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Live Coverage of Senate Hearing on the January 6th Insurrection; Opening Statements by Robert Salesses, Melissa Smislova, Jill Sanborn, William J. Walker; Questioning by Sen. Gary Peters (D- MI). Aired 10:30-11a ET

Aired March 03, 2021 - 10:30   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

[10:30:00]

ROBERT SALESSES, SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The acting secretary also authorized a 40-person Quick Reaction Force to be readied at Joint Base Andrews.

On January 5th, the acting secretary of Defense and the secretary of the Army received a letter from the mayor of D.C., stating, MPD is prepared and coordinated with its federal partners, namely the Park Police, the Capitol Police and the Secret Service. Based on these communications with federal and local civilian authorities, DOD determined that no additional military support was required on January 5th and 6th.

DOD has detailed the events of 6 January 2021 in a memorandum published on Defense.gov. I will provide a summary of those key events.

After the U.S. Capitol Police ordered the evacuation of the Capitol Complex, the secretary of the Army and the commanding general of the D.C. National Guard received calls shortly before 2:00 p.m. from the mayor of D.C. and the Capitol Police chief, respectively.

At approximately 2:30 p.m., the secretary of the Army met with the acting secretary of Defense and other senior leaders of the Defense Department. After this meeting, the acting secretary of Defense determined that all available forces of the D.C. National Guard were required to reinforce the D.C. Metropolitan Police and the U.S. Capitol Police, and ordered the full mobilization of the D.C. National Guard at 3:04 p.m.

During this period, Major General Walker, the commanding general of the D.C. National Guard, recalled and made ready the D.C. National Guard forces at the National Guard Armory for deployment to the Capitol Complex.

After reviewing the D.C. National Guard's missions, equipping and responsibilities to be performed at the Capitol Complex in support of the Metropolitan Police and Capitol Police, and conferring with the D.C. Metropolitan Police at their headquarters at 4:10 p.m., the secretary of the Army received the acting secretary of Defense's approval at 4:32 and ordered the D.C. National Guard forces to depart the armory to the Capitol Complex.

DOD continued to deploy National Guard forces through the evening to support the U.S. Capitol. By 9:00 on 7 January, 1,100 National Guard personnel had arrived at the Capitol. By 9:00 on 8 January, 1,800 National Guard personnel had arrived at the Capitol. And by 10 January, 6,000 National Guard personnel were at the Capitol, providing security.

DOD continues to support efforts to protect the safety and security of the U.S. Capitol, and provide support to our civilian law enforcement partners. From January 9 through the inauguration, DOD provided nearly 25,000 National Guard personnel to support security in Washington, D.C. Today, there are approximately 4,900 National Guard personnel supporting Capitol Police, and 500 supporting the Metropolitan Police.

Going forward, the Department of Defense is committed to working closely with our federal, state and local law enforcement partners, the D.C. government and the Congress to ensure that we learn from this event and take all necessary actions to respond and ensure an attack on our nation's Capitol never happens again.

Chairman Peters, Chairwoman Klobuchar, Ranking Member Portman and Blunt, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today, and thank you for your continued commitment and support to the men and women of the Department of Defense.

SEN. GARY PETERS (D-MI): Ms. Smislova, you are now recognized for your opening statement.

MELISSA SMISLOVA, SENIOR OFFICIAL PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE UNDER SECRETARY, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Thank you, Senator.

Good morning, Chairman Peters, Chairwoman Klobuchar, Ranking Member Portman, Ranking Member Blunt and other distinguished senators. Thank you for the opportunity for me to testify to you -- with you today.

I want to start with saying I am deeply saddened by the terrifying events that you, your staff, your loved ones and others experienced on January 6th. The country -- myself included -- watched in horror as our Capitol was attacked.

I am here today as the acting under secretary for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, I&A, at DHS. I am a career intelligence professional of over 35 years. I am honored to have this opportunity to lead I&A. I have great faith in the workforce and in our mission, which is to focus on a range of homeland threats, including domestic terrorism, and ensuring that our partners across state, local, private sector have the information they need.

[10:35:26]

Before I summarize the actions my office took before January 6th, I do want to say I'm deeply concerned that despite our best efforts, they did not lead to an operational response to prepare and defend the U.S. Capitol.

Throughout the 2020 election period and the presidential transition, I&A produced numerous strategic assessments about the potential for election-related violence from domestic violent extremists.

