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Senate Holds First Hearing on Insurrection at U.S. Capitol; Security Officials Agree that Insurrection was Planned Attack. Aired 1-1:30p ET

Aired February 23, 2021 - 13:00   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

SEN. JOSH HAWLEY (R-MO): And Mr. Irving stated that he was concerned about the optics of having the Guard deployed, is that right?

[13:00:06]

Am I remembering that correctly?

STEVEN SUND, FORMER U.S. CAPITOL POLICE CHIEF: That is correct, Sir. On the 4th, it actually -- it wasn't a phone call, it was an in-person visit over to his office where I went in and requested the National Guard.

HAWLEY: And, Mr. Irving, could you just clarify, when you used the term, optics, and maybe your recollection is you didn't, so maybe you could speak to that, did you talk about being concerned about the optics of the National Guard? And then could you just elaborate on what you meant by that? Again, this is Monday, January 4th, now.

PAUL IRVING, FORMER HOUSE SERGEANT AT ARMS: Yes. On Monday, January 4th, Senator, safety was always a deciding factor in making security plans. And the issue on the table was whether the intelligence warranted troops at the Capitol. And the conversation with Mr. Sund was not -- I did not take it as a request, he was merely informing me that he had received an offer from the National Guard.

And then when we included Mr. Stenger, the three of us discussed the specific issue as to whether the intelligence warranted the troops and the answer was no. It was a collective answer no, and then Mr. Stenger put forward his recommendation of having them on stand-by, and my recollection was Mr. Sund was very satisfied with that. In fact, he briefed the following day that he was satisfied, and I heard no concern anytime thereafter.

HAWLEY: Were you concerned -- this use of the word, optics, the appearance, what it would look like to have the Guard, this is what Mr. Sund has testified, it was a concern on January 4th that there was reluctance to request assistance because of the appearance. Was there something -- what's the appearance that you were concerned about, Mr. Irving, if indeed you were? Were you concerned that having the Guard present would look too

militarized? Were you concerned about the criticism of the Guard being deployed in Washington during rioting earlier December, December 2020? Just give us some insight into your thinking there as you recall it.

IRVING: Senator, I was not concerned about appearance, whatsoever. It was all about safety and security. Any reference would have been related to appropriate use of force, display of force. And, ultimately, the question on the table when we look to any security asset is, does the intelligence warrant it? Does the security plan match with the intelligence? And, again, the collective answer was yes.

HAWLEY: Mr. Chairman, could I just ask one final question?

SEN. AMY KLOBUCHAR (D-MN): Yes.

HAWLEY: Thank you. Madam Chair, thank you.

Speaker PelosI has asked retired Lieutenant General Russel Honore to lead an immediate review of Capitol security in light of the attack. The general has said that the leadership of the Capitol Police, that would be you, Mr. Sund, and both of you gentlemen, the House and Senate sergeants at arms, he has criticized you for, and I'm quoting now, the appearance of complicity during the attack and also said you potentially took complicit actions. Those were his words during the attack.

Mr. Sund, were you complicit in this attack on January 6th?

SUND: Absolute not, Sir. I've heard those comments. I think it's disrespectful to myself and to the members of the Capitol Police Department.

HAWLEY: Mr. Stenger, were you complicit in the attacks on January 6th?

Mr. Stenger? Were you complicit to the attacks on January 6th?

MICHAEL STENGER, FORMER SENATE SERGEANT AT ARMS: (INAUDIBLE).

HAWLEY: Mr. Irving, were you complicit in the attacks on January 6th?

IRVING: Absolutely not, Senator.

HAWLEY: Of course, none of you were. There is absolutely no evidence to that effect. And, Mr. Sund, I think your reaction was appropriate to allege that any of you were complicit in this violent mob attack on this building, I think, is not only extremely disrespectful, it's really quite shocking and this person has no business leading any security review related to the events of January 6th.

Thank you for your indulgence, Madam Chair.

KLOBUCHAR: Thank you very much.

Next, a new member of both committees, Senator Padilla.

SEN. ALEX PADILLA (D-CA): Thank you, Madam Chair.

There have been a lot of questions that have been popping up from multiple committees. And I understand there's been a lot of questions already about intelligence, what was known, what was assessed, what was shared, et cetera, and differing opinions. I'll try not to be too repetitive.

First, a quick question for Chief Sund and the two sergeants at arms. I imagine, like most people, you saw most, if not all, of the House impeachment managers' presentations before the United States Senate as they sort of laid out the case.

