Return to Transcripts main page
CNN Newsroom
BP CEO Testifies on Capitol Hill
Aired June 17, 2010 - 12:00 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
JOHN KING CNN, ANCHOR: I want to bring back our national political correspondent Jessica Yellin.
That was probably, if you're a PR consultant, a crisis control, a damage control consultant, that was probably about as good as you can get, given the scope and the gravity of this.
But when this hearing resumes and Tony Hayward is getting the questions, the tone will shift.
JESSICA YELLIN, CNN NATIONAL POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT: It will become aggressive, it will probably be very hostile in some ways.
We actually were given his prepared testimony. As you'd said earlier, it was significantly longer than what he actually said and it went into some detail about their response, the lead-up, and what they're going to do going forward. One can assume maybe perhaps he figures this will all come up in testimony later. So he set it aside and just set a tone of contrition, cooperation, and remorse.
KING: He has a technical expert with him. The committee asked him to put the name into the record of a drilling engineer who's with him. Because many of the questions they want to ask is because they think they cut corners, they think they should have had redundant casing systems, they should have had better cement, they should have had what's called centralizing forces, so that this thing could not blow.
He will get a lot of technical questions.
My biggest question today is, what can he answer knowing that the attorney general is looking at these very same documents and interviewing people to see if there's criminal negligence, and that the families who have 11 people lost family members in this, 11 families, lost individuals in this, and some of the businesses down there could go into court as well? Because even though this escrow fund is set up, it does not limit anybody from suing BP.
So, Tony Hayward has to be incredibly careful.
YELLIN: Incredibly careful. And it's interesting that he chose not to sit there with an attorney.
He declined. He was offered an opportunity and declined. No doubt, that's partly an image thing. It always is suspicious when the person has to consult with their attorney and then answers, "No comment." So, this much looks much more transparent.
But it does create a challenge for him because, as you say, there's only so much he can say without creating legal problems. And we'll have to see how just cooperative he is.
KING: The biggest "wow" we heard today was from one Republican, Joe Barton, who on the full committee is the ranking Republican. This is the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, but he is the ranking committee on the full committee.
And he said early on that he wanted to personally -- he said he was not speaking for the Republican Party, he was speaking for himself -- that he personally wanted to apologize to Mr. Hayward, saying that he found it shameful what happened at the White House yesterday. And referring to the $20 billion escrow account as a "shakedown" and a "slush fund."
Now, you heard another Republican from Texas, the ranking member on this committee. He didn't want to directly criticize Joe Barton, but he was saying no, actually, BP needs to make right here.
YELLIN: Right. I'll tell you, obviously this is not a universally-held view. Most people seem to be embracing this escrow fund as a good idea. But I will tell you that are other people who are Tea Party spokespeople who are very engaged with the Tea Party who have also come out and been critical.
Michele Bachmann has been quoted, calling it a "redistribution of wealth." Dick Armey saying, "There's no constitutional authority." Tom Price saying, "This is a Chicago-style shakedown and a politicization of the economy."
So, I do think that this is going to be something we hear those Tea Party-aligned conservatives saying is an overreach by the government into the economy. And I wouldn't be surprised if this becomes a political theme going forward.
One thing I can tease into it going forward, is that we've looked at how much each of these people have raised as contributions from the oil industry. Joe Barton seems to have the most.
KING: Seems to have the most, Joe Barton from Houston, the Republican.
Our Senior Congressional Correspondent Dana Bash has been in the hearing all day. She's outside the hearing now.
Dana, you had a chance exclusively to talk to the chairman, Bart Stupak, about what will happen today. When we get to the most difficult part of this hearing for Tony Hayward in just moments, the questions, the committee is armed with hundreds of thousands of BP e- mails.
What should we expect?
DANA BASH, CNN SR. CONGRESSIONAL CORRESPONDENT: Well, if they stick to what the plan is, at least from the perspective of Bart Stupak, they insist that this is an investigative committee. And they do want to get to the bottom of what they're looking at in this particular hearing, which is, what happened in the days and weeks leading up to the explosion, the decisions that they made at several different points?
In fact, they outlined five crucial decision-making points that the committee says that they've learned through their investigating. BP simply decided to use the riskier and lower-budget way instead of doing something that would maybe put more security measures in place.
So, what my understanding is, is that they are going to really try to press Tony Hayward on why some of these decisions were made. For example, why, when they had the choice between two well casings, why they chose one that was $7 million to $10 million less expensive. But also, people were warning them that it was also much, much more risky. That's just one example.
So, they say that they're going to get into the nitty-gritty. They also are saying, look, they expect Tony Hayward to maybe punt and say, "I'm not sure. I don't have any knowledge of that."
That is why they sent this letter to Tony Hayward on Monday, giving him the answers to the test, as Bart Stupak put it to me, making sure that he knows what he's going to be asked. And the expectation is that he should have answers.
KING: Dana Bash about to head back into that committee room, because Tony Hayward will be back in the witness chair.
We are expecting the most dramatic part of the hearing. He had given his opening statement. He has said he is sorry.
He will get questions from the committee, the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.
Our continuing coverage in the CNN NEWSROOM in just a moment.
Don't go anywhere.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
WOLF BLITZER, CNN ANCHOR: Welcome back. I'm Wolf Blitzer.
You're taking a look at live pictures right now from the congressional committee that is about to resume. They just took a break so some members could go vote. But this is a dramatic moment we're anticipating right now, the formal questioning for the BP chairman, Tony Hayward, is about to begin.
He had a very brief opening statement. He expressed his contrition. But now the grilling will begin.
Dana Bash is our congressional correspondent. She's on the Hill.
Dana, set the stage for what is about to happen. BASH: You're going to see a lot of lawmakers press the man who is in charge, the man who they think has ultimate culpability as to what happened.
This is a committee that is looking into a specific investigation in this hearing. And that is, what happened in the days and weeks leading up to the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon rig on April 20th? And they've already done investigating. And we're probably going to see more documents that they have not yet made public on what they say are -- were critical and wrongheaded, from the perspective of the Democrats, decisions that BP made to cut costs, to save time, to get back on schedule.
