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Amanpour
Interview with RAND Distinguished Chair for Israel Policy Shira Efron; Interview with Ynet Columnist Nadav Eyal; Interview with University of St. Andrews Professor of Iranian History Ali Ansari; Interview with "Unreliable Boyfriend" Author and Former Canadian Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland. Aired 1-2p ET
Aired October 28, 2026 - 13:00 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
[13:00:00]
PAULA NEWTON, CNN ANCHOR: Hello, everyone, and welcome to "Amanpour." Here's what's coming up.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
GADI EISENKOT (through translator): Tonight, we got the answer. The public decided for change.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
NEWTON: In Israel, opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot declares victory as Benjamin Netanyahu claims his bloc wins decisively. With neither side in
the majority, we take an in-depth look at how this will play out.
Then, what will elections in Israel and the U.S. mean for the people of Iran? I ask historian Ali Ansari.
And --
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
CHRYSTIA FREELAND, AUTHOR, "UNRELIABLE BOYFRIEND" AND FORMER CANADIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER: It sure will be better for the world's democracies
if America is on Team Democracy.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
NEWTON: "Unreliable Boyfriend: An Insider's View of Dealing with a Chaotic Superpower, Plutocrats, and Other Complicated People." Walter Isaacson
speaks with former Canadian Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland about how to manage a seemingly unmanageable U.S. president.
And a warm welcome to the program, everyone. I'm Paula Newton in New York, sitting in for Christiane Amanpour.
Benjamin Netanyahu is down, but not quite out. With Israel's vote count ongoing, the country faces potential deadlock. Neither Netanyahu nor his
leading rival, ex-military chief Gadi Eisenkot, is projected to reach the 61-seat threshold for a majority in Israel's parliament.
Now, voters turned out in record numbers with a consequential surge among Palestinian Arab voters, who we know to make up about 20 percent, pardon
me, of the electorate. They are now on track to secure at least 19 seats in the Knesset, their highest ever.
Now, both leaders and their leading contenders say they won't form a government with Arab parties. Here's what Benjamin Netanyahu said speaking
after the polls closed.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER (through translator): The first thing that was made clear is that the Likud is the largest party in Israel.
There's no doubt about it. And the second thing that's been made clear is that the right bloc has a major decisive majority among the Zionist public.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
NEWTON: Notes among the Zionist public, deliberately excluding Palestinians from his coalition. Once a count is final, a horse trading
begins, and we note again that Netanyahu is a horse trader of some repute. Israel's president, Isaac Herzog, now decides who can build a viable
coalition. He wants all parties to have an open mind, and this is key here. He is urging them to avoid another round of voting. You may remember that
starting in 2019, Israel held four elections in just two years.
Joining us now for a deeper look at where we are headed is Shira Efron. She is Israel Policy Chair at RAND, a global policy think tank, and I want to
welcome you to the program.
SHIRA EFRON, DISTINGUISHED CHAIR FOR ISRAEL POLICY, RAND: Thank you. Good evening.
NEWTON: Good evening to you. I want to start with your major takeaways here. I mean, turnout was high, results split. We discussed the Arab
parties. It gained a record number of seats, it looks like. But when we take a deeper look at this, I mean, what are your takeaways from the
results, aside from the obvious?
EFRON: So, I think there's a fundamental misunderstanding about what just happened in Israel, because the winner is the loser, and the loser is
perceived to be a winner. Netanyahu's coalition currently occupies 68 seats in the 120-seat parliament, the Knesset. The votes are not final, but
they're close to final, and he's going to fall down on 53 or 54 seats. So, definitely a sounding loss for his agenda in the Israeli Knesset, you know,
the parallel.
You can say to an American audience, he just lost Congress. That means that Gadi Eisenkot and his opposition partners can immediately begin working in
the Knesset, cancelling legislation, advancing legislation, removing key figures from the Knesset. And this happens regardless of whether Israel's
president assigns the role of government formation on any of them, Ulysses, of whether Israel's president assigns the role of government formation on
any of them.
[13:05:00]
You're right that when it comes to the government formation, who actually runs the country, then we are running a separate process, which is likely
to be a little bit more complicated.
NEWTON: Shira, that is an interesting point you make because we have been trying to parse exactly what this will look like in the days afterwards. We
are now joined by Nadav Eyal. I believe you just arrived. You are with Ynet. You just arrived from Israel.
So, I ask the same question to you. Given the results, we still don't know that they are official, but we understand this could lead to deadlock right
now in Israeli politics. So, what are your key takeaways from this vote?
NADAV EYAL, COLUMNIST, YNET: Well, first of all, the Israeli public said loud and clear they don't want this government. Netanyahu has lost his
majority. A new Knesset would be sworn in. A new parliament would be sworn in. In this Knesset, he holds a majority of 68.
