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Secret Service Holds Press Conference on Trump Assassination Attempt. Aired 1-1:30p ET

Aired September 20, 2024 - 13:00   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

[13:00:53]

ANNOUNCER: This is CNN breaking news.

BORIS SANCHEZ, CNN HOST: We're following breaking news into CNN.

Any moment now, we're going to get a live update from the Secret Service on the results of their investigation into the attempted assassination in July of former President Donald Trump. We have just learned the Secret Service has concluded its investigation into the security failures in Butler, Pennsylvania.

And soon, Ronald Rowe, the acting director of the Secret Service, will announce those findings and then take questions from reporters. It was that 13th of July shooting in Butler in which a gunman opened fire at a Trump campaign rally, grazing the ear of the former president and killing a spectator while injuring others.

BRIANNA KEILAR, CNN HOST: The Secret Service has been facing significant criticism for more than two months now for the -- actually, let's go now to that press conference.

RONALD ROWE, ACTING U.S. SECRET SERVICE DIRECTOR: So, in today's hyperdynamic threat environment, the mission of the Secret Service is clear. We cannot afford to fail.

After reviewing the planning, event details, and coordination with partner agencies regarding the attempted assassination of former President Donald Trump on July 13, our mission assurance review is nearing its completion. As I have said, this was a failure on the part of the United States Secret Service.

It's important that we hold ourselves accountable for the failures of July 13 and that we use the lessons learned to make sure that we do not have another failure like this again.

The findings of the mission assurance review have prompted the Secret Service to move into the accountability phase of this process. The Office of Professional Responsibility and the Office of Integrity are reviewing the findings.

And as a result of these failures, what has become clear to me is we need a shift in paradigm in how we conduct our productive operations. As was demonstrated on Sunday in West Palm Beach, the threat level is evolving and requires this paradigm shift.

But here are some of the findings from this mission assurance review. With respect to command-and-control of the site in Butler, Pennsylvania, the Secret Service has the main responsibility of building the site plan. We cannot abdicate or defer our responsibilities to others.

Advance team personnel have an obligation to ensure that each site meets the protective requirements and principles of Secret Service methodologies. The Secret Service did not give clear guidance or direction to our local law enforcement partners.

There were communication deficiencies between law enforcement personnel at the site. For example, the Secret Service did not colocate its security room with local law enforcement. There was an overreliance on mobile devices, resulting in information being siloed.

For example, at approximately 18:10 local time, Secret Service informed personnel that local police were addressing an issue at the 3:00 of the outer perimeter. At approximately 18:10 local time, by a phone call, the Secret Service security room calls the countersniper response agent reporting an individual on the roof of the AGR building.

That vital piece of information was not relayed over the Secret Service radio network. At approximately 18:10 and 54 seconds, verified through body camera footage of local law enforcement, officers confront the assailant on the roof of the AGR building.

At 18:11:05, by a phone call, a site agent calls the assistant site agent to find out what exactly is going on at the 3:00. And, during that call, shots ring out. At 18:11:32, verified through body camera footage, the first series of shots are fired by the assailant. At 18:11:36, again verified through body camera footage, a second series of shots are fired by the assailant.

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At 18:11:47, through body camera footage, Secret Service countersnipers neutralized the threat. With respect to diligence, line of sight issues were acknowledged, but not properly mitigated. Issues were encountered the day of the visit with respect to line of sight concerns, but they were not escalated to supervisors.

While some members of the advance team were very diligent, there was complacency on the part of others that led to a breach of security protocols. With respect to accountability, the mission assurance review has identified deficiencies in the advanced planning and its implementation by Secret Service personnel.

These employees will be held accountable and this agency has among the most robust table of penalties in the entirety of the federal government. And these penalties will be administered according to our disciplinary process. Due to federal regulations, I cannot get into personnel matters as they are proceeding. With respect to a paradigm shift, we're at a pivotal moment in the

history of the Secret Service and at a pivotal moment in the history of our country. And I have directed that the Secret Service embark on a significant paradigm shift that will redefine how we conduct protective operations.

What occurred on Sunday demonstrates that the threat environment in which the Secret Service operates is tremendous and under constant threat. And we have been in this heightened and increasingly dynamic threat environment since July 13.