[13:05:00]

So, the impeachment question aside, we know how that was resolved, but in terms of how January 6th didn't just happen, but the lead-up to January 6th, is there anything from that presentation that you would disagree with?

SUND: Sir, just to make sure I understand, the video I watched and all the information the video that was portrayed is all accurate video. As far as any of the other commentary associated with the video, I can't say I watched every single bit of it, but I can tell you the video, a lot of that video was video from the United States Capitol Police and it was all accurate.

PADILLA: Okay, thank you. Mr. Stenger, Mr. Irving, same question.

STENGER: The video I saw certainly was what I could see from my window on the day of January 6th.

IRVING: And from my perspective, Senator, I have not diagnosed the -- why attack occurred at the time. We left all information to the intelligence agencies that we had at the time, and now I would say leave it to the after-action investigations to make determinations.

PADILLA: Okay. A question for Chief Sund specifically, there is an intelligence division within the department, correct?

SUND: Yes, Sir.

PADILLA: Now, having read your letter to Speaker Pelosi, you make reference to events on both November 14th as well as December 12th that you had sort of comparable intelligence in terms of risk assessment, threat assessments and the events of November 14th and December 12th, not leading into anything near what happened on January 6th. Is that my correct interpretation of your letter?

SUND: Yes, that is the correct interpretation of the letter. Both the assessments indicated that we were going to have various militia groups and extremists in attendance. In addition to the fact that as Chief Contee had testified to earlier, weapons were recovered during both those events. PADILLA: Okay. And so to the best of your recollection, in the lead- up to January 6th since it was assessment-comparable intelligence, roughly, you therefore proceeded with comparable preparation and posture?

SUND: Yes, that is absolutely correct. We proceeded with the posture of the scene that could have incidences of violence. We knew it was going to be focused on the Capitol. We knew there were going to be members of Proud Boys, Antifa participating. And like I said before, not Capitol Police, not Metropolitan Police, not anymore federal agencies had any information we would be facing an armed insurrection of thousands of people.

PADILLA: Now, if we take our experience with terrorism globally and look at case studies both incidents that were -- have been prevented and those that were successfully executed against the United States, is it plausible -- and I know hindsight is 2020 -- is it plausible that the November 14th and December 12th incidents may well have been trial runs, the very extremist organizations you've referenced involved with the organizing and participation of November 14th, December 12th to gain counterintelligence on how you and your partner agencies would be planning and preparing for such incidents?

SUND: As you rightly point out, when you look at some of the terrorist attacks that have occurred, there has been pre-planning, there has been pre-surveillance, pre-collection of intelligence on the security features. I don't know if November and December were two incidents of that, but I would suspect with the fact that we're finding this was a coordinated attack, I wouldn't doubt there was pre- surveillance.

PADILLA: So we don't know there were, we don't know there weren't? That's my --

SUND: Correct.

PADILLA: And now the intelligence folks will be here at a subsequent hearing, but were all in this together in your letter and your testimony earlier today, you bluntly said the intelligence community missed this.

SUND: That is correct, Sir. That's the way I feel.

PADILLA: Now, who was commander in chief on December 6th?

SUND: When you say commander in chief?

PADILLA: Who was the president of the United States --

SUND: Donald Trump, Sir.

PADILLA: -- overseeing the intelligence community that missed this? Repeat your answer.

SUND: For the entire 18 agencies that represent the intelligence community? Yes, sir, it would be commander in chief. PADILLA: And who was that again?

SUND: President Donald Trump.

[13:10:00]

PADILLA: Let me ask a couple questions on a different topic. I think it's obvious to many across the country, I was of three senators who was not in chambers on January 6. I had the benefit, if you will, of watching the events occur in real-time both inside the Capitol and outside the Capitol on television.

One thing that was not lost on me and many people that I've talked to is the difference in both police presence and response on January 6 compared to events from last summer when peaceful protesters were demonstrating in the nation's Capitol in the wake of George Floyd's murder. Last summer, they were met with significant force.

A couple data points, to-date some 250 individuals who were involved in the Capitol insurrection of January 6 have been arrested. More will likely be arrested in the coming weeks and months, but only a small number, about 52 of these individuals, were arrested on January 6th.

By contrast, during the largely peaceful protests of last summer, 427 people were arrested. Excuse me, on June 1st alone, 289 people were arrested. Similarly, some 300 protesters were arrested during the Kavanaugh hearings in 2018.

