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U.S. Authorities Update Afghanistan Strike Investigation; D.C. Officials Prepare For Right-Wing Rally. Aired 3-3:30p ET.

Aired September 17, 2021 - 15:00   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

[15:00:23]

VICTOR BLACKWELL, CNN HOST: Top of the hour. Thanks for staying with us. I'm Victor Blackwell.

ALISYN CAMEROTA, CNN HOST: And I'm Alisyn Camerota.

We want to welcome our viewers across the country and all around the world.

Better safe than sorry, that's the strategy of law enforcement officials preparing for that far right rally at the U.S. Capitol tomorrow. The protest is in support of the rioters who attacked police at the U.S. Capitol on January 6. U.S. Capitol Police say they have again received credible threats of violence.

The Department of Homeland Security is also warning of the potential for violence starting as early as today.

BLACKWELL: CNN crime and justice correspondent Shimon Prokupecz is live outside the Capitol.

Shimon, just a few hours ago, Capitol Police say that they have received threats of violence. They know of threats of potential violence. And tell us about the precautions that are being taken.

SHIMON PROKUPECZ, CNN CRIME AND JUSTICE CORRESPONDENT: Right.

One of the big precautions, obviously, is this fence that we have been talking about the last two days and those of us who've been covering the insurrection are very much familiar with. These fences exists all around the Capitol.

Right now, people are still allowed inside.But by 5:00, everything changes. They're going to shut this area down, traffic will be stopped, and people will no longer be inside, this, as you said, all as a precaution, because better to be safe--

(JOINED IN PROGRESS)

JOHN KIRBY, PENTAGON PRESS SECRETARY: -- some opening comments for you that will -- related to the August 29 airstrike that was taken in Kabul, and then he will stick around for some questions.

I will moderate those questions, as we have done before. And since we got pretty much a full house here, and he has limited time, I'd ask you to keep your follow-ups to an absolute minimum, so that we can be as fair as we can to everybody.

When the general is done, I will come back up and brief on some other topics as well.

So, with that, General McKenzie, can you hear and see me OK?

GEN. FRANK MCKENZIE, COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND: John, I can hear and see you fine. (INAUDIBLE) Over.

KIRBY: All good here, sir.

I will turn the floor over to you.

MCKENZIE: Thanks, John.

Good afternoon.

I'm here to brief the results of the investigation I directed following the report a civilian casualties from our strike in Kabul on 29 August. Having thoroughly reviewed the findings of the investigation and the supporting analysis by interagency partners, I am now convinced that as many as 10 civilians, including up to seven children, were tragically killed in that strike.

Moreover, we now assess that it is unlikely that the vehicle and those who died or associated with ISIS-K or were a direct threat to U.S. forces.

I offer my profound condolences to the family and friends of those who were killed. This strike was taken in the earnest belief that it would prevent an imminent threat to our forces and the evacuees at the airport. But it was a mistake.

And I offer my sincere apology. As the combatant commander, I am fully responsible for this strike and this tragic outcome.

While I have begun with the most important findings of our investigation, I do want to provide the background leading up to the strike and include an explanation as to why we felt reasonably certain that this was a legitimate strike on an imminent ISIS-K threat, with no indication that the strike would result in civilian casualties, as we asserted in our initial statements.

The strike on 29 August must be considered in the context of the situation the ground in Kabul at Hamid Karzai International Airport following the ISIS-K attack that resulted in the deaths of 13 soldiers, sailors and Marines and more than 100 civilians at Abbey Gate on 26 August, and also with the substantial body of intelligence indicating the imminence of another attack.

In the 48 hours prior to the strike, sensitive intelligence indicated that the compound at point number one on the map -- and let's bring the map up now, please. And we're just going to bring this up. Hopefully, you will have an opportunity to see it here as we go forward.

John, can you see the map there?

QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE).

MCKENZIE: Hey, John, can you hear me now?

KIRBY: (OFF-MIKE). And the press have hard copies.

MCKENZIE: OK, roger. Then I'm just going to -- I'm going to continue based on that then, John.

