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U.S. Senate Holds Hearing on Deadly January 6th Insurrection at Capitol. Aired 1:30-2p ET

Aired February 23, 2021 - 13:30   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

[13:30:00]

STEVEN SUND, FORMER CAPITOL POLICE CHIEF: And we knew that somebody may be armed.

That was what was really driving, up until -- regardless of what was put out the 3rd. This is information we knew. We were developing our security plan around that.

And that's when we looked at -- based on our November and December MAGA events, determined we were going to adjust our fence line and push our fence line out. And when we wanted to do that, that's when I requested the National Guard, knowing we would need support for the fence line.

Thank you.

SEN. KYRSTEN SINEMA (D-AZ): Chief Contee, you stated that the intelligence you had received on January 6th didn't differ from the previous MAGA marches, the two previous.

Was there any conversation or consideration about the fact that the January 6th was scheduled on a very important day that Congress would be in session certifying the results of the election?

And was that different in a consideration around security than the other two marches, which had been on weekends without Congress being in session?

ROBERT CONTEE, ACTING CHIEF, D.C. METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT: Absolutely. And that's reflected in the response posture for the Metropolitan Police Department.

For the other two prior demonstrations that happened, the MAGA one and two marches, the Metropolitan Police Department, we did not call up officers from surrounding jurisdictions to be stationed physically with the footprint of the District of Columbia. We did not do that before.

The mayor, in addition to calling up those additional resources, again, called up the National Guard, specifically for the reasons which would be outlined to them, which would allow the Metropolitan Police Department to be a lot nimble in our response.

That, in essence, enabled us to be able to respond quickly to assist the Capitol Police officers. So those responses were different.

We were disrupting individuals or intercepting individuals who were armed with firearms in our city, in violation of the mayor's order, many of whom that were on federal grounds.

So the Metropolitan Police Department's posture certainly was escalated beyond what we did with the prior two marches.

SINEMA: Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your indulgence. I see I've gone over my time. I have a few extra questions that I'll submit.

Thank you.

SEN. AMY KLOBUCHAR (D-MN): OK, very good. Thank you, Senator Sinema.

And thank you for your emphasis on the FBI report and the issues here that everyone here seems to acknowledge with getting that -- that it didn't go to the right place and just putting "send" isn't enough for a report like that.

OK. Next we have Senator Cruz. And then after that will be Senator Ossoff.

And if there are any other Senators who wish to ask questions, if you haven't asked questions, you should tell us because those are the last two we have.

Senator Cruz?

SEN. TED CRUZ (R-TX): Thank you, Madam Chair.

And let me say to each of the witnesses here today, thank you for being here. Thank you for your testimony. And thank you also for your service.

I want to thank each of you and also each of the heroic officers who demonstrated extraordinary courage in fighting to repel the terrorist attack that unfolded on the capitol on January 6th. We are grateful for the bravery and the courage in the face of a truly horrific attack.

In the aftermath of that attack, there's naturally a process to assess what could have been done to better prevent that attack, to better secure the capitol.

And I think everyone recognizes that hindsight is different from a decision made in the moment, facing the threat immediately.

But this hearing is, nonetheless, productive for analyzing the security decisions and law enforcement decision that were made real time and for learning from them what can be done differently to ensure that an attack like that never again occurs.

Chief Sund, I want to focus on, with some detail, your written testimony and just walk through what occurred in the days preceding January 6th and then on January 6th.

In your written testimony, you say, "On Monday, January 4th, I approached the two sergeant-at-arms to request the assistance of the National Guard." As you had no authority to do so.

You go on to say, "I first spoke with the House sergeant-at-arms to request the National Guard. Mr. Irving stated that he was concerned about the," quote, "optics of having National Guard present and didn't feel the intelligence supported it."

"He referred to the Senate sergeant-at-arms to get his thoughts on the request. I then spoke to Mr. Stenger and again requested the National Guard."

"Instead of approving the use of the National Guard, however, Mr. Stenger suggested I ask then how quickly we could get support if needed and to lean forward in case we had to request assistance on January 6th."

[13:35:13]

Can you describe in at a little more length those conversations with the two sergeant-at-arms on January 4th?

SUND: Absolutely, sir. The first conversation occurred Monday morning. I went over -- I would have to refer to my notes -- but sometime maybe around 11:00 in the morning.

I met with Mr. Irving in his office. That's where I made the first request for the National Guard. He had indicated, I don't know if I really like the optics. I don't think the intelligence really supports it.

