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CNN Live Saturday
Reaction To al-Jubeir's Press Conference; Riveting Final Testimony in 9/11 Hearings
Aired June 19, 2004 - 14:00 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
FREDRICKA WHITFIELD, CNN ANCHOR, CNN SATURDAY: Adel Al-Jubeir a foreign adviser to the Crown Prince Abdullah out of Saudi Arabia there at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, D.C. spelling it out. Saying despite earlier reports, the body of Paul Johnson, the American engineer, has not been found. However, they made the determination of his death because they analyzed the tape put out by the Al-Qaeda network on the Web site.
They do say, however, they have some idea of where the body may be based on the information on that Web site. He says that our people, the Saudi people are outraged and saddened by the treatment of Paul Johnson "saying they demand action. We'll give them action," and so far Al-Jubeir has said that 12 suspects have been arrested, mostly Saudi's in connection with the death of Paul Johnson and the self- professed leader of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, Abdel Aziz Al-Muqrin (ph) has been killed.
Our military intelligence analyst Ken Robinson joins us now to give us a better understanding about what was said in particular about a 30,000 Americans still in Saudi Arabia, we heard from Al Jubeir who said it would not be wise in his view to encourage them to leave that region. He said already they believe they have made a dent in the Al- Qaeda force there by these arrests and by these killings. Do you agree with that?
KEN ROBINSON, CNN ANALYST: No, I don't. First reports are always wrong. We don't know for sure whether the real prize of Al-Muqrin is actually who was killed. We know that they say that's who it is. We know they say that his second in command is wounded and being interrogated. We know that they say they have just one cell that they've been operating against.
However, there's no way to know for sure. When you make a declarative policy that declares victory, the terrorists often come back and surprise you by saying no you're not in charge. We're still here. That's likely to happen in the next week.
WHITFIELD: And perhaps the warnings now coming from these arrests and the killings of the Al-Qaeda leader certainly there is some caution now there may be some retaliatory strikes and perhaps more Americans in that region would in deed be targeted?
ROBINSON: I think it is absolutely; it should be taken to the bank. Remember Al-Muqrin himself, if he has been killed; he rose to power by replacing a man named Al-Haj who had been killed by Saudi forces in a previous gun battle. So when one leader is taken out, it doesn't take out an organization and it certainly doesn't kill the ideology, which caused that organization to form.
WHITFIELD: Ken, Al Jubeir said no two countries in the world are working as closely as Saudi Arabia and the U.S. in the war on terrorism. He says anything that has been required and asked of the U.S., the U.S. has delivered. However, he wouldn't go into details of the technical support that the U.S. has been providing, particularly in the search for Paul Johnson and now thereafter. By what means do you believe this technical support is being provided by the U.S.?
ROBINSON: Well, I think if you look at past performance predicting future behavior, it's clear that we do not have a human capability to put operatives on the ground there and have them be able to successfully penetrate these foreign terrorist organizations. What we do have is our technology and our technology is signals intelligence and our technology is imagery from space-based systems.
We also have technology from low-flying platforms of unmanned aerial vehicles that are being used in Afghanistan and in Iraq, and one could assume that those technologies would be shared in the war on terrorism.
WHITFIELD: Ken Robinson, our military intelligence analyst, thanks very much for joining us. Appreciate it.
ROBINSON: Sure Fred.
WHITFIELD: Well, last week it was the culmination of the 9/11 commission hearings. Thursday's dramatic report and tapes demonstrating just how U.S. air defenses responded to those first hijacking alerts and how they were caught off guard by the terrorist plans of the attack. We have some of the most riveting testimony for you to hear so listen as the drama unfolds.
(BEGIN VIDEO TAPE)
PHILIP ZELIKOW, 9/11 COMMITTEE MEMBER: FAA Centers often receive information and make operational decisions independent of one another. On 9/11, the four hijacked aircraft were monitored mainly by four of these FAA en route trap control centers based in Boston, New York, Cleveland, and in Indianapolis. Each center thus had part of the knowledge of what was going on across the system.
But it is important to remember that what Boston Center knew was not necessarily known by the centers in New York, Cleveland, or Indianapolis. Controller's track airliners like the four aircraft hijacked on 9/11 primarily by watching the data from a signal emitted by the aircraft's transponder equipment. The four aircraft hijacked on 9/11 like all aircraft traveling above 10,000 feet were required to emit a unique transponder signal while in flight.
On 9/11, the terrorists turned off the transponders on three of the four aircraft. With the transponder turned off, it may be possible, although more difficult to track an aircraft by its primary radar returns. On the morning of 9/11, the existing protocol was unsuited in every respect for what was about to happen. What ensued was the hurried attempt to create an improvised defense by officials who had never encountered or trained against the situation they faced.
