and keep it in situ. Do you see, having been around the table, JCPOA and et cetera, or implementing it, do you see a way
out of that highly enriched uranium conundrum?
SWANSON: Yes, of course. I mean, yes, right? And right now, it's the question of the price. But yes, if, you know, Iran got rid of their
stockpiles of 20 percent as part of the JCPOA, you know, they send -- they down blended and sent it out. I mean, it's not technically hard to do. It's
a political decision on both sides.
And so, whether they down blend it or send it out, I mean, it's very plausible, but, you know, it basically comes down to what price is the U.S.
willing to pay for this, for this, something that didn't exist, you know, prior to 2020. And so, this is a newer development, and I think Iran's
willing to do it. They're just probably going to charge an exorbitant price for this, something that didn't exist prior to 2020.
[13:10:00]
And so, this is, you know, a newer development, and I think Iran's willing to do it. They're just probably going to charge an exorbitant price.
AMANPOUR: You know, you say it doesn't exist prior to 2020. That, I assume, is a reference to Trump pulling out of the JCPOA, which kept
enrichment low.
SWANSON: Yes, it's that and it was the assassination of Fakhrizadeh, right? So, they actually started doing enrichment fall -- and the modulus
passed a bill in 2020 after his assassination mandating 60 percent enrichment. So, it was first the JCPOA withdrawal and then the
assassination by Israel that led directly to 60 percent. So, they're both connected, but that was the actual tipping point.
AMANPOUR: And you're referring to one of their senior nuclear scientists who was assassinated.
SWANSON: The most senior, right, exactly. Exactly.
AMANPOUR: Exactly. So, when you were in the room and there were negotiations going on, what did you see going on in the Trump
administration? And then we'll go back to the Biden administration.
SWANSON: Sure. So, I mean, my involvement was fairly limited just to the spring of 2025, but we were in some ways following the same format that the
Biden team did, which was Oman was the mediator. You know, you would sit in these different rooms.
The only contact that would happen would be, Steve Witkoff would sit in a room with Abbas Araghchi, the Iranian foreign minister, and they would have
it. But then you would otherwise sit in these rooms and the Omanis would shuttle back and forth. It's not a conducive way of doing diplomacy at all,
but this is basically what Iran has insisted on ever since the U.S. withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018.
AMANPOUR: And when you say, you know, going to war, you had predicted the ways Iran would respond. Just go through those. And why do you think the
United States didn't take more seriously the issue of closing the Strait of Hormuz? I guess I'm asking whether you think the president was really given
that -- you know, was told what really, really could happen.
SWANSON: Yes. So, what I thought could happen was that, you know, instead of striking just U.S. and Israeli targets, that Iran would go after Gulf
energy and try to shut down the Strait of Hormuz. And the rationale for that is, you know, one, is it's much easier to do. It's much closer. And
two, it actually puts a price on the U.S. that we wouldn't otherwise feel.
And so, to me, it seemed -- and actually, to be quite frank, Iran was saying they were going to do this. So, I mean, it wasn't that hard to
predict. I think it just maybe happened quicker and with more ferocity than everyone expected.
And I do think the president was given this advice. I think, you know, there's been numerous reports and various outlets that said that, said
that, you know, there was these possible outcomes. And I think ultimately, he just chose not to believe it because he kind of felt coming off the
Maduro strike that he was, you know, invincible. And so, I think it was told and he just chose not to listen.
AMANPOUR: Even in your own Foreign Affairs piece, you sort of do a little bit of self-criticism. You say that American analysts, yourself included,
probably overestimated Iran's fragility before the war. And I'm just going to say, you know, everybody thought, with reason, that the attacks by
Israel on -- you know, on Iran, the attacks by the United States, also the attacks by Israel on all Iran's proxies would have weakened it to a point
that it couldn't have kept up a fight like this. Why do you think you misread it?
SWANSON: Well, I've worked on Iran for 18 years in the U.S. government, and I kind of am routinely amazed how often both myself and the government
gets big things wrong, you know, on Iran because it's complicated and it's a very dynamic culture and society and history. And so, we continually get
things wrong.
I mean, you look back, no one would have really seen, you know, Rouhani winning in 2013 the presidency. You know, I mean, there's just time and
time again, you know, where you would have thought the conventional wisdom was something and the exact opposite happened. And so, you know, that
happens all the time.