In the 48 hours prior to the strike, sensitive intelligence indicated that the compound at point number one on the map was being used by ISIS-K planners, used to facilitate future attacks. We were also receiving a significant number of reports indicating multiple avenues of attack which were being planned simultaneously, through which ISIS- K would attempt to harm our forces, including with rockets, suicide explosive vests, and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.

[15:05:13]

In fact, in the 36 hours preceding the strike, our leaders on the ground at the airport and in the strike cell received more than 60 different pieces of intelligence related to imminent threats, with some intelligence corroborating and some conflicting, with events observed from our UAVs which were flying about Kabul throughout the day.

One of the most recurring aspects of the intelligence was that ISIS-K would utilize a white Toyota Corolla as a key element in the next attack. Because the compound at point number one was our strongest lead for the series of imminent attacks, we initiated an intense surveillance of the compound with as many as six MQ-9 Reapers on the morning of 29 August.

At 8:52 a.m. local time on 29 August, a white Toyota Corolla arrived at point number one, the compound we believed to be a key area of interest associated with imminent threats to the airport.

Two adult males exited the vehicle, met with an adult male in the compound, and received a bag from him. The Corolla then departed the compound heading south, and we followed the vehicle.

At 9:05 a.m., the Toyota Corolla picked up a third adult male carrying a bag at point number two, and then continued south. At 9:35, the Corolla arrived at the compound at point number three, which we now know to include an office of Nutrition and Education International. And all three adult males in the vehicle entered the building on the compound.

At 11:19 a.m., three adult males unloaded bags and jugs from the Trump of the vehicle before departing the compound at 11:22 a.m. heading south. At approximately this time, U.S. forces were notified of a sensitive intelligence collection indicating that an ISIS-K cell leader in Kabul was dropping off supplies.

At 12:11 p.m., the Corolla arrived at point number four, and at least two adult male occupants exited the vehicle in front of an office building before returning to their vehicle and departing at 1:27 p.m., heading west and then south.

At 2:00 p.m., the Corolla returned to the compound at point number three. Subsequently, multiple adult males were observed loading the truck of the vehicle -- the trunk of the vehicle with the items assessed at the time to be explosives, before departing at 3:47 p.m. with four adult males heading north.

At 4:11 p.m., the Corolla returned to point number two and dropped off one adult male carrying a bag, then continued north. After driving near point number one, the Corolla dropped off one adult male on the road at point number five, which is roughly several hundred meters north of point number one.

At 4:39 p.m., the Corolla dropped off its last passenger on the road at point number six. That 4:51 p.m., the Corolla arrived at point number seven, and backed into a compound that was approximately three kilometers from the airport, which was the closest it came to the airport all day.

We were very concerned that the vehicle could move quickly and be at the airport boundary in a matter of moments. By this time, we observed the vehicle for about eight hours. While in the compound, the vehicle was observed being approached by a single adult male assessed at the time to be a co-conspirator.

The strike was executed at this time because the vehicle was stationary and to reduce the potential for civilian casualties. The single Hellfire missile was fused to detonate inside the vehicle to further minimize the chance for civilian casualties. It struck the vehicle at 4:53, which produced an explosive event and follow-on flames significantly larger than a Hellfire missile would have been expected to produce.

It is my assessment that leaders on the ground and the strike cell had achieved a reasonable certainty at the time of the strike to designate the vehicle as an imminent threat to U.S. forces at the airport, and that they made this self-defense strike in accordance with established rules of engagement.

That assessment is based upon interviews with leaders on the ground and members of the strike cell on a review of the intelligence available to the team at the time of the strike and on the team's interpretation of how this vehicle and its occupants' actions were confirming the intelligence that they were seeing.

[15:10:00]

It is further my assessment that the strike team were convinced at the time of the strike that the area was clear of civilians, and that they had taken prudent steps in regards to weaponeering the strike to minimize the potential for civilian casualties.

Finally, it is my assessment that they did believe, as reported, that there was a secondary explosion.

Our investigation now concludes that the strike was a tragic mistake.