This rig was 43 days late for its next job, and it was millions of dollars. In fact, the chairman of this committee, Bart Stupak, said they were spending $1 million more each day than they were supposed to. So, they were over budget, they were out of time, and that led to some decisions that these Democrats -- and, frankly, we've heard from even Republicans already this morning, saying that they were just trying to cut corners, and they want to get to the bottom of why this happened. And more specifically, the witness that they have, what did Tony Hayward know about it?
They expect that he did know. Unclear if he did.
BLITZER: And I assume there's going to be some tough questioning, specifically from the chairman of this subcommittee, Bart Stupak. You had a chance to speak with him, and he wants to get into specifics. It's not enough for Tony Hayward to simply apologize and say he's sorry. He wants answers.
BASH: He wants answers. He says, you know, that the person who is in charge should go down with the ship. And the person in charge is Tony Hayward.
And, you know, he's actually interesting before -- we're going to hear from him very shortly -- and asking questions. And so our audience should know kind of his background.
He was a police officer in his home state of Michigan. And he mentioned to me that he spent a lot of time preparing for court hearings. And when he prepared for those court hearings, he needed to know what the witnesses and what people were going to say before they said them. And so that plays into his experience and plays into the way he's going to approach Tony Hayward.
But you're absolutely right. He said to me -- I spent about 25 minutes with him in his office yesterday. He said to me umpteen times that he knows Tony Hayward says he's sorry, he appreciates that, but not enough.
They want answers. That's what the purpose of this subcommittee hearing is for, to investigate and to get to the bottom of it, so that, ultimately -- this is Congress -- they can try to legislate to try to avoid something as disastrous like this in the future. BLITZER: He's the chief executive of BP, Tony Hayward. We'll see if he has the answers, because I'm told that some of these questions are going to be very specific. Did BP cut corners to save a few bucks here and there, but in the process, of course, create the potential for this disaster that is still unfolding now almost 60 days?
Ali Velshi is down on the Gulf Coast for us right now.
Folks are going to be watching the Q&A with Tony Hayward where you are, Ali, very closely because they want questions as well.
ALI VELSHI, CNN CHIEF BUSINESS CORRESPONDENT: Yes. And the people I've been speaking to -- I'm in New Orleans now, but I've been deeper into the Gulf, through Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. And I'll tell you, even when they were watching the president's address from the Oval Office the other night, there was a sense that they don't want as much of the history as they want the solution right now.
They were hoping for a now announcement from the president about numbers of people coming down here and putting rocks -- and creating barrier islands, getting unemployed people to come down here and help with the cleanup, putting everything possible towards stopping the spill. I think a lot of people here get the fact that BP's got a bit of a spotty history with respect to safety.
If you look at the Texas City refinery explosion, you look at the Alaska North Slope leak that they've had, the issue here is, is this a BP problem or is this an industry problem? Because if it's an industry problem, and you no that ExxonMobil and the other companies had the same backup plan if they had a leak in the Gulf of Mexico, then it may not be worth taking down Tony Hayward, or asking for him to fall on his sword. We need the industry fixed and we need the government regulation body, the Minerals Management Service, the Department of the Interior, to be fixed so that everybody is being governed properly.
I'll tell you, the people I've been speaking to here in the bayous who work both in fishing, shrimping, oystering, crabbing, and in oil, are very concerned. They don't know when the seafood comes back. That might be five years or 10 years. They are very, very concerned that the oil doesn't come back, because their money is made in either one or the other. And in some cases, it's not a great deal of money, but it is their livelihood.
So, they really want to hear solutions more than acrimony, more than partisanship, and more than blame. They want to know, how is this thing going to stop, and when can I get on with the rest of my life?
BLITZER: Well, the fact, Ali, that BP has now agreed to establish this $20 billion escrow fund to try to repay everyone who is going to be losing a lot of money, and a separate $100 million compensation fund for laid-off oil workers, BP oil workers and others who work on those deepwater oil exploration teams, and they don't have jobs right now, how has that played over the past 24 hours? Are people breathing a little bit easier?
VELSHI: You know, I was out yesterday with those groups that set fires to the oil that's on the surface of the Gulf of Mexico. The people who are employed doing that, the boats, are the shrimpers who have no shrimping to do, so they tie the booms in and they collect the oil. And the guys who do the rest of the work are divers and other oil workers who also have no work to do.
They know this is short-term work. They're happy it's there while it's here. They would rather not be working for BP. They would rather be doing what it is they actually do for a living, for the money they were actually earning.
And they know that when that well stops leaking, which it will at some point, this work, too, will go away, but the old work may not come back. If the moratorium is not lifted on the drilling, or the shrimp are not back, or the oysters are not back, what do they do next year? That's the big fear.
BLITZER: And they're waiting anxiously to see what happens in the immediate term.
You heard Tony Hayward say that right now, they're capturing about 20,000 barrels a day. But that's going to go up to 40,000, eventually 60,000, or even 80,000 barrels a day by mid-July. It won't completely be stopped until August or so, when those two relief wells are supposed to be in place, and stop it once and for all. Although, I'm told by experts, that's not necessarily 100 percent guarantee, either.
But it does seem to be the case that they're making some progress, at least in containing the spill significantly.
VELSHI: Yes. And the issue is that it isn't 100 percent certainty, because there's a chance of rupturing the well or another blowout like this one that happened.
But, generally speaking, if you've got three holes going into the same reservoir, you have less chance of the pressure that would have caused this first eruption in the first place. So, most people think that will do most of the job. Not all of it, but it will do most of the job.
Now, on the surface, we couldn't get exact numbers yesterday, but the burn seems to handle sometimes several thousand barrels an hour. They think maybe they can get 30,000 barrels a day out of burning the surface oil. So, if they collect more and they burn more, if the trickle sort of lessens a little bit, there may be some sense that by the end of summer, they can get it.
But I have to remind you of one thing, Wolf. The weather, while hot here, is perfect. Low winds, no rain. The minute we start getting the sign of a hurricane -- and they're praying that they don't get one -- this whole operation has to come to a stop.
BLITZER: Yes, that's a nightmare scenario we don't want to think about right now. But it's the hurricane season, as all of us know.
Ali, stand by.