And so, in this case, and when January happened and the repression was so brutal, I kind of, probably like many people, and maybe yourself thought,
like, this just is unsustainable. This can't go on any longer. Like, the Islamic Republic as an experiment has kind of failed.
And there's a part of me that still feels that's true, but they clearly have been willing to kill their own people, stay in power, and then willing
to take extraordinary military risks to survive this attack. So, in some ways they're just much more resilient than I think I anticipated. And, you
know, and it's Iran where the U.S. has had no relations for a long time and we don't really have a good view of what's happening.
AMANPOUR: And, you know, there's this complicating factor, I guess. It's not just the U.S. war. It's a U.S. and Israel war.
[13:15:00]
And I wonder whether you think, because Israel, obviously, in terms of the prime minister, basically, I think, believes that this constant war
footing, which he's been on at least since October 7th, is the only way to keep Israel and Israelis safe and secure. Do you think that the U.S. and
Israel that Netanyahu has emerged a winner out of this?
SWANSON: Yes, that's a hard question. My inclination is probably no. I think what kind of seems to be coming out of these peace talks -- or, well,
whatever this sort of talks in Islamabad are, is basically what we're looking for is this security guarantee you referred to, that basically the
U.S. and Israel won't attack again.
If that in case -- if that happens, then I think, you know, it's a pretty big blow to the Israeli government, which had freedom of action coming out
of the October attack from Hamas. So, that, I think, ultimately is something probably that's not fully understood in Israel, and or they think
they can just override Trump. But if that holds, that's a pretty big loss for Israel and Netanyahu in particular.
AMANPOUR: And just going back to your service for the Biden administration, you know, obviously, they tried to get Iran back into some
kind of JCPOA 2.0. It didn't work. Tell us why it didn't work.
SWANSON: Yes. I mean, you asked five different people to have like nine different opinions on this. I think there's a couple of things. One was we
probably moved a little too slow on the front end. I think it just took a little bit of time to get the house in order. And I think that didn't
coincide with the Iranian window, right? So, by the time we were ready to move back into JCPOA, they were entering their own electoral season.
And, you know, it wasn't possible for Rouhani to finish the deal. And they didn't want Rouhani to get credit. And so, at that point, you know, we
extended into, you know, the second part of the year. And basically, it just took forever to get the point where we were all ready to get back into
the deal, like 15 months. At that point, Russia-Ukraine happened. That stalled everything. And so, basically, just the timing never aligned.
And I do think there was multiple opportunities for Iran to go back in. And they kind of ultimately chose to not do it. And by the time they were ready
to go back in, the time had passed.
AMANPOUR: And how important was their demand that the U.S.-Biden administration promised that no future president would pull out?
SWANSON: Well, I mean, we were pretty clear with them from the beginning that we can't do that. You know, you cannot guarantee what a future
administration could do. What we were willing to guarantee was what the Biden administration was committed to. And so, that's all you can do, you
know? And so, that could have been potentially up to eight years. And that's what we told them. And so, I think, eventually, they accepted it,
but it was just too late at that point. We were just in a different world.
AMANPOUR: We're in a much, much different world now. I recently spoke to the former, you know, army commander, General Stanley McChrystal, who, as
you know, commanded troops in Afghanistan, was very senior commander in Iraq. And he said a lot of things to me, including this. I think we're
becoming hated in the world. And that's something that will take decades to fix. And once we're not the good guys, who are we? And there are so many
limits to our military capability now, because the difference between even just a generation ago, when we had high-tech stuff, and our potential
enemies didn't, nowadays, everyone has it. Some people have less expensive versions of it, but they have it. Reflect on that.
SWANSON: I mean, he's right, right? These $30,000 drones are more as effective as our $1.1 million interceptors, right? The asymmetric war Iran
is fighting now is very, it matches us in ways, you know? And so, Iran doesn't need to win a war to win. They just need to survive. And so, we
just have completely different types of warfare. And I think you feel it in this case in Iran. So, it's just a different world than the past.
AMANPOUR: And on this issue of we're becoming hated in the world, the United States, as somebody who's worked in diplomacy for the U.S. for 20
years or more, across both parties, how does that, do you recognize that possibility?
SWANSON: Yes. Look, I hope he's wrong. And I think America has a lot to offer, but I recognize at the same time that our actions are making it
harder for our allies to stay on board, especially threatening NATO and some of these other things. And our values, which have always had flaws and
problems and some hypocrisy, look worse than ever right now.