So, a question, Mr. Sund, can you tell us how the Capitol Police preparations for January 6th differ for the protests over the summer? And if you could specifically address if they were the same or different use of force guidelines in place on January 6th compared to the protests of last summer or any criteria for making arrests on January 6th versus the protests from last summer.

KLOBUCHAR: Okay, and if you could do that in about a minute. Thank you, Senator.

SUND: Yes, Ma'am, I will do that very concisely.

So I want to look at it from planning and preparations. We plan before every demonstration the exact same way. It doesn't matter the message of the person, it doesn't matter the demographics of the grievance involved in the demonstration. We do it the exact same way we develop our information, we develop our intel and we base a response plan on that.

So let's transition to preparations. I will tell you we handle 15 major demonstrations involving Black Lives Matters groups following the death of George Floyd over the summer. We had a total of six arrests, no use of less lethal capabilities, no use of lethal force capabilities.

The events, the -- everything that we put in place for January 6 far exceeded any planning that we did for events in 2020. With a full activation of the department, the size of the perimeter that we expanded, the deployment of additional protective, the deployment of less lethal and the application of less lethal would far exceeded anything -- any other event that I can recollect on the nation's Capitol. So I'll just leave it at that. We --

KLOBUCHAR: Thank you. We're going to go to, and, thank you, Senator Padilla. We're going to go to Senator Hagerty and then Senator King, who has been very patient and been on with us online for quite a while. Senator Hagerty.

SEN. WILLIAM HAGERTY (R-TN): Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much for having us here today and holding this hearing.

I want to begin by thanking all the law enforcement officers that are represented here today. You and your families, thank you for your sacrifice, and certainly my heart goes out to those loved ones who lost their lives in this.

In the spring and summer of 2020, many people criticized the use of the National Guard to help restore order in Washington following some of the worst rioting in decades. Mayor Bowser said that the Guard presence was, and I quote, unnecessary and maybe counterproductive. And a D.C. National Guard leader even had to tell his troops, I quote again, some of the D.C. public does not agree with our mission and they have nefarious intentions with our servicemembers.

And according to a January 5th Washington Post report, top Pentagon officials emphasized that on January 6, the Guard would have a, quote, far more muted presence than in June, saying that, quote, we've learned our lessons and we'll be absolutely nowhere near the Capitol building.

Mr. Sund just stated that despite attempting to obtain National Guard support on Capitol Hill on January 6th, he was unable to get approval (INAUDIBLE) support. And several people today have reported (ph) the concerns over the optics of January 6th.

So my first question is directed to Mr. Sund. Do you think that the backlash against the use of National Guard troops to restore order back in the summertime led to reluctance in advance of January 6th to utilize Guard troops to protect the Capitol?

SUND: Sir, I cannot really testify to what the inner working was or working decisions over at the Pentagon regarding either the decisions made over the summer or the memo that was put out by the secretary of the Army on the 4th.

[13:15:08]

However, I was very surprised that the amount time and the pushback I was receiving when I was making an urgent request for their assistance.

HAGERTY: I'd also like to follow-up on a line of questioning that Senator Hawley brought up. Speaker Pelosi indicated that she intends to establish a commission to examine the events of January 6th. Of course, that's why we're here today examining those issues. Speaker Pelosi has also appointed a retired army lieutenant general, Russel Honore, who is going to lead the investigation of what happened.

But days after the attack, General Honore said, I think once all this gets uncovered, and I'm quoting him, it was complicit actions by Capitol Police. Before, he added that you, Mr. Sund, were, quote, complicit along with the sergeant at arms in the House and Senate.

My question is do any of you believe that comments like these by Mr. Honore suggest that he is someone who is well-suited to conduct a serious and unbiased review of the events of January 6th? So, please explain.

SUND: I'll go ahead and start with the response. As I mentioned before, I found the comments that he made regarding myself and also the Capitol Police officers highly disrespectful to the hard-working women and men of that police department, and also to myself. I welcome and I look forward to an after-action that will move this agency forward, move our partnership with the federal agencies forward, but it has to be done in an unbiased fashion.

HAGERTY: I couldn't agree more, Mr. Sund. Any other responses?

STENGER: I would disagree with the general's -- what he said. I don't believe that's true. There are a lot of people that found themselves in very much danger on that day, and I think saying something like that is just not in good taste.

