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CNN Live Saturday

Interview With Daniel Brumberg

Aired May 03, 2003 - 14:13   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.


FREDRICKA WHITFIELD, CNN ANCHOR: We turn now to the new Iraq and the formation of an interim government. Saddam Hussein's Baath Party governed Iraq before its collapse. Now the coalition must decide whether any of those party members can be trusted to run a new government. For analysis, we turn to Daniel Brumberg. He works on the Democracy and Rule of Law project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in Washington. Good to see you.
DANIEL BRUMBERG, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE: Hi.

WHITFIELD: Well, can any of these Baath Party members be trusted? Any of those be trusted to be part of an interim government?

BRUMBERG: Well, the Baath Party, or the very top echelon of the party itself, was a party that was controlling the Baath Party from top to bottom. It was the party that had control of the education system, the media system, the political system. The United States will have to prosecute the upper echelons of the Baath Party through a system that allows Iraqi judges and lawyers to handle the majority of the prosecutions, but yes, this is going to have to be a critical part of any process of rebuilding Iraq.

WHITFIELD: Well, obviously, in the upper echelon party members would not be a part of any kind of interim government. But how in the world will this coalition forces, led by the U.S. in any way try to weed out or find any particular Baath Party members who could be trusted to be part of the interim government to have some level of representation in a widespread way in that country?

BRUMBERG: Well, that's going to be very difficult. Our experience at the end of World War II in what was Nazi Germany was that we tried very much to make a distinction between those who were responsible for war crimes and those who were not. At the upper echelons of the Nazi Party, that was possibly, but as you went down the rungs, that was more difficult.

It's not going to be easy in the case of Iraq. One thing we're going to have to use is intelligence informants, and we are going to have to do so in a way that doesn't make it seem as if we are favoring the Shi'a and the Kurds over the Sunnis, because the Baath Party war largely, not exclusively but largely a Sunni-based political establishment. We don't want to be seen as using a search for Baath Party members as a mechanism simply to favor Shi'a and Kurds over Sunnis.

WHITFIELD: And at the same time, it seems like the challenge is going to be trying to find balance. When you talk about representation of the Shi'as, of the Sunnis, of Kurds, of Baath Party members. Who should make the determination of just how many of these members, of these various factions, and parties, should be involved?

BRUMBERG: That's a very good question. The United States is already planning to draw down its forces. The United States is not in the position of being a victorious party over a defeated country. The United States is viewed particularly from the Sunni community as an occupying force. And if we really don't have the legitimacy to go through this process, we're going to have to in some sense, as I noted before, bring in Iraqi judges and lawyers, people some of whom are trained outside of Iraq, as part of the process, and we are also diversifying the occupation forces, bringing in Poles and bringing in other forces who were part of the alliance, to play a role. So this doesn't seem as if the United States is engaging in some sort of witch-hunt, but it's going to be very difficult, because we are not going to have the kind of legitimacy to engage in de-Baathification that United States had in Germany at the end of the second world war.

WHITFIELD: And if not done delicately, don't you see that it could indeed spark yet another type of conflict?

BRUMBERG: It could, but I think the important thing to remember is that the Baath Party did not have the kind of reach that the Nazi Party had in Germany. In many respects, of course you have a society that's largely Shi'a, largely Kurd. They make up the majority. And as a result, the Baath Party did not have the kind of the extensive reach that the Nazi Party in Germany had. And as a result, I think in some respects, precisely because it didn't have quite the ideological reach that the Nazi Party had in Germany, the job will be easier. But the problem will be that the forces undertaking this task, the Americans, don't have the legitimacy to do so the way that the Americans did in Germany.

WHITFIELD: All right, Daniel Brumberg, thank you very much for joining us.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com







Aired May 3, 2003 - 14:13   ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
FREDRICKA WHITFIELD, CNN ANCHOR: We turn now to the new Iraq and the formation of an interim government. Saddam Hussein's Baath Party governed Iraq before its collapse. Now the coalition must decide whether any of those party members can be trusted to run a new government. For analysis, we turn to Daniel Brumberg. He works on the Democracy and Rule of Law project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in Washington. Good to see you.
DANIEL BRUMBERG, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE: Hi.

WHITFIELD: Well, can any of these Baath Party members be trusted? Any of those be trusted to be part of an interim government?

BRUMBERG: Well, the Baath Party, or the very top echelon of the party itself, was a party that was controlling the Baath Party from top to bottom. It was the party that had control of the education system, the media system, the political system. The United States will have to prosecute the upper echelons of the Baath Party through a system that allows Iraqi judges and lawyers to handle the majority of the prosecutions, but yes, this is going to have to be a critical part of any process of rebuilding Iraq.

WHITFIELD: Well, obviously, in the upper echelon party members would not be a part of any kind of interim government. But how in the world will this coalition forces, led by the U.S. in any way try to weed out or find any particular Baath Party members who could be trusted to be part of the interim government to have some level of representation in a widespread way in that country?

BRUMBERG: Well, that's going to be very difficult. Our experience at the end of World War II in what was Nazi Germany was that we tried very much to make a distinction between those who were responsible for war crimes and those who were not. At the upper echelons of the Nazi Party, that was possibly, but as you went down the rungs, that was more difficult.

It's not going to be easy in the case of Iraq. One thing we're going to have to use is intelligence informants, and we are going to have to do so in a way that doesn't make it seem as if we are favoring the Shi'a and the Kurds over the Sunnis, because the Baath Party war largely, not exclusively but largely a Sunni-based political establishment. We don't want to be seen as using a search for Baath Party members as a mechanism simply to favor Shi'a and Kurds over Sunnis.

WHITFIELD: And at the same time, it seems like the challenge is going to be trying to find balance. When you talk about representation of the Shi'as, of the Sunnis, of Kurds, of Baath Party members. Who should make the determination of just how many of these members, of these various factions, and parties, should be involved?

BRUMBERG: That's a very good question. The United States is already planning to draw down its forces. The United States is not in the position of being a victorious party over a defeated country. The United States is viewed particularly from the Sunni community as an occupying force. And if we really don't have the legitimacy to go through this process, we're going to have to in some sense, as I noted before, bring in Iraqi judges and lawyers, people some of whom are trained outside of Iraq, as part of the process, and we are also diversifying the occupation forces, bringing in Poles and bringing in other forces who were part of the alliance, to play a role. So this doesn't seem as if the United States is engaging in some sort of witch-hunt, but it's going to be very difficult, because we are not going to have the kind of legitimacy to engage in de-Baathification that United States had in Germany at the end of the second world war.

WHITFIELD: And if not done delicately, don't you see that it could indeed spark yet another type of conflict?

BRUMBERG: It could, but I think the important thing to remember is that the Baath Party did not have the kind of reach that the Nazi Party had in Germany. In many respects, of course you have a society that's largely Shi'a, largely Kurd. They make up the majority. And as a result, the Baath Party did not have the kind of the extensive reach that the Nazi Party in Germany had. And as a result, I think in some respects, precisely because it didn't have quite the ideological reach that the Nazi Party had in Germany, the job will be easier. But the problem will be that the forces undertaking this task, the Americans, don't have the legitimacy to do so the way that the Americans did in Germany.

WHITFIELD: All right, Daniel Brumberg, thank you very much for joining us.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com