So, we don't have our best foot forward as a country right now. And I think that absolutely makes it harder. And I think, you know, that hurts our
standing around the world. I hope it's not permanent. I hope these are temporary measures, but yes, it's definitely hurting our standing.
AMANPOUR: Nate Swanson, thank you so much indeed for joining us. Formerly on the National Security Council for the Trump and the Biden
administrations. Stay with CNN. We'll be right back.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
[13:20:00]
AMANPOUR: We turn now to another nation feeling the brunt of Trump's foreign policy or economic warfare, and that is Cuba. The United States has
also blockaded this island nation, preventing any oil from getting there for nearly four months now. And it's in the grip of an escalating
humanitarian crisis with fuel shortages causing widespread blackouts, hospitals are on their knees.
And while Trump's attention is mainly focused on Iran, fears mount the president could follow through on his threats that Cuba is, quote, "next."
Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel says his country is prepared to fight back, or maybe Trump will choose a different path to regime change. This
week, there was confirmation that there have been diplomatic talks in Havana with American officials.
Our next guest is well-versed in these types of discussions. The former State Department official, Ricardo Zuniga, led the negotiations to
normalize relations under President Obama. And he's joining me now from Washington, D.C. Welcome to our program.
RICARDO ZUNIGA, FORMER U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE AND LED NEGOTIATIONS WITH CUBAN GOVERNMENT UNDER PRES. OBAMA: Thank you very much.
AMANPOUR: So, let me first ask you, since this is confirmation now that there have been talks, do you know anything about these talks? Who is
talking to who between the United States and Cuba?
ZUNIGA: I don't on the U.S. side, and that's probably a good thing. That means that they're maintaining a disciplined information approach to this.
On the Cuban side, they said it was the vice minister level. I suspect that it was probably somebody like Josefina Vidal, their vice foreign minister,
who's a very skilled diplomat and knows the United States well.
AMANPOUR: And what do you think they are trying to negotiate or talk about right now? Do you think the whole, you know -- I mean, is Cuba going to be
Venezuela? Is it going to be Iran? How do you think the lessons learned over these past few months of the U.S. at war will translate into Cuba
policy?
ZUNIGA: Well, I hope neither one is taken as the lesson for Cuba, because in the case of Venezuela, it's quite a different scenario than what we're
seeing in Cuba. Cuba is a consolidated 67-year-old authoritarian regime. In the case of Venezuela, there was fragmentation at the top, and it was,
excuse me, it was easier to --
AMANPOUR: Sorry, these little earplugs can be pretty dicey.
ZUNIGA: Yes, that's right, that's right. So, it was -- and it was much easier to manage in the case of Venezuela. In the case of Iran, I think
what we see is that the option for war was, Iran is a much more capable military adversary.
In the case of Cuba, I think what you have is an entrenched government that has been in place for a long time, a population that desires change, but
the question is, how do you get there?
AMANPOUR: OK. So, let's take it, you know, bit by bit then. A senior State Department official has met separately, and we've seen reporting about
this, with Raul Castro's grandson during the visit. So, Raul Castro was president, that's after his brother Fidel Castro, you know, gave up the
presidency, and now there's another president.
What is the significance of the U.S. government official talking to a non- government official there, but a Castro, and a Castro grandson?
[13:25:00]
ZUNIGA: So, obviously Castro -- Raul Castro is an emblematic leader. He has a history going back to the Revolution, going back 67 years in power,
but his grandson doesn't have the same stature that Raul Castro does, nor is he part of the inner core of power.
In Cuba, what you have is a consortium of leaders. It's no longer just a single one, like you had under Fidel Castro. So, when you're negotiating,
you really have to take into account that that leadership, that leadership cupola, not just a single individual, and that's, a single individual in
Cuba now is unlikely to have the authority to take such dramatic decisions as the ones that are being pressed by the United States at this point.
AMANPOUR: And just quickly, you know, it's clear what the leadership is in Venezuela. It's basically an American protectorate right now. Delcy
Rodriguez is carrying out the wishes of the United States. In Iran, we're not quite sure, people aren't quite sure who exactly the leadership is. And
in Cuba, you say there's a clear, you know, there's a clear leadership.
So, we hear that the United States is both preparing for military action, at least, you know, putting options down, but also seeking to convince
Cubans to, you know, implement all sorts of economic changes and maybe political changes to the U.S. standards. What do you think?
