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Live Coverage of Senate Hearing on Capitol Riot; Opening Statement by Capitol Police Captain Carneysha Mendoza; Opening Statements by Metropolitan Police Chief Robert Contee, Former U.S. Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund, Former Senate Sergeant at Arms Michael Stenger, Former House Sergeant at Arms Paul Irving. Aired 10:30-11a ET

Aired February 23, 2021 - 10:30   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

[10:30:00]

CARNEYSHA MENDOZA, U.S. CAPITOL POLICE: At some point, my right arm got wedged between rioters and the railing along the wall. A CDU sergeant pulled my right arm free and, had he not, I'm certain it would have been broken.

Shortly after that, an officer was pushed and fell to the floor. I assisted the officer to a safer location, and got back in line.

At some point, the crowd breached the line officers worked so hard to maintain. Civil disturbance units began to redeploy to keep rioters from accessing other areas of the building.

I proceeded to the Rotunda where I noticed a heavy smoke-like residue and smelled what I believed to be military-grade CS gas, a familiar smell. It was mixed with fire extinguisher spray deployed by rioters.

The rioters continued to deploy CS into the Rotunda. Officers received a lot of gas exposure, which is worse inside the building than outside because there's nowhere for it to go. I received chemical burns to my face that still have not healed to this day.

I witnessed officers being knocked to the ground and hit with various objects that were thrown by rioters. I was unable to determine exactly what those objects were. I immediately assumed command in the Rotunda and called for additional assets.

Officers began to push the crowd out the door. After a couple hours, officers cleared the Rotunda but had to physically hold the door closed because it had been broken by the rioters.

Officers begged me for relief as they were unsure how long they could physically hold the door closed with the crowd continually banging on the outside of the door, attempting to gain re-entry. Eventually, officers were able to secure the door with furniture and other objects.

I'm proud of the officers I worked with on January 6th. They fought extremely hard. I know some said the battle lasted three hours, but according to my Fitbit, I was in the exercise zone for four hours and nine minutes, and many officers were int he fight even before I arrived.

I'm extremely proud of the United States Capitol Police. I'm especially proud of the officers who are the backbone of this agency and carry out day-to-day operations. I know with teamwork, we can move forward.

The night of January 7th into the very early morning hours of my birthday, January 8th, I spent at the hospital, comforting the family of our fallen officer and met with the medical examiner's office, prior to working with fellow officers to facilitate a motorcade to transport Officer Sicknick from the hospital.

Of the multitude of events I've worked in my nearly 19-year career in the department, this was by far the worst of the worst. We could have had 10 times the amount of people working with us, and I still believe the battle would have been just as devastating.

As an American and as an Army veteran, it's sad to see us attacked by our fellow citizens. I'm sad to see the unnecessary loss of life. I'm sad to see the impact this has had on Capitol Police officers. And I'm sad to see the impact this has had on our agency and on our country.

Although things are still raw and moving forward will be a difficult process, I look forward to moving forward together as an agency and as a country.

In closing, I want to honor Chief Sund's leadership. I served under his command as a watch commander for three years and was able to personally see his hard work and dedication. He was fully dedicated to the United States Capitol Police and he cared about every employee on the department.

I often hear employees on the department praise his leadership and his ability to inspire others. He's made a significant impact on our agency. Thank you, Chief.

Thank you.

SEN. AMY KLOBUCHAR (D-MN): Thank you very much, Captain Mendoza, for that beautiful statement and for your work on behalf of our country.

I'm going to give you the bios on the other witnesses, and then Senator Peters will swear them in.

Our first witness today is Roberg J. Contee, acting chief of the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia. Acting Chief Contee was sworn in as acting chief of the MPD on January 2nd of this year. He first joined the department in 1989 as a cadet. After being sworn in, he became a patrol officer before being promoted to lieutenant and leading the force's Intelligence Branch. In 2004, he was promoted to captain and put in charge of the Violent Crimes Branch.

After being promoted to second district commander, he joined the Special Operations Division. For the next decade, Acting Chief Contee served in multiple leadership roles with the MPD including as patrol chief of Patrol Services South, where he oversaw several police districts. He was appointed as assistant chief of the Investigative Services Bureau in March of 2018.

Acting Chief Contee is a graduate of D.C. schools and holds a bachelor degree in professional studies from the George Washington University. Acting Chief Contee grew up in the Carver Terrace community in northeast Washington, D.C.

[10:35:08]

Our second witness today will be Mr. Steven A. Sund. Mr. Sund served as chief of the U.S. Capitol Police from June of 2019 to January 16th of this year. Mr. Sund joined the Capitol Police in 2017 as assistant chief and chief of operations.