In 15 unclassified assessments, I&A discussed the heightened threat environment and the potential for domestic violent extremists to mobilize quickly and attack large gatherings or government buildings.

These products were intended to increase awareness about the volatile threat environment and enhance both policy and operational planning. They were shared broadly with all levels of government, law enforcement partners, critical infrastructure including through Fusion Centers nationwide.

I will highlight a few products and engagements. In August, I&A published an assessment on physical threats stemming from the 2020 election, in which we assessed ideologically motivated violent extremists and other violent actors could quickly mobilize the threaten or engage in violence against election or campaign-related targets in response to perceived partisan and policy-based grievances.

In October, DHS released its first publicly available homeland threat assessment, which stated racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists, specifically white supremacists, would remain the most persistent and lethal threat in the homeland. The assessment also emphasized the breadth of the domestic violent extremist threat, including the heightened threats from election-related violence.

A week before the attack, on December 30th, I&A coauthored an intelligence product with the FBI and the National Counterterrorism Center, highlighting persistent threats to government facilities and law enforcement, noting the perceptions of the outcome of the election could mobilize some extremists to commit violence in the coming months.

Additionally, I&A proactively conducted briefings and stakeholder calls before and after the election, and leading up to January 6th, to share that information.

Moving forward, I want to underscore the department is prioritizing combating domestic terrorism. Specifically in I&A, we're working very closely with our DHS colleagues in the Civil Rights, Civil Liberties Office, Private Office, and our own Intelligence Oversight Office, to carefully examine how we can better address the complex and evolving threat in the manner consistent with the Constitution and U.S. law.

My office is committed to developing more expertise on domestic terrorism, improving our analysis of social media to better characterize the threat, and ensuring our assessments are received and understood by key decision-makers.

Additionally, the department has taken these steps since January 6th: In late January, DHS issued our first National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin on domestic terrorism. It warned domestic violent extremists may be emboldened to act in the wake of the U.S. Capitol breach.

Domestic violent extremists, which span a diverse set of ideological actors including racially and ethnically motivated extremists, will continue to exploit lawful constitutionally protected protests and other events to pursue criminal behavior and commit acts of violence. Also for the first time, Secretary Mayorkas designated domestic violent extremists as a national priority area within the department's homeland security grant.

Let me close by saying my colleagues at I&A and across DHS are unwavering in our commitment to ensuring the department is well positioned to combat this evolving threat and protect the American people.

Thank you for your opportunity to appear before you today, I welcome your questions.

[10:40:00]

PETERS: Thank you.

Ms. Sanborn, you are now recognized for your opening comments.

JILL SANBORN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, FBI COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION: Good morning, Chairwoman Klobuchar, Ranking Member Blunt, Chairman Peters, Ranking Member Portman, and the members of the committees. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

My name is Jill Sanborn, and I'm the assistant director for the Counterterrorism Division within the FBI. It is always an honor to be here with you in the Senate. For those of you that I haven't met or you don't know, I actually started my career in public service as a Senate page in 1987, thanks to a sponsorship from my home senator, Senator Max Baucus.

I want to start by offering my condolences to all of you who had to endure, up-close and personally, the violence and destruction that occurred on January 6th. The siege on the Capitol Complex, where you were carrying out your duties as our elected representatives, was not just unacceptable and disturbing, it was criminal.

I also want to offer condolences to our partners at U.S. Capitol Police for the loss of one of their brothers, Officer Sicknick. This is a loss to us all in law enforcement.

Violence designed to intimidate the population and influence the government is exactly what the FBI's Counterterrorism Division was designed to combat. The men and women of the FBI are not only dedicated to identifying and bringing to justice the individuals involved in the attack on January 6th, but also and equally as important -- and let me stress this -- we're committed to working to prevent something like this from ever happening again.

Over the last two months, Americans -- the Americans you represent -- from across the country have sent in over 200,000 digital media tips, and reported more than 30,000 leads to our National Threat Operations Center. With this support, we have identified hundreds of people involved in the attack, and arrested more than 300 with more and more arrests every day.

I want to reiterate something the director mentioned to some of your colleagues yesterday. As Americans, we are all victims of this assault, and the American people deserve nothing less than our commitment to see this investigation through, and to protect them from acts of violence like this in the future.

The FBI's number one priority is preventing acts of terrorism. The greatest threat we face is a threat posed by lone actors, both domestic violent extremists and what we refer to as the home-grown violent extremists.