ZUNIGA: So, look, this is a really hard thing to do, and I don't want to diminish the task on the U.S. side, which is essentially to convince a
government that's been in place for 67 years to kind of end its model. It is a model that has failed, but they've hung on to power, and they've been
able to hang on to power beyond the period that most people expected them to.
So, what they're trying to do is outlast the Trump administration when the fundamental problem is that their model is unsustainable at this stage. And
the difficulty is getting them to move off that when they believe, essentially, that they're either in power or potentially in prison or
potentially dead.
AMANPOUR: Yes. Now, you have experience with all of this because of the Obama administration and the negotiations that you led towards
normalization. It's OK. Why don't you hold it, just hold it in your ear, and it won't --
ZUNIGA: How do I do that?
AMANPOUR: Yes, but you've got to put it in your ear, otherwise you won't hear me.
ZUNIGA: Well, I can't really.
AMANPOUR: OK. Just hold it there.
ZUNIGA: Please, go ahead.
AMANPOUR: There you go. Sorry about that. It's very difficult sometimes. But what did it take for Cuba to, I don't know, change a bit, according to
U.S. wishes, under the Obama administration?
ZUNIGA: So, under the Obama administration, there was, I think, an understanding that this was a government that you weren't going to, as I
said in the article, charm into changing or bully into changing, and we're seeing that now. What they're trying to do is, again, outlast the Trump
administration and continue to remain in control of the pace and the scope of change in Cuba.
And again, the real problem is that this is a very different time than under the Obama administration, when the attempt had really been to
pressure them by essentially making conditions better for the population so that there would be increasing demand and popular demand for change. That's
no longer really a viable option in terms of the time involved, because the conditions have gotten so much worse in Cuba.
AMANPOUR: You mean the conditions, the economic, the humanitarian conditions?
ZUNIGA: That's correct.
AMANPOUR: Yes. So, what -- you know, if people are hoping, like they hoped in Iran, that somehow there would be a mass uprising to topple the regime.
In Iran, it was brutally crushed. Would Cubans rise up to try to topple their government, their regime, or not? Is it a different kind of, I don't
know, inculcation of values or principles there?
ZUNIGA: Well, look, the thing is that the Cuban government is in dire straits, but they have managed to maintain their very strong repressive
apparatus, and nobody wants to be the Cuban regime's last victim. They all believe that change is possible or might be possible, and they don't want
to be the one to kind of lose their life or lose their liberty. At the very end of this cycle, there is an exhaustion, but also a belief that change
has to come because conditions have gotten so bad for the Cuban government.
So, under those circumstances, and what we've seen before, is that they use a relief valve, which has been mass migration in the past, and Cuba is
different. You hear about mass executions in Iran. That hasn't happened in a long time in Cuba, but mass arrests absolutely are a part of what they
do.
[13:30:00]
So, I think that one theory has been that if you pushed the conditions hard enough in Cuba, that inevitably you would get to a point where you had an
uprising. We haven't seen an indication of that, certainly not on a broad scale.
AMANPOUR: Now, Ricardo Zuniga, I am going to go to a break so that you can have some assistance in fixing your earpiece, and we've got half our
conversation left, so I'll come back afterwards and we'll continue.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
AMANPOUR: OK. We are back now with the former State Department official, Ricardo Zuniga, who led the Obama administration negotiations with Cuba
during that period of normalization. Let me ask you what you think, Ricardo Zuniga, is the bottom line for the Trump administration. First, listen to
something Trump himself has said to Cubans. Take a listen.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
DONALD TRUMP, U.S. PRESIDENT: Very soon, this great strength will also bring about a day, 70 years in waiting. It's called a new dawn for Cuba.
We're going to help them out with Cuba.
Whether I free it, take it, I think I can do anything I want with it, if you want to know the truth. They're a very weakened nation right now. They
were for a long time.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: So, those are two parts of two different conversations, which we just showed together to give him -- to give you an idea of what he's been
saying. So, what do you think is the bottom line? What actually does the Trump administration want?
ZUNIGA: Well, I mean, I think there's probably a difference between what President Trump wants and what the whole administration as a whole wants.
The administration as a whole, I think wants a very traditional goal of the United States, which is sort of a transition to democracy and an opening of
the economy and realignment geopolitically by Cuba.
