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Defense Secretary Testifies on ISIS Strategy. Aired 10-10:30a ET

Aired December 09, 2015 - 10:00   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

[09:59: 58] ASH CARTER, DEFENSE SECRETARY: Moreover, because of improved intelligence and understanding of ISIL's operations, we've intensified the air campaign against ISIL's war-sustaining oil enterprise, a critical pillar of ISIL's financial infrastructure. In addition to destroying fixed facilities like wells and processing facilities, we've destroyed nearly 400 of ISIL's oil tanker trucks, reducing a major source of its daily revenues. There's more to come, too.

We're also improving our capability to eliminate ISIL's leadership. Since I last appeared before this committee in late October, we have removed two more key ISIL figures from the battlefield, namely Jihadi John, an ISIL executioner, and Abu Nabil, ISIL's leader in Libya.

Like previous actions, these strikes serve notice to ISIL that no target is beyond our reach. And as our military campaign intensifies on the ground and in the air, the Defense Department is also developing more strategic options in the cyber domain.

These, then, are just nine areas of the adaptations we've made over the past six weeks to accelerate this campaign and to see momentum build. President Obama is committed to doing what it takes as opportunities rise, as we see what works and as the enemy adapts until ISIL is defeated in a lasting way.

The president has consistently supported the recommendations from me and General Dunford and we know he is prepared for us to bring him more, and we will. At the same time that we're constantly looking to do more in the fight -- in this fight, the world must do the same. The international community, including our allies and partners, has to step up before another attack like Paris.

France was galvanized by the attack on its capital and intensified its role. Britain has now expanded its air campaign to strike ISIL in Syria. Italy has deployed its most elite police units, like the Carabinieri, to assist in Iraq. Germany is now making additional contributions and the Netherlands is active -- actively considering doing more as well.

But we all -- let me repeat that -- all must do more. Turkey must do more to control its often porous border. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states joined the air portion of the campaign in the early days, only the air part, but have since been preoccupied by the conflict in Yemen, both in the air and on the ground. And just this past week, I personally reached out to my

counterparts in 40 countries around the world in the coalition and asked them to contribute more, in many case, contribute much more to enhancing the fight against ISIL. The types of things I've requested from our partners includes special operations forces, strike and reconnaissance aircraft, weapons and munitions, training assistance and other items.

Meanwhile, as the Chairman noted, Russia, which is publicly committed to defeating ISIL, has instead largely attacked opposition forces. It's time for Russia to focus on the right side of this fight.

Before I conclude, I'd like to respectfully request the committee's attention to matters that bear upon our security and its responsibilities. First, over a month ago, I submitted a request to the four congressional defense committees, including this one, to release holds on the final tranche of funds in the Syria equipping program. That is some $116 million. We need these funds to provide and transport ammunition, weapons and other equipment to further enable the progress being made against ISIL in Syria by partners like the Syrian-Arab coalition.

All four committees have failed to act on that request and I ask you to release these holds urgently. We should not be impeding the very momentum we are trying to build.

Next is the necessity to fill kill -- key vacancies in the Defense Department's critical leadership positions. I have appeared before this committee, as noted, six times over the last 10 months, four times on the Middle East and twice in just the last six weeks on ISIL. While, this committee has held 58 full hearings over the last year, only three have been confirmation hearings for DOD civilian leaders.

[10:04:58] DOD currently has 16 nominees awaiting the constitutional advice and consent of the Senate, 12 of the 16 are still awaiting even a hearing, including our nominees to be secretary of the Army, the undersecretaries of each of our three military departments, Army, Navy and Air Force, and the undersecretary's of both intelligence and personnel and readiness.

These positions should be filled by confirmed nominees, especially in a time of conflict. So I welcome that the process is now moving and I urge it to move quickly for all of our civilian nominees and also for our senior military nominations that will be made early next year.

Finally, as I conclude, I want to commend this committee on last month's budget deal, which is the kind of deal I called for back in March. It was a consequential agreement for the nation's security. As current funding for the government is set to expire, it is vital that the two houses now conclude work on funding all of the government, consistent with the budget deal. Now is not the time for more gridlock. I thank this committee in advance for your efforts because

funding this budget deal is what our national security demands and it sends the right message to our troops, our allies and our enemies in this time of broad global national security challenges, and especially in this war.