Like we had said, he recommended I talk to the Senate sergeant-at- arms.

I went over and met with, later on in the day -- I'm trying to recall if it was in person or on the phone. I would have to go over my timeline -- where I reached out to him.

And they may have already talked because he had said, do you know somebody over at the D.C. National Guard. I said, yes, I do. I have a good friend over there, General William Walker.

He said, could you give him a call and see, if we need assistance, how quickly could we get assistance and what type of assistance could he give us.

So that evening, as I was driving home at about 6:35 at night, I went ahead and called General Walker and spoke to him.

And I said, hey, General Walker, I don't have authority to request National Guard, but I want to find out, if we needed them on Wednesday, how quickly could you get them for us. And is there a way you could kind of be prepared just in case we put in the request? At that point, he had advised me he had 125 National Guardsmen who

were supporting the COVID response in the District of Columbia, and if we needed a response, a quick response, he could, what he called, re- purpose them and get them to the armory, at which point we could get somebody over there to swear them in and try to get them to us as quick as possible. We ended our call.

The next, day I met with Mr. Stenger. He came over to the office for the 12:00 video call that I hosted with the law enforcement officials from the national capitol from D.C.

We spoke about it briefly there. And I told him what William Walker had told me, as well as I passed on to Mr. Irving, I think later on that afternoon, and they both seemed satisfied with that response.

CRUZ: So, Mr. Irving and Mr. Stenger -- Mr. Irving, as I understand it, you have some disagreement with the characterization about the concern about the optics.

So I would invite both Mr. Irving and Mr. Stenger to relay your best recollection of that conversation on January 4th.

PAUL IRVING, FORMER HOUSE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS: Senator, my best recollection on January 4th was a phone call from Chief Sund indicating he had received an offer for 125 unarmed guard that could be positioned around traffic perimeter checkpoints at the capitol.

My recollection again is, as we followed up with Mr. Stenger, the three of us engaged in a conversation whereby we looked at the offer in light of the existing intelligence.

And the decision, the collective decision among the three of us, was that the intelligence did not warrant the National Guard. And my recollection is that ended the discussion relative to the offer.

And the only question on the table is: Should we perform any follow- up? And Mr. Stenger recommended that we ask that they be placed on standby. And that was the end of the discussion.

CRUZ: So to the best of your recollection, did you make the comment about optics, and if so, what did you mean by that?

IRVING: I cannot remember my exact verbiage. Had I used any language to the effect, it was all in reference to whether the intelligence was matched to the security plan.

CRUZ: Let me ask both Mr. Irving and Mr. Stenger, did you all have any discussion with congressional leadership, either Democratic or Republican leadership, on this question of supplementing law enforcement presence, bringing in National Guard either on January 4th or real time on January 6th?

IRVING: On January 4, no, I had no follow-up conversations. And it was not until the 6th that I alerted leadership that we might be making a request. And that was the end of the discussion.

CRUZ: Mr. Stenger?

MICHAEL STENGER, FORMER SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS: For myself, it was January 6th that I mentioned it to Leader McConnell's staff.

CRUZ: So there's been some disagreement about what time phone calls occurred. I know Senator Portman asked earlier.

[13:40:03]

Presumably, everyone has phone records. I think it would be helpful if each of you could forward the relevant phone records to this committee.

And, Chief Sund, you also reference in your testimony that you sent an e-mail to congressional leadership.

SUND: I have it.

CRUZ: If you could forward that to the committee as well, I think that would be helpful.

Thank you.

KLOBUCHAR: Thank you.

Senator Ossoff?

SEN. JON OSSOFF (D-GA): Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you to our panel.

I just to want to take a moment and echo the sentiments of so many of my colleagues expressing appreciation for the men and women of the United States Capitol Police who endured a great deal on January 6th and showed great heroism.

And also, Madam Chair, if I might express an interest in working with you to ensure that they are well taken care of and their needs are met.

This discussion of the conversation the three of you had regarding supplementary security support on January 6th raises the question of who is in charge.

Is consensus between the two sergeant-at-arms and the chief of the U.S. Capitol Police required to make such a request?

Mr. Sund?

SUND: The request for the National Guard needs to go to the Capitol Police board for approval, yes.

OSSOFF: Who has ultimate responsibility for the security of the U.S. capitol complex, which individual?

SUND: I believe that falls under the Capitol Police board. OSSOFF: The Capitol Police board. So there's no individual who has

personal responsibility for the security at the U.S. capitol complex?