In the next Knesset, he's going to have, according to -- and basically, all votes -- Almost all votes have been counted. Maybe 400,000 are left. He's
going to have 56. So, he's down from 68 to 56, and there are only 120 members of Knesset. He has lost the absolute majority that he had in a
resounding way. But that doesn't mean, as you said earlier, that the former General Eisenhower can actually form a coalition himself because the
opposition is divided. It's divided between Israeli-Palestinian parties that are non-Zionist and right-wing parties that don't support a
Palestinian State.
And because of that, there is no guarantee that the fact that Netanyahu lost this election will actually lead to a new government to replace him
anytime soon.
NEWTON: And, Shira, do you see things differently? Because when I parsed the results again in my time zone here in New York, I again saw it as
perhaps Netanyahu not leaving the prime minister's ship there. And I do want to turn to you to speak about those crucial Arab parties.
We said they could have as many as 19 seats, the highest ever. They make up 20 percent of Israel's population. But they are so disconnected, really,
from Israeli politics. Will this time be different? Will they have some agency in any kind of a coalition here?
EFRON: Sure. So, just before we get to the Arabs, what we have to understand is that Eisenkot theoretically has a pathway to forming a
government relying in one shape or form on the Arab parties that you mentioned. What Netanyahu is now doing, because he does not have the same
pathways to forming a coalition, is delegitimize the same Arab parties.
And the Arab parties today have, yesterday, excuse me, have shown up in historical numbers. It's less of it being drawn to their own parties and
more of a protest vote against Netanyahu's agenda. They are demanding not to be treated, not even as a second-class citizen, fifth-class citizens,
fourth-class citizens, but having participation that is equal in Israel's life and society. And they cannot be ignored. They will not be able to be
ignored in legislation, in budget allocation.
And again, if the opposition were to embark on this courageous and politically maybe not easy pathway of attempting at least to rely and
partner with the Arabs, they will be the kingmakers.
NEWTON: And to get back to that point, Shira, then, though, of the Arab parties right now that could have a historic win in terms of seats, will
they have any way to govern in this government?
EFRON: So, you know, not all the Arab parties are the same. One Arab party in particular, led by Mansour Abbas, who is number two, is a Jewish former
security official, Segalovitz. They subscribe and adhere to most of the conditions set by the opposition to form a government. The joint list,
which is the biggest Arab list according to where we are in the count at the moment, is farther away from these demands.
There is a possibility, and again, I'm not saying this could happen. I'm sure Nadav can elaborate on how politically controversial this is. But
there is a pathway for forming a government, a coalition with Ram, at least, and with having the joint list abstaining. This would mean that
President Isaac Herzog, despite his push for a unity government, which is not going to be easy either, he will receive most endorsements for Gadi
Eisenkot, and based on the endorsements, he will have to give Gadi Eisenkot the key to forming a government. Whether this will happen, not clear at
all, But the Arabs have a strong card to play.
[13:10:00]
NEWTON: And, Nadav, that's where we put you on the spot, right? I mean, we just saw him there on our screen. Israel's President Isaac Herzog is in a
very difficult position, as Shira just outlined. I mean, he's tasked with choosing the politician most likely to be able to govern here. And he's
already warned them, please, do not bring us to the brink of another election. So, Nadav, I mean, where do you think he goes now to navigate
this?
EYAL: Well, he's going to try and have a national unity government, because that's the most obvious fix to this problem. And here's the
problem. No homogeneous coalition here of both sides, no bloc has won an outright 61, as was said during this broadcast. And because of that, there
is the ability and the tradition of Israel to have national unity governments.
Now, the problem there, of course, is that Netanyahu has lost trust -- sorry, Netanyahu has -- his partners have lost trust in Netanyahu in any
kind of government like that. He, in the past, has made agreements, for instance, to have a rotation in the position of a prime minister. And he
did everything in his power to violate that agreement with former General Benny Gantz. And he destroyed him politically as a result of that. And
that's just one example.
So, to have a national unity government, you first need to have trust between the sides. But there are also principled issues. There's the issue
of mandatory service in the army, of conscription. There are the far-right partners of Netanyahu, people like Ben-Gvir and Smotrich, that Israel's
center and Eisenhower don't want to see in the same government and say they are harmful to Israel and to Israel's reputation around the world. And
because of that, it's going to be a very difficult task by the president.
And here's why it's most difficult. It's most difficult because Netanyahu has a vested interest in another elections, because this election was where
the bloc running against him, they employed everything they could. It was a general enlistment to the point of many, many thousands of Israelis flying
in from around the world to vote in the elections in Israel. You need to be physically in the country in order to vote.
So, everything was done here on a volunteer basis, on a campaign basis for years preparing this election. And they didn't manage to muster a majority.
For Netanyahu, the fact that he managed to even survive this without them reaching a majority is actually hinting to the possibility that if he goes
for another election, he might actually swing it and win, outright win the election and have a stable majority.