This reality has necessitated that we significantly increase our protective footprint, and we have already begun to do so following the events of July 13. This increased operational tempo requires additional resources to not only account for costs being incurred today, but ensure that we have the tools, the technology, and personnel needed to meet these new requirements and execute our mission going forward.

The paradigm shift will be a driving force to move the Secret Service from a state of reaction to a state of readiness. And the vision is for the Secret Service to be more agile, with the ability to escalate protection to the highest levels for numerous protectees for undetermined periods of time.

But in order to do this, we need additional personnel, technical assets and equipment for the sustainment of immediate and future needs. Our personnel have been in a state of hypervigilance following July 13. We are certainly working our people hard. And I have used this term publicly, redlining.

This cannot be about working our people harder. So,with respect to changes, the work force, the American public, they can expect changes in our processes for advances. There will be an increased use of technology, not only to assist in communications, but also situational awareness when we're doing our protective mission.

There will be organizational changes. For example, I have already directed the creation of an applied research and development section to field new technologies, leverage the research of other government agencies, and calibrate our technical security assets to stay ahead of threat vectors and technical collection impacting Secret Service equities.

This will be an iterative process, meaning it will be constantly evaluated, validated, updated, and evolving. We cannot be stagnant. And we must be weaned off the reliance of partners within DHS to assist us during high operational times.

The Secret Service should be self-reliant outside of national special security events. However, we recognize that we will always need assistance from our partners within the Department of Homeland Security and our partners at the Department of Defense.

And I want to take this moment now also to thank you, to thank our work force. I want to conclude by thanking the men and women of the Secret Service, who are working tirelessly. This summer, we experienced an unprecedented operational tempo for our agency.

Within a 45-day period, the Secret Service successfully implemented our operational security planning at three national special security events, the NATO Summit, the Republican National Convention, and the Democratic National Convention.

We successfully protected both the presidential debate in Philadelphia and multiple protective visits commemorating the anniversary of the September 11 attacks. All of this took place while protecting major- party candidates on the campaign trail.

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This high operational tempo continues as the Secret Service prepares for the United Nations General Assembly next week, where we expect to protect more than 140 visiting world leaders and heads of state. I am proud of all that we have accomplished in a very difficult and tumultuous time for the agency.

And I recognize and thank the men and women of the Secret Service and their families for continuing to make great sacrifices in support of our enduring mission.

And, with that, I will take questions.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: (OFF-MIKE)

QUESTION: Director, given all the attention and scrutiny related to these events -- sir, given all the attention and scrutiny related to these events, do you believe your highest-level protectees will now need to campaign differently in how they organize their events and in how they live their daily lives, things like trips to golf courses or recreational time?

Will they have to live differently in order to be safe?

ROWE: Well, ultimately, Kelly, this is -- it's the responsibility of the Secret Service to make sure that we provide a secure environment for our protectees.

We want them to make sure that they can live their lives with some type of normalcy, but they must do so with us providing the highest levels of protection, which we have been doing since July 13. And so it's ultimately our responsibility to make sure that, wherever our protectees go, we are creating a safe environment.

And that comes back to us being able to use our methodologies, to use our redundancies, our systems that we have in place to create their secure environments.

QUESTION: Do they need to campaign differently, sir (OFF-MIKE) organize, set up outdoor events, that kind of thing?

ROWE: So, since July 13, we have been securing successfully outdoor events. And what you're seeing is an increased use of assets, increased use of ballistic glass. So we certainly make sure that when we're -- then they are out there

in an outdoor venue, that we are using our protective methodologies to create that safe environment.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: (OFF-MIKE)

QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) Hello, Director. Thank you for taking the time.

Could you just kind of go into a bit more detail about the conversations you had with Trump campaign staff about the selection of the Butler site?

The report says that Secret Service agents saw it as a challenge and staff wanted to have the rally there. Did the staff go against your recommendation? Can you speak to exactly what was said and what the outcome was?

ROWE: So, listen, the staff chooses a site. And, ultimately, it's on the Secret Service to secure it. So when the site was selected, the advanced team went about identifying areas of concern.

The AGR building was one of those hazards that was identified. But let me just be clear, Maria. Ultimately, it is the Secret Service's responsibility to secure a site. We certainly have conversations. And it doesn't matter whether it's a campaign staff or a White House staff.