First, I will stress this was not a rushed strike. The strike cell deliberately followed and observed this vehicle and its occupants for eight hours, while crosschecking what they were seeing with all available intelligence to develop a reasonable certainty of the imminent threat that this vehicle posed to our forces.

Second, while the initial reports indicated a secondary explosion, the initial investigation could only conclude that there was a possible to probable presence of external accelerants that can include either explosive material in the vehicle or an ignition of the gas tank of the vehicle.

Subsequent analysis could not rule out the president of a small amount of explosive material, but determined that the most likely cause was the ignition of gas from a propane tank located immediately behind the car.

Such an ignition would have created the brief, but massive fireball oriented directly up and out of the compound that was observed in the video and displayed in this photo.

If we could get that next photo up, please.

QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) sir.

MCKENZIE: Finally, while the strike cell reported -- John, can hear me OK?

KIRBY: I got you, sir.

MCKENZIE: Roger.

Finally, while the strike cell reported the president of two adult males, one inside the vehicle and one outside the vehicle at the time of the strike, the cell initiated a review of their footage immediately following the report of civilian casualties and determined that a few -- a few partially obscured forms were briefly visible moving in the compound.

This led to my initiation of an investigation within 24 hours of the strike. A comprehensive review of all the available footage and reporting on the matter led us to a final conclusion that as many as 10 civilians were killed in the strike, including up to seven children.

At the time of the strike, based upon all the intelligence and what was being reported, I was confident that the strike had averted an imminent threat to our forces at the airport. Based upon that assessment, I and other leaders in the department repeatedly asserted the validity of the strike.

I'm here today to set the record straight and acknowledge our mistakes.

I will end my remarks with the same note of sincere and profound condolences to the family and friends of those who died in this tragic strike. We are exploring the possibility of ex gratia payments.

And I will finish by saying that, while the team conducted the strike did so in the honest belief that they were preventing an imminent attack on our forces and civilian evacuees, we now understand that to be incorrect.

With that, I'm ready to take your questions.

KIRBY: Thank you, General.

Tom.

QUESTION: General, this is a complete and utter failure. Can you explain how this possibly could have happened?

MCKENZIE: So, this particular strike certainly was a terrible mistake. And we certainly regret that. And I have been very clear that we take full responsibility for it.

At the same time, we were carrying out a number of complex operations designed to defend ourselves. We conducted a strike a couple of days before up in Nangarhar that was very successful. We conducted other operations across the battle space to defend ourselves during this very difficult 48-hour period when so many imminent threats were manifest.

So, while I agree that this strike certainly did not come up to our standards and I profoundly regret it, I would not qualify the entire operation in those terms.

QUESTION: And will anybody be held responsible?

MCKENZIE: We are in the process right now of continuing that -- continuing that line of investigation. But I have nothing for you now because that involves personnel issues.

KIRBY: Please identify yourself and your outlet when you ask your question.

David.

QUESTION: David Martin with CBS News.

So, you said that the -- you started following this car after it showed up at a place associated with ISIS. In retrospect, is that -- was that place associated with ISIS?

And this was described as an over-the-horizon strike, which is what the U.S. is going to be relying on from now on in Afghanistan. So what does this incident say about the reliability of future strikes against terrorist threats in Afghanistan?

[15:15:00]

MCKENZIE: Sure, David. So I will take the first part of your question and begin with that.

So point one on the map, we do assess -- very definitely associate with ISIS-K. In fact, a little less than 24 hours later, rockets would be launched from that point against the airfield. So, we had very good intelligence to make us think point one on the map was, in fact, an area where ISIS was centered. So I think that's a -- that was -- very good intelligence supported that belief.

Now, to the second part of your question about whether this is -- this will affect future OTH operations, let me be clear, this was a self- defense strike taken under self-defense rules of engagement, based on an imminent threat to attack us.

That is not the way that we would strike in an over -- in an OTH mission going into Afghanistan against ISIS-K targets. For one thing, that will not be a self-defense strike. It'll be done under different -- it'll be different -- done under different rules of engagement.