Prior to joining the USCP, he spent nearly 25 years with the Metropolitan Police Department, where he started out as a patrol officer in 1990. From 1999 to 2006, he served as MPD's Special Operations Division and helped plan several major events including the 2001 and 2005 presidential inaugurations.

After joining the MPD's Homeland Security Division, he rose through the ranks to become commander of the Special Operations Division in 2011. As commander of the Special Operations Division, he served as lead planner for both the 2009 and 2013 presidential inaugurations, and many other national security special events.

He received his bachelor and master of science degrees from Johns Hopkins and his master of arts in Homeland Security from the Naval Postgraduate School.

Our third witness will be Mr. Michael Stenger, former Senate sergeant at arms who served in that capacity from April of 2018 through January 7th of this year. He joined the Senate in 2011 as assistant sergeant at arms for the Office of Protective Services and Continuity. He has also served as chief of staff of the sergeant at arms, and as deputy sergeant at arms.

Prior to joining the Sergeant at Arms Office, he was a 35-year veteran of the United States Secret Service, where he served in many roles including as the special agent in charge of the Washington field office. Immediately before joining the Senate, he served as assistant director of the Office of Government and Public Affairs for the Secret Service.

He graduated from Fairleigh Dickinson University. He is also a veteran, having obtained the rank of captain in the U.S. Marine Corps.

Our final witness today is Mr. Paul Irving. Mr. Irving served as the sergeant at arms at the U.S. House of Representatives from January of 2012 through January 7th of this year. He joined the United States Secret Service in 1983, after briefly serving with the FBI.

He served as head legal instructor for constitutional law and criminal procedure at the Secret Service Training Academy before joining the Presidential Protective Division during the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations.

Following his White House service, he served as the assistant director for Congressional Affairs, assistant director for Government Affairs, assistant director for Homeland Security and assistant director for Administration for the Secret Service.

He retired from the Secret Service in 2008 as assistant director, and worked as a private security consultant until his appointment as House sergeant at arms in 2012. He is a graduate of the American University and Whittier Law School.

I want to thank our witnesses for appearing voluntarily today and I look forward to your testimony.

SEN. GARY PETERS (D-MI): It is the practice of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee to swear in witnesses. So if the witnesses would stand, including those joining us virtually, and raise your right hand.

Do you swear that the testimony you will give before this committee shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you God?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I do.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I do.

PETERS: Thank you. You may all be seated.

KLOBUCHAR: Do you want to begin, then, Chief Contee?

ROBERT CONTEE, ACTING CHIEF OF POLICE, METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT: Sure.

Good morning, Chairman Peters, Chairwoman Klobuchar, Ranking Members Portman and Blunt and members of the committees. I am Robert J. Contee III, the acting chief of police at the Metropolitan Police Department, the primary police force in the District of Columbia.

I appreciate this opportunity to brief you on the events of January 6th, 2021, a dark day for our country. I would like to begin by highlighting a few key facts to ensure the committees and the audience understand the very different roles of Mayor Muriel Bowser and the District of Columbia, including MPD and those of congressional and federal authorities.

First, MPD is prohibited by federal law from entering the Capitol or its grounds to patrol, make arrests or serve warrants without the consent or request of the Capitol Police Board.

Second, the president of the United States, not the mayor of the District of Columbia, controls the D.C. National Guard. The scope of the request by the mayor must be limited to supporting the district's local jurisdiction and authority, which excludes entities -- which excludes federal entities and property.

[10:40:10]

Third, since Mayor Bowser declared a public health emergency last March, the district has not issued permits for any large gathering.

Although the district MPD take pride in facilitating the exercise of First Amendment rights by all groups regardless of their beliefs, none of the public gatherings on January 5th and 6th were issued permits by the city.

On the morning of January 6th, MPD was prepared to support our federal partners with a First Amendment assembly that was held primarily on federal land while continuing to patrol and respond to calls for service throughout D.C.

Based on our experience with prior demonstrations after the election, we recognized that there was a possibility of violence, especially after dark as smaller groups of protestors gathered with malicious intent on our city streets.

To be clear, available intelligence pointed to a large presence of some of the same groups that had contributed to violence in the city after demonstrations in November and December. The district had intelligence indicating the potential for violent actions in the streets of the District of Columbia.