And because of that, why should he agree to a national unity government as far as he is concerned right now? And that's going to be the question,
what's the leverage? And the answer is that the president has no leverage over the prime minister. He can just say no. And then either Eisenkot forms
a coalition with those Arab parties, or we're headed to another election.
NEWTON: Yes. As you point out, there are complications for Eisenkot both with the unity government and any kind of a coalition government. President
Trump seems to be backing a unity government. He certainly endorsed Benjamin Netanyahu. But all of this in terms of a unity government is
tricky because Eisenkot doesn't want to work with Netanyahu as I've just made clear.
So, where do we go from here, especially -- and Shira, I want to bring in, how shall we call it, the legal troubles of Prime Minister Netanyahu?
Because that is a key element here as well, right? In terms of his very survival.
EFRON: Right. I mean, some of the terms, as opposition leaders have said, they have no problem sitting in a government with Netanyahu as a minister.
However, he cannot serve as a minister because of his illegal troubles. According to the Israeli law, he must stay prime minister, and that is a
ticket out of his legal troubles.
There have been throughout the years, multiple speculations of Netanyahu agreeing to retire from the political life and receiving some pardoning,
canceling the trial. There have been different suggestions and they have not panned out. And some of these speculations are being raised again.
And when Nadav spoke about the president, the Israeli president not having leverage, the U.S. president might have leverage. And this is also
speculative, but whether he's going to call the two sides to form in a unity government and himself provide the sort of, he would vouch for
Netanyahu this time fulfilling the terms of the agreement.
[13:15:00]
But we are in a real predicament on all sides because for Gadi Eisenkot and the opposition sitting with the Arabs could be a violation of their
campaign promise, but the same is sitting under Netanyahu and his government because they see it as a referendum on October 7th and they want
to see everyone and anyone who is responsible for this immense failure out and primarily Prime Minister Netanyahu.
NEWTON: Yes. I mean, Shira, the challenges that you're pointing out there, they are stark. Nadav, look, obviously all of this is happening as the Iran
conflict continues and reports that Netanyahu, he wanted to launch new attacks even before the election. We heard earlier that Eisenkot in his
speech said, and I'm quoting him now, Eisenkot, Netanyahu, don't dare use Israel's security for your political needs. Some argue he already has.
Does this election impact what will happen vis-a-vis the conflict with Iran going forward?
EYAL: Of course, we are in a very dangerous period right now. First, there is a tension with the Iranians as to actions that the Iranian regime has
been conducting related to their military capabilities, maybe ballistic capabilities and others. And because of that tension, there's a lot of
discourse across the region. And of course -- as to the possibility of another strike in Iran.
And the person who would need to make that decision is of course, the president of the United States. If the president wants a strike in Iran,
it's going to happen. If the president says, no, there's nothing going to happen at least until the midterm elections, right? At least. Israel is not
going to do anything that the White House tells her not to do.
But at the end of the day, after the midterm elections, it's Prime Minister Netanyahu who has actually lost the majority in the Knesset. And I need to
explain, it's not like in the United -- in Israel, the house that gives you to maintain your rule.
If you lost control of the Knesset, that's it. You're supposed to be out of office until, you know, there's a new government. And in that interim
period, Netanyahu can actually --
NEWTON: Apologies --
EYAL: -- strikes, it's completely legal. Doesn't need to go to parliament in order to authorize that. So, it's a very tense period. And yes, it can
also serve his political means. I should say that fighting against Iran's nuclear program and generally fighting against Iran is sort of a consensus
in Israel's political sphere.
NEWTON: Shira, I'm going to let you get in here on the Iranian point. But as you are there in Israel, I want to ask you, I mean, look, I have no
stake in this and I'm exhausted. And I can't imagine with the trauma that Israel has gone through in a little bit over three years now, not to
mention the years before, I have reported from Israel and the region. What are Israelis feeling at this hour? I can't even imagine.
EFRON: So, just one point on Iran. I think the situation is even more precarious now, just your question, because objectively, the previous two
rounds have not addressed Iran's nuclear program, at least not the highly enriched uranium. And we know that Iran is rebuilding its ballistic
missile.
So, there's a security pretext to relaunch the campaign that would be decided by Trump. But also, from Netanyahu's perspective, this changes the
conversation again and the agenda to national security. And it would force this national unity government, but under his own terms. So, I could see
also political justification.
But you know, to your question, I think Israelis are exhausted. You need to remember Israel has been at war with its neighbors for three years on
multiple fronts. The year before Israel was at war with itself over the judicial overhaul and Israel's future as a liberal democracy. The elections
and Israel's growing isolation in the world. And you know, there's not a day that goes by without showers of news and another sanction in one
country and another event. And I think Israelis are exhausted.
And this is one of the reasons that President Herzog is really adamant about preventing another round of elections. For this reason, whether he
succeeds or not, though, remains to be seen.
NEWTON: Yes. And that's what is so disconcerting by looking at the situation right now, because no matter what he says, no one can guarantee
that there will not be another round of elections and soon.
