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Gen. Milley Faces Questions on Afghanistan, Trump Revelations; Gen. Milley Defends Calls to China During Trump Era; Military Leaders Face Questions on Afghanistan Withdrawal. Aired 10-10:30a ET

Aired September 28, 2021 - 10:00   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

[10:00:00]

GEN. MARK MILLEY, JOINT CHIEFS CHAIRMAN: Beginning in 2011, we steadily drew down our troop numbers consolidated in close bases and retrograded equipment from Afghanistan. At the peak in 2011, we had 97,000 U.S. troops alongside 41,000 NATO troops in Afghanistan. Ten years later, when Ambassador Khalilzad signed the Doha agreement with Mullah Baradar on 29 February 2020, the United States had 12,600 U.S. troops with 8,000 NATO and 10,500 contractors.

This has been a ten-year multi-administration drawdown, not a 19-month or 19-day NEO. Under the Doha agreement, the U.S. would begin to withdraw forces contingent upon Taliban meeting certain conditions, which would lead to a political agreement between the Taliban and the government of Afghanistan.

There were seven conditions applicable to the Taliban and eight conditions applicable to the United States. While the Taliban did not attack U.S. forces, which was one of the conditions, it failed to fully honor any other condition under the Doha agreement. And perhaps most importantly for U.S. national security, the Taliban has never renounced Al Qaeda or broke its affiliation with them. We the United States adhered to every condition.

In the fall of 2020, my analysis was that an accelerated withdrawal without meeting specific and necessary conditions, risks losing the substantial gains made in Afghanistan, damaging U.S. worldwide credibility, and could precipitate a general collapse of the NSF and the Afghan government resulting in a complete Taliban takeover or general civil war. That was a year ago.

My assessment remained consistent throughout. Based on my advice, and the advice of the commanders, then-Secretary of Defense Esper submitted a memorandum on 9 November recommending to maintain U.S. forces at a level between about 2,500 and 4,500 in Afghanistan until conditions were met for further reduction.

Two days later, on 11 November 2020, I received an unclassified, signed order directing United States military to withdraw all forces from Afghanistan no later than 15 January 2021. After further discussions regarding the risks associated with such a withdrawal, the order was rescinded. On 17 November, we received a new order to reduce levels of 2,500-plus enabling forces no later than 15 January.

When President Biden was inaugurated, there were approximately 3,500 U.S. troops, 5,400 NATO troops and 6,300 contractors in Afghanistan with the specified task of train, advice and assist, along with a small contingent of counterterrorism forces. The strategist situation on the inauguration was stalemate.

Biden administration through the National Security Council process conducted a rigorous interagency review of the situation in Afghanistan in February, March and April. During this process, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of us, the CENTCOM commander, General McKenzie, the U.S. commander, General Miller, and myself were all given serious consideration by the administration. We provided a broad range of options and our assessment of their potential outcomes. The cost, benefit, risk to force and risk to mission were evaluated against national security objectives of the United States.

On 14 April, the president announced his decision and the U.S. military received a change of mission, to retrograde all U.S. military forces, maintain a small contingency force of 600 to 700 to protect the embassy in Kabul until the Department of State could coordinate contractor security support and also assist Turkey to maintain the Karzai International Airport and transition the U.S. military to an over-the-horizon counterterrorism support and security force assistance.

It is clear, it is obvious the war in Afghanistan did not end on the terms we wanted with the Taliban now in power in Kabul. Although the NEO was unprecedented, as the largest air evacuation in history, evacuating 124,000 people, it came at an incredible cost of 11 marines, 1 soldier, and a navy corpsman.

[10:05:08]

Those 13 gave their lives of the people they never met to have an opportunity to live in freedom. And we must remember that the Taliban was and remains a terrorist organization, and they still have not broken ties with Al Qaeda.

I have no illusions who we are dealing with. It remains to be seen whether or not the Taliban can consolidate power or if the country will further fracture into civil war. But we must continue to protect the United States of America and its people from terrorist attacks coming from Afghanistan.