Thank you.

SEN. JOHN MCCAIN (R-AZ), CHAIRMAN, SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In response -- Mr. Secretary.

In response to your last two points, one on the funding, we just received that request last week, but you know very well it's a result of this absolute failure of the expenditure of what was judged then to be $43 million and four or five people were trained.

We don't want to approve of something like that again. We want to -- we want to -- if you want that kind of funding to train and equip, we want to know what the plan is and we don't want to see a repetition of testimony by the head of Central Command, who said, "Well, we have for five less and we've spent $43 million." We have an obligation to taxpayers.

On the nominees, there is four pending before the United States Senate today, and there is four more will be -- having hearings this afternoon, which takes care of half of yours. And I am not going to waste the time of the committee to go back and forth about threats of vetoes that, in the view of the majority this committee, were totally unjustified on the part of the president, including the failure still.

Still, despite your appearance in my office with the president's counter terrorism person that you were going to send me a plan, you were going to send this committee a plan on the closure of Guantanamo.

We still have not gotten that plan, Mr. Secretary. So if you are a little bit concerned about the lack of movement, I have been a little concerned about a lack of movement on Guantanamo for the last seven years.

CARTER: Right.

MCCAIN: So I -- I will do what I can to get the four that are pending before the Senate today confirmed by the Senate, and I will -- we will be having a hearing this afternoon on the four additional ones.

CARTER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, appreciate that.

MCCAIN: Mr. Secretary, on the 1st of December before the House Armed Services Committee. Congressman Forbes asked General Dunford quote, "Have we currently contained ISIL?" General Dunford, "We have not -- we have not contained ISIL."

Mr. Secretary, do you agree with General Dunford?

CARTER: I agree with what General Dunford said, yes. MCCAIN: So, if we have not contained -- we have not contained

ISIL, how are we to know -- believe that we are succeeding against ISIL?

CARTER: I think that we are building momentum against ISIL. I going to be very careful about describing the -- I have describe the trajectory of that success all around Iraq and Syria, some actions were taking in Libya.

It is not my principal responsibility, but I met yesterday with the secretary of Homeland Security, the director of FBI -- of the FBI, the director of National Intelligence, and other officials to talk about what we could do more to strengthen the defense of the homeland as the Department of Defense.

But in our principal responsibility, which is to take the fight to Syria and Iraq, I've describe the actions that we have taken, just as I've appeared last time, and I think they are building momentum.

MCCAIN: Thank you. How long do you think it will be before we retake Mosul or Raqqah?

CARTER: With respect Mosul, Mr. Chairman, it is hard to say, because it -- that depends much on the progress of the Iraqi Security Forces, which I described in building themselves into a more capable combat force.

[10:10:05] With respect to Ramadi, as I've described...

MCCAIN: Raqqah.

CARTER: Oh, Raqqah. Well, Raqqah there, the -- and you noted this yourself, Mr. Chairman, the Syrian-Kurds to the north have done an excellent job of clearing their territory, working with the Syrian- Arabs...

MCCAIN: They're not going to go into Raqqah, and you and I know that.

CARTER: Oh, they're not going to go into Raqqah, no, no, no. It's the Syrian-Arabs -- it would be the Syrian-Arabs.

MCCAIN: I guess the point is, Mr. Secretary, here we are with attacks on the homeland, the United States of America, we have not contained ISIL and we have no timeline -- the timeline I was given when Senator Graham and I went over there was at least the end of next year before Mosul, and there is no plan, no strategy to retake Raqqah.

And I think it is pretty obvious to all that, as long as they have caliphate base, than they are able to orchestrate attacks such as they have successfully achieved in the last several weeks, whether it be the -- Ankara, or the Russian airliner, Southern Beirut, Paris or San Bernardino.

So, here we are with a -- and you described some measures that are probably very helpful, but with no timeline of which to take out the caliphate, from which there are many things happening, including, according to the news reports, developing chemical weapons.