I think what President Trump wants is to win. And I don't think that Cuba has been especially important to him as an objective compared to Venezuela,
where he was very fascinated by the oil situation. He doesn't see the same kind of advantage in Cuba. And so, for him, anything that he can call a
victory, I think is sufficient. What his supporters in the United States might feel is that something that looks like Venezuela would be
insufficient.
AMANPOUR: Well, that's important because, you know, you just mentioned what many supporters want and maybe the greater administration wants also a
transition to democracy. I mean, do you see the path towards a transition to democracy in Venezuela right now, if you're looking for an example in
the hemisphere?
ZUNIGA: There is a path to democracy in Venezuela, but there were, of course, opposition parties in place. There was a more of a tradition of
democracy in Venezuela and political activity. There's a private sector. There's a lot of conditions that exist in Venezuela that don't exist in
Cuba right now.
And right now, what we're seeing actually is an extension of Chavismo, of the regime in Venezuela, right now in collaboration with the United States.
But I think there are people who believe and have raised concerns about how long it will be before you have free and fair elections there. And in Cuba,
I think you don't even have that possibility. You don't have any, you know, discussion at this point of a time for a transition.
AMANPOUR: You know, just quickly, you know that there are many Venezuelans, maybe the majority, but there are a lot of Venezuelans who are
really pleased that Maduro was, you know, taken out and that there might be some chance towards a freer and a richer Venezuela, or at least for the
people, you know, for them who so many have been impoverished over the policies of the regime there.
[13:35:00]
And obviously, there's so many in Cuba who want to see a change of regime. And there are many, many Cuban Americans who do as well. There have been
real changes in Venezuela, right? I mean, just the idea of bringing different, you know, foreign companies in, maybe freeing some of the
political prisoners, and getting rid of quite a few, purging -- Delcy Rodriguez has purged many, many of the Maduro henchmen. Do you see that as
-- is that happening in a way that's positive, or is it a way of her setting up her own power base?
ZUNIGA: Well, it's clearly setting up her own power base. Whether that is a path to democracy, I think is generating some unease, including among
people who are very happy to see a change in Venezuela. As you said, I think there were a lot of people who were happy to see Maduro leave and
face accountability in the United States. But a lot of those same people are very concerned that what we've seen is a continuation of the
government, in part because the United States very quickly sort of gave up the 2024 election, which the official party, the Chavismo, lost to the
opposition by a broad margin.
And I think there's also some concern in among those same people that the pace in the kind of the -- towards the democratic change has been really
subsumed to the economic effort of the administration to re-energize the economy. I agree, we've seen some very improved conditions in Venezuela,
especially economic opportunities. And we hope that those will continue, but there's still 500 political prisoners in place. And the question is,
with this level of U.S. influence, why haven't those prisoners been freed? And that's what generates concern also in the case of Cuba and some
skepticism about the kind of the pace of democratic commitment.
AMANPOUR: And just one other sort of broader question. There are critics of the Venezuela model, including inside Venezuela right now, who say a lot
of what Delcy Rodriguez is doing and what the United States is asking of her could have been done under Maduro, because if you remember, there were
negotiations between him and Trump's emissary for a while, and they were -- apparently, he was willing to do a whole load of things that the U.S.
wanted, including kicking out the Chinese, the Iranians, the Russians, all of that kind of stuff, releasing political prisoners, doing what the U.S.
said, bringing in U.S. companies and sharing resources, et cetera.
They say the same thing about Iran, that a lot of what Trump is asking for now was on the table during, or just before the military action, during the
negotiations beforehand. Can you just tell me whether you think that's legitimate or were these wars necessary? And do you think they could
justify war against Cuba or some kind of military intervention in Cuba to get what they want?
ZUNIGA: Well, look, I think that's a really important observation. I think that a lot of observers have said that much of what the administration says
it wants, it could have obtained at the negotiating table, and you've just laid out why that was. And yes, I believe that in part, it's that the
president wanted the emblematic success of a military assault, which worked in the case of Venezuela because of, frankly, superb tactical capacity on
the part of the U.S. Armed Forces, and didn't work in the case of Iran because it's a tougher adversary.
Now, in the case of Cuba, what really concerns me is that what you have there is a very weak country, I think, militarily, but you would also, if
you had military action there, what would be the point? It's a country that's already on its knees economically, a very battered society, and I'm
not sure what you could obtain through military action that you probably couldn't obtain through diplomacy, negotiation, and so forth.