JOHN AZZARELLO, 9/11 COMMITTEE MEMBER: At 8:00 on September 11th, 2001, American Airlines flight 11 began its takeoff roll at Logan Airport in Boston. A Boeing 767, flight 11 was bound for Los Angeles with 81 passengers, 11 crew, and 24,000 gallons of jet fuel. By 8:09, it was being monitored by the FAA Boston Center located in New Hampshire. At 8:13, the controller instruct the flight to "turn 20 degrees right." which the flight acknowledged.
This was the last transmission to which the flight responded. Sixteen seconds later, the controller instructed the flight to climb to 35,000 feet. When there was no response, the controller repeated the command seconds later. And then tried repeatedly to raise the flight. He used the emergency frequency to try to reach the pilot. Though there was no response, he kept trying to contact the aircraft. At 8:21, American 11 turned off its transponder. Immediately degrading the available information about the aircraft.
The controller told his supervisor that he thought something was seriously wrong with the plane. At this point, neither the controller nor his supervisor suspected a hijacking. He became even more concerned as its route changed moving into another sector's air space. Controllers immediately began to move aircraft out of its path and searched from aircraft to aircraft in an effort to have another pilot contact American 11. At 8:24 and 38 seconds, the following transmission came from American 11 --
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: We have some planes. Just stay quiet and you'll be OK.
AZZARELLO: The next transmission came seconds later.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Nobody move. Everything will be OK. If you try to make any moves, you'll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet.
AZARRELLO: At 8:28, Boston Center called the Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, to advise management that it believed American 11 had been hijacked and was heading towards New York Center's air space. By this point in time American 11 had taken a dramatic turn to the south. At 8:32 the Command Center passed word of a possible hijacking to the operation center at FAA Headquarters.
The duty officer replied that security personnel at headquarters had just been discussing the hijack situation on a conference call with the New England regional office. The Herndon Command Center immediately established a teleconference between Boston, New York, and Cleveland centers so that Boston Center could help the others understand what was happening. At 8:34, the Boston Center controller received the third transmission from American 11.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Nobody move please. We are going back to the airport. Don't try to make any stupid moves.
AZARRELLO: At 8:37 and 52 seconds, Boston Center reached NYAX. This was the first notification received by the military at any level that will American 11 had been hijacked.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Hi, Boston Center TMU, we have a problem here. We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New York, and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble some F-16s or something to help us out.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Is this real world or exercise.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: No, this is not an exercise manifest.
AZARRELLO: F-158 fighters were ordered scrambled at 8:46 from Otis Air Force Base but NYAD's did not know where to send the fighter aircraft. "I don't know where I'm scrambling these guys to, I need a direction, a destination." Because the hijackers had turned off the plane's transponder, NYAD's personnel spent the next minutes searching their radarscopes for the elusive primary radar return. American 11 impacted the World Trade Center's north tower at 8:46 and 40 seconds.
Shortly after 8:50, while NYAD's personnel were still trying to locate American 11, word reached them that a plane had hit the World Trade Center. Radar data showed the Otis fighters were airborne at 8:53. Lacking a target, they were vectored toward military controlled air space off the Long Island Coast. To avoid New York area air traffic and uncertain about what to do, the fighters were brought down to military air space to "hold as needed."
In summary is NYAD received notice of the hijacking nine minutes before it impacted the North Tower. The nine minutes' notice was the most the military would receive that morning of any of the four hijackings.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
WHITFIELD: We've been listening to a dramatic report from the 9/11 commission's final hearing on Thursday that tells how decisions were made as the horrors of that day unfolded and why in the end U.S. Air defenses were unable to stop what the terrorists had set in motion.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
AZARRELLO: At 8:48, the New York Center manager provided the following report on a command center tells conference about American 11 including information that had been relayed by the airline.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: This is New York Center. We're watching the airplane. I also had conversations with American Airlines and they have told us they believe that one of the stewardesses was stabbed and that there are people in the cockpit that have control of the aircraft. That's all the information they have right now.
AZARRELLO: The New York Center controller and manager were unaware that American 11 had already crashed. At approximately 8:55, the controller in charge notified a New York Center manager that she believed that United 175 had also been hijacked.
The manager tried to notify the regional managers and was told that the managers were discussing a hijacked aircraft; presumably American 11 ran and refused to be disturbed. At 8:58, the New York Center controller searching for United 175 told another New York controller "we might have a hijack over here, two of them." Between 9:01 and 9:02 a manager from New York Center told the Command Center in Herndon.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: We have several situations going on here. It's escalating big, big time. We need to get the military involved with us.