So -- and this is why I am really fun -- puzzled. This morning, by the way, on one of the new shows, a former head of the United States Army -- Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General Odierno, said, we ought to have an American contingent of troops on the ground. And I frankly do not understand the logic in your statement about, you said, well, you certainly have the capability to furnish a U.S. component and such a ground force. We have not recommended, because it would be a significant undertaking.

I agree. We would have to do it largely by ourselves. I do not agree it would be ceding our comparative advantage, we would be -- in the medium-term, it would seem to Americanize the conflicts. That somehow, does anybody really believe that the United States struck back against the people that just slaughtered some Americans in San Bernardino, that somehow that would encourage them?

What encourages them, Mr. Secretary, is success. And they have a pretty serious record here of success just in the last several -- couple of months since you were here.

So I do not understand, why in the world, you would not want, as General Keane, the architect of the surge, the successful surge and others -- military leaders, including this morning, former Chief of Staff the United States Army, a small component of American forces with an international force, which could be, if the United States had the credibility, could be gathered. And then go in and take out this caliphate.

As long as the caliphate -- I know of no expert that doesn't believe that as long as this caliphate exists in Raqqah, they are going to be able to orchestrate attacks and metastasize and maybe even move to Libya.

So, maybe you can help the committee out again that this would somehow cede a comparative advantage if we went in with a large Arab force, the Turks and Egyptians, even, and other Sunni nations, and go in there and take those people out.

There is 20 to 30,000 of them. They are not giants.

So -- but finally, someone's going to have to convince me that air power alone, special operations forces are going to succeed in the short-term, in order to prevent further things such as San Bernardino, I would love to hear your response.

CARTER: A couple of things, Mr. Chairman, first of all, to your main point about more American forces -- and I will by would say special forces, but others as well, that train, advise, assist and accompany -- they're not special forces -- we are doing...

MCCAIN: I was talking about a multinational force.

CARTER: Well, there, Mr. Chairman, as I indicated, I, too, wish that particularly, the Sunni-Arab nations of the Gulf would do more, and going way back...

MCCAIN: They are willing to do so, if there is a United States commitment.

CARTER: I've had -- I've had lengthy conversations...

MCCAIN: And so have I.

CARTER: ... with representatives there. Well, I -- I have to say that I have consistently emphasized to them that they have a unique role here. And also, insofar as they are concerned about Iran, which is another concern they have -- and by the way that we have, also -- is totally different but serious subject also -- is that what I have emphasized to them is that we do not like it, but the Iranians are in the game on the ground.

[10:15:19] And I very much would like -- and we would very much welcome, and we have repeatedly said this -- working with those countries on the ground, because we believe, as you noted, that they have -- would have a distinctive advantage in a ground fight.

With respect to the Europeans, the Europeans have, generally speaking, offered to do more within their capabilities and capacities. I will note here and there -- this is uneven across -- across Europe, but in general, I am quite concerned with the level of investment that Europe is making in its militaries and its alliance and partnership, therefore, with the United States.

There is much more than their economies would enable them to do and that their history as standing up for the same kind of civilized values that we stand up with -- really require of them.

And so, while we're getting more from the Europeans, and I indicated I have asked for more. I would like there to be still more, so in that sense, I am completely am with you.

I just -- I simply -- and on the basis of my urgent and persistent consultations with them, am less -- have less high hopes, perhaps, than you that they would assemble such force. We would certainly welcome that.

With that, I also don't want to...

MCCAIN: Could I just say, that I urgently and fervently ask you for a strategy that you can tell us when we are going to take Mosul, when we are going to take Raqqah, and when we are going to wipe out this caliphate.

And frankly, I have not seen that.

General, did you want to add anything?

GENERAL PAUL J. SELVA (USAF), VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: Sir, I would add three points. First, agree completely that defending the homeland is our top priority. MCCAIN: That's helpful.

SELVA: Second, taking the fight -- taking the fight to the caliphate is what is going on today in Iraq and Syria. The combination of increasing the momentum with the movements in Iraq, in Baiji, as well as in Ramadi, and partnering with Syria...

MCCAIN: And again, General, there is no timeline for Mosul and Raqqah, which is the basis of the caliphate.

SELVA: Sir, the fight on the ground defines the progress we will make against the caliphate. We have put significant pressure on Northern Syria. We have -- we have taken, with Syrian-Arab coalition partners have taken significant ground in the north and east of Syria.