A reconstituted Al Qaeda or ISIS with aspirations to attack the United States is a very real possibility. And those conditions to include activity and ungoverned spaces could present themselves in the next 12 to 36 months. That mission will be much harder now but not impossible, and we will continue to protect the American people.

Strategic decisions have strategic consequences. Over the course of 4 presidents, 12 secretaries of defense, 7 chairman, 10 CENTCOM commanders, 20 commanders in Afghanistan, hundreds of congressional delegation visits and 20 years of congressional oversight, there are many lessons to be learned. Two specific to the military that we need to take a look at, and we will, is did we mirror image the development of the Afghan National Army and the second is the unprecedented rapid collapse of the Afghan military in only 11 days in August.

However, one lesson must never be forgotten. Every soldier, sailor, airman and marine who served there in Afghanistan for 20 consecutive years protected our country from attack by terrorists. And for that, they should be forever proud and we should be forever grateful.

Thank you, Chairman, and if I could, I know that there's some issues in the media that are of deep concern to many members on the committee, and with your permission, I would like to address those for a minute or two. Again, I've submitted memoranda for the committee to look at.

SEN. JACK REED (D-RI): You may proceed.

MILLEY: Mr. Chairman, I've served this nation for 42 years. I spent years in combat, and I buried a lot of my troops who died while defending this country. My loyalty to this nation, its people, and the Constitution hasn't changed and will never change as long as I have a breath to give. My loyalty is absolute and I will not turn my back on the following.

With respect to the Chinese calls, I routinely communicated with my counterpart, General Lee, with the knowledge and coordination of civilian oversight. I am specifically directed to communicate with the Chinese by Department of Defense guidance, the policy dialogue system. These military-to-military communications at the highest level are critical to the security of the United States in order to de-conflict military actions, manage crises and prevent war between great powers that are armed with the world's most deadliest weapons.

The calls on 30 October and 8 January were coordinated before and after, with Secretary Esper and acting Secretary Miller's staffs and the interagency. The specific purpose of the October and January calls were to generate -- or were generated by concerning intelligence, which caused us to believe the Chinese were worried about an attack on them by the United States.

I know, I am certain that President Trump did not intend to attack the Chinese, and it is my directed responsibility and it was my directed responsibility by the secretary to convey that intent to the Chinese. My task at that time was to de-escalate. My message again was consistent, stay calm, steady and de-escalate. We are not going to attack you.

At Secretary of Defense Esper's direction, I made a call to General Lee on 30 October. Eight people sat on that call with me and I read out the call within 30 minutes of the call ending. On 31 December, the Chinese requested another call with me. The deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asia-Pacific policy have coordinated my call, which was then scheduled for 8 January, and he made a preliminary call on 6 January. 11 people attended that call with me and readouts of this call were distributed to the interagency that same day. Shortly after my call ended with General Lee, I personally informed both Secretary of State Pompeo and White House Chief of Staff Meadows about the call among other topics.

[10:10:10]

Soon after that, I attended a meeting with acting Secretary Miller where I briefed him on the call.

Later that same day on 8 January, Speaker of the House Pelosi called me to inquire about the president's ability to launch nuclear weapons. I sought to assure her that nuclear launch is governed by a very specific and deliberate process. She was concerned and made various personal references characterizing the president.

I explained to her that the president is the sole nuclear launch authority and he doesn't launch them alone and that I am not qualified to determine the mental health of the president of the United States. There are processes, protocols and procedures in place, and I repeatedly assured her that there was no chance of an illegal, unauthorized or accidental launch.

By presidential directive and secretary of defense directive, the chairman is part of the process to ensure the president is fully informed on determining the use of the world's deadliest weapons. By law, I am not in the chain of command and I know that. However, by presidential directive and DOD instruction, I am in the chain of communication to fulfill legal statutory role as the president's primary military adviser.