[13:20:00]
Shira Efron from RAND, Nadav Eyal from Ynet, we thank you both as we continue to try and parse what Israel's political future will look like.
Grateful to both of you. Thank you.
EFRON: Thank you.
NEWTON: Now, we will have more news in just a moment.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
NEWTON: So, with neither bloc in the majority in Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu's caretaker government remains in power. Now, the Wall Street
Journal is reporting that the Israeli and American militaries are preparing for possible short, intense strikes on Iran. In Israel, this raises
concerns about Netanyahu's mandate to go back to war.
Opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot warned about that, speaking to those serving in the Israeli armed forces. Listen to this.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
GADI EISENKOT (through translator): Netanyahu is a caretaker prime minister, without a mandate or the people's trust. Remember that you serve
only the state and the interests of Israel's citizens. Stand firm in the face of any attempt to challenge you. Netanyahu, do not dare use Israel's
security for your political needs.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
NEWTON: And then this. According to a U.N. report, the people of Iran are caught between attacks from abroad and repression at home. So, what can
they expect after the votes are counted in Israel and the United States? We want to discuss all of this with Ali Ansari. He's professor of Iranian
history at the University of St. Andrews. And I really want to welcome to the program. I've been looking forward to this discussion. Appreciate it.
ALI ANSARI, PROFESSOR OF IRANIAN HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS: Thank you.
NEWTON: Now, we have just been talking about those highly consequential elections in Israel. In your estimation, what's at stake here for Iran? And
what would another term for Netanyahu as prime minister mean for them?
ANSARI: Well, I think a Netanyahu victory is probably the last thing they wanted. It's probably going to increase the obviously the likelihood of an
attack. Although I think from an Iranian perspective, the differences in policy between the various candidates would have been fairly slight. But of
course, Netanyahu has been much, much more vocal in his call to finish the job, so to speak, and to move ahead with, in his own mind, the removal of
the regime in Iran.
So, I think, you know, there'll be a certain amount of anxiety and anticipation that actually the prospect of the cold war going hot again is
probably more likely than not.
NEWTON: More likely than not. That is probably the estimation in the region as well, as we see people prepare there. What we're hearing about is
a potential planning on the part of the U.S. for a short and intense renewal of the war after those midterms. And then you have Iranian
officials that continue to be defiant. Mehdi Mohammadi, senior adviser to the speaker of the parliament, Mohammad Ghalibaf. He said on social media,
I'm quoting now, "We are in a surprise phase of the war and we will not fight a classic war." Warning here, it will be asymmetrical, fierce and
conclusive war that will target the enemy's strong points and weak spots.
[13:25:00]
I mean, listen, what do you make of this rhetoric? And I want to point out to our audience that very early on here, you predicted that Iran would hold
its own in any kind of conflict.
ANSARI: Well, I mean, I think the -- you know, the Iranians are very good at bombast. They're very good at the sort of controlling the narrative.
They'll want to be sure that the message is put out very, very clearly to the to Israel and the United States that they were hit back quite hard.
Now, the issue here will be is that I think last time, certainly I think the United States, if not Israel, was probably taken by surprise by the
reaction that the Iranians had put in. The question, really, we have to think about is, how prepared now the United States and Israel are for any
renewal of conflict should they decide to go down that path?
There's no excuse for being caught by surprise now. I mean, you would have to be much, much better prepared. You'd have to be much more aware of what
you're planning to hit and why. And also, to, as you say, prepare yourself for any reaction that may come in.
Now, one must assume that the previous round of combat did diminish and did degrade some of Iran's ability to hit back. So, the question mark is, to
what extent are the Iranians indulging in a bit of bombast? To what extent can they actually get back as much as they claim they can? Last time, of
course, as I said, they caught the Americans certainly by surprise with the speed and the extent of their fight back.
Although it was probably a little bit more eclectic than people often presented. I mean, you had this sort of decentralized command that was
firing at almost at almost everyone, including, in some cases, allies, which obviously, you know, the Iranians hadn't intended. But there you are.
So, I think we have to be -- you know, we have to be careful about what they're planning to do. But also, one would assume or one would have to
hope to assume that, you know, CENTCOM and the Israelis, you know, are also thinking very carefully about, you know, what they're facing this time and
what they might have to face in retaliation.
NEWTON: Can you explain a comment that you made again several months ago? You argue that Iran is more afraid of peace than war. What did you mean by
that?
ANSARI: I think that at the moment, you see, you have a situation with the Revolutionary Guard Corps are very much in control in the sense that they -
- you know, you're in a military situation. You are under threat. They can effectively -- as people have said to me, you know, Iran is under martial
law. I mean, it's essentially there's a military government.
What they worry about, I think, at the end of the day is if you end up having some sort of peace. First of all, it has to be a peace they can
sell. And you have to bear in mind that Iran's ideology and the ideology of the Islamic Revolution doesn't go for compromise. I mean, it requires that
its narrative is that it will win a great victory against the West and it will achieve this. So, it has to achieve something.