SUND: That's the way I interpret it, yes.

OSSOFF: Had the U.S. Capitol Police conducted exercises simulating comparable events such as a violent riot on or at the capitol complex.

SUND: Part of our training involves for civil disobedience units involves dealing with riotous groups, so we do that training.

We do training on people attempting to gain entry into the building. Officers are trained on how to handle it if someone comes through the door unauthorized.

But training for thousands of armed insurrectionists that were coordinated and well equipped, no, we have not had that training before January 6th. But I'm sure they'll find a way to do it now.

OSSOFF: So, if I understand correctly, Mr. Sund, you're saying that personnel had engaged in tactical training regarding techniques to repel attempts to breech the complex regarding rules of engagement.

But had any comprehensive exercises that included command, that included procedures for coordination with supporting agencies, that included requests for support, that included communications with the Department of Defense or White House officials or guard units, been conducted?

SUND: Yes, we have. We do exercises that are very similar to what you're talking about before some of our National Special Security Events. Those are the NSSEs, such as the inauguration.

We'll do tabletop exercises that go through the process of what you're talking about, yes.

OSSOFF: Thank you.

And had the Capitol Police held any such exercises not pertaining to specific national security special events?

So in order to deal with emergent contingencies, like a riot, not associated with one of those moments specifically identified as requiring a whole-of-government security response?

SUND: Yes. One of the most important aspects you're talking about that we train our individuals to is what we call the incident command system. That is one of the systems we feel really unprecedented pressure that they exhibited on January 6th began to break down.

The incident command system is established specifically so you have people that have the clearest understanding of what's happening, either in the field or inside the building, in control of the resources to utilize to defend against whatever issue you're having or respond to whatever incident you have. It's really an all-hazards approach. But that is something that's

trained. We have it as part of our general orders. That is something we'll need to look back on to see how it broke under this pressure.

OSSOFF: And I ask this question in part because of the account that's been shared regarding the coordination with the guard unit, which was here for a COVID-related mission.

If I recall correctly, you related that you had a conversation with the commanding officer and discussed mobilizing that unit if necessary, first, via a military stop at a military facility and then to come to the capitol, if necessary, on January 6th.

[13:45:05]

Were there not preexisting channels of communication and procedures in the event you, not at a moment such as an inauguration or the State of the Union, but on a given day, needed quick reaction force to provide security support?

SUND: Well, I think when you referred to it, I think it's the established process where, if you're going to request them in advance or request them for an incident, I think what you need to look at is those emergency requests.

But there's a process for going through the secretary of the Army, placing an official request. Ultimately, we did that. We had to do a letterhead after the fact. We did the oral request first and set it up that way.

But I think what I did by reaching out to General Walker was to get an idea, much like I was requested to do, if we requested them on the 6th, what kind of resources could they give us and what type of time frame were we looking at?

But I agree, there are already existing processes and channels for make a request for the National Guard.

OSSOFF: Right. Because you, in fact, anticipated there might be some need based on intelligence your department was seeing.

But on any given day, if a foreign terrorist organization decided to mount an attack on this complex, do the procedures exist and are their channels in place so that a quick-reaction force can be mustered swiftly, such that someone in your position knows exactly who to call and they can do so without consulting with the sergeant-at-arms?

SUND: I think what you're saying is what we need to look at because I would still be required to consult with the sergeant-at-arms to make the request for National Guard.

OSSOFF: OK.

By time is running short so I want to ask you this. What is the intelligence budget for the U.S. Capitol Police? And how many personnel do you have in the Intelligence Division or did you have when you served as chief?

SUND: I would have to go back and pull that specific information. We have a number of intel analysts. We have a number of people that work there but sworn-in civilian. But I want to give you clear and --

(CROSSTALK)

OSSOFF: Approximately how many personnel are in the Intelligence Division, please?

SUND: Approximately, right around 30 or 35 people.

OSSOFF: Thirty or 35.

Does the U.S. Capitol Police have the capacity to do any intelligence collection other than by making requests to executive branch agencies for raw intelligence or analysis?

SUND: Again, when you talk about intelligence collection, we are a consumer of intelligence from the Intelligence Community.

We do have the ability to go and look at, say, open source, seeing what people are talking about on open source. But going and collecting in-depth specific intelligence is something we are a consumer of from the Intelligence Community.

OSSOFF: Thank you. Appreciate your time.

SUND: Yes, sir.

OSSOFF: I yield back.

KLOBUCHAR: Thank you very much.