I'm not saying that having leverage isn't important, it is, but the forms of leverage and how they affect the population, this is our neighbor. It's
a country of 10 million people that sits right next to the United States. This is not halfway around the globe, and we've already seen mass
migrations from Cuba in the recent past. A million people left in the first half of this decade. You can easily see something like that affecting not
just the United States, but Cuba's neighbors like Mexico.
AMANPOUR: Ricardo Zuniga, former State Department, thank you so much indeed, and I am so sorry about those technical issues you've been
grappling with. Thanks for your expertise.
More than six years later, President Trump continues to claim that he won the 2020 election and that voting was rigged.
[13:40:00]
Since his second inauguration last year, Trump has introduced executive orders designed to change election rules, most recently proposing to create
lists of U.S. citizens who are eligible to vote and instructing the U.S. Postal Service to send mail ballots only to those featured on those lists.
With upcoming midterm elections, many are concerned about election interference.
ProPublica reporter Jen Fifield joins Hari Sreenivasan to discuss what the administration's efforts could mean for voting access later this year.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
HARI SREENIVASAN, CNN INTERNATIONAL CORRESPONDENT: Christiane, thanks. Jen Fifield, thanks so much for joining us. You have a recent piece out in
ProPublica. It's called "Inside Trump's Effort to Take Over the Midterm Elections." And you start with this meeting back in 2020 that included
Attorney General William Barr at the time at the Justice Department. What happened there? Why was it so pivotal?
JEN FIFIELD, REPORTER, PROPUBLICA: Well, thanks so much for having me on. I think the reason we chose to focus on that, as you know, there are a lot
of claims coming out in 2020 and Attorney General Bill Barr was facing all of those. Trump was telling him, you need to look into this, you need to
look into this.
And what we heard was he stood up to Trump eventually and he resigned. What we didn't know was there was a bunch of staff that came together that told
him how to stand up to Trump, that told him the election was fair, that told him they had researched this.
And so, we wanted to look at this one key meeting just before he resigned, where he met with staff, cybersecurity experts to talk about Antrim County,
Michigan, this one contest where he felt like the election had been rigged against him and how it was a pivotal moment in Attorney General Bill Barr
deciding that he was going to go stand up against Trump. He went and he said to his deputy at the time, I'm going to kamikaze myself into the White
House. And everyone in the room realized at that moment that that was the end for his federal career.
SREENIVASAN: Wow. You know, your investigation takes a look at all of what we assume are the guardrails that were put in place as kind of a result of
the 2020 election. What did you investigate? What did you find?
FIFIELD: So, that team that came together in front of Barr, we started there, we looked at this cybersecurity and infrastructure security agency,
which is a long way to say this group that was put together after the 2017 election to protect elections by looking at cybersecurity threats across
the country. This has never been an organized effort before 2017. And since then, it had built up into a very sophisticated mission.
Now, this was the group that met with Bill Barr. And then when Trump took office, this was one of the first teams that he dismantled. You know, he
basically there were more than 30 people working on this across the country. And now, everyone has been reassigned to other projects. So,
there's not that national look at election cybersecurity from within the Department of Homeland Security at this point. That was one team. We looked
at many other teams, including in DOJ, the Department of Justice, that have been dismantled. And those people are now gone and not watching over
elections.
SREENIVASAN: So, how did this agency that he created turn out to become a top target of his? In a memo issued by the Trump administration in 2025, it
said CISA under Chris Krebs' leadership suppress conservative viewpoints under the guise of combating supposed disinformation and recruited and
coerced major social media platforms to further its partisan mission. Similarly, Krebs through CISA falsely and baselessly denied that the 2020
election was rigged and stolen, including by inappropriately and categorically dismissing widespread election malfeasance and serious
vulnerabilities with voting machines.
And again, this was an organization set up by the Trump administration. So, what happened? Why did he turn on it?
FIFIELD: So, under the Biden administration, after January 6th happened, and after the social media companies started to begin to censor information
on the internet, CISA would communicate with state officials if there was false information out there about elections. For some in the country, that
was seen as censorship, as First Amendment problems. And so, Trump, when he came in, he said, I don't want any of that -- or sorry, the Trump
administration did. I don't know that he said that himself. And so, that team was not only doing that, and actually had backed away from that work
after getting backlash about it.
And so, a few people were still left working on that. But this is 30 people that were working on other key projects, like checking out voting machines,
making sure that hacking doesn't happen. So, they were working on other projects, but they're all now gone.