And if it's short of achieving that, it will have to explain both to its supporters and to those many, many people who are disaffected with the
Islamic Revolution and Republic, you know why they've had to go through so much pain.
I mean, at the end of the day, we talk a lot about the reckoning that maybe Netanyahu or Trump or others will have to face at home. And obviously, if
you see the elections now, I think there will also be a reckoning in Iran itself. I mean, people will sort of say -- will say -- be saying to the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, you brought this war on. You've been very bombastic in fighting it. What have you achieved?
And if you look at the discussions going on in Iran at the moment, there's already a lot of criticism, actually, about the way in which the war has
been handled. We look at it from a different perspective because we're looking at the failings on our own side. But they also are looking at the
failings on their side about how they haven't really achieved the sort of things that they want to achieve.
And of course, the minute you get some sort of peace, people will have to explain the situation they're in. And the economic situation in Iran is
extremely poor at the moment.
NEWTON: Yes. As we've heard before, you wonder, though, what kind of agency they will have. I'm going to get to everyone in Iran waiting, you
know, for a change. But we want to talk about those ordinary Iranians. The U.N. special rapporteur on Iran recently said that the war has intensified
repression inside Iran. I mean, think about that. It's increased repression.
Many struggling, as you say, to make ends meet. Inflation spiraling out of control. I want to hear now from some people in Iran about the situation
there. Listen.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
UNIDENTIFIED MALE (through translator): As for savings, I don't think anyone is much in the way of savings anymore. People are managing their
income as best they can.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE (through translator): I had decided to live as frugally as possible this month and cut back on my spending. I wanted to eliminate
many of my usual expenses and do without a lot of things. But even then, it's still not enough. There's hardly anything left at the end of the
month.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
NEWTON: That is just the economic side of this, never mind the kind of repression. You know, I hear you, that the discontent in Iran, that it is
filtering through and that they will demand something of their leaders, whoever they are, because it is very opaque exactly who has control of Iran
right now. But where does that lead them?
[13:30:00]
ANSARI: Well, I think, you know, the first dissent will actually happen probably within members of the elite itself. I mean, there will be
divisions within the elite about how they're taking the country forward. And you can see that in the discussions. And then after that, you will see
probably discontent on the ground.
Now, what that leads to, as you say, is something that, you know, is not at all clear. When you have one group of people with a lot of guns who are
sort of oppressing another group of people without any guns, it's quite -- you know, the ability to maintain that suppression is fairly tight.
But at the end of the day, I think you will see a certain amount of dissension even within the ranks. You know, the regime itself does have to
pay its shock troops. Not everyone is doing this on the basis of zealous belief. They're doing it because they think they have better access to sort
of economic benefits at a time when the rest of the country is really suffering.
So, when you find that actually you're unable to pay your own shock troops, that's when the regime will come into real difficulty. And we're not that
far away from this at the moment. I mean, the situation, people talk about Iran being a sanctioned country, and it has been a sanctioned country over
many years, but it's never been blockaded on quite this scale. I mean, this is a wholly different scale of economic pressure. And I think it's banking
on the fact that President Trump will blink first or the Americans will blink first.
And I think we ought -- they ought to be very careful about this. I mean, at the moment, it's not at all clear that certainly the Western economies
or the United States will blink before they have much bigger problems to handle domestically.
NEWTON: And to that point, in terms of when the tipping point may come in Iran, you know, months ago you quoted the philosopher, Hannah Arendt,
saying, and I love this quote, revolutions are impossible before they happen and inevitable after they happen.
When you continue to follow the dialogue on Iran right now, knowing everything you know about its history, because, you know, we want to really
lean into your understanding of Iranian history, can this really still happen in the next few months, in the next few years? You talk about the
pressure from the United States, and yet here we are, right? We still don't see the change that Iranians want on any level.
ANSARI: I think it's -- I think these things are very difficult to predict. And, I mean, as a historian, I'll be absolutely, you know,
straight with you and say that what we should really be doing is thinking of contingencies and about what can happen. It's true, you know, it
basically goes back to that sort of famous Hemingway quote that, you know, how did you go bankrupt? First very slowly and then very quickly. And the
problem is, is that we're always teetering on the brink with Iran.
So, it's not like we've always had, you know, the best predictions in the geopolitics profession. It's not like we foresaw the fall of the Soviet
Union, for instance, or the fall of Yugoslavia. Other countries have managed to sustain themselves in very, very poor economic conditions. Of
course, that's true, too.
But the fact is, in Iran, you have an ideological regime that seeks to go in a particular direction. It's very possible that, you know, you'll get to
a tipping point where things begin to unravel extremely quickly. And, of course, that's the problem. It could last. It could certainly last for
months or even years to some extent. I personally doubt it myself under this sort of pressure.