That was our last set of questions. And we're going to conclude this hearing.

I wanted to say a few words at the end.

First of all, I want to thank Chairman Peters and Senators, Ranking Members Blunt and Portman for conducting this hearing in such a professional way.

We had a bipartisan agreement on how this hearing would be conducted, who our witnesses would be, and also the plan to have additional hearings, including one next week that we'll be announcing tomorrow with the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security and the FBI.

Because clearly we have, and our members have, additional questions.

I want to thank the witnesses, as I said, for voluntarily appearing before us.

I want to thank Captain Mendoza for her moving words and bravery. In many ways, she represents all of the officers that were there that day.

A few things that are very clear to me. The first is the statements at the beginning from all of the witnesses. They may have disagreed on some details. And, you know, OK.

But there's clear agreement that this was a planned insurrection. So I think most members here very firmly agree with that. And I think it's important for the public to know that this was planned. We now know this was a planned insurrection. It involved white supremacists. It involved extremist groups.

And it certainly could have been so much worse except for the bravery of the officers.

Secondly, we learned about the intelligence breakdown. So many of the members of both committees asked about that, particularly the January 5th, the FBI report that had some very significant warnings from social media about people who were coming to Washington who wanted to wage war.

The fact that did not get two key leaders, either the sergeant sergeant-at-arms or the Capitol Police chief is really disturbing, really, on both ends.

You can't just push "send." As we know, we get tons of e-mails and we can't hope it gets to the right person, especially when we're dealing with something so serious.

[13:50:01]

The January 3rd intelligence report that came right out of the Capitol Police also contained, according to "Washington Post," reports and other information, some pretty foreboding details that I would have thought would have resulted in planning and more preparations.

The delays in the approving of the request for National Guard assistance, both from the Capitol Police board and the Department of Defense.

The fact the sergeant-at-arms were focused on keeping the members safe in both chambers while the chief was trying to get some emergency approval, to me, you can point fingers but you can also look at this as a process that is not prepared for a crisis.

And I think, out of that, there's some general agreement, just based on talking to a number of members, that there should be changes to the Capitol Police board, the approval process and the like.

And it's clear that that action must be taken not only to protect our capitol, but also to protect the brave officers charged with protecting the citadel of democracy.

Better intelligence sharing, always an outcome when there's failures of intelligence, we know that. But I think we'll get more details in the coming weeks. Some security changes at the capitol, requests that have been made for

a while on those changes that I think we have to seriously consider. I know, it does not have to be barbed wire.

And of course, this is a public building and you want the school groups and veterans and you want people to be able to visit here. But that doesn't mean that we don't make smart security changes to this building.

The use of the National Guard. We know after 9/11, the National Guard helped for quite a while.

We also know that we have to have a plan going forward, as well as consider what happens when we need a greater number of National Guard in a crisis and how those approvals are made.

Those are just some of my takeaways. I'm sure many others will have more.

But I do want to make it clear that there are some items of agreement between most of us on this committee. And I don't think we should let the words of a few become the story here because I think this has been a very constructive hearing.

And I want to thank our witnesses for coming forward as they did.

And I want to thank Senator Peters. And we look forward to more hearings.

Thank you.

SEN. GARY PETERS (D-MI): Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. I have enjoyed this hearing. Thank you for your leadership. It's been good working with you and your entire team with the Rules and Administration Committee.

I certainly want to thank Ranking Members Blunt and Portman and all of the members who came here together today to work in a bipartisan way to ask tough questions and to get answers.

I want to thank Captain Mendoza for sharing her experience. It's certainly a very powerful way to start this hearing.

But I truly appreciate that each of the witnesses that were here today, who came here today willingly and knew you would be asked the tough questions and you were willing to do that. And certainly, we appreciate you for that effort.

While this hearing certainly shed some new light and offered some new information on what happened to the lead-up as well as the response on the January 6th attack on our capitol, it's also raised a number of additional questions that need to be asked.

For the past two years, I have been working to draw attention to the rise of domestic terrorism, and specifically violence driven by white supremacists. We've only seen the threat of this violence grow, not just from white

supremacists but also from anti-government groups and people who have been swept up by conspiracy theories and just simple outright lies.

The events of January 6th and the answers that we heard today only further highlight the grave national security threat that our current Homeland Security apparatus is clearly not fully equipped to address.

Our national security agencies were overhauled and they were forged in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks. And they're basically built around responding to foreign terrorist attacks.

And they've been slow to adapt to this evolving threat of domestic threat of terrorism that we've seen the last few years.