AZARRELLO: Meanwhile a manager from Boston Center reported they had deciphered what they had heard in one of the first hijackers transmissions from American 11.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: You still there.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes, I am.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I'm going to reconfirm with downstairs but the -- as far as the tape, but seem to think that the guy said we have the plane. I don't know it was because we have the accent or if there's more than one. But I'm going to reconfirm that for you. I'll get back to you real quick with that.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Appreciate it.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Planes, as in plural. It sounds like we're talking to New York and that there's another one headed to the World Trade Center.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: There's another aircraft?
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: The second one just hit the Trade Center.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: OK. We've got to alert the military real quick on this.
AZARRELLO: The first indication that the Norad Air Defenders had of the second hijacked aircraft, United 175, came in a phone call from New York Center to NYAD's at 9:03. The notice came in at about the time the plane was hitting the South Tower. At 9:08, the mission commander at NYAD's learned of the second explosion at the World Trade Center and decided against holding the fighters in military air space away from Manhattan.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: This is what I foresee that we probably need to do. We need to do talk to FAA, tell them that this stuff is going to keep on going. We need to take those fighters and put them over Manhattan, that is the best play right now. Tell them if there's more out there, which we don't know -- get them over Manhattan. At least we got some kind of play.
AZARRELLO: At 8:54, American 77 began deviating from its flight plan. First with a slight turn toward the south. Two minutes later, it disappeared completely from Indianapolis radar. The controller tracking American 77 told us he first noticed the aircraft turning to the southwest and then saw the data disappear. By 9:25, FAA's Herndon Command Center and FAA's Headquarters knew the following -- they knew two aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center, they knew that American 77 was lost.
They knew that a hijacker on board American 11 had said "we have some planes." Concerns over the safety of other aircraft began to mount. A manager at the Herndon Command Center asked FAA Headquarters if they wanted to order a "nationwide ground stock." While executives at FAA Headquarters discussed it, the Command Center went ahead and ordered one anyway at 9:25. Norad did not know about the search for American 77. Instead, they heard once again about a plane that no longer existed, American 11. At 9:21, NYAD's receive a report from the FAA.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Military, Boston Center, I just had a report that American 11 is still in the air and heading towards Washington.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: The American 11 is still in the air and heading towards Washington?
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Another aircraft hit the tower. That's the latest report we have. I'm going to try to confirm an ID for you, but I would assume he's somewhere over either New Jersey or somewhere further south.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: OK, so American 11 isn't a hijack at all then, right?
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: No, he is a hijack.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: American 11 is a hijack.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: And he's going into Washington.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: He could be a third aircraft.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
WHITFIELD: We continue now with some of the most compelling details to emerge from the 9/11 commission hearings this week. We turn our attention now to the story of United flight 93.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
JOHN FARMER, COMMITTEE MEMBER: Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from unknown origin." The controller responded seconds later "somebody call Cleveland." This was followed by a second radio transmission with sounds of screaming and someone yelling "get out of here, get out of here." Again from an unknown source. The Cleveland Center controllers began to try to identify the possible source of the transmissions and noticed that United 93 had descended some 700 feet.
The controller attempted again to raise United 93 several times with no response. At 9:30, the controller began to pull the other flights in his frequency to determine if they heard the screaming. several said they had. At 9:32, a third radio transmission came over the frequency, "Keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board." The controller understood but chose to respond, "Calling Cleveland Center, you're unreadable, say again slowly." He notified a supervisor who passed a notice up the chain of command.
By 9:34, word of a hijacking had reached FAA Headquarters in Washington. Between 9:34 and 9:38, the controller observed United 93 climbing to 40,700 feet and immediately moved several aircraft out of its way. The controller continued to try to contact United 93 and asked whether the pilot could confirm that he had been hijacked. There was no response. Then at 9:39 a fifth radio transmission came over the radio frequency from United 93.
ZIAD JARRAH: Uh, this is the captain, would like you all to remain seated. There is a bomb on board and are going back to the airport and to have our demands (UNINTELLIGIBLE). Please remain quiet.
FARMER: The controller responded, "United 93, I understand you have a bomb on board." Go ahead. The flight did not respond. At 9:41, Cleveland Center lost United 93's transponder signal. The controller located it on primary radar, matched its position with visual sightings from other aircraft and tracked the flight as it turned east then south. At 9:49, 13 minutes after getting the question from Cleveland Center about military help, Command Center suggested that someone had headquarters should decide whether to request military assistance.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: They are pulling (UNINTELLIGIBLE) talk about United 93.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Do we want to think about scrambling aircraft?