But nonetheless, at the end of the day, history and the history of Iran also tells us that when regimes go, they go very quickly and they go often
without any sort of sense of prediction. We've had that earlier in the last century. We had that during the Islamic Revolution itself, in which a
seemingly very powerful state collapsed within the space of about six months.
And, of course, this requires, you know, a certain constellation of events, contingency. The fact that, you know, whether those on the losing side are
willing to admit that they've lost. I mean, there are all sorts of things that have to be in play. But certainly, economic crisis is one of those
ones that triggers this. And there's also a political crisis afoot.
Again, I mean, I would emphasize that a lot of this will happen internally. I think what happens externally may push things, may accelerate things, may
tip things over. But ultimately, at the end of the day, it depends what people inside the country choose to do. And it depends also how the elites
in the country decide to negotiate what's going forward.
And I think there's a there's a lot to play for here. And I -- you know, the assessment that some people have that Iran or the Islamic Republic of
Iran is extremely strong and is likely to last for an eternity. I mean, no system in Iran, no political system in Iran lasts forever. No political
system anywhere lasts forever.
So, I mean, it's -- if you're under this sort of pressure sooner or later, the laws of gravity, you know, will apply to everyone. I mean, these are
things that will apply. And I think you're going to begin to see fracturing within the domestic within the political system domestically. But as
prediction, I'm going to be very open with you. And you say as a historian, we don't do predictions.
NEWTON: I will, though, press upon you again and your history, your knowledge of the history of Iran and the region. And we get to that complex
relationship between Tehran and Washington. Obviously, it's been tumultuous.
[13:35:00]
But I really wanted to ask you this question. What do you believe the United States fundamentally misunderstands about Iran and its history that,
unfortunately, does not well inform the way its foreign policy is wielded in the region?
ANSARI: I think I think the United States has made mistakes on both sides of the equation, by the way. I mean, I think, first of all, the United
States relationship with Iran is a very emotional one, just the same way as the Iranian relationship with the revolutionary relationship with the
United States is a highly emotional one. There's been a sort of an intimacy in that relationship prior to the revolution, which has resulted in many
people feeling on one side or other betrayed by either side. And this is often meant that we tend to view the things we tend to view the
relationship with a high level of emotion and irrationality rather than looking at it very hard nosed.
But, you know, I do think, you know, on the one side, there's been an overweening element of guilt on some people. You know, people think back to
1953 as if this is something that America has to pay some sort of dues to. And there's been a guilt factor. On the other hand, you know, there's been
this sort of belief that the regime is so weak that it will topple immediately or that there's a there's a possibility of basically with an
element of shock and awe, if you will, that things will crumble.
You know, what we need really in the relationship -- and I would apply on both sides, by the way. I think the Iranians have a very poor
understanding. Well, certainly the Islamic Republic has a very poor understanding of how American politics works, for instance. I mean, they
don't see -- they can't seem to make sense of it at all either.
But the -- I think what you need from the American side and certainly from the Western side is a lot more nuance, a lot more subtlety and sort of
understanding how the relationship works and an appreciation of the history without being a prisoner of the history. And I think far too much American
policymakers have been prisoners of a history which, frankly, most Iranians have moved on from.
So, I mean, it's something that we need a little bit more hardnosed realism in terms of that relationship. And understanding what the Islamic
Revolution means and what it entails for the rest of the world. But also, you know, I think some American politicians do, by the way. I mean, they
have made this clear that there is a distinction to be made between the ideology of the state, the revolution and the people.
And, you know, when you can distinguish that and not sort of talking in the somewhat grandiose terms that sometimes President Trump does. I mean, he's
very loose with some of his rhetoric, shall we say. You know, he tends to merge the Iranian people with the regime. And, of course, that's a big
mistake, for instance. That's a big mistake that many presidents and politicians in the United States have made.
There's a lot more sympathy, I have to say, among the Iranian population for the United States in the West than there is with the regime. And I
think, you know, policy has to be targeted very carefully. And to some extent, we have seen that, by the way. I mean, we've seen that being done,
but I think obviously there's always room for improvement.
NEWTON: I note many things that you said, including that you have to have an appreciation of the history and not be prisoner to it. And we do hope
some of that nuance and understanding comes through. And also, the fact that there are still Iranians there had that show of nationalism when they
were first struck by the U.S. and Israel, but are likely still hoping that there is a peaceful way out of this. Professor Ali Ansari, we really
appreciate your insights here. Thanks so much for joining us.
ANSARI: Thank you very much. Thank you.
NEWTON: OK. Still to come for us, has the U.S. become an unreliable boyfriend to its international allies? Former Canadian Deputy Prime
Minister Chrystia Freeland takes us behind closed diplomatic doors in her new book. We'll have that after the break.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
[13:40:00]
NEWTON: President Trump wants it to become the 51st state, but now it's actually getting closer to becoming part of the European Union. Canada
shared a decades-long partnership with the United States, economically and culturally. Today, the two nations are in the midst of a relentless trade
war. It's one of the most striking examples of Trump's unique brand of diplomacy, one that our next guest likens to an unreliable boyfriend. In
fact, that's the title of her new book, part memoir, part blueprint for dealing with chaotic superpowers.