After the Speaker Pelosi call, I convened a short meeting in my office with key members of my staff to refresh all of us on the procedures which we practiced daily at the action officer level. Additionally, I immediately informed acting Secretary of Defense Miller of Speaker Pelosi's phone call. At no time was I attempting to change or influence the process, usurp authority or insert myself in the chain of command. But I am expected, I am required to give my advice and ensure that the president is fully informed on military matters.

I am submitting for the record a more detailed and unclassified memorandum I believe you all now have, although late. And I welcome a thorough walkthrough on every single one of these events and I'd be happy in a classified session to talk in detail about the intelligence that drove these calls. I'm also happy to make available any email, phone logs, memoranda, witnesses or anything else you need to understand these events.

My oath is to support the Constitution of the United States of America against all enemies foreign and domestic. And I will never turn my back on that oath. I firmly believe in civilian control of the military as a bedrock principle essential to the health of this republic and I'm committed to ensuring that the military stays clear of domestic politics.

I look forward to your questions. And thank you, chairman, for the extra time. REED: Thank you, General. General McKenzie, I understand you do not have a statement. Is that correct?

GEN. KENNETH FRANK MCKENZIE, U.S. CENTCOM COMMANDER: Sir, I waive my statement in order to get this back on schedule.

REED: Thank you very much, General.

Secretary Austin, the Doha agreement represents direct negotiations with terrorists and not just negotiations but an agreement with them that excluded the Afghan government and the allies who have been fighting with us now since 9/11. It set a fixed departure date with conditions has been indicated were not really followed consistently by the Taliban.

As you considered in April what to do, did the intelligence suggest to you that reneging on the departure of the troops would lead to significant attacks against American and allied military forces?

LLOYD AUSTIN, DEFENSE SECRETARY: Chairman, my recollection, the intelligence was clear that if we did not leave in accordance with that agreement, the Taliban would recommence attacks on our forces.

REED: And they would include (INAUDIBLE) any means they could use to attack American forces?

AUSTIN: That's correct, Chairman.

REED: So, the choice was, in many respects, was, were we going to incur additional casualties indefinitely in Afghanistan. That's one way to look at it. Is that fair?

AUSTIN: That's correct, Chairman. You certainly would have to do -- take additional measures to be able to defend yourself if the Taliban recommenced their offensive operations against us.

[10:15:00]

REED: Now, General Milley and General McKenzie, did the Doha agreement affect the morale of the Afghan forces, i.e., was there a sense now that even though it was months away that the United States was leaving since we had agreed to leave?

MILLEY: I'll let Frank talk to the details but my assessment is yes, Senator, it did affect the morale of the Afghan Security Forces.

REED: General McKenzie?

MCKENZIE: Sir, it's my judgment that the Doha agreement did negatively affect the performance of the Afghan forces particularly by some of the actions that the government of Afghanistan was required to under an agreement.

REED: And one of the critical issues was the agreement to withdraw our contractors, which are basically the engine that maintains the air force of Afghanistan and many other logistical operations. And that was just as critical as the troop departure, I would assume.

MCKENZIE: Chairman, it was. We had plans in place to try to conduct those operations from over the horizon. They were not as effective as having contractors on the ground onsite with the aircraft.

REED: The momentum appeared to be shifting to the Taliban. Indications were their penetration in parts of the country in the northern sectors, particularly, which traditionally oppose the Taliban, the Northern Alliance, but that started -- to be fair, that started long before Doha. There are some commentators who have suggested since 2014 the Taliban have been surrounding provincial capitals, insinuating themselves into the politics of the local communities, striking bargains. Is that your impression too, General McKenzie?

MCKENZIE: Sir, I think it is a good assessment from 2014 on the Taliban did pursue that strategy and they had some success. And the government of Afghanistan also had success holding on to centralized urban areas and population centers. But the Taliban pursued a distinct strategy and had some success with it.

REED: All right. General -- excuse me, Secretary Austin, you did provide the best military advice to the president regarding the situation in Afghanistan and as has been recounted several times there were multiple meetings and he received the advice of many different quarters. Do you feel you had the opportunity to make your advice very clear?