They are using the equipment that we have provided to put pressure on ISIL's main lines of communication between Raqqah and Mosul. To provide a timeline would deny the fact that the enemy on the ground gets a vote, but they do not have freedom of maneuver.

They do not have operational freedom of maneuver. They do not have tactical freedom of maneuver.

SELVA: General, they were just able to orchestrate an attack in San Bernardino, California. My time is long ago expired.

Senator Reed.

SEN. JACK REED (D-RI), RANKING MEMBER: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, we have all come to the conclusion we need American forces on the ground.

The question, very generically, is how many and what are they going to do?

This is a unique situation, but we have got some analogies or at least examples. One, in Enduring Freedom, we sent in specialized teams of U.S. personnel and air power, and together with local forces, were able to disrupt and then ultimately defeat the Taliban.

In Iraqi Freedom, we sent in conventional forces, we won a very swift and brilliant conventional victory, and then we're confronted with instability and counterinsurgency.

It would seem to me that you're tending to favor the former model, which would be to have specialized troops in there with our air power, et cetera, and that the constraining factor right now is the local indigenous forces on the ground, particularly Arab forces, not Kurdish forces, but Arab Forces.

And I am told there's about 100 new Syrian fighters that have been trained that are on the ground, that are the potential. Can you elaborate on -- on those comments?

[10:19:49] CARTER: I can. First of all, with respect to the Afghan experience, I agree with your general analysis of the history of those two incidents. That was a -- a circumstance in 2001 and 2002 where we were able very rapidly and extremely effectively to leverage a preexisting indigenous force, namely largely the Northern Alliance, which we had over the previous decade or so built up in order to fight the Soviets, and they actually succeeded in expelling the Soviets from -- from Afghanistan.

That force, that organization and other organizations of the so- called Mujahedeen in those days we could quickly link up with again. And by providing them, enabling exactly in this manner, they would -- they would advance. That would cause the Taliban to expose their positions and we could cream them from the air.

And so that was a perfect example -- ideal. We'd like to replicate that, of course, in this current circumstance in Syria and Iraq. We're having to build those forces and they don't exist in the same way that they did in the Northern Alliance.

With respect to the new Syrian forces, and it gets back to the funding issue, we did change our approach to training and equipping Syrian forces. Our early experience there was disappointing. I've said that. I always told you I'm going to be very honest about things. That didn't work out very well because we were trying to build units from scratch.

And what -- the new approach -- and the one we're asking you to fund, and we are providing them -- I'm willing to set up a team today to brief you further on what we're -- we're looking for. But we -- we really need this agility if we're going to fight a way, so I plead with you to take the briefings or whatever. We have a reason for requesting this money. It's different from the old program.

We learned our lesson. We're doing something different, which is this: We're taking units that have already formed and have undertaken to combat ISIL. The Syrian-Arab coalition is an example of that. And instead of making it -- trying to create a brand new force or recruit a brand new force, and then put them, including by being on the ground with them, but especially equipping them and providing them with air power, amplifying their power.

And we hope -- and this gets to the chairman's question about a timeline for Raqqah -- the -- the -- that if we make them successful as they move further south; remember now, these are Syrian Arabs, not -- not Kurds. As the chairman rightly noted, it wouldn't be appropriate for us to attack largely Arab Raqqah -- that they and their success will build, so to speak, a snowball that accumulates more fighters as they go.

As that accumulates and there are more of them, we'll do more in -- to fall in behind them with the objective, then, of them taking Raqqah, which would be a very important victory in the heart of -- of ISIL territory.

REED: Thank you.

General, quickly, the command arrangements. General MacFarland is now the joint commander with operational control both in Iraq and Syria, I understand. Are you satisfied and General Dunford satisfied that you have the best framework for command now to integrate all of the DOD elements and -- and ancillary elements you need?

SELVA: Yes, sir. The Joint Task Force Command structure in Baghdad that covers both Iraq and Syria is more than adequate to cover the military maneuver that's required and to orchestrate the forces that are required, and has the support of Central Command's headquarters as an oversight and supporting headquarters.