These actors are especially challenging for law enforcement because by definition, their insular nature makes them particularly difficult to identify and disrupt before they have an opportunity to act.

The FBI has been investigating domestic terrorism throughout our organization's history. However, today's threat is different than it was 100 years ago, and continues to evolve. Between 2015 and 2020, racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists were responsible for the most lethal domestic terrorism threat. And in fact, 2019 was the most lethal year for domestic violent extremist attacks since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995.

However, in 2020, three of the four fatal domestic violent extremist attacks were perpetrated by what we call anti-government or anti- authority violent extremists. One of those attacks was perpetrated by an anarchist violent extremist in Portland. And in fact, this was the first fatal anarchist violent extremist attack in over 20 years.

2020 also marked the first year since 2011 that there were no fatal attacks committed by the racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists advocating for the superiority of the white race. I think all of those explain how the threat is persistent and evolving.

Looking forward, we assess the domestic violent extremist threat will continue to pose an elevated threat of violence to the U.S. We expect racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists and anti- government, anti-authority violent extremists will very likely pose the greatest domestic terrorism threats throughout 2021, and in fact leading into 2022.

Regardless of the specific perpetrator, the domestic terrorism threat remains persistent and that is why we must remain focused on countering it. I want to take this opportunity to re-emphasize that the FBI's mission to uphold the Constitution and protect the American people is both dual and simultaneous, and not contradictory. One does not come at the expense of the other.

That said, when a person crosses a line from expressing beliefs to violating federal law and endangers the communities we serve, we aggressively pursue those threats.

Before closing, I want to mention the importance of partnerships in the counterterrorism fight. We simply cannot be successful without them. Our investigations and disruptions rely on these partnerships, and they represent American lives saved in communities around the United States. For instance, in Fiscal Year 2020 alone, your (ph) JTTFs across the United States arrested 235 terrorism subjects.

[10:45:03]

We also continue to expand our partnerships in academia, private sector, and within the communities we serve. This is critical because nearly half of our cases are predicated on tips and leads from the community and our law enforcement partners.

We in law enforcement cannot and will not tolerate individuals who use the First Amendment as a guise to incite violence. That's true now, as we work hard to hold those accountable involved in the events on January 6th, just as it was last summer when individuals exploited peaceful protests as cover for their own violence and destruction.

When violent extremists utilize explosive devices, attack government facilities and businesses, or target law enforcement officers, the FBI investigates those unlawful acts, regardless of the underlying ideological motivation. At the FBI, we work every threat with the same level of rigor and dedication, and that's what I hope you take away from my testimony today.

Thank you again for an opportunity to talk with you about the hard work our folks and our partners are doing every day to keep the country safe. We are grateful for the support that you have provided, and continue to provide the men and women of the FBI. I look forward to answering any of the questions you may have.

PETERS: Thank you.

General Walker, you are now recognized for your opening statement.

WILLIAM J. WALKER, COMMANDING GENERAL, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA NATIONAL GUARD: Good morning, Chairman Peters, Chairwoman Klobuchar, Ranking Members Portman and Blunt and members of the committees. I am Major General William Walker, the commanding general for the District of Columbia National Guard, affectionately known as Capitol Guardians.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the events of January 6th, a dark chapter in our nation's history. I was personally sickened by the violence and destruction I witnessed that fateful day, and the physical and mental harm that came to U.S. Capitol Police officers and Metropolitan Police Department officers, some of whom I met with later that evening, and I could see the injuries that they sustained.

It is my hope that the recollection -- my recollection of the events and my presentation of the facts as I know them will help your committees in its investigation, and prevent such tragic events from ever occurring again.

First, I think it's critical to understand what the District of Columbia National Guard mission was on January 6th, to include the civilian agency we were supporting, and how requests for support of other civilian authorities were handled.

On December 31st, 2020, the District of Columbia National Guard received written requests from the District of Columbia mayor, Muriel Bowser, and her director of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, Dr. Christopher Rodriguez. The request sought National Guard support for traffic control and crowd management for planned demonstrations in the district from January 5th through January 6, 2021.

After conducting mission analysis to support the district's request, I sent a letter to the secretary of the Army, Ryan McCarthy, on January 1st, requesting his approval. I received that approval in a letter dated January 5th, granting support to the Metropolitan Police Department with a 320-guardsmen personnel, to include a 40-personnel Quick Reaction Force.