Momentarily, Tony Hayward, the chief executive of BP, will be back in that subcommittee hearing room on Capitol Hill. He had a brief opening statement. He apologized, expressed his deep regret for what has happened.
But now the Q&A begins, the questioning. The chairman of this subcommittee, Bart Stupak, will kick off the questioning.
Our coverage will resume in just a moment.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
BLITZER: All right. These are live pictures you're seeing from the Committee on Energy and Commerce. This is actually the subcommittee of that full committee, the Subcommittee on oversight and Investigations chaired by Bart Stupak, Democrat of Michigan.
H's getting ready to begin the questioning of Tony Hayward, the chief executive of BP. This is going to be the exciting time when, member after member, Democrat and Republican, will have a chance to ask tough questions of Tony Hayward.
We'll see how well prepared he is to give answers. He's backed up by a lot of technical experts behind him. It will be interesting to see how often he has to call on them for some answers.
Dana Bash is up there on Capitol Hill, our senior congressional correspondent.
Dana, the questioning will begin, I assume, by Bart Stupak. Is that right?
BASH: That's right. And we actually just grabbed Bart Stupak on his way back into the hearing. We have the chairman of this committee with us.
Congressman Stupak, thank you very much for coming and talking to us.
What's your first question?
STUPAK: The first question is, how could you not know the problems with this well? You know, if you take a look at it, all the reports we've put out from five hours, two hours, 51 minutes, 48 minutes, 18 minutes, who made these decisions to allow this nightmare well to run away and blow? I guess that's one my first questions. It's one of the first questions I'll have for Mr. Hayward.
BASH: Anything that we have not seen that you're going to reveal in terms of the documents that you all have been going through?
STUPAK: Well, I think you saw the 2007 management report itself which said they have a culture of accepting risk and ignoring regulations. And I'm going to ask a little about that.
As far as the documents, I think most documents you probably have. There may be one or two you haven't seen yet that will come out.
BASH: Just one other question about a surprise that we heard from your colleague, the Republican colleague, Joe Barton, saying that the $20 billion escrow fund is a slush fund.
What do you think about that?
STUPAK: Well, I think it was a bad choice of words on behalf of Mr. Barton. You know, it's not -- the American people are hurting down there in the Gulf area. They are complaining there's no payments. They don't trust, necessarily, BP or the government to do it quickly.
We had this 9/11 Commission. Why don't we just put the money there and let them roll it over? They did a good job of distribution of money. And people need it because their livelihoods are in the balance.
I think it was a good move on BP's part, and also the president. And it wasn't a shakedown or anything. This was something that was talked about for some time, and they were able to negotiate through it.
BASH: Thank you very much. We don't want to keep you, because we know that we're keeping you from the hearing's beginnings.
So, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
STUPAK: Thanks.
BASH: OK.
There you heard Bart Stupak. He really does -- and he just repeated what I heard from him during the time I spent with him in his office yesterday, Wolf. He very much is intent on trying to get to the bottom with Tony Hayward on some of the details on the decisions that were made on that rig by BP executives that he said were, according to the documents he had, explicitly made to cut corners at the risk of safety.
BLITZER: Dana, stand by, because this hearing is about to resume. You see Bart Stupak back in the room from your little interview there. He's about to sit down and reconvene this hearing, the subcommittee, and the questioning will begin. I think it's going to begin right now, as soon as he sits down.
So, I just want to make sure that we're all set for that. We clearly are. Everyone is going to be seated. The photographs will get away, and this hearing will resume.
STUPAK: When we left off, Mr. Hayward had made his opening statement. We'll begin with questioning. I'll begin.
Mr. Hayward, when I heard about the explosion in the Gulf, the immediate company that popped in my brain was BP. And that's because the last number of years, from Texas City, where people died and 170 people were injured, the North Slope, the problems we've had there, and BP's own 2007 report on the Management Accountability Project, in which it stated there was a culture that evolved over the years that seemed to ignore risk, tolerate noncompliance and accept incompetence, so I wasn't surprised when we heard about the explosion in the Gulf and BP was part of it.
Since then, this committee, the Oversight and Investigations Committee of the Energy and Commerce Committee, we have methodically looked at this issue. And I know you have and your company has also.
On May 12th, we had a hearing in which we looked at a number of things that went wrong. On May 25th, our committee, Chairman Waxman and myself, put out a memo. It was based on BP's preliminary report.
And I'm sure you're familiar with that report. Are you not, sir?
HAYWARD: I am.
STUPAK: And then on June 14th, Chairman Waxman and I sent you a letter, 14 pages, where we talk about the crazy well and the nightmare well.
Quite frankly, BP blew it. You cut corners to save money and time. And as the chief executive officer of BP, as I stated in my opening, you called for a leaner decision-making process, you called for fewer people in the decision-making process. You stated individuals need to be accountable for risk and to manage risk.
Therefore, did BP's leadership manage their risk in this well? Did you manage the risk properly?
HAYWARD: Since I've been the CEO of this company, I have focused on safe, reliable operations. I've set the tone from the top by making it very clear to everyone in BP that safe, reliable operations are our number one priority.
But, of course, it's about much more than words. Safety is about three things. It's about plants, it's about people, and it's about process. In the last three years, we've invested more than $14 billion in plant integrity.
STUPAK: But then what happened here? I mean, the June 14th letter we put out the other day, we went through five major areas.
The head of the CEOs of the oil companies that were before this committee Tuesday all said you did it wrong. They never would have done a well this way.
You made decisions, whether to a casing or the string with the tie-back, which everyone said the tie-back would have been safer -- the lockdown sleeve, centralizers. Instead of doing 21, as recommended, you only do six.
That defies this safety emphasis, does it not?
HAYWARD: We've launched an investigation which we've shared with yourself, Mr. Chairman, and all of your members, which has identified seven areas. It's identified areas around cement, casing, integrity pressure measurement, well control procedures, and three areas around the blowout preventer which failed to operate.
STUPAK: Sure.
HAYWARD: That investigation is ongoing. It's not complete.
STUPAK: But you're the CEO of this company. You said you were here to answer the questions of the American people.
You were an exploration manager -- exploration manager with BP. You were the director of BP's exploration. You were VP of BP's exploration and production. You hold a Ph.D. from the University of Edinburgh.