The Homeland Security Committee was created to oversee reforms to fix the intelligence failures that led to 9/11. Now I tend to ensure that this committee oversees to fix the failure that's led to the January 6th attack.

There's no question our federal counterterrorism resources are not focused on effectively addressing the growing and deadly domestic terror threat.

[13:55:04]

The January 6th attack marked a once-in-a-lifetime failure. And now we have the duty to ensure the federal government is doing everything in its power to make sure another attack like this never happens again.

We must align our counterterrorism resources and our intelligence gathering efforts to ensure we're focused on this dire threat.

The FBI, the Department of Homeland Security and the National Counterterrorism Center, right now, are eight months late on a report to assess the threat posed by domestic terrorism.

We will continue to push them to complete this report as soon as possible so we can take meaningful action.

There's no question in my mind that there was a failure to take this threat more seriously, despite widespread social media content and public reporting that indicated violence was extremely likely.

The federal government must start taking these online threats seriously to ensure they don't cross into the real-world violence.

I also plan to keep the pressure up on social media companies to work harder to ensure that their platforms are not used as a tool to organize violence.

So this investigation does not end here today. And I look forward to our next hearing, where we will continue to seek answers to important questions that were raised today and others that need to be answered.

Before we adjourn, however, I have to do a bit of quick housekeeping. It's my privilege to announce the members of the subcommittees of the

Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee for the 117th Congress.

The following Senators will serve on the permanent subcommittee on investigations: Jon Ossoff will be chair. Ron Johnson, ranking member, Tom Carper, Maggie Hassan, Alex Padilla, Rand Paul, James Lankford and Rick Scott.

The following Senators will serve on the Emerging Threats and Spending Oversight Subcommittee: Maggie Hassan, Rand Paul -- Maggie Hassan will be chair. Rand Paul will be ranking member. Kyrsten Sinema --

BRIANNA KEILAR, CNN HOST: You've been watching here the first of what will be many hearings on the deadly insurrection on January 6th.

We've been listening here to the former sergeants-at-arms for both the House and Senate, the former Capitol Hill police chief and the acting D.C. Metro police chief. All of them answering lawmakers' questions here. Some of the questions we have not had the answers to until now.

And this is what we heard so far in this hearing. The witnesses agree that it was a planned and coordinated attack, that white supremacists were involved in this capitol attack.

There's accusations of bad intel that didn't indicate an insurrection, missed intel warnings from the FBI. Capitol Police lacking training and equipment.

There was red tape within the Capitol Hill police board leadership and the National Guard request was not immediately approved.

Let's talk about all of this now with CNN's chief political analyst, Gloria Borger, our CNN law enforcement analyst and former Philadelphia police commissioner, Charles Ramsey, and Peter Licata, who is a CNN law enforcement analyst and former supervisory agent at the FBI.

Charles, to you first.

I want to listen first and I want to get all of your reactions to something that Senator Ron Johnson said.

Let's listen.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

SEN. RON JOHNSON (R-WI): Many of the marchers were families with small children, many were elderly, overweight or just plain tired or frail, traits not typically attributed to the riot prone.

Many worse pro-police shirts or carried pro-police black-and-blue flags.

Although the crowd represented a broad cross section of Americans, mostly the working class by their appearance and manner of speech, some people stood out. A very few didn't share the jovial, friendly, earnest demeanor of the great majority. Some obviously didn't fit in.

And he describes four different types of people, plain-clothed militants, agent provocateurs, fake Trump protesters, and then disciplined, uniformed columns of attackers (ph). I think these are the people who probably planned this.

The vast majority of Trump supporters are pro-law enforcement and the last thing they would do is violate the law.

I will say the information I received from some of my officers, they were trying to prevent people from coming into the building. And people were showing up and saying, hey, we're police, let us through, and still wanting to violate the law to get inside the building.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

KEILAR: I mean, Charles, you have the former chief there completely contradicting what Senator Ron Johnson is saying.

What did you think of that, really, conspiracy theory that Senator Johnson is propagating?

CHARLES RAMSEY, CNN LAW ENFORCEMENT ANALYST: Well, first of all, I didn't think much of it. I think it's pretty clear that not everyone who shows up at a rally is there to commit acts of violence or even thought about trying to breach the capitol.

There was obviously a very significant number of people that really did want to do that. And there was some planning that was associated with that.

[14:00:05]

So this is a very serious issue that, hopefully, can kind of keep politics out of this as much as possible and that sort of thing.