So -- and we would have a lot more opportunity probably than we had under this extreme time pressure to take a look at the target, just to use a phrase that you will be familiar with, to soak the target with multiple platforms to have an opportunity to develop extended pattern of life.

None of these things were available to us, given the urgent and pressing nature of the imminent threat to our forces.

QUESTION: Sir, are you considering reparations for the victims here? And what is what happened with this strike say to you about the over- horizon-capability that we have been hearing so much about? What are the risks involved with carrying out strikes when you don't have people on the ground in Afghanistan going forward?

MCKENZIE: Sure.

So, as I have said in my statement, we are considering exploration or reparations for this, and that ultimately will be a matter for policy. So we're in consultation with the office of the secretary of defense to determine the way forward there.

As you will also understand, it's very difficult to reach out on the ground in Afghanistan to actually reach people. But we are very interested in doing that, and we will move on it based on our ability to do that.

So your question about this and OTH, I will sort of echo what I said to David. I would reject a parallel between this operation and an over-the-horizon strike against an ISIS-K target, again, because we will have an opportunity to further develop the target in time, to look at pattern of life. That time was not available to us, because this was imminent threat to our forces. It's important that I emphasize that. We did not have the luxury of time to develop pattern of life and to do a number of other things. We struck under the under the theory of reasonable certainty. Probably, our strikes in Afghanistan going forward will be under a higher standard.

That's a policy matter, not a purely military matter. But I don't think you should draw any conclusions about our ability to strike in Afghanistan against ISIS-K targets in the future based on this particular strike.

QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) AFP.

You said that you had the intelligence about a threat emanating from a white Toyota. So, was it -- this intelligence was not good, or there was another white Toyota which was dangerous, and nothing happened from another white Toyota?

MCKENZIE: So, I would tell you this.

Clearly, our intelligence was wrong on this particular white Toyota Corolla. At the same time, we undertook a variety of things to make it hard for them to get at us during this period of time. We closed the gates, which we didn't want to do at HKIA during this period of time, as force protection.

We were very active with our ISR overhead, which we know is very -- often has a suppressive effect on their activities. We still took rockets the next day, as you know, and they fired those rockets from near point one and from other places, actually, near the route of this vehicle.

But I would tell you unequivocally, in this case, clearly, the intelligence was wrong on this vehicle, and we certainly regret that, as I have been very clear.

KIRBY: Let me go to the phones.

Jennifer Steinhauer, "New York Times."

Jennifer, you there?

QUESTION: My call is -- my question is on a different matter, John, for after this.

KIRBY: All right. OK.

Luis Martinez, ABC. You there, Luis? OK, nothing heard.

Nancy Youssef.

QUESTION: Thank you.

General, can you clarify a couple of points you make? If I'm understanding you correctly, you followed the Toyota Corolla from the beginning in. That is, you weren't following one vehicle and mistaken it for another one.

And, also, in your initial statement, you said that there was no initial reports of civilian casualties. It appears that there was at least some concern about civilian casualties very early on. So, on what basis did you make that statement?

And, finally, was any of the intelligence that you were using gathered from the Taliban?

Thank you.

MCKENZIE: So, let me begin with the last question.

Nothing we did was gathered from the Taliban. And I should be very clear about that.

[15:20:03]

We selected this car based on its movement at a targeted area of interest to us, a known target area of interest to us. And we held it throughout the day. Clearly, based on the end result, that was a mistake. And I have acknowledged that.

KIRBY: OK, Meghann?

QUESTION: Meghann Myers from "Military Times."

During this time, were you tracking any other suspicious activity in Kabul that might have also been part of this threat? And do you have any intelligence from after this drone strike that suggests what happened to the imminent threat afterward?

MCKENZIE: Sure.

So, as I noted in my comments, we had over 60 very, very high-caliber reports of imminent threat to our forces in and around Kabul. Typically, those are signals-based, but they're also some human and other human intelligence as well. So we have a variety of sources for that intelligence.