Based on our May 12th hearing, the May 25th memo, our June 14th letter to you, based on all of those facts, are you trying to tell me you have not reached a conclusion that BP really cut corners here?
HAYWARD: I think it's too early to reach conclusions with respect, Mr. Chairman. The investigations are ongoing, they've identified seven key areas. And when they're complete --
STUPAK: Every one of those seven key areas, sir, dealt with saving time and saving money and accepting the risk. So, if we use your own words, if you're going to hold BP accountable, then we have to manage the risk.
Shouldn't leadership at BP be held accountable here?
HAYWARD: There is no doubt that I have focused on safe reliable operations. We've made major changes in everything we do over the last three years. We changed people. We --
STUPAK: What changes have you made since April 20th, when the BP Deepwater Horizon exploded? What changes were made then?
HAYWARD: Based on what we know so far, we have made changes with respect to the testing and evaluation of blowout preventers. We've made changes with respect to ensuring that people who are likely to be dealing with well control are up to date and fully validated for well control procedures. And as we learn more about what happened here, we will continue to make changes.
STUPAK: My time is just about up, but I'm going to try to hold members quickly to our time, because we want to get through at least one more round.
Let me just ask you this. The last five years I've been up here, your safety record, you have 26 people dead, more than 170 injured. You have the largest spill ever in Alaska. You now have the largest environmental disaster to hit the United States, with no end in sight with this disaster.
Do you believe the U.S. government should continue to allow companies that have poor safety records, poor environmental records to explore minerals or oil exploration in our country? Should there be a ban on companies that have miserable safety and environmental records?
HAYWARD: In the three years that I've been CEO, I've focused on improving dramatically our safety and environmental performance. The price of this accident, this has indeed been the case. And that is why, amongst all the other reasons, I am so devastated by this accident.
STUPAK: I agree, and under your tenure you said -- you had the 2007 report that was scathing of BP's culture. We still have problems with Alaska. You said you were going to hold people accountable.
Who are we going to hold accountable here?
HAYWARD: We've engaged in a systemic change at BP over the last three years. We have begun to change the culture.
I'm not denying that there isn't more to do, but we have made dramatic changes in the people we have in our organization, the skills and capabilities they have. We've invested heavily into that.
We've changed, significantly, the processes that we use to manage our operations. And most importantly, perhaps, we've made safe, reliable operations the core of the company. It is a thing that I talk about every time I talk internally and every time I talk externally about BP.
STUPAK: Sure.
Not to play games semantics, but in your opening statement you said as long as you were CEO of BP these things would occur. Do you expect to be CEO of BP much longer?
HAYWARD: At the moment I'm focused on the response. I think everyone here believes that the highest priority is to stop the leak, contain the oil on the surface, and clean it up. And that is what my focus is.
STUPAK: Mr. Burgess, for questions.
REP. MICHAEL BURGESS (R), TEXAS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The highest priority, stopping the leak.
Let me just ask Mr. Hayward, is your presence in here in any way interfering with that number one task of stopping the leak?
HAYWARD: No, it is not.
BURGESS: Thank you. Let me ask you -- let me just make a statement for clarification.
I am not going to apologize to you. It was, after all, BP executives who were on that rig, BP executives who ultimately could have made the call to stop operations when things became unsafe. And ultimately, you are the person at the top and you are responsible.
We lost 11 men on that rig. Transocean and other companies lost 11 men on that rig. I don't feel that apologies are in order.
But, Mr. Chairman, I do have serious questions about the setup of this fund that we heard about from the White House yesterday. And I hope this committee will stay engaged in the oversight of that activity as well.
It's still disturbing to me that we have not had anyone from the federal regulatory side. We've brought a ton of other people in here and questioned them. But really, we need Mr. Salazar here. We need whoever the Minerals Management people were who approved that exploration plan that BP submitted that was woefully inadequate.
Shame on you, Mr. Hayward, for submitting it.
But shame on us for accepting it with just simply a rubber stamp.
Now I've got some questions that I do need to ask.
BP, unfortunately, it's not the first time you've been in front of our committee. And in 2006, although you were not CEO in September of that year, I pulled the transcript last night and looked through it again.
There was a big oil spill in Alaska. It had to do with not proper maintenance on the pipelines. And when you came in, you said you were going to focus like a laser beam on safety. And, certainly, that had to be welcome news after Texas City, after the North Slope accident.
So, what safety briefings do you get as your office of chief executive officer? And who provides them to you?
HAYWARD: The basis of our management of safety performance is through something that we call our Group Operating Risk Committee. It's a committee that I set up, I chair.
It involves the heads of all of the business streams. And we meet on a bimonthly basis to review the safety performance across the company. That process is mirrored down through the company.
BURGESS: And what type of safety directives, then -- or what type of directives do you issue in terms of safety as a result of those meetings? And, perhaps, would you be willing to share some of that information with the committee as we go forward?
HAYWARD: We can certainly share that information with the committee. They range from changes to procedures, to requirements to have people where there are issues with safety, to come and present to us.
BURGESS: But somebody records minutes during those meetings, and your directives that come as a consequence of those briefings are written down and delivered to the appropriate managers on the --
(CROSSTALK)
HAYWARD: There are minutes of those meetings.
BURGESS: I beg your pardon?
HAYWARD: There are minutes of those meetings.
BURGESS: Let me ask you this -- and Mr. Stupak already alluded to the fact that, should we allow someone who is perhaps not following the best practices, drilling practices, to continue to drill? Is there any other well, to your knowledge, in the Gulf of Mexico that is -- has been done in the same manner as this well that was being drilled under the Deepwater Horizon?
HAYWARD: There are many wells in the Gulf of Mexico.
BURGESS: Are there any other wells where you haven't put the proper number of centralizers --
(CROSSTALK)
HAYWARD: There are many other wells in the Gulf of Mexico that have the same casing design. There are many wells that have been drilled where the same cement procedure has been used.
BURGESS: Now, have the Minerals Management Service people been there and looked over those with a fine-tooth comb?
HAYWARD: Everything that we do is subject to regulatory oversight.
BURGESS: Are you changing your procedures at those wells as a result of things that you've encountered in your investigation with the Deepwater?