[13:45:00]
SREENIVASAN: Now, you focused on a couple of other groups as well, besides CISA. You said that the National Security Council's Election Security Group
and the FBI's Foreign Influence Task Force and the DOJ's Public Integrity Section, these at least -- you know, these have been changed radically if
they're still around. Explain.
FIFIELD: So, the intelligence agencies were taking a look at any kind of threats from foreign governments, like China, that might come in as an
election approach or during election, in which they could then respond quickly from a federal agency in a way that local governments can't do if
they see someone trying to hack into their system. They had that broad look at all of the threats and all the ways that people were trying to influence
our elections, and they could respond quickly and then try to investigate. All of that has now at least changed, or a lot of it has been dismantled
across the federal government.
SREENIVASAN: You also bring light to a group of political appointees who structurally were opposed to the results of the 2020 election in the first
place, right? And where are they now, what they call themselves kind of Team America, where are they now, what kinds of positions that they're in,
and what are they doing?
FIFIELD: So, what was key to us was looking not just at the dismantling, which has been in the media a lot, how a lot of these people have left, a
lot of people have left under new presidential administrations that happens. We need to look at who's in there now. And so, we started to look
at this team that has emerged within the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice that's working across government silos to try to
fulfill Trump's executive orders on elections.
So, they're looking at things like how to see if there's non-citizens on the voter rolls, as Trump has claimed for years that millions are voting in
our elections. There's never been proof that that's actually true, but this team is focused on trying to seize state voter rolls, find tools to search
those voter rolls, and that kind of work that's trying to fulfill his mission.
SREENIVASAN: So, is this basically a merger or a takeover of what we would consider the federal government's efforts to make sure that there are free
and fair elections by people who structurally feel like, well, they're kind of election deniers on the 2020 side?
FIFIELD: So, there's two things going on. There's one, this new push board for the election executive orders, and there's this other campaign going on
to reinvestigate the 2020 election and past elections. We just recently saw the Department of Justice request ballots from the 2024 election that Trump
won in Michigan. And so, they're doing these two compartmentalized ideas where they're looking back at these elections and trying to, you know,
fulfill whatever Trump mission is in front of them.
And so, I think, you know, we're trying to figure out the White House, the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security all say they're
doing it to uphold free and fair elections. But I think a lot of election experts are worried about their end game.
SREENIVASAN: So, what is the end game that they're worried about?
FIFIELD: They fear that if people are within the federal government working on this, say they seize voting machines, they already did in Puerto
Rico, say they continue to seize voting machines, and they say there's something wrong with the voting machines. We can't use these in the
upcoming election. While states and local governments have the ultimate authority over their election, that's what courts have said, that's what
courts have defended. There's still this worry that the American public then doesn't trust what we're using to conduct our elections going into
this key midterm.
SREENIVASAN: You know, the president has also called on the midterms to be nationalized. I guess explain what that means in practice. And what is the
response from local election officials?
FIFIELD: Well, as I talked about, state and local officials are used to working with the federal government. They run elections under the
Constitution. That power is with the states. They're used to working with the cybersecurity agency on elections. And now, they've seen this turn
where they're getting subpoenas for their voter information or they're getting their ballots seized. And they feel like the federal government is
an adversary now. And they're kind of trying to war game out how to defend themselves now against the federal government.
SREENIVASAN: There's also been this push to try to get voter rolls and kind of reexamine voter rolls, as you mentioned. The FBI, the Department of
Justice, have subpoenaed election records and voter data across the country in different places.
The former attorney general, Pam Bondi, said in a February 26 statement, she said, accurate, well-maintained voter rolls are a requisite for the
election integrity that the American people deserve. This latest series of litigation underscores that this Department of Justice is fulfilling its
duty to ensure transparency, voter roll maintenance and secure elections across the country. That sounds reasonable. It sounds like something that
people should want to make sure that people who are voting are citizens, right?
[13:50:00]
FIFIELD: I agree. And all the county clerks, state clerks that work on elections agree with that idea. You should not have non-citizens voting in
our elections. That dilutes the strength of the citizens that vote. What's happening, though, is the 2020 to use so far on this mission at the federal
level. ProPublica has covered this tool. It's called the SAVE tool. It's incorrectly identifying people as non-citizens that are actually citizens.