HAGERTY: Yes, I can't imagine that being said myself, implying that you all were complicit in this. I thank you for your answers and for your service.

I yield back, Madam Chair.

KLOBUCHAR: Thank you very much, Senator Hagerty.

Next, Senator King. You may be muted, Senator King.

SEN. ANGUS KING (I-ME): No, I got it.

KLOBUCHAR: Okay, great.

KING: Thank you, Madam Chair. And I want to thank the witnesses first for their patience this morning and their ongoing answers. This has been a long hearing and I really appreciate it. And I appreciate the fact that although you all are no longer, other than the chief in Washington, no longer in your positions, that you've come forward to give us the benefit of your observations.

It seems to me one of the clear -- I'm not going to plow this ground again, but one of the clear pieces of information we've learned today is an intelligence failure, not necessarily a failure of intelligence but a failure to communicate intelligence.

And I think that's something that we all need to think about, and you can be very helpful to us in suggesting what should be the chain of communication in terms of intelligence. You can't adequately prepare if you don't have the information, and it clearly seems to me there were some failures.

Chief Sund, I have a specific question for you, and it's more forward- looking, but I'd appreciate your insights. The question is, how do we protect the Capitol from either an angry mob or probably more likely, one or two or three malignant actors without turning it into a fortress? How do we allow the American people to go in the rotunda to tour the Capitol, to picnic on the grounds, to play with their kids?

It seems to me going forward that's really one of the challenges. We want security but we don't -- I would hate to see the U.S. Capitol turned into a fortress. Your thoughts, Mr. Sund?

KLOBUCHAR: I think you need your mic on there. Thank you.

SUND: Thank you very much.

I'll go back to your original comment with the intelligence and the communications. I think we have the process in place for when we have credibly intelligence, especially high-level credible intelligence to quickly get to where it needs to be. I think my big concern is on the collection, on how wide casting the net to collect our intelligence that would have revealed that this was coming and we're facing this type of mass insurrection.

[13:20:01]

I'd definitely want to say the Capitol police is well-versed, well- trained on handling what you're talking about, a Mumbai style attack, a couple of attackers armed, active shooter events, things like that, those are the types of things that we are ready for. It is the thousands of people that are storming the Capitol that creates a big issue with us.

So when you talk about physical security, and I mentioned in my opening statement in one of the initial questions, I think there are options for maintaining an open environment, an open campus-type of environment while putting in substantial, physical security measures in place both for the building, the skin of the building, as well as farther out. Time and distance is our best friend, and the most important thing is to provide some kind of protection farther out so the officers have more time to deal with it.

But that's something that I think should be discussed in a closed or classified session.

KING: I understand. But -- and I hope that is a discussion, Madam Chair, that we can have. I think that's a very important -- because, as I say, we don't want the United States Capitol to be so protected that it's inaccessible to the American people.

Amplify on your intelligence answer. It seems to me you're saying it's communicated adequately but we didn't have the collection that we needed. For example, the Norfolk, Virginia letter, how does it get filtered and where does it get filtered?

SUND: Again, the Norfolk Field office letter, that's something to consider, because even on the 5th, at noon on the 5th, I held a joint conference call with the members of the board, my executive team, a dozen of the top law enforcement and military officials from Washington, D.C., where we discussed the upcoming events on the 6th, the upcoming events for the inauguration, any kind of threats, any kind of issues we may have. And even though I had -- we had the director of the field office for the Washington field office of the FBI, nothing was mentioned about it.

So I think my big point is, I think we need to look out. There is significant evidence coming out that the insurrection that occurred on the 6th was planned, coordinated well in advance, coordinated almost to the point where you're looking between the number of states where you're having events coordinated, and it's that detection that I think would have been key to put the effective security in place for this event.

KING: Finally, when we're talking about providing this level of security, is there a playbook? Is there a contingency plan that's literally sitting on a shelf somewhere that says, demonstrations around the Capitol, here's what you do?

I mean, some of the timing things, for example, the deployment of the National Guard, might have been faster had there been a predetermined set of phone numbers, actions, steps to be taken. Does that exist, and, if not, should it exist?

SUND: To the level where you're including the National Guard, there is a process where we handle special events and demonstrations, but I tend to agree that we need to streamline the process that we request the National Guard in the future.

KING: Yes, because, clearly, there was a delay there that was an important part of the response at the time.