AUSTIN: I do, chairman. As I've said before, I always keep my advice to the president confidential, but I am very much satisfied that we had a thorough policy review. And I believe that all of the parties had an opportunity to provide input and that input was received.

REED: Thank you very much. Senator Inhofe?

SEN. JAMES INHOFE (R-OK): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It was two weeks ago that we had a closed, classified hearing. We had General Miller's recommendation at that time. Well, let me, first of all, just mention that during the confirmation process, you committed -- and I'm speaking now to General McKenzie and General Milley -- to giving your honest and personal views to this committee, even if those views differed from those of the administration, and I'm confident you will be doing that.

During this hearing that we had, it was emphasized to us from General Miller that we -- he was recommending that 2,500 troops in Afghanistan. Now, we didn't receive the documentation from your offices, I'd say, to the witnesses today until 10:35 last night. So, there really wasn't time to get into a lot of the details.

But I'd ask General McKenzie, did you agree to the recommendation that General Miller had two weeks ago?

MCKENZIE: Senator, again, I won't share my personal recommendation to the president, but I will give you my honest opinion, and my honest opinion, in view, shaped my recommendation. I recommended that we maintain 2,500 troops in Afghanistan and I also recommended earlier in the fall of 2020 that we maintain 4,500 at that time. Those were my personal views.

[10:20:00]

I also have a view that the withdrawal of those forces would lead inevitably to the collapse of the Afghan military forces and eventually the Afghan government.

INHOFE: Yes, I understand that. General Milley, I assume you agree with that in terms of the recommendation of 2,500.

MILLEY: What I said in my opening statement and the memoranda that I wrote back in the fall of 2020 remained consistent and I do agree with that.

INHOFE: This committee is unsure as to whether General Miller's recommendation ever got to the president. You know, obviously, there are conversations with the president, but I would like to ask General McKenzie, I think you've all made this statement, did you talk to the president about General Miller's recommendation?

MCKENZIE: Sir, I was present when that discussion was heard, and I'm confident that the president heard all the recommendations and listened to them very thoughtfully.

INHOFE: So, one of the recommendations that was made by the three of you would be the recommendation that virtually was made by General Miller's two weeks ago.

During the August 18th interview on ABC, George Stephanopoulos asked President Biden whether U.S. troops would stay beyond August 31st if there are still Americans to evacuate. President Biden responded, and this is a quote, if there's American citizens left, we're going to stay to get them all out. This didn't happen. President Biden's decision resulted in all the troops leaving, but American citizens are still trying to get out.

How many American citizens, is it your opinion, are still there? Just go down the line, each one of you. Anyone?

AUSTIN: Senator, I would defer to the State Department for that assessment. But that's a dynamic process. They've been contacting the civilians that are in Afghanistan. And, again, I would defer to them for definitive numbers.

INHOFE: Go ahead. Others?

MILLEY: Same as the secretary just said. There were numbers at the beginning of the process with the F-77 report out of the embassy, and we know that we took out almost 6,000, I guess it is, American citizens, but how many remain --

INHOFE: Do all of you agree that Secretary of State Blinken, when he made his analysis as to how many people would be here but would still be there, you talked about 10,000 to 15,000 citizens left behind, and the -- and then evacuated some 6,000, that would mean a minimum of 4,000 would be -- would still be there now? Anyone disagree with that? By your silence, I assume you agree.

AUSTIN: I have no -- I don't -- I personally don't believe there are 4,000 American citizens still left in Afghanistan, but I cannot confirm or deny that, Senator.

INHOFE: I see. The secretary of state was probably wrong in his analysis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REED: Thank you. And just for the record, the chair and the vice chair/ranking member have each abided by the five-minute rule. Fair is fair.

SEN. JEANNE SHAHEEN (D-NH): Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Secretary Austin, General Milley and General McKenzie, being here this morning and, Secretary Austin and General Milley, thank you for your effort to put into some historical perspective what happened in Afghanistan and for recognizing the incredible service and sacrifice of the troops who served there.