Former Canadian Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland draws on her own experience to instruct readers on how to fight back, as she explains to
Walter Isaacson.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
WALTER ISAACSON, CO-HOST, AMANPOUR AND CO.: Thank you, Paula. And, Chrystia Freeland, welcome to the show.
CHRYSTIA FREELAND, AUTHOR, "UNRELIABLE BOYFRIEND" AND FORMER CANADIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER: Great to be with you. In your new book, "Unreliable
Boyfriend," you have a pretty tough beginning in which you say, ultimately, this is the story of the world America made and the world America is trying
to destroy. This is the story of America's descent from leader of the free world to the world's problem child. You have gone from building a city on a
hill to wielding a wrecking ball, quite literally, against your own home. Explain to me what Canada does to adapt to this whole new situation.
FREELAND: Well, I think Canada is doing exactly the right thing. And we have some practice. This is not our first rodeo with the Trump
administration. We experienced something actually pretty similar with the first Trump administration when President Trump threatened to rip up NAFTA,
our trade agreement with the United States.
And we developed a three-part playbook then. Part one was, do collaborate where you can. Be reasonable. Were there areas of shared interest? And we
found with the first Trump administration that was having elements in our trade agreement that preserved high-paying blue-collar jobs in North
America. Our second point, though, and this is really important, is do not capitulate.
And you know, Walter, that there was, in this second Trump administration, initially a view by a lot of people inside the U.S. and also a lot of
people outside the U.S. that what you had to do was somehow kind of sweet- talk the president, and maybe he would get distracted, and that was how to get through this.
Our view then, and Canada's view today, is that is absolutely wrong. President Trump is a classic bully, and if you give in to him once, he
doesn't say, oh, you're such nice guys. That's great. He just decides to come back for more. So, our view was, we do not escalate. We do not back
down.
The third part of the playbook, though, is very important. We called it the donut strategy. And the idea was that the president is the hole in the
middle of the donut. Important, but far from the only player in the United States.
And we believed that what we needed to do is get out and talk to Americans, mayors, governors, small businesses, trade unions, and that if we made the
case to Americans, they would get it, and they would put pressure on their president to stop trying to beat Canada up, to stop trying to take Canada
over, and to go back to what we've had for pretty much all of our history, which is a win-win, mutually beneficial, mutually respectful relationship.
ISAACSON: You know, we're about to go into our midterm elections in a week or so, and the tariffs are playing a big role in two key states, Maine and
Michigan. And certainly, they've cut against, it seems, President Trump and the Republicans. How do you read the situation, especially in terms of the
midterms and those two states?
FREELAND: Exactly as you say, Walter. I think that, you know, Maine and Michigan are two states that have extremely close relationships with Canada
over many, many decades, and they understand that those relationships are good for the people of Maine. They're good for the people of Michigan.
You know, in Michigan, we build cars together. The car sector really depends on us collaborating. Something that, you know, in Michigan, we
build cars together. The car sector really depends on us collaborating.
[13:45:00]
Something that I know the people of Michigan remember is during COVID, 1,500 Canadian doctors and nurses crossed the bridge from Windsor into
Detroit every single day to keep Detroit hospitals going. That's how close the relationship is.
And the same is true of Maine, where the economies, the families are closely integrated, and people see that these tariffs are not only
pointless, they are actually economically harmful. They are costing people in Michigan and Maine jobs. They're making life less affordable. So, I
think that, you know, the voters of Michigan and Maine understand it, and it's, you know, it's in America's power to stop it.
ISAACSON: You talk about Ronald Reagan. You invoke the shining city on a hill as what America had built but is now wrecking. That, of course, comes
from John Winthrop's famous sermon when the Puritans arrive in America. But it was made famous by Ronald Reagan, who made it a symbol of American
exceptionalism.
Explain to me your view on what used to be called American exceptionalism and what's happened to it, because it's something you talk about in your
book, "Unreliable Boyfriend."
FREELAND: Yes. So, you know, Walter, I would say probably more than Americans realize. America, the world, and in particular, America's closest
friends, countries like Canada, countries like America's NATO allies, one of whom is Canada, but America's NATO allies in Europe, countries like
America's allies in the Pacific, are giving up on America and are starting to see America not as a friend but as a threat. There were some very
shocking to me surveys over the summer that showed that in Canada, in Germany, all of those countries saw China as less of a threat than the
United States. Think about that for a minute.
Now, to me, the big question is, can this relationship be rebuilt? Can, you know, the alliance of the non-geographic West be renewed in some way? I
would say a lot of Canadians, if you ask them that question, would say it can't. We can never trust America again. My own view is we need to leave
the door open, and I think that because I really believe there's a big fight going on in the world right now. There's a fight between democracy
and dictatorship.