In preparation for the anticipated demonstrations and the possibility of violence on city streets, MPD was fully deployed on 12-hour shifts the week of January 4th, with days off and leave cancelled. At Mayor Bowser's request, several area police departments were on standby in D.C. and more than 300 members of the National Guard were deployed on district streets, providing traffic control and other services.

However, these resources were barely enough to counter an event that had never happened in the history of the United States: a mob of thousands of American citizens, launching a violent assault on the U.S. Capitol, the seat of our government, in an attempt to halt the counting of the electoral ballots, an essential step in the peaceful transfer of power in our nation.

The mob's sustained assault on the Capitol precipitated an equally unprecedented response with then-Capitol Police Chief Steve Sund issuing an urgent request for MPD to come assist in defending the Capitol.

Needless to say, when we received the call for help, MPD responded immediately. Within minutes, our members arrived at a chaotic scene. The violent mob had overran protective measures at the Capitol in an attempted insurrection, prior to the arrival of MPD officers at the West Front.

Our objectives were to, one, stop the rioters from entering the Capitol building, and remove those that were already inside. Two, secure a perimeter so that the Capitol could be cleared for lawmakers. Three, enable Congress to resume their sessions to demonstrate to our country and to the world that our democracy was still intact. And lastly, once the third objective had been accomplished, begin making arrests of anyone violating the law.

At 2:22 p.m., a call was convened with, among others, myself, leadership of the U.S. Capitol Police, the National Guard and the Department of the Army. I was surprised at the reluctance to immediately send the National Guard to the Capitol grounds.

In the meantime, by 2:30 p.m., the District had requested additional officers from as far away as New Jersey, and issued notice of an emergency citywide curfew beginning at 6:00 p.m.

From that point, it took another 3.5 hours until all rioters were removed from the Capitol. Ninety minutes later, at 8:00 p.m., Congress was able to resume its critical work and fulfill its constitutional duty.

Over the course of January the 6th and into the early morning of the 7th, approximately 1,100 MPD members responded to the Capitol. At least 65 MPD members sustained injuries. Five people lost their lives on January the 6th. As we reflect on that dark day, we offer our condolences to all of the grieving families.

In closing, I appreciate the opportunity to highlight the heroism of MPD officers who put their lives on the line to protect the Capitol, Congress and our democracy. But to ensure the continued safety of the District and everyone in it, we must be frank in looking at several critical issues.

This assault on the Capitol has exposed weaknesses in the security of the most secure city in the country. The federal police forces in D.C. will be re-examining their security protocols, given the risk of both foreign and domestic terrorism.

[10:45:09]

As the chief of the District's municipal police force, I must think about our preparations not only for possible attacks, but the daily impact of the changing operations of our federal partners. As they harden targets in the federal enclave, other buildings in the city under MPD jurisdiction may become more likely targets.

This concludes my testimony. I am happy to answer any questions.

KLOBUCHAR: Thank you very much.

Mr. Sund?

STEVEN SUND, FORMER CHIEF OF POLICE, U.S. CAPITOL POLICE: Good morning, Chairwoman Klobuchar, Ranking Member Blunt, Chairman Peters and Ranking Member Portman. Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify before your two committees regarding the attack on the United States Capitol that occurred January 6th.

I have been in policing for almost 30 years. The events I witnessed on January 6th was the worst attack on law enforcement and our democracy that I have seen in my entire career. I witnessed insurgents beating police officers with fists, pipes,

sticks, bats, metal barricades, and flagpoles. These criminals came prepared for war. They came with their own radio system to coordinate the attack, and climbing gear and other equipment to defeat the Capitol's security features. I am sickened by what I witnessed that day.

Our officers fought valiantly using batons, shields, chemical munitions and pepper ball guns to hold back the attackers. Capitol Police and responding law enforcement agencies showed tremendous restraint by not using their firearms, which would have likely led to a more chaotic situation and a possible mass casualty incident.

No civilian law enforcement agency, to include the United States Capitol Police, is trained or equipped to repel an insurrection of thousands of individuals focused on breaching a building at all costs.

I am extremely proud and appreciative of the Capitol Police officers, the Metropolitan Police Department and the other law enforcement agencies that came to our assistance.

A clear lack of accurate and complete intelligence across several federal agencies contributed to this event, and not poor planning by the United States Capitol Police. We rely on accurate information from our federal partners to help us develop effective security plans.

The intelligence that we based our planning on indicated that the January 6th protests were expected to be similar to the previous MAGA rallies in 2020, which drew tens of thousands of participants. The assessment indicated that members of the Proud Boys, white supremacist groups, Antifa and other extremist groups were expected to participate on January 6th, and that they may be inclined to become violent.