HAYWARD: As we learn -- I'm sorry. I apologize I apologize. As we learn from our investigation, we will make appropriate changes, as I've already indicated.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Are there any of those changes that are ongoing right now?
HAYWARD: The ones that I've talked about are ongoing.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Well, let me ask you this. Well, you know, the question came up about centralizers and someone said that they'd rather push some more cement or squeeze more cement than get something stuck. I'm not technically savvy enough to know exactly about that, but if that's the statement and you're going to push cement and do deal with a fewer number of centralizers to hold this thing steady in the center of the column, is there any way to find out that, in fact, that cement went where you intended it to do and that rod didn't, in fact, get off to one side or the other?
HAYWARD: I wasn't part of the decision-making process on this well. I've looked at the material --
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Now that's not the question I asked you. Was there a procedure that could have been followed that would have actually given that information?
HAYWARD: I can't answer that question.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Well, there is -
HAYWARD: I'm not a - I'm not a cement engineer, I'm afraid.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: There is, and those people were available, and for whatever reason they decided not to do that. Do you think that might have made a difference in the ultimate story of the Deepwater Horizon?
HAYWARD: I'm not prepared to speculate on what may or may not have made a difference until such a time as the multiple investigations that are ongoing are concluded.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Well, but prior to April 20th, when the well blew up, were you briefed on the progress of the drilling of the Mancoto (ph) well?
HAYWARD: The only knowledge that I had of the Mancoto well occurred in April when it was evidence to the team drilling it that we had made a discovery. And they notified myself that we made a discovery. That was my only prior involvement in the well.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Who briefed you? Who briefed you on that discovery?
HAYWARD: The person who would have briefed me was -- would have been the chief executive of exploration and production.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: And were you privy then to any other information, any difficulties that they had had, the multiple gas kicks, the losing the tools down the hole, the length of time they'd been over the hole, the decisions to move quickly because we'd spent too much time over this well?
HAYWARD: I had no prior knowledge to it (ph).
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Who would have had that information?
HAYWARD: Certainly the drilling team in the Gulf of Mexico has --
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: But you're the CEO of the company. And -
HAYWARD: And with -
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Do you have any sort of technical expert who helps you with these things who might have been there?
HAYWARD: With respect, sir, we drill hundreds of wells a year all around the world.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes, I know, that's what's scaring me right now.
Did you have a technical expert who was advising you there on this well? Because we've heard from other people that there were problems. It was a bad well. It was a dangerous well. Gas kicks and the mud was not degasified or whatever the procedure was. So did you have a technical expert advising you?
HAYWARD: I had no prior knowledge or involvement in the drilling of this well. None whatsoever.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Well, then who was? If you're - you're the CEO of the company. If I'm a shareholder of BP, which I'm not, but if I am, how can I then have comfort that the CEO knows what's going on as far as safety on the rigs? Or is it true that it's just all about profit?
HAYWARD: Well, there was a drilling team providing oversight of this well.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: There was a drilling team.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I'm going to have to go to Mr. Waxman.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: All right.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Mr. Waxman for questions, please.
REP. HENRY WAXMAN (D), CALIFORNIA: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hayward, when you became CEO three years ago, you said that safety was going to be your top priority. You had focus on it like a laser. Your website said safe and reliable operations are integral to BP's success. I want to ask you whether you think BP has met that commitment that you made when you became CEO?
HAYWARD: Since I became CEO, we have made a lot of progress. We have made it very clear to everyone in the company that safe, reliable --
WAXMAN: Have you met that commitment that you made?
HAYWARD: And we've made major changes. We've made major changes throughout -
WAXMAN: You've made major changes, but now we see this disaster in the Gulf. Does that indicate that you didn't keep that commitment?
HAYWARD: And one of the reasons that I am so distraught --
WAXMAN: Can you answer yes or no?
HAYWARD: Is that --
WAXMAN: I don't want to know whether or not you're distraught. I want to know whether you think you've kept your commitment?
HAYWARD: We have focused like a laser on safe and reliable operations. That is a fact.
WAXMAN: OK. All I'm asking -
HAYWARD: Every day.
WAXMAN: Let me follow up on that. We had a hearing earlier this week with CEOs from the other oil companies. They were unanimous in their view that you made risky decisions that their companies would not have made. And, in particular, they criticized your decision to install a long, single string of casing from the top of the well to the bottom on April 19th, the day before the blowout. They said this well design choice provided an unrestricted pathway for gas to travel up the well, in the annular space that surrounded the casing. And of course it blew out the -- it blew out the seal.
How do you respond to their criticism? Did BP make a fundamental misjudgment in selecting the single string of casing?
HAYWARD: I wasn't involved in any of that decision-making.
WAXMAN: Well, but I want to know your view of it. Now that you know about it. Now that you know what your company did, pursuant to your laser request that they be attuned to safety, do you think that that was a mistake?
HAYWARD: The original well design was to run a long string. It was approved by the MMS. It was in a discussion in the course of the drilling of the well whether a long string or a seven-inch liner would be most appropriate. That is what I understand based on having looked at the documents and listened to our investigation team. The decision to run a long string, at least in part, was to do with the long-term integrity of the well.
WAXMAN: Well let me be fair to you, because I'm asking you to look with hindsight as to what happened and the decision that was made. But your own engineers warned in advance that this was a risky approach and I'd like to put on the screen what's called the plan review that your engineers prepared in mid-April warning against the long string of casing. As you can see, your engineers said that if you used a long string of casing, quote, it is unlikely to be a successful cement job. You would be unable to fulfill MMS regulations, and there would be an open annulus to the wellhead. I have that on the screen.
Now, those are serious risks, a failed cement job, a violation of MMS safety regulations, an open pathway for gas to travel to the top of the well. The same document says that if you use the liner and tie- back approach, which is what Exxon Mobil and other companies said you should have used, you would have avoided or lessened these risks. And here's what the plan review said. If you use the liner there would be less issue with landing it shallow, it would be a second barrier to gas in the annulus, and a higher chance for a successful cement job.
Now, you said that BP was supposed to be focused like a laser on safety. Yet BP apparently overruled the warnings of its own engineers and chose the more dangerous option. How can you explain that decision by BP? Why were the safety recommendations of your own engineers ignored?