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Oh, God, I don't know.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: That's a decision somebody's going to have to make probably in the next ten minutes.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Uh, you know everybody just left the room.
FARMER: United 93 was spotted by another aircraft and at 10:01 Command Center advised FAA Headquarters that one of the aircraft had seen United 93 "waving its wings." The aircraft had witnessed the radical gyrations in what we believe was the hijackers efforts to defeat the passenger assault on the cockpit. The United 93 crashed in Pennsylvania at 10:03, in 11 seconds, 125 miles from Washington, D.C. five minutes later, Command Center forwarded this update to headquarters. UNIDENTIFIED MALE: There is now on United 93, there is a report of black smoke in the last position I gave you, 15 miles south of Johnstown.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: From the airplane or from the ground.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: They're speculating it's from the aircraft who hit the ground. That's what they're speculating. Speculation only.
FARMER: NYAD was never able to locate United 93 on radar because it was already in the ground. The news of a reported bomb on board United 93 spread quickly at NYAD. The air defenders search for United 93's primary radar return and tried to locate assets to scramble toward the plane. NYAD's called Washington Center to report.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: United 93, have you got information on that yet?
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes, he's down.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: He's down?
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: When did he land?
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: He did not land.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Oh, he's down.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes. Somewhere northeast of Camp David.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Northeast of Camp David.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: That's the last report. They don't know exactly where.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
WHITFIELD: America is under attack those four words whispered in the president's ear belie the complexities of what was unfolding on the morning of September 11th. Listen as we learn how America's leaders were made aware of the chaos underway and what they did.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
DANA HYDE, 9/11 COMMITTEE MEMBER: In Florida, the president's motorcade was just arriving at the Emiet (ph) E. Booker Elementary School where President Bush was to read to a class and talk about education. White House Chief of Staff Andrew Carr told us he was standing with the president outside the classroom when senior advisor to the president, Karl Rowe, first informed them that a small twin- engine plane had crashed into the World Trade Center.
The president's reaction was that the incident must have been caused by pilot error. At the White House, the vice president had just sat down for a meeting when his assistant told him to turn on his television because a plane had struck the North Tower of the World Trade Center. The vice president was wondering, "how the hell a plane can hit the World Trade Center" when he saw the second aircraft strike the South Tower.
The president was seated in a classroom of second graders when at approximately 9:05; Andrew Card whispered to him "a second plane hit the second tower. America is under attack." The president told us his instinct was to project calm, not to have the country see an excited reaction at a moment of crisis. The national press corps was standing behind the children in the classroom. He saw the phones and pagers start to ring.
The president felt he should project strength and calm until he could better understand what was happening. The president's motorcade departed at 9:35 and arrived at the airport between 9:42 and 9:45. During the ride, the president learned about the attack on the Pentagon. He boarded the aircraft, asked the Secret Service about the safety of his family and called the vice president. According to notes of this call, at about the 9:45, the president told the vice president, "sounds like we have a minor war going on here. I heard about the Pentagon. We're at war, somebody's going to pay."
News of an incoming aircraft later discovered to be American 77 prompted the Secret Service to order the evacuation of the vice president just before 9:36. The vice president entered the underground tunnel that led to the shelter at 9:37.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: At 10:0 2, the communicators in the shelter began receiving reports from the secret service of an inbound aircraft, presumably hijacked heading toward Washington. That aircraft was United 93. At sometime between 10:10 and 10:15, a military aide told the vice president and others that the aircraft is 80 miles out. Vice President Cheney was asked for authority to engage the aircraft. The vice presidents reaction was described as quick and divisive, "and about the time it takes a batter to decide to swing." He authorized fighter aircraft to engage the inbound plane. He told us this was based on his prior conversation with the president. It is not clear how the order was communicated to the Continental Region Headquarters but we know that at 10:31 General Larry Arnold instructed his staff to broadcast the following message over NORAD chat log. 10:31 "vice president has cleared us to intercept traps of interest and shoot them down if they do not respond per CONR/CC. General Arnold."
In upstate New York NYAD's personnel first learned of the shoot down order from that chat log message.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: You need to read this. The Region Commander has declared that we can shoot down aircraft that do not respond to our direction. Copy that?
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Copy that.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: So if you're trying to divert somebody and he won't divert -
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Do --
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: It came over the chat. You got a conflict on that direction?
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Right now no, but...
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: OK, you read that from the vice president right?