Based on the intelligence that we received, we planned for an increased level of violence at the Capitol, and that some participants may be armed. But none of the intelligence we received predicted what actually occurred.

Extensive preparations were put into place for January 6th that included the full activation of the department; intelligence and information-sharing with our federal and local partners and department officials; implementing a significant enhancement for member protection; extensive operational enhancements to include significant civil disobedience deployment and an expanded perimeter. We also distributed additional protective equipment for our officers, and coordinated outside agency support.

As recent as Tuesday, January 5th, during a meeting I hosted with my executive team, the Capitol Police Board and a dozen of the top law enforcement and military officials from D.C., no entity including the FBI provided any new intelligence regarding January 6th. It should be also noted that the secretary of Homeland Security did not issue an elevated or imminent alert in reference to the events at the United States Capitol on January 6th.

We properly planned for a mass demonstration with possible violence. What we got was a military-style coordinated assault on my officers and a violent takeover of the Capitol building.

I know that the images we saw of the officers battling for their lives and the visuals on national TV had a profound effect on the nation. The United States Capitol Police did everything we could based on the intelligence and available resources to prepare for this event.

While my officers were fighting, my post was in the command center, coordinating resources from numerous agencies around the National Capital Region to provide critically needed support. I was also briefing the two sergeant at arms and working on establishing accountability and priorities for the incoming resources.

As Capitol Police and outside resources began to re-establish the security perimeter, I responded to the Capitol building to personally evaluate the situation and brief the sergeants at arms and leadership.

[10:50:00]

I acknowledge that under the pressure of an unprecedented attack, a number of systems broke down. One of the reported issues described by officers was a lack of clear communications and directions from officials. It appears that the established incident command for the Capitol building was overwhelmed by the enormity of the situation and as officials battled insurrectionists as opposed to directing the response.

There have also been reports that some officers may have felt confused or let down during the attack. As an official who cares as much as I do about my colleagues, nothing is more painful to me.

These issues must be addressed through new training policies and procedures. Even our best efforts were not enough to stop this unprecedented assault on the Capitol. However, casting blame solely on the United States Capitol Police leadership is not only misplaced, but it also minimizes what truly occurred that day.

The focus going forward needs to be on the efforts to improve intelligence and the coordination of security measures between all involved agencies. Hopefully this will be part of the focus of an independent after-action committee to look at all aspects of the January attack on our nation's Capitol.

In closing, I want to again recognize the heroic efforts of the Capitol Police officers who, on January 6th, outnumbered and against the odds, successfully carried out their mission to protect the members of Congress and the legislative process.

I couldn't have been more proud to be part of their team and the USCP mission. I'm available to answer any questions you may have. Thank you.

KLOBUCHAR: Thank you, Mr. Sund.

Mr. Stenger?

MICHAEL STENGER, FORMER SENATE SERGEANT AT ARMS: Chairwoman Klobuchar, Chairman Peters, Ranking Member Blunt and Ranking Member Portman, the National Capital Region is a unique environment (INAUDIBLE).

U.S. Capitol Police, in conjunction with the sergeants at arms, work to provide security of the Capitol Complex and its population. But there is a shared responsibility with other law enforcement groups within the region. The sharing of information and resources are paramount for success.

Once assuming the position of the Senate sergeant at arms, enhancement of the working relationship between my office and the U.S. Capitol Police had been a priority.

I am a proponent of the concept of intelligence-led policing. This methodology can be used in assessing threats to individual members, as well as threats to the Capitol (ph). But (ph) as (ph) in (ph) all intelligence operations, it is only as good as the analyst assessing it. And that assessment is then placed in the appropriate hands to take steps in order to mitigate any threats.

We have to be careful returning (ph) to a time when possibility rather than probability drives security planning. While (ph) the (ph) events of January 6th certainly (INAUDIBLE) should be done, returning to the concept of possibility driving security operations may result in the poor use of resources. This is the constant give-and-take of security planning.

There is an opportunity to learn lessons from the events of January 6th. Investigations should be considered. As to the funding (ph), (INAUDIBLE) what appears to be professional agitators. First Amendment rights should always be considered in conjunction with these investigations.

Law enforcement coordination int he National Capital Region should be reviewed to determine what can be done in a more efficient, productive manner. Intelligence collection and dissemination, training and concepts on the use of force must be consistent. This integration should be accomplished without regard to self-interest (INAUDIBLE).

In conclusion, whenever you prepare for a major event, you must always consider the possibility of some level of civil disobedience at these demonstrations, and plan accordingly. The events of January 6th went beyond disobedience. It was a wild (ph), coordinated attack where the loss of life could have been much worse.