HAYWARD: I wasn't involved in any of the decision-making. It's clear that there was some discussion amongst the engineering team. And an engineering judgment was taken.
WAXMAN: It's clear to me that you don't want to answer our questions. Because isn't it true that you've served your life in BP? You've only recently become the CEO. But haven't you been in this business most of your professional life?
HAYWARD: I've been in this business 28 years.
WAXMAN: Twenty-eight years. So you should have some knowledge about these issues. And I sent you a letter in advance asking you - we were going to be asking these questions and to be prepared to answer it. How can you explain this decision where you ignore -- not you, yourself, but people that work for you, who should have known that it was your directive to be a laser on safety -- how could they have ignored these warnings from people right within your company?
HAYWARD: It was clearly a discussion between the engineering team as to what was the most appropriate course of action to take. An engineering judgment was taken that involved long-term integrity.
WAXMAN: Well, it was more than an engineering judgment because on April 15th, there's a document which is five days before the blowout that said that using the safer liner will add an additional $7 million to $10 million to the completion cost. That same document calls it the single string of casing, the best economic case for BP. And the conclusion I draw from these documents is that BP used a more dangerous well design to save $7 million. What do you think about that? What's your response?
HAYWARD: Well, I believe that document also highlights that the long-term -
WAXMAN: You believe what?
HAYWARD: I believe that document also highlights that the long term integrity of the well will be best served by a long string. The long string is not an unusual well design in the Gulf of Mexico. As I understand it --
WAXMAN: OK, say that again?
HAYWARD: The long string is not an unusual design in the Gulf of Mexico. As I understand it, there are - WAXMAN: Well, as I understand it from Halliburton witness, who was interviewed by our staff, that only 2 percent to 10 percent of those wells might use this particular string. The fellow from Exxon Mobil, and other CEOs, said they wouldn't proceed this way. It appears to me that BP knowingly risked well failure to save a few million dollars. And you were drilling 18,000 feet below the sea. If you made mistakes, the consequences of those would be catastrophic. And in fact have turned out to be catastrophic. I - don't you feel any sense of responsibility for these decisions?
HAYWARD: I feel a great sense of responsibility for the accident. We need to allow -
WAXMAN: How about for the decisions that made the accident more likely?
HAYWARD: We need to determine what were the crucial decisions and --
WAXMAN: Did you get my letter and did you review it?
HAYWARD: I've read your letter, chairman, and I've reviewed it.
WAXMAN: And did you realize in the letter we asked you to be prepared to discuss these issues?
HAYWARD: As I've said, I've seen the documents following your letter and I can't pass judgment on those decisions.
WAXMAN: Even though you've worked 28 years in the oil industry, you're the BP CEO and you said laser -- like a laser you're going to -- safety is the biggest issue and you have people under you making these kinds of decisions and now you're reviewing them. You disagree with the conclusion that this was riskier to use this particular well lining?
HAYWARD: I'm not prepared to draw conclusions about this accident until such time as the investigation has concluded.
WAXMAN: Well, this is an investigation. That's what this committee is doing, is an investigatory committee. And we expect you to cooperate with us. Are you failing to cooperate with other investigators as well? Because they're going to have a hard time reaching conclusions if you stonewall them, which is what we seem to be getting today.
HAYWARD: I'm not stonewall, I simply was not involved in the decision-making process. I've looked at the documents. And until the investigations are complete, both yours and others --
WAXMAN: No, no, but that's somebody else's conclusion. What's your conclusion?
HAYWARD: I haven't drawn a conclusion, Mr. Chairman.
WAXMAN: I see. My time has expired and I'm just amazed at this testimony. Mr. Hayward, you're not taking responsibility. You're kicking the can down the road and acting as if you have nothing to do with this company and nothing to do with the decisions. I find that irresponsible.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Along those lines, do you disagree with the conclusions of Chairman Waxman's June 14th letter, the one Mr. Chairman and I sent you? Do you disagree with those five conclusions, five areas we hit, the conclusions we reached? Do you disagree with it?
HAYWARD: I think they're very legitimate areas for concern, Mr. Chairman.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: They're very what?
HAYWARD: Legitimate areas for concern.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: So we reached legitimate conclusions that people could then base the decision you cut corners to save money and we had this accident, correct?
WAXMAN: It doesn't appear that you're very concerned about that. Are you?
HAYWARD: I'm very concerned that we get to the bottom of this incident and understand exactly what happened, such that we can assure that it never happens again.
WAXMAN: Easy to say.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Mr. Chairman, just a request, please, if Mr. Hayward could move the microphone a bit closer, I'm having difficulty hearing.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes. Right. I think we all are. And I should have said something earlier. Just pull it a little closer if you could, please.
Mr. Sullivan for questions, please. I should note, Mr. Upton's here, from Michigan, member of the full committee, and so is Mr. Engel. If they want to ask questions, they can at the appropriate time.
Mr. Sullivan.
REP. JOHN SULLIVAN (R), OKLAHOMA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hayward, according to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, there is mounting evidence that BP is one of the worst -- perhaps one of the worst safety records of any major oil company operating in the United States. Is there a deficient safety culture at BP that led to the Deepwater Horizon and other disasters like the refinery explosion in Texas City, Texas, and the Alaskan oil pipeline spill?
HAYWARD: I think we acknowledged in 2005 and 2006 that we had serious issues. And as a consequence, set out to implement systemic change in the culture and safety of BP. I set the tone from the top by saying, very clearly, safe, reliable operations were our number one priority. We've invested billions of dollars in the integrity of our plant. We've recruited many thousands of engineers and technologists into our company, including many from other industries, such as the nuclear industry and other parts of the chemical and oil and gas industry. And we have changed fundamentally our whole approach to the management of our operations through the implementation of significant changes to our processes.
SULLIVAN: Well, it doesn't seem like that. I mean if you look at the reports of what happened on the Deep Horizon, it doesn't look like many safety procedures have changed much at all. And, Mr. Hayward, do you feel that your safety record, compared to other major oil companies, is comparable?
HAYWARD: As I said, it's clear that we had some serious issues to deal with in the 2005-2006 timeframe. And we have worked hard to improve our safety performance since that time period.