The District of Columbia National Guard provides support to the Metropolitan Police Department, the United States Park Police, the United States Secret Service, and other federal and district law enforcement agencies in response to planned rallies, marches protests and other large-scale First Amendment activity on a routine basis.

A standard component of such report is the standup of an offside Quick Reaction Force, and element of guardsmen held in reserve with civil disturbance response equipment: helmets, shields, batons, et cetera. They are postured to quickly respond to an urgent and immediate need for assistance by civil authorities.

The secretary of the Army's January 5th letter to me withheld that authority for me to employ a Quick Reaction Force. Additionally, the secretary of the Army's memorandum to me required that a concept of operation be submitted to him before the employment of a Quick Reaction Force.

I found that requirement to be unusual, as was the requirement to seek approval to move guardsmen supporting the Metropolitan Police Department to move from one traffic control point to another.

At 1:30 p.m. on January 6th, we watched as the Metropolitan Police Department began to deploy (ph) officers to support the Capitol Police. In doing so, the officers began to withdraw from the traffic control points that were jointly manned with District of Columbia guardsmen.

At 1:49 p.m., I received a frantic call from then-Chief of United States Capitol Police Steven Sund, where he informed me that the security perimeter of the United States Capitol had been breached by hostile rioters. Chief Sund, his voice cracking with emotion, indicated that there was a dire emergency at the Capitol, and he requested the immediate assistance of as many available National Guardsmen that I could muster.

[10:50:14]

Immediately after that 1:49 call, I alerted the U.S. Army senior leadership of the request. The approval for Chief Sund's request would eventually come from the acting secretary of Defense, and be relayed to me by Army senior leaders at 5:08 p.m., about three hours and 19 minutes later.

I had already had guardsmen on buses at the armory, ready to move to the Capitol. Consequently, at 5:20 p.m., less than 20 minutes, the District of Columbia National Guard arrived at the Capitol and were being sworn in by the United States Capitol Police. We helped to establish the security perimeter at the east side of the Capitol, to facilitate the resumption of the joint session of Congress.

In conclusion, I am grateful for the guardsmen from the 53 states and territories who supported the District of Columbia National Guard Operation Capitol Response, and helped to ensure a peaceful transition of power on January 20th.

In particular, I am grateful for the timely assistance from our close neighbors from Virginia, Delaware and Maryland National Guard, who augmented D.C. National Guard forces in establishing the security perimeter.

I am honored to lead these citizen soldiers and airmen. These are your constituents, many of whom left behind their families, careers, their education, their businesses to help ensure the protection and safety of the United States Capitol and those who serve in it every day.

Thank you for the opportunity to brief you today, and thank you for your continued support of the National Guard. I look forward to any questions you may have. Thank you again.

PETERS: Thank you, General Walker, thank you for your testimony. And again, I know I speak on behalf of everybody in this joint committee room, that we fully support the men and women of the National Guard and appreciate your work on that day, and continue to appreciate the service you're providing to our country in protecting the Capitol as well as our country, so thank you again.

General Walker, I want to start my questioning by going back in time a little bit, prior to the events on January 6th. So my question is, in June of 2020, as violence was escalating during the summer protests, were you able to immediately receive approval from the secretary of the Army and the secretary of Defense to deploy National Guard to assist law enforcement at that time?

WALKER: Senator Peters, I was, yes, sir. The secretary of the Army was with me for most of that week. He came to the armory, I was in constant communication with him when we were not together.

PETERS: So you were immediately able to receive approval in June of '20. From your testimony, I want to be clear. You were -- were you able to immediately receive approval from the secretary of the Army and the secretary of Defense to deploy the National Guard on January 6th?

WALKER: No, sir.

PETERS: In your opening remarks, you said that a January 5th memo was unusual. Could you explain to the committee why it was unusual, and what was the impact of the memo that you received on January 5th?

WALKER: So the memo was unusual in that I was -- it required me to seek authorization from the secretary of the Army and the secretary of Defense to essentially even protect -- protect my guardsmen. So no -- no civil disturbance equipment could be authorized unless it was -- came from the secretary of Defense.

Now, the secretary of the Army, to his credit, did tell me that I could have force protection equipment with the guardsmen, so we did have helmets, shin guards, vests, we did have that with us. But that came from the secretary of the Army.

The secretary of Defense told me I needed his permission to escalate, to have that kind of protection.