We have conversations and we have very good working relationships with those staffs. But, ultimately, it is the Secret Service's responsibility to secure a site.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: (OFF-MIKE)

QUESTION: Director, thank you.

Based on your review and analysis, what is the reason, what's the best explanation for why there was not law enforcement personnel covering the roof, physically on the roof itself or making sure someone could not get on top of the roof? And the follow-up question would be, how disappointed are you in what you described as deficiencies in diligence?

ROWE: Sure.

So ultimately, Pierre, we have to be very direct and clear when we're talking to our state and local counterparts. With respect to Butler, I think what the mission assurance review has identified is that there was that lack of clarity.

And I can tell you, since July 13, when I have been out on the road and I have watched field offices, and I gave guidance upon becoming the acting director to the field, we have to be very clear when we're talking to our state and local partners. We value those relationships with them.

We need them to be assisting us and be shoulder to shoulder with us. And it appears that there was that lack of clarity with respect to Butler. And go again with your follow-up here.

QUESTION: So there was a lack of clarity that that roof should be secure, period, full stop?

ROWE: There was a discussion about how the roof was going to be secured. And I think what it came back to is, we should have challenged what that -- how that mechanism was being implemented, meaning we should have been more direct.

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We cannot be too -- we cannot be overly deferential to the state and local law enforcement. We -- ultimately, it's our responsibility. And so we just have to be very clear when we're asking them for support. They want to help us.

And what we found is that in this, they -- in the mission assurance interviews, it became apparent that, in comparison to prior visits to that area -- there was one prior visit in 2020 -- that there was a lack of assertion with respect to what exactly state and locals would have to require -- or would be required to support that advance.

QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) second question, simply, how disappointed are you when you see that, as the report states, that some personnel did not follow Secret Service protocols?

ROWE: Well, I'm not going to get into -- into employee disciplinary matters, but what I can tell you is, the men and women of the Secret Service are dedicated professionals.

And so while July 13 is a failure, we're not proud of it, but we certainly have been rising to this moment. The men and women in the field are rising to this moment. They are working tirelessly to make sure that the people we protect are safe.

And so I will never be disappointed in our folks. I am proud of this agency. I am proud of our people.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: (OFF-MIKE)

QUESTION: Hi. Thanks so much for doing this.

On the question of the AGR buildings, is there a process that's standard for the day of the event that somebody from the Secret Service looks around and makes sure all of the assets are where they are? And since the roof of the AGR building was such a glaring omission, why didn't anybody raise that issue at the time, or, secondly, in the security room, look and say, I don't see any local police in here, how are we going to hear them?

ROWE: Right.

And I think that was a failure to challenge our assumptions, the assumption that local police were going to have more of a presence in that AGR building. Getting back to your question, there is that diligence that has to be done by the side agents to make sure that, hey, all of the assets are in place.

And so there was an assumption that they had it covered, but there clearly was not that follow-up to make sure.

QUESTION: But is there a process that you look around and like a punch list and check it off and...

ROWE: It is part of the principles of our advance and our protective methodologies.

QUESTION: OK. And, secondly, just to follow up on the campaign question, you said it's ultimately the Secret Service's responsibility.

So when there's a disagreement between the campaign and the Secret Service on a security issue, who has the last word?

ROWE: So it's not about disagreement. It's about a negotiation. They certainly don't want any harm to come to their principal.

And so they respect us. And so, usually, what it boils down to is escalating it up to a supervisor at a senior staff level.

What I can tell you is that, if there were discrepancies -- and there were -- regarding how the site was supposed to have been secured, how supervisors were briefed, and supervisors reported in their mission assurance interviews that they envisioned harder assets to be able to secure that line of sight, to be able to mitigate anything that might have been looking in or would have created an openness on the site at the Butler farm show.

And so, on the morning of, if there were those deficiencies they were never escalated up to the supervisors to be able to resolve.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: (OFF-MIKE)

QUESTION: Thank you, sir.

I have two questions. They're related. The first is looking forward. The House just voted within the last couple of hours unanimously from those that were president in the chamber to give presidential candidates the exact same Secret Service protection as sitting presidents.

My first question is, can you handle that?

ROWE: We have been doing that since July 13, David.

QUESTION: So what is the purpose of the bill?

ROWE: I don't know. You would have to ask members of Congress that.