So, you know, it doesn't, you know, if there is a tool that works great, that identifies actual non-citizens on the voter rolls, we want to be using
that. But that's not so far what's happening.
SREENIVASAN: There also seems to be a different type of kind of understanding of what the courts say in response to the president's
executive orders and what the executive orders are trying to do and what his administration is trying to do, right?
So, I guess if you could lay out some of the executive orders that the administration has put out when it comes to elections, what the courts have
said and how they've pushed back, but what some of his political appointees are doing anyway.
FIFIELD: So, the first election executive order came out in March of last year, and this looked at two main things. One was making sure that non-
citizens don't vote by trying to change a federal form for registering to vote by putting something on the form to say, I'm going to prove my
citizenship now. I'm going to give you documents to prove that. That has been shut down by the courts so far. Courts have said you cannot control
that portion of elections. This is not your role as the president. Congress can pass a law to change the form to make it so we prove our citizenship.
Right now, we just have to attest to it. We just have to say I am a citizen to vote. So, that's one thing.
He also tried to change barcodes on voting systems so that you're only voting on a paper ballot that doesn't have any kind of barcode coding your
vote. There's some security concerns around that, real security concerns. There's also some wide misinformation about what that can lead to. And so,
the courts have also blocked that part.
Now, we have this new executive order that just came out recently that says for mail-in voting, the U.S. Postal Service is going to be able to decide
and put together voter lists for who is eligible to cast a mail-in ballot. Now, this is something that is definitely controlled by the states. They
ask voters to send in a notice if they'd like to vote by mail, a lot of them. And once that's decided, they're on the voting by mail list. So, this
is another attempt. We're already seeing challenges in court.
SREENIVASAN: You know, we've had at least a tradition, if not a set of norms, that say that law enforcement doesn't come necessarily near the
polls, right, to not be an intimidating force. What happens if there are places where ICE troops or troops, ICE officers are near polling areas in
specific counties or specific jurisdictions where they think, OK, this is going to be a place to catch people who are undocumented. But does that
create any kind of an other unintended effect or intended effect?
FIFIELD: It absolutely does. We know that federal law prohibits law enforcement from being around polling places. What we see here is the
acting Attorney General Todd Blanche has said he doesn't see the concern of having ICE agents around polling places because if you're not a citizen,
you shouldn't be voting. So, why are you concerned?
But we know that there's an intimidation factor that comes in certain communities, specifically minority communities that see law enforcement at
polling places as a threat or something to stay away from that could very much factor into who shows up at the polls.
And so, what we're seeing is attorney generals, I mentioned war gaming, talking about what happens, how do we respond if certain scenarios like
this happen in November. And so, we'll have to see how all of that plays out. But I think there is real concern about voter intimidation.
SREENIVASAN: You know, put this in perspective, if you can, from the experts that you've spoken to who watch elections, you know, a lot of
times, the strategy to winning elections is to make sure that your team comes out to vote and make sure the other team has a hard time getting
there or a hard time having their votes counted. Have we seen anything like this on a structural level from the federal government or elsewhere to try
to change so many rules in such a short period of time?
FIFIELD: Well, of course, there was the Civil Rights Act is in place for a reason. If we go back in our history, there's been times where certain
groups have been disenfranchised, specifically minority voters in different ways when it was all in-person voting. There were attempts to shift
locations throughout your area to make sure someone can't vote. There's gerrymandering that happens that dilutes votes.
[13:55:00]
So, there's always been attempts to do this. And I think that this is different from that because you have the president dictating it now. You
have someone who's in power who's not saying, OK, Congress is going to do this. The state legislature is going to set your lines. The local county is
going to decide where you vote. It's coming from the top down now.
SREENIVASAN: ProPublica reporter Jen Fifield, thanks so much.
FIFIELD: Thank you so much.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
AMANPOUR: And finally, a new form of eye gene therapy is being hailed as life changing after six-year-old Saffie Stanford, who suffered from a rare
genetic condition causing blindness, has had her sight restored at Great Ormond Street Hospital in London.
And in a positive week for medical development, an experimental individualized cancer vaccine that uses mRNA to treat pancreatic cancer has
shown lasting results in an early trial. While a five-year survival rate for pancreatic cancer is less than 10 percent, over 40 percent of those
involved in the clinical trial were still alive up to six years later. And that is great news.
And that is it for now. Thank you for watching, and goodbye from London.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
[14:00:00]
END