REED: And they have the flexibility to make critical decisions in a timely way without sort of second-guessing up and down the line?

SELVA: Yes, sir.

REED: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MCCAIN: Senator Sessions?

SEN. JEFF SESSIONS (R), ALABAMA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I appreciate your remarks. There's a great deal of frustration, Secretary Carter, and concern that we're drifting and reacting and not in -- don't have the kind of plan that will lead to success, number one.

Number two, I understand now the president says he wants an authorization of force, but because of the difficulties and bungling, I think, that we've seen so far, we're going to have to know what you're going to do, how you're going to do it, how it's going to be successful. That is not clear. It's not clear to the American people. It's not clear to Congress; not clear to our European allies, our allies in the Middle East, or our enemy. That's a problem we've got. It's just very real.

[10:24:49] Secondly, I think that Secretary Gates was correct to say we need an over-arching strategy for this whole deal with Islamic extremism in may 20, 30, 50 years. And we've used the word "containment" to deal with that. However, that does not mean that in a long-term strategy of containment of extremism that we don't have to act decisively and militarily now.

And I just think, and I shared with you, that we're -- I believe the Defense Department is underestimating the significance of the refugee crisis -- the impact it's having in Europe; the impact it's having in the United States; what's happening from all this disorder and the flee of human beings and the death that's being caused, and the humanitarian disaster that's out there.

So, it seems to me, does it not to you, that a prompt, decisive action to create safe zones in Syria where people don't have to flee their home country, can be kept safe there, would be positive as a matter of humanity and as a military possibility.

CARTER: Thank you, Senator. I'll begin, including on the safe zones, and then perhaps ask the vice chairman to add any -- he's done a lot of work on that as well.

I'll just note with respect to the AUMF that we have the -- I'm not a lawyer, but I'm told, and I'm glad, otherwise it would be a problem -- we have the authority -- legal authority to do what we want to do. And the AUMF, as I'm testified, that the president submitted would also allow us to do everything we need to do in this campaign.

SESSIONS: But just don't blame Congress for not rubber-stamping it immediately...

CARTER: No, I understand.

SESSIONS: ... if we don't understand what...

(CROSSTALK)

CARTER: I think it's OK. In fact I didn't even mention for just that -- for just that -- that reason.

You're right. And I -- I associate with you about acting decisively. I do recognize that there may be decades of combating radicalism in general. But we need to go after ISIL in its parent tumor in Iraq and Syria now and urgently. And so I associate myself with that -- with that point of view.

Refugees is a tragic matter. And by the way, just a reminder that only about half of the refugees are actually from Syria. They're also, importantly, from Libya, from Afghanistan, from throughout Africa. And -- and while there are women and children caught up in this circumstance, the great bulk of them are young people, mostly male, and professionally oriented who are looking for work. That's why German companies are at the train station recruiting them off the trains for their companies. That's a reality.

But what does that mean for the countries from which they come? It's a tremendous talent drain, as well as a humanitarian issue. All the more reason why particularly in Syria, to the extent that's part of -- a major part of the refugee crisis, we have to get an end to the civil war there and get a government that can govern decently. And Assad's government is not that.

With respect to safe zones, we have thought about that. I've certainly thought about that a great deal. I'll begin, and describe -- the concept of a safe zone would be to create a patch of Syria that wherein people who are inclined to go there, could go there and be protected. They would need to be protected because you can foresee that at least ISIL and other radical groups, and quite possibly elements of the Assad regime, would -- would undertake to prove that it wasn't safe.

And so it would have to be made safe. And that takes us back to the question of who -- what's an appropriate force of that size to protect a zone of that size. It -- in our estimate, it's substantial. And again, I don't see, much as I wish otherwise, anybody offering to furnish that force.

I also think we have thought about who might want to reside in such a zone. I think it would be undesirable if it -- if it became a place into which people were pushed, say, from Turkey or Europe, expelled, so to speak, into this zone. I don't know what the people who now live in the zone would think about other people coming into the zone. That would have to be taken into account, and whether other people want to live there.

So it's -- so we have thought about it. It's complicated. We have not recommended that because it's an undertaking of substantial scale where I -- in my judgment, the costs outweigh the benefits.

Let me ask General Selva.