PETERS: That kind of protection, even though you would be engaged in force protection? To protect your men and women, before you could do that, you would have to get approval from the secretary of Defense?

WALKER: The memo from the secretary of Defense made clear that I needed his permission to have -- so what it says, "Without my personal authorization, the District of Columbia National Guard is not authorized the following: to be issued weapons, ammunition, bayonets, batons or ballistic protection equipment such as helmets and body armor."

Now, again, to be clear, the secretary of the Army told me to go ahead and issue that equipment. So we never were going to have weapons or ammunition, and we no longer have bayonets. But we do have ballistic protection equipment, helmets, body armor. And so I did have that with each guardsman.

[10:55:15]

PETERS: Thank you, General. So -- but that was unusual, as you mentioned, to have that kind of request.

You were on the January 6th phone call at 2:30 that we heard, and from our previous hearing, where the chief of Capitol Police was making an urgent appeal for help and we heard that the D.C. Metro Police chief said it was a tepid response, he was shocked by it. What happened on that call, what was your recollection of the call and where -- the assessment of the two individuals I mentioned, was that your assessment as well?

WALKER: Yes, sir. So that call came in, it was -- we actually helped facilitate it. The deputy mayor from the District of Columbia, and Dr. Rodriguez, Chief Contee, Chief Sund later joined the conversation. And we dialed in, the senior leadership of the U.S. Army.

And at that time, Chief Contee and Chief Sund passionately pleaded for District of Columbia National Guard to get to the Capitol with all deliberate speed. So the Army senior leaders did not think that it looked good, it would be a good optic.

They further stated that it could -- it could incite the crowd, so their best military advice would be, to the secretary of the Army, who could not get on the call. So we wanted the secretary of the Army to join the call, but he was not available. We were told that he was with the secretary of Defense and not available.

But the Army senior leadership expressed to Chief Contee, Chief Sund, Dr. Mitchell, the deputy mayor and others on the call that it would not be their best military advice to have uniformed guardsmen on the Capitol.

PETERS: So during the call -- you're saying that optics was raised on that call, specifically. So I want to go back to the question I started. You said that you were able to get immediate authorization in the summer of 2020, during those protests. General Walker, was the issue of optics ever brought up by Army leadership when the D.C. National Guard was deployed during the summer of 2020? Was that discussed?

WALKER: It was never discussed the week of June, it was never discussed July 4th, when we were supporting the city. It was never discussed August 28th, when we supported the city.

PETERS: Did you think that was unusual?

WALKER: I did.

PETERS: So let's put it in context. You -- in your opening statements, you mentioned the National Guard troops that were ready to go, you had them back at the armory. How many folks were in the armory, ready to go once the order was given? And at what time were they ready to go?

WALKER: So I had them ready to go shortly after the phone call, so I brought -- at 15:00, I directed that the Quick Reaction Force that was based at Andrews Air Force Base leave the base, get to the armory at all deliberate speed. I had a police escort bring them to the armory.

They returned to the armory in about 20 minutes, so we had them sitting there, waiting. And then -- in anticipation of a green light, a go, we put guardsmen on buses. We brought them inside the armory so nobody would see them putting on the equipment and getting on the buses, and then we just waited to get the approval. And that's why we were able to get to the Capitol in about 18 minutes.

PETERS: What time were they on the buses, ready to go? Do you recall?

WALKER: Before 5:00. But at 5:00, I decided that, you know, we've got to -- there's got to be an approval coming, so get on the buses, get the equipment on, get on the buses and just wait. And then a few minutes after that, we did get the approval.

I was on a secure video conference when the Army leadership conveyed to me that the secretary of Defense had authorized the appointment of the National Guard at the Capitol. So my timeline has 17:08, 5:08 p.m. is when we wrote down that we had approval, and that was about eight people in the office with me when I got that --

PETERS: How many guardsmen were ready, you said right immediately -- or earlier in the afternoon --

WALKER: It was about 155.

PETERS: So you could have sent 155 much, much earlier. What would have been the impact of sending those 155 right around that 2:00 timeframe?

WALKER: Well, based on my experience with the summer and -- I have 19 years -- I have 39 years in the National Guard. I was in the Florida Guard, Hurricane Andrew, I've been involved in civil disturbances. So I believe that number could have made a difference, we could have helped extend the perimeter and helped push back the crowd.

[11:00:06]