We believe that the strike we took a couple of days prior up in Nangarhar actually had an effect on quieting down, because we got a key attack planner in that strike. We believe that disrupted some of their plans.

Additionally, we did things to make it harder for them to get to us. For example, we closed the gates. The gates, as we know, are a particular point where we're vulnerable. So we decided not to process people. And we hunkered down for a little bit of time while this threat was still there.

So there were over 60 clear threat vectors that we were dealing with during this period of time, including, as I have noted before, rocket attacks that occurred a little bit after this from locations that are displayed on the graphic that you have. Thank you.

QUESTION: A really quick follow-up.

Not in terms of the number of threats, but the number of other cars or groups of people that you were following that day, were you tracking anybody else this closely?

MCKENZIE: We tracked a lot of other people. We didn't track anybody as we -- as closely as we did this because of the limitations on our resources.

And, frankly, we thought this was a good lead. We were wrong.

KIRBY: Alex?

ALEX MARQUARDT, CNN SENIOR NATIONAL SECURITY CORRESPONDENT: Thanks, John.

General McKenzie, this is Alex Marquardt from CNN.

You mentioned that, immediately following the attack, you saw shapes in the video that led you to believe that this necessitated an investigation, that there could have been more civilians there. On September 1, we heard from General Milley, who called this a righteous strike.

And this was several days later. Did you at the time several days later also believe that this was a righteous strike? And could you talk about your erosion of confidence over the following -- the next subsequent two weeks of the investigation?

MCKENZIE: Sure.

So, I think we issued a statement from U.S. Central Command about six hours after the strike acknowledging the possibility of civilian casualties. So we knew from the very beginning there was a possibility of civilian casualties.

I think we still thought we had good reason to have taken that strike. And it took us gathering the facts to change that. We took -- we didn't think -- well, as you will understand and appreciate, we didn't take the strike because we thought we were wrong.

We took the strike because we thought we had a good target. It takes a little while to uncover some of those things. We moved and worked as rapidly as we could. And, actually, I think we work extremely rapidly to get this information out and to make it public.

KIRBY: (OFF-MIKE).

QUESTION: Thank you, John. Thank you, General.

So, despite numerous intelligence reports and warnings, on the 26th, we had that tragic attack on the airport; 13 U.S. service members were killed, in addition to tens of Afghan civilians.

Again, on the 29th, in this strike, another tragedy took place. As you said, 10 civilians were killed, among them, seven children. Is that a failure or -- of intelligence or leadership in Afghanistan? And what do you intend to do about that?

Thank you.

MCKENZIE: Well, I would tell you, so we had two events. We had the attack at Abbey Gate. And we had this -- and we had this strike.

The Abbey Gate attack, you're in combat with an enemy who is alive and has his own will. And, sometimes, that enemy is going to -- his plans are just going to work. You can't cover every eventuality all the time, despite our very best efforts to do that. And we took every precaution we could at Abbey Gate.

In fact, when we had threats develop over the 48 hours that followed, as I have noted, we closed the gates in order to -- recognizing it would reduce our ability to bring people in. But, at the same time, we thought that was the best thing we could do to actually reduce our attack surface, if you will, to protect our forces.

There were also a number of attacks that were thwarted. These are two that you know about because they're high visibility and we're talking about them. Others were thwarted and did not occur. So the silence of those attacks should mean something too.

Unfortunately, it's pretty difficult to prove the negative.

KIRBY: Tony.

QUESTION: Yes, sir, Tony Capaccio with Bloomberg.

I got two quick questions. Are you going to release the report of investigation? Two, in your fact gathering, to what extent did will rely on "The New York Times"' extensive video investigation, and then talks with NGOs or civilian eyewitnesses at the scene?

[15:25:05]

So, repeat the first question again for me.

QUESTION: You will be releasing the final report of investigation.?

MCKENZIE: The final report -- the report is a highly classified document. There will be procedures that would have to be followed to declassify elements of that document if it were to be released. And I'll just leave that -- I'll just leave that question there.