What I can tell you is that, when I say the highest levels of Secret Service protection, the former president is getting tactical assets. He's getting everything that the former president -- I'm sorry -- that the current president has with respect to Secret Service assets. QUESTION: And that was my second question.

Can you explain that President -- former President Trump is getting the same protection as President Biden and Vice President Harris? Because a lot of members of Congress on Capitol Hill are skeptical about that. There's a lot of talk saying, clearly, he didn't have the same protection, because, if he did, the golf course would have been secure in West Palm Beach.

Can you tell people what's going on with that?

ROWE: So, with respect to West Palm Beach, what I can tell you without getting into our TTPs, our techniques or tactics, our procedures, what I can tell you is that, on that day, there were countersniper elements that were present with the former president on the golf course in proximity.

There was an entire counterassault team that was there in proximity. There was also a jump team in proximity. The advance agent who was part of the first element whose goal was to sweep ahead did his job. That young man is a very young agent early in his career.

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His vigilance, his reaction is exactly how we trained and exactly what we want our personnel to do. He identified a threat, an individual with a long gun, and he made swift decisions and took a swift action to be able to mitigate that.

No shot was fired at the former president. The former president was not exposed to where he was on the golf course. And what I have said, and I said this Monday, that the procedures work. The redundancies work. So that high level of protection is working.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: (OFF-MIKE)

QUESTION: Acting Director, thank you very much for doing this.

Two questions, just one on West Palm Beach. The busy public road that is adjacent to that sixth hole where the suspect was hiding is a well- known blind spot on that specific golf course. Why did no one within the U.S. Secret Service sweep behind that fence line for threats?

ROWE: They were sweeping ahead, Nicole (ph). So what I just explained is that the element, that lead element was going ahead sweeping.

QUESTION: But was there anyone behind the fence where the road was sweeping there to see if anyone was in the bushes?

ROWE: Having been there and seen the vantage point, whether they were on the public side or the private side, the bottom line is, the individual was detected.

QUESTION: On Butler, you testified before Congress that all assets requested for the Butler rally by Trump's detail were approved. But there are Secret Service assets that may have prevented the

tragedy on July 13, most notably, a counterassault advance team that would have surveyed the site ahead of time or enhanced counterdrone protection, that might have prevented the tragedy. Were those specific assets requested by Trump's detail? If they were, were they denied?

And if they weren't, why weren't they requested?

ROWE: So the counterassault team had an element that was there that had embedded with local law enforcement. So we had tactical elements in place.

The counterassault team leader that day had been in direct contact in the days leading up to July 13 with those tactical elements.

QUESTION: But just to be clear, did the Trump detail ask for any additional resources that were denied by the Secret Service?

ROWE: So, based on the asset, based on the information I have right now, the asset requests, all of those assets that were asked for were approved.

And so what we're looking at now is, were there any additional ones that came in through other channels? So -- but what I can tell you, based on the information I have now, the assets were approved.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: (OFF-MIKE)

QUESTION: Two questions.

When we're talking about Florida and the idea that this was the Secret Service working as it should, does this mean that no security will change for Trump when he goes golfing again?

ROWE: Well, I think what we try to do, Holmes (ph), after every incident we look at it. What could we have done better? We look at everything.

And it doesn't matter whether there's a critical incident that occurs. So we are looking and we're reevaluating to look at, what do we need? I have had conversations with Sheriff Bradshaw in Palm Beach County. And so I will leave it to the local field office to carry on those conversations about making changes.

Let's where I will leave that.

QUESTION: And then, on Butler, if we can drill down on the specific timeline a little bit, at 6:08, we note that a local radio call went out that a man was on the roof.

Now, my understanding is that the State Police were in a separate area with locals and where their job was to communicate any local chatter to the Secret Service. Why was that 6:08 radio call not communicated to Secret Service, or was it by the State Police?

ROWE: So, the information I have is that we had a -- we had a member of the Pennsylvania State Police in our security room, and that's what spurs that phone call to the countersniper response agent at 18:10.

QUESTION: And so the State Police never communicated a local radio call at 6:08 to the Secret Service?

ROWE: What I'm saying is that the personnel that was in the security room passed that information, and that triggers the 18:10 phone call.

QUESTION: OK.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: (OFF-MIKE)

QUESTION: Hi.