SULLIVAN: But it doesn't seem to be changing, Mr. Hayward. Your safety performance doesn't. And here's some highlights of your safety procedures. BP had 760 safety violations and you've paid millions of dollars, $373 million in fines, to avoid criminal prosecution and manipulating the propane markets.
Also, if you look at other industries, sir -- let's take some of your competitors, for example. Sunoco, you had 760 violations in five years. Sunoco had eight safety violations. Conoco Phillips had eight safety violations in the same time you had 760. Sitco had two safety violations, the same time you had 760. And Exxon Mobil had one safety violation, the same time period you had 760. How in the heck do you explain that?
HAYWARD: As I said, we acknowledged the problems that we had in 2005 and 2006. The vast number of those things that you referred to date from that time period. And we have made major changes in the company over the last three to four years.
SULLIVAN: Do you think the changes you've made in that time period you're talking about when you're CEO, I understand why you're saying that, do you think that they were using those measures and protocols on the Deep Horizon?
HAYWARD: To my best knowledge, they absolutely were.
SULLIVAN: You don't think they shortcutted anything on the Deep Horizon?
HAYWARD: I -
SULLIVAN: And you're CEO of a major company -
HAYWARD: I believe -
SULLIVAN: Looking back - looking back, sir, do you think that they cut corners?
HAYWARD: I believe we should await the results of the investigations before we draw conclusions.
SULLIVAN: But, sir, you've had to have looked at some of the - some of the results of any kind - your internal investigation. Internally your investigation, did it show any kind of breakdown? Anything that you wouldn't have liked -
HAYWARD: I shouldn't (ph) -
SULLIVAN: That you, with your protocols, you said you put in place, were any of those short-cutted?
HAYWARD: The investigation is still ongoing, as you know. It's identified seven areas. The cement, the casing, the integrity pressure, the well control procedures and three failures of the blowout preventer. And when the investigation is concluded, we'll make a judgment.
SULLIVAN: Well, I'd say that this problem is with your organization and your safety and the culture of your company, safety culture, and not a culture of our domestic oil and gas producers. And we can see, they haven't had the kind of problems you've had with cutting corners on safety. They have a lot of redundancies, contingency plans. I venture to say that this may not have happened if one of these other companies was operating that rig. Would you say that would be true?
HAYWARD: I don't think I can make that judgment.
SULLIVAN: Do you think the other companies have different or stricter -- or stricter guidelines with their safety and spend more money on it? And -- you probably compare yourself to other companies, I'm sure.
HAYWARD: I can't make a detailed comparison, but I can be clear that what we've done. We've invested billions of dollars, we've recruited thousands of people and we've changed significantly our processes, systems and procedures in the course of the last three years.
SULLIVAN: Well, thank you. I yield back.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Thank you. Before Mr. Dingell begins questions, we have votes on the floor again. There's less than 10 minutes remaining, so I'm going to at least get through Mr. Dingell's questions and then we'll recess.
REP. JOHN DINGELL (D), MICHIGAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Mr. Dingell.
DINGELL: Mr. Hayward, you had two choices, using single casing or tie-back. The risks are substantial associated with single casings, which is what BP chose. Please answer yes or no, can you assure us that under - under oath, that that was not a decision made to save time and money?
HAYWARD: I wasn't part of that decision-making process.
DINGELL: I'm sorry.
HAYWARD: I was not part of that decision-making process, so I can't possibly know the basis on which that decision was taken.
DINGELL: How much money was saved by using the single string casing?
HAYWARD: I believe the documents refer to a sum of, I think, I think, $7 million to $10 million and may also refer to the fact that the casing would have longer-term integrity as a long string.
DINGELL: Please, please, please submit that for the record. How much time was saved?
HAYWARD: I don't recall the time that was saved. There would have been some time saved.
DINGELL: Would you submit that for the record, please.
Now, you had the option of using a number of centralizers to keep the casing in the center of the bore hole. Halliburton recommended 21. You ultimately chose to use two. Can you tell us under oath that the decision to use six centralizers instead of the recommended 21 was not made to save time and money? Yes or no?
HAYWARD: I was -- I was not involved in that decision. So it's impossible for me to answer that question.
DINGELL: All right. Can you tell us how much money BP saved by not using the proper number of centralizers?
HAYWARD: I'm afraid I can't recall that.
DINGELL: Would you submit that for the record? How much time was saved?
HAYWARD: I don't recall that, either, I'm afraid.
DINGELL: Please submit that for the record.
You at BP decided not to conduct this cement bond log and acoustic test to find out whether the cement was bonded to the casing and surrounding formations despite mineral management service regulations. Can you state under oath to the committee that BP did not decide to -- against using the cement bond log to save time and money? Yes or no?
HAYWARD: My understanding, from what I've read, again I was not involved in the decision-making, is that the team on the rig, the Transocean team, the BP team and the Halliburton team concluded that they had sufficient evidence that the cement job was good. And that they decided - DINGELL: Does that mean yes or no?
HAYWARD: Not to use the cement bond log.
DINGELL: Does that mean yes or no?
HAYWARD: It means I can't answer your question in that form, I'm afraid.
DINGELL: How much would - how much would this test have cost BP?
HAYWARD: I can't recall that number, I'm afraid.
DINGELL: Please submit for the record.
How long would the test have taken?
HAYWARD: Of the order of hours, I believe, but I'm not certain.
DINGELL: Please submit that for the record.
Would BP - well, now, you were supposed to engage in circulating drilling mud in the well bottom when the casing is on the bottom and before cementing. This is referred to as bottoms up. Did BP fully circulate the mud, yes or no?
HAYWARD: I don't believe the mud was fully circulated. The process that the team on the rig were following was in line and approved by the MMS.
DINGELL: Thank you.
Did BP -- can you assure us under oath, again, that the decision not to fully circulate the mud was not made to save money and time?
HAYWARD: I can't answer that question because I wasn't there.
DINGELL: Thank you.
How much money did avoiding this procedure save?
HAYWARD: I'm afraid I can't recall.
DINGELL: Would you submit for the record, please.
How long would the fully-circulating of the mud have taken?
HAYWARD: I'm afraid I can't recall that either.