As we, in fact, worked our investigation, we used all available sources of information to inform us as we went forward. Certainly, that included some of the stuff "The New York Times" did. It also included our own extensive resources in this area, which we looked at.

So we tried to go everywhere we could and not overlook anything as we start -- tried to build a picture.

QUESTION: Was the Taliban at all in the investigation or the fact- gathering?

MCKENZIE: No.

QUESTION: Thanks.

KIRBY: Lucas.

QUESTION: General McKenzie, Lucas Tomlinson, FOX News.

Did you have forces on the ground that helped you conduct this strike?

MCKENZIE: No, we did not.

As you know, at no time were our forces really away from Hamid Karzai International Airfield. So there was nobody there -- nobody there on the ground to have to play that role. I think you can see from the graphic that the position of the strike was about three to four kilometers to the west of HKIA. So, no, there was nobody, either us or a proxy of ours, that was involved in this

QUESTION: That includes special operations forces?

MCKENZIE: Explicitly.

QUESTION: Can you talk about the challenges of conducting these drone strikes without any U.S. troops on the ground?

MCKENZIE: So, we conducted a very successful drone strike two days earlier up in Nangarhar province. And we got the target. And I think that had a significant event on dislocating and suppressing ISIS-K's capability to attack us during this period of time.

So, we actually had a success with that. This one, we did not have success with. And we have been very clear about owning up to our responsibility in this regard.

(CROSSTALK)

KIRBY: Lucas, you have had three questions.

We have got time for just a couple more.

Tara Copp.

QUESTION: Thank you.

General McKenzie, Tara Copp with Defense One.

Since there are no more U.S. forces on the ground, how would the ex gratia be provided to surviving family members, if they are provided? And then I know you walked us through the timeline at the beginning of this, but can you give us the overall amount of time spent actually identifying and confirming this target before the strike was taken?

MCKENZIE: Sure.

So, as for the ex gratia payments, we're working on that right now. And it will be difficult, as I noted in my remarks, I think, or in one the first questions, it will be difficult to do that without a presence on the ground. And that's just something we're going to have to work through.

I don't have a better answer for you right now, other than I -- we recognize the obligation, and we will continue to work -- we will continue to work that problem.

So, in a situation like this, to go to the second part of your question, as you continue to look at the target over the course of the day, you begin to build probabilities. You to weigh, are we going to take a strike? Why are we going to take the strike?

When the vehicle came up to the final point, that point seven on your map, which is actually, as I have noted, as close -- the closest to the airfield it had been all day, we were very concerned about a white Corolla being involved in an attack.

So the cumulative force of all those -- all those -- the intelligence that we gathered throughout the day, the position of the vehicle, its nearness to the airport, the imminence of the threat, and the other SIGINT that we're getting throughout the day all led us to the moment of deciding to take the strike.

QUESTION: And one last follow-up. Who actually ordered the strike? Who had the final authority to say fire?

MCKENZIE: So, in this case, the target engagement authority is held by the over-the-horizon commander who's forward in the theater, the over-the-horizon strike cell commander, I should say,

KIRBY: OK, we got time for one more, and then we're going to have to let the general go.

Jeff Seldin, VOA?

QUESTION: Jeff Seldin from VOA. Thanks very much for doing this, General.

Given how this over-the-horizon strike went, where do things stand in terms of getting at least a closer presence, a closer basing agreement for future over-the-horizon strikes? And we have been told that the Taliban have made various commitments to counterterrorism.

I know you said that they didn't provide any information for this strike. But did they provide any sort of help in the closing days in terms of preventing the threat against from ISIS-K, or have they been helpful since then in cracking down on ISIS-K, as they continue to plot against U.S. Western targets?

MCKENZIE: So, I think the best I can answer your question is to sort of take the middle part of the question.

In the final days, and really in the second half of our time at HKIA, as we continued our evacuation, the Taliban were helpful in establishing an outer security perimeter, which actually, we believe, prevented some attacks from developing. But, look, there's a downside to that too. It also allowed them to screen people that might otherwise have gotten to the airfield. And that's just a hard, harsh fact.