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Vice president has cleared. Vice president has cleared us to intercept traffic and shoot them down if they do not respond per CONR/CC.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
FREDRICKA WHITFIELD, CNN ANCHOR, NEXT@CNN: And by the time Vice President Cheney's orders were confirmed, the last of the hijacked planes had crashed. The confusion led to what may have been the boldest statement in Thursday's hearing, it came from the leader of Norad. The North American Areao Space Defense Command. He said that all four planes could have been brought down had the FAA notified the military as soon as it knew of each hijacking. The panel will issue its report and recommendations by July 26.
NEXT@CNN begins right after this short break.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
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Aired June 19, 2004 - 14:00 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
FREDRICKA WHITFIELD, CNN ANCHOR, CNN SATURDAY: Adel Al-Jubeir a foreign adviser to the Crown Prince Abdullah out of Saudi Arabia there at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, D.C. spelling it out. Saying despite earlier reports, the body of Paul Johnson, the American engineer, has not been found. However, they made the determination of his death because they analyzed the tape put out by the Al-Qaeda network on the Web site.
They do say, however, they have some idea of where the body may be based on the information on that Web site. He says that our people, the Saudi people are outraged and saddened by the treatment of Paul Johnson "saying they demand action. We'll give them action," and so far Al-Jubeir has said that 12 suspects have been arrested, mostly Saudi's in connection with the death of Paul Johnson and the self- professed leader of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, Abdel Aziz Al-Muqrin (ph) has been killed.
Our military intelligence analyst Ken Robinson joins us now to give us a better understanding about what was said in particular about a 30,000 Americans still in Saudi Arabia, we heard from Al Jubeir who said it would not be wise in his view to encourage them to leave that region. He said already they believe they have made a dent in the Al- Qaeda force there by these arrests and by these killings. Do you agree with that?
KEN ROBINSON, CNN ANALYST: No, I don't. First reports are always wrong. We don't know for sure whether the real prize of Al-Muqrin is actually who was killed. We know that they say that's who it is. We know they say that his second in command is wounded and being interrogated. We know that they say they have just one cell that they've been operating against.
However, there's no way to know for sure. When you make a declarative policy that declares victory, the terrorists often come back and surprise you by saying no you're not in charge. We're still here. That's likely to happen in the next week.
WHITFIELD: And perhaps the warnings now coming from these arrests and the killings of the Al-Qaeda leader certainly there is some caution now there may be some retaliatory strikes and perhaps more Americans in that region would in deed be targeted?
ROBINSON: I think it is absolutely; it should be taken to the bank. Remember Al-Muqrin himself, if he has been killed; he rose to power by replacing a man named Al-Haj who had been killed by Saudi forces in a previous gun battle. So when one leader is taken out, it doesn't take out an organization and it certainly doesn't kill the ideology, which caused that organization to form.
WHITFIELD: Ken, Al Jubeir said no two countries in the world are working as closely as Saudi Arabia and the U.S. in the war on terrorism. He says anything that has been required and asked of the U.S., the U.S. has delivered. However, he wouldn't go into details of the technical support that the U.S. has been providing, particularly in the search for Paul Johnson and now thereafter. By what means do you believe this technical support is being provided by the U.S.?
ROBINSON: Well, I think if you look at past performance predicting future behavior, it's clear that we do not have a human capability to put operatives on the ground there and have them be able to successfully penetrate these foreign terrorist organizations. What we do have is our technology and our technology is signals intelligence and our technology is imagery from space-based systems.
We also have technology from low-flying platforms of unmanned aerial vehicles that are being used in Afghanistan and in Iraq, and one could assume that those technologies would be shared in the war on terrorism.
WHITFIELD: Ken Robinson, our military intelligence analyst, thanks very much for joining us. Appreciate it.
ROBINSON: Sure Fred.
WHITFIELD: Well, last week it was the culmination of the 9/11 commission hearings. Thursday's dramatic report and tapes demonstrating just how U.S. air defenses responded to those first hijacking alerts and how they were caught off guard by the terrorist plans of the attack. We have some of the most riveting testimony for you to hear so listen as the drama unfolds.
(BEGIN VIDEO TAPE)
PHILIP ZELIKOW, 9/11 COMMITTEE MEMBER: FAA Centers often receive information and make operational decisions independent of one another. On 9/11, the four hijacked aircraft were monitored mainly by four of these FAA en route trap control centers based in Boston, New York, Cleveland, and in Indianapolis. Each center thus had part of the knowledge of what was going on across the system.
But it is important to remember that what Boston Center knew was not necessarily known by the centers in New York, Cleveland, or Indianapolis. Controller's track airliners like the four aircraft hijacked on 9/11 primarily by watching the data from a signal emitted by the aircraft's transponder equipment