General Milley, in a hearing before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense in June, I explicitly raised concerns about the plight of that risk, Afghans, due to our withdrawal and I asked about the department's plans to evacuate them.

Now, you indicated today that you thought we might be facing a kind of desperate situation that we saw in Kabul, but your response at that time was that, quote, lots of planning was ongoing and this is -- end quote -- and the State Department was leading efforts pertaining to evacuating our Afghan partners. And you explicitly told the committee that in your professional opinion you did not see Saigon 1975 in Afghanistan.

So, I'm just trying to figure out why we missed -- or from a public perception it appears that we didn't anticipate the rapid fall of Afghanistan and Kabul and the rise of the Taliban in the way we saw it play out on television.

[10:25:19]

And what did we miss?

MILLEY: I think, Senator, we absolutely missed the rapid 11-day collapse of the Afghan military and the collapse of their government. I think there was a lot of intelligence that clearly indicated that after we withdrew, that it was a likely outcome of a collapse of the military and a collapse of the government. Most of those intelligence assessments indicated that that would occur late fall, perhaps early winter, Kabul might hold until next spring. It depends on when the intel assessment was written.

So, after we leave, the assessments were pretty consistent that you'd see a general collapse of the government and the military.

While we were there, though, up through 31 August, there's no intel assessment that says the government is going to collapse and the military is going to collapse in 11 days that I'm aware of. And I've read I think pretty all of them. So -- and even as late as the 3rd of August, and there's one on the 8th of August, et cetera, they're still talking weeks, perhaps months, et cetera.

General McKenzie can illuminate on his own views on the same topic. He gave his assessments at the same time. And although General Miller did in many assessments say, rapid, fast, hard for collapse, he also centered into the October-November timeframe as opposed to August.

SHAHEEN: So, how do we avoid that happening again?

MILLEY: I think the key, Senator, that missed, frankly, we had some indicators but we didn't have the full wholesome assessment of leadership, morale and will. There were some units, and I don't want to say negative things about these guys, 60,000, 70,000 of the Afghan service killed in action over the last 20 years, and many units did fight at the very end. But the vast majority put their weapons down and melted away in a very, very short period of time. I think that has do with will, leadership, and I think we still need to try to figure out exactly why that was.

And I have some suggestions but I'm not settled on them yet. But we clearly missed that. I think one to have key factors we missed it for was we pulled our advisers out three years ago. And when you pull advisers out of the units, you no longer can assess things, like leadership and will. We can count all the planes, trucks and automobiles and cars and machine guns and everything else. We can count those from space and all the other kinds of intel assets but you can't measure the human heart with a machine. You've got to be there.

SHAHEEH: Thank you. Secretary Austin, I'm about to run out of time, so you may want to respond to this on the next round. But one of the challenges with getting special immigrant visa applicants out of Afghanistan has -- and this wasn't just a problem in the evacuation. This has been an historic problem that has gone over years, has been having the documents that show they actually served with our military. And DOD has been cited as the major problem in getting those documents.

So, again, how do we make sure that doesn't happen again in some future conflict where we need our partners on the ground to serve alongside of our military members? And I'm out of time. So, hopefully, you will answer that. Thank you.

REED: Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Wicker, please.

SEN. ROGER WICKER (R-MS): Chairman Reed, before I ask my questions, I have an objection. We've been having hearings in a classified setting on this, our first public hearing. And I'm sorry Senator Kaine has had to step away. But in a previous hearing, he expressed frustration in various hearings he had been to, a frustration that I shared, that when the State Department is here and we ask them a question, they say, well, you have to ask the defense department that.

And now, today, again, Defense Department people are before us and a question was asked and the answer to Senator Inhofe was, well, you have to ask the State Department that. Senator Kaine gently but fatherly sent a message to the administration at our last classified hearing that we need to cut that out, that members of the Defense Department need to be ready for the questions that we have asked and that we're going to ask. And so I object to the continuation of that in this hearing today.

While I'm at it, I would also point out, General Milley, I appreciate your statement and I read it and I understand what you're trying to say.

[10:30:07]