DINGELL: Would you submit that for the record, please.
Now, BP made the decision not to install a casing hanger lock- down sleeve. Can you assure the committee under oath that the decision not to install such a lock-down sleeve was not made to save time and money?
HAYWARD: That was a decision I was not party to.
DINGELL: How much did the installing of the lock-down sleeve save BP?
HAYWARD: I don't know.
DINGELL: How much time did installing the lock-down sleeve save?
HAYWARD: I'm afraid I don't know that either.
DINGELL: Now, you have received a letter from the chairman of the subcommittee and the full committee asking a series of questions. When will the committee have the response to that letter?
HAYWARD: You'll get it as soon as we can make them available to you.
DINGELL: Now, did BP have an emergency response plan in the event of a failure?
HAYWARD: An emergency response plan or a spill response plan, congressman?
DINGELL: Sorry.
HAYWARD: Sorry, what was the question, please?
DINGELL: Did you have a response plan in the event of a failure of the well?
HAYWARD: We had a response plan, which we have --
DINGELL: What was the date of that response plan?
HAYWARD: The response plan was last approved, as I recall, on the -- in June of 2009.
DINGELL: Please submit to us the date of the response plan and the number of times in which it was updated and who it was that did the formulation of the plan. Please inform us for the record whether or not that plan was approved by the Mineral Management Service and on what date.
Thank you.
Mr. Chairman.
I'll look forward to seeing those answers in the record.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Thank you, Mr. Dingell.
Let members know, we're going to stand in recess for one hour. We have six votes plus a motion to recommit. The good news is, when we come back, that -- these are the last votes of the day. We'll be able to finish the hearing then. UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Mr. Chairman, let me just -- Mr. Hayward has brought up a point about, he followed the procedures of MMS. I can -- once again, it is so critical that we get the federal regulatory agencies in this committee to ask them questions.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Mr. Burgess, as you know --
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: The fact that we haven't here after all these hearings is really disturbing to me.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I reclaim my time, Mr. Burgess. As you know, we have a methodical method we've been using in this investigation. We've gone through it very methodically. You know, we have at least two more hearings. One was scheduled for Tuesday, but your request and my request, we moved it back at little more. There will be at least two more hearings. We will do our job. We'll have all parties here before this committee at the appropriate time.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Because clearly Mr. Hayward is not prepared to answer the questions and we need to get MMS in here to do that as well.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: MMS isn't going to help Mr. Hayward answer the questions. Mr. Hayward has to answer the questions himself.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I would just submit that with the depth of knowledge -
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: We're in recess until -
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: (INAUDIBLE).
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Recess until 2:00.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Any one of us could do his job.
WOLF BLITZER, CNN ANCHOR: All right, they're taking a one-hour recess right now to go vote. And then the questioning will resume for Tony Hayward, the CEO of BP. The chairman, Bart Stupak, of the subcommittee saying he thinks in the next round they can complete all the questions.
There are lots of questions. So far, though, not many answers from Tony Hayward. He's backing off giving a lot of answers, saying he was not involved in some critical decision-making or he simply does not know the answer, even though he's the chief executive officer of BP.
Dana Bash is up on The Hill. Bart Stupak, the chairman, Henry Waxman, the chairman of the full committee, they promised there would be some tough questions. They clearly vented their anger. They didn't get a lot of answers, though, Dana, from Tony Hayward.
DANA BASH, CNN CORRESPONDENT: Well, I just came out of the room. And, Wolf, you can sense and you can feel the frustration. It is palpable in that room. And it is not just from Democrats. It is also strikingly from Republicans who asked among the toughest questions at the beginning of Tony Hayward.
I stopped counting the number of times that Tony Hayward said I was not involved in that decision or I don't recall. Exactly what the members of this committee, again both Democrats and Republicans, said that they were trying to avoid in providing him on Monday with a letter and some details about exactly what they wanted from him.
But he did not come to play. He is very clear that either he was advised or obviously he was advised or he has decided that it is incumbent upon him to not answer the questions. You know, look, we've mentioned this morning, it is important to note that there is a criminal investigation going on and that clearly is got to be part of his thinking in not answering these questions.
But you saw Chairman Waxman get right in there on that and say, look, you know, we're part of the investigation, too. We're investigating, too. And if you're not going to answer our questions, then maybe you're stonewalling some of the others. And at that part, Tony Hayward bristled a little bit. But he is low key and he is not giving up really anything much to the chagrin of these lawmakers.
BLITZER: Well, whenever there's a criminal investigation, Dana, as you well know, and we've covered a lot of them here in Washington over the years, the lawyers also immediately lawyer up and they tell the key executives, don't say anything, try to avoid saying anything that could be damning as far as a criminal trial is concerned. And they've hired some of the best lawyers, BP, in Washington right now, including the former deputy attorney general of the United States, Jamie Gorelick, who served during the Clinton administration. So I assume some of these questions that he's dodging are the result, as you point out, of the specific or recommendations or advice the lawyers are giving this witness before this subcommittee.
Let's go over to the White House. Our senior White House correspondent, Ed Henry, is standing by.
What are they saying at the White House about the very serious charge that one congressman leveled this morning, Joe Barton of Texas, that the White House yesterday was simply inappropriate at that meeting when the attorney general of the United States, Eric Holder, was in on this meeting with the chairman of BP, the CEO of BP, the top leadership of BP. Joe Barton saying this was a shakedown to get the $20 billion escrow fund. I know the White House is reacting, Ed.
ED HENRY, CNN SENIOR WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENT: They are, Wolf. They're jumping all over him.
I mean, first of all, at the Justice Department, you have the attorney general saying, look, the investigation, the criminal investigation Dana was talking about is completely walled off from this separate matter of the financial compensation that was hammered out here yesterday. And then you have the White House spokesman, Robert Gibbs, putting out a tough statement, jumping on Congressman Barton for apologizing to BP, saying in part, quote, "What is shameful is that Joe Barton seems to have more concern for big corporations that caused this disaster than the fisherman, small business owners and communities whose lives have been devastated by the destruction. Congressman Barton may think that a fund to compensate these Americans is a tragedy, but most Americans know that the real tragedy is what the men and women of the Gulf Coast are going through right now."