I know Congress has sounded a little resistant lately in terms of what it might do for funding for the Secret Service. Given the sort of paradigm shift that you have laid out today, I'm curious what you will be looking for from Congress and sort of what you're seeking from lawmakers to carry that out.

ROWE: We have been briefing. We have been providing information.

Right now I do think that -- and Congress has questions. We're responding to those questions and providing them information. But at the end of the day, I think everybody wants a strong Secret Service. And that's what I'm working towards. That's what members are working towards. And so we will continue to have those conversations.

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UNIDENTIFIED MALE: We will go to Claudia (ph) with Univision.

QUESTION: Hi. Thank you so much for doing this.

Republicans in Congress, they won the same level of security than the president for the candidates. How realistic is really that? Can you be more specific on that? I know you asked -- you answered that question, but can you just -- can a candidate have the same level of security of a sitting president?

And, also, what changes are we expecting in the security area after -- where most of the incidents happened?

ROWE: So, how I approach that, Claudia, is this. The way the Secret Service is structured, the president of the United States has the highest level of protection of any world leader, period, the end.

The number of assets that the Secret Service provides and the Department of Defense provides is at the highest levels. Those same highest levels with respect to the Secret Service are being provided to the former president's detail.

And so, when it comes to maintaining this, where we are at right now is, we have finite resources. The way we are structured with some of our classified assets, with some of our personnel, and with some (AUDIO GAP) designed to support the president and vice president. We have now expanded that to include the former president. And so,

while we can do this, it is certainly -- we are burning through a lot of assets and resources. And that's the argument that we have been trying to show. This isn't -- this isn't some pie in the sky, trying to say, hey, we want -- we want this now.

We are not capitalizing on a crisis. We are showing the math. We have finite resources. And we are stretching those resources to their maximum right now, which is going to require us to replace these assets. It's going to require us to also adjust to look at this and evaluate that, if we have to do this again or do it because of some other situation that we have no other control of, we have to be able to sustain that for an indefinite period of time.

And so I am hopeful and I am certainly engaged in these, in these discussions. And I feel like, at the end, we will get there because we have no other choice.

QUESTION: What changes are you going to make outside of the secure area, that zone where everything happens?

ROWE: The outer perimeter.

QUESTION: Yes.

ROWE: So I think that's where we have to be very direct and clear with our state and local partners as to what we're asking of them.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: (OFF-MIKE)

QUESTION: Thank you, Acting Director.

I have got two questions. The first, it's our understanding it takes anywhere from four to 10 years for an agent to go through the training that rises them up to a presidential detail level. You have described a manpower issue. Given that, do you think that training time frame might change so you can expedite getting more officers to a presidential detail, should you need that?

ROWE: So we're not going to drop standards, Joe. We have not dropped standards.

You do need to develop those agents. And when agents start, we don't -- you cannot put them on the highest level protection, protecting a protectee. When they graduate from our training facility, they go to a field. They do advances. They do criminal investigations.

The importance of having that, what we call phase one, that's where those agents that are doing federal investigations, that are interfacing with local law enforcement, those are skills that they learn, analytic skills, how to conduct a federal investigation, how to interact with a U.S. attorney, how to interact with a state or local agency.

And all the while they're doing that, they're also popping in and out doing protection, whether they're doing it in New York City for a United Nations General Assembly or they're doing an advance for a visiting head of state or a world leader that comes into their field office district.

That's where they cultivate and sharpen those skills. And it will take them up until probably four years. Ideally, that sweet spot is between the fourth and fifth year where we send them off to a permanent detail.

That's where we are getting to as far as the career path. And so it's critically important that we make sure that we still develop people. You -- it is -- being on the Presidential Protective Division or the vice presidential detail, it is a very, very high-pressure situation.

It requires a lot of maturity. It requires decision-making, analytic skills and the ability to problem-solve. And it takes time to develop those skills, even though we have put you through training. The more seasoning you have in the field, the better off you're going to be as far as being a protection agent.

QUESTION: So, then how do you address the manpower issue quickly?

ROWE: So, right now, we are -- we have had robust hiring. This year, by the time we close out the fiscal year, we're going to hire more than 400 special agents this year.

Right now, it looks like we're going to have a net gain in the hundreds, triple-digit net gains, something that we have not seen in a little while. I can tell you that applications right now are at an all-time high for applicants seeking employment with the United States Secret Service.