Madam Chair, again, I want to thank these witnesses. I think they really made a contribution and they made a contribution when they were serving in their respective positions. Thank you, I yield back.

KLOBUCHAR: Thank you.

SEN. GARY PETERS (D-MI): Thank you, Senator. Senator Sinema is recognized for her questions.

SEN. KRYSTEN SINEMA (D-AZ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My first question is for Chief Contee. What coordinating actions were taken in the weeks leading up to January 6th to share intel across federal and local law enforcement, and what security planning took place and with which agencies?

ROBERT CONTEE, ACTING CHIEF, D.C. METROPOLITAN POLICE: Thank you for that question.

So, there were a series of several meetings that took place leading up to the events of January 6th. There were weekly law enforcement partners calls that take place where our federal partners are part of that. There is the First Amendment coordinating calls that took place, at least two of those, prior to this event. There is a National Parks Service permit call that also took place prior to this event, and as Chief Sund mentioned, several calls involving several of the law enforcement entities leading up to the events of January the 6th.

[13:25:02]

So there are a significant amount of phone calls or virtual meetings that took place, all leading up to January 6.

SINEMA: Thank you. And could you talk a little bit about what you see as the mistakes that were made or the holes that didn't help connect all those dots in those meetings in coordinating prior to January 6?

CONTEE: So, I think the major issue, at least from my perspective, I think that in terms of the sharing of information, how it's shared, I think that that is where the focus should be. Again, we're talking about a report that came from the office on the day before, that night, after 7:00 P.M., that was sent to email boxes.

As the chief of police for the Metropolitan Police Department, I assure you that my phone was on 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and I'm available for any phone call from any agency that has information with respect to something of this magnitude happening in our city.

Certainly, if there was information about one of our police stations being overwhelmed or a federal building being overrun that was related to the Metropolitan Police Department, I assure you that I would be on the phone directly with the officials that are responsible for the law enforcement response to give them that information firsthand. I'm not really relying on technology in the form of an email in hopes that that information makes it to where it needs to be.

So I think that's critical. To Chief Sund's point, there were several phone calls leading up to this and no specific information that talked about the events that we saw and experienced on January the 6th. And I really do believe that there should be a lot of attention given to that.

SINEMA: I appreciate that. My next question is for Mr. Sund.

So, you outlined the FBI report was sent via email to the Capitol Police the evening of January 5th and that you never received the report. Is there an understanding within the system of how that report did not make it to you or to other individuals in leadership in the Capitol Police the night of January the 5th?

SUND: I appreciate that question, Ma'am. Actually, as I mentioned earlier in the discussion, this is a report that I am just learning about within the last -- you know, they informed me yesterday of the report. So I'm not sure what investigation may be going on. Since January 8th, I have left the department. What investigations, I know the chief has put additional safeguards in place to make sure something like that doesn't happen again, but I'm not sure what the outcome was, why that didn't get pushed farther. SINEMA: Was there an expectation or proper procedure prior to January 6 that should have gotten that memo up to your attention, the night of January 5th?

SUND: There is a process that ensures that information from the Joint Terrorism Task Force and through our task force officers gets over to their our intelligence division and would be moved up to our intelligence analysts and the director of the intelligence division. And then based on that information, he could push it then up to the assistant chief or directly to me. He has my cell phone number. We talk regularly.

SINEMA: And so you to your -- and as you mentioned, you were just learning about this recently, but would it have been an expectation that the FBI would have called Capitol Police or someone on the joint task force to alert the new intelligence in an expedited fashion, knowing that this information made it to the Capitol Police intel team on the 5th? What I'm trying to understand is how it did not get to the higher levels to make preparations the night of the 5th.

SUND: Right. I'll just go ahead and echo what Chief Contee had mentioned, that I do think that deserves additional focus. I think if we have information that's coming in the day before a major event that it has a level of specificity, that it could get a little more attention than just being handled either through an email or an electronic format.

SINEMA: Was there any intelligence you did receive in the several days leading up to January 6 that caused you to change any of the security plans amongst the United States Capitol police?

SUND: So, yes. Just to reiterate, all the intelligence and all the information that we had been receiving during the development of the event for the 6th outlined very similar to what the intelligence report that was published on the 3rd outlined. We were expecting large numbers of protesters coming in, we expected a potentially violent group. We knew they were being focused on the Capitol, and we knew that someone may be armed.

[13:30:01]

And it's that was what was really driving up until -- even regardless of what was put out the 3rd.