This concludes my prepared remarks.

KLOBUCHAR: Thank you, Mr. Stenger.

Mr. Irving?

PAUL IRVING, FORMER HOUSE SERGEANT AT ARMS: Chairman Peters, Chairwoman Klobuchar, Ranking Member Portman, Ranking Member Blunt, and distinguished members of the committees, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. There has been a lot of press reporting about me -- not all of it accurate -- and I appreciate the opportunity to address some of that today.

My name is Paul Irving, and I served as the sergeant at arms for the House of Representatives for the past nine years. Serving in that role was one of the great honors of my life, and I count it a privilege to have worked with speakers from both political parties, including Speaker Boehner, Speaker Ryan and Speaker Pelosi.

I'm a law enforcement officer by training. My professional career started more than 40 years ago as an intern at the Department of Justice, and then as a clerk at the FBI. I later became a special agent at the Secret Service, where I worked on two different presidential protection details, and (INAUDIBLE) rose to the rank of assistant director.

Like you, I am profoundly saddened by the events of January 6th. The entire world witnessed horrific acts of violence and destruction, carried out by our very own citizens against a global symbol of democracy, our seat of government. I am particularly saddened by the loss of life, which included three officers. My heart goes out to all the families that lost a loved one.

We began planning for the protests of January 6th in December 2020. The planning relied on what we understood to be credible intelligence provided by various state and federal agencies, including a special event assessment issued by the Capitol Police on January 3rd.

The January 3rd assessment forecast that the protests were, quote, "expected to be similar to the previous million MAGA march rallies that had taken place in November and December 2020." Every Capitol Police daily intelligence report between January 4 and January 6th, including on January 6th, forecast the chance of civil disobedience or arrest during the protests as "remote to improbable."

I relied on that intelligence when overseeing the security plan put forth by Chief Sund. The chief's plan took on an all-hands-on-deck approach whereby every available sworn Capitol Police employee with police powers was assigned to work on January 6th. That meant approximately 1,200 Capitol Police offers were on-site including civil disturbance units and other tactical teams.

I also understood that 125 National Guard troops were on notice to be standing by for a quick response. The Metropolitan Police Department was also on 12-hour shifts with no officers on day off or leave and a stage of officers just north of the Capitol to provide immediate assistance if required.

The plan was briefed to multiple law enforcement partners. Based on the intelligence, we all believed that the plan met the threat and that we were prepared. We now know that we had the wrong plan. As one of the senior security leaders responsible for the event, I am accountable for that. I accept that responsibility and, as you know, I have resigned my position.

Much has been said about whether optics affected my judgment in a January 4 telephone call with Chief Sund and Senate Sergeant at Arms Stenger about a National Guard offer to incorporate 125 unarmed National Guard troops into the security plan. The Guard's purpose would have been to work traffic control near the Capitol.

My use of the word "optics" has been mischaracterized in the media. Let me be clear. Optics as portrayed in the media played no role whatsoever in my decisions about security. And any suggestion to the contrary is false. Safety was always paramount when making security plans for January 6th.

We did discuss whether the intelligence warranted having troops at the Capitol. That was the issue, and the collective judgment at that time was no, the intelligence did not warrant that. If the chief or any other security leader had expressed doubt about our readiness without the National Guard, I would not have hesitated to request them.

Chief Sund, Senate Sergeant at Arms Stenger and I were confident in the chief's plan. And I did whatever I could to ensure that Chief Sund had the support needed to prepare and execute that security plan. And on January 6th, when I was asked for authorization to request National Guard assistance, I approved it.

There are important lessons to be learned from January 6th. I commend the committees for conducting this proactive review of the events leading up to and on January 6th. I want to help the staff and members make changes and improvements and to ensure the tragedies of January 6th never occur again.

I look forward to answering your questions.

KLOBUCHAR: Thank you very much.

We'll now begin questioning. I want to start out just to clear up one thing by just asking all of our witnesses a yes-no question. Based on what we know now, including the recent Department of Justice indictments, do you agree that there is now clear evidence that supports the conclusion that the January 6th insurrection was planned and it was a coordinated attack on the U.S. Capitol?

Just say every one agree?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes.

KLOBUCHAR: OK. Would you agree that this attack involved white supremacists and extremist groups?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes.

[11:00:00]

KLOBUCHAR: OK. Would you agree that this was a highly dangerous situation which was horrific but could have actually been worse without the courage of the officers that you commanded?