Now, I do a lot of work in Ukraine, and Ukraine is on the front lines of that fight. The world's democracies, we're going to keep on going no matter
what choice Americans make, but it sure will be better for the world's democracies if America is on team democracy.
ISAACSON: What should Canada do and what is Canada doing to have better relationships with China, both on trade and we hear even on some military
and defense matters? There's discussions.
FREELAND: So, Walter, I'm no longer in the government, and I am a China hawk. I think that the world's democracies need to be very careful about
getting too close to China. I was appalled, as I know so many people were, when we saw President Trump directly siding with Russia, when we saw his
representative, Steve Witkoff, describing Putin as a humanitarian. Those were shocking, appalling moments, and we should be shocked and appalled.
If we're shocked and appalled by that, we need to recognize that China is Russia's number one supporter right now. The Russian economy is continuing
to operate because of China. Xi has talked about the eternal friendship he has with Putin and between China and Russia, and China is supporting
equipment for Russia's military.
So, if you are a person who believes in democracy, if you are a person who believes that Putin's dictatorship is trying to tear democracy down,
starting with Ukraine, but is a threat to Europe, and I believe all those things, then you have to recognize that China is part of that effort, too,
and is on the wrong side.
[13:50:00]
ISAACSON: One of the great global forces happening now is the rise of plutocrats, whether it be in Russia, United States. You wrote a book in
2012 called "Plutocrats," and you talked about the problems that can arrive when there's a great disparity like that. You also then address it in your
new book, "Unreliable Boyfriends." You write, they may be scorpions, but it's our job, we the people through our elected government, to impose on
them the constraints that will channel their inevitably selfish self- interest for the public good. Tell me how you think governments now have to deal with this new economic order we've been in for the past 30 years.
FREELAND: Yes. When I wrote "Plutocrats," I could analytically see that we, and in particular, the United States, was moving to a real plutocracy,
but it's one thing to understand something analytically. It's another thing emotionally to actually see it.
And I have to say, when you see the just extreme wealth that a handful of people have accumulated in the United States, and the extent to which that
wealth has become an outsized political voice in the United States and around the world, just consider the Elon Musk, Starlink drama. I think my
own fears of plutocracy, if anything, were understated 15 years ago. What do we have to do about it?
Look, I'm glad you read that quote, because I am pro-market economy. I am pro-capitalism. Very early on in my career, when I was still a student, I
actually lived in the actual Soviet Union. I know what it's like to live in a centrally planned economy where the state owns and controls everything.
It's not good, Walter. I remember standing in line for sausage and for butter.
At the end of the day, a market economy works, but a market economy only works if we the people, through our democratically elected governments,
control the markets, shape the markets, regulate the markets, and control the capitalists. It was Warren Buffett who said that he likes to invest in
companies that have a moat around them, that don't have competition.
That's what every great investor, that's what every capitalist wants. It's the government's job to regulate, to be sure that businesses are acting in
the interests of the people, to be sure that monopolies are not formed, and to be sure that the people who are accumulating great wealth, thanks to all
of us, pay the taxes that are necessary to create a just society, to provide a social safety net.
It is connected to the unreliable boyfriend and to my own hope that we can renew the Western alliance. Because one of the challenges with plutocrats
and democracy is capital has gone global and democracy is national.
And so, unless you have the world's democracies working together to rein in the plutocrats, to ensure that the work that they are doing serves
everybody, then the plutocrats can always jurisdiction shop. They can always threaten the country, look, I'm going to leave. If you tax me, if
you regulate me, I'm gone.
And one of the things we've seen over the past 30 years is a race to the bottom when it comes to taxation, when it comes to regulation. Under the
Biden administration, there was actually an effort to end that race to the bottom, to do a deal among the world's democracies, among the world's
richest countries, on tax. What we really need, what Americans need, is an administration that's prepared to renew that effort.
ISAACSON: Chrystia Freeland, thank you so much for joining us. Appreciate it.
FREELAND: Great to be with you.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
NEWTON: And finally, for us, meet the Picasso of pumpkin carvers, a cybersecurity systems engineer by day.
[13:55:00]
Mike Valladao, goes by Farmer Mike, every fall, putting his chisel to work and carving whimsical designs on giant Atlantic pumpkins. Now, get this,
they can weigh up to a thousand pounds, and their thick skins mean elaborate features can be crafted more easily. Now, over the last four
decades, Farmer Mike has carved hundreds of gourds from ghoulish faces to cartoon icons like Charlie Brown, an art he has taken great care to master.
Farmer Mike, please, after Halloween, we need you back on your day job, given A.I.
That is it for us. If you ever miss our show, you can find the latest episode shortly after it airs on our podcast. And remember, you can always
catch us online, on our website, and all-over social media. I want to thank you for watching, and goodbye from New York.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
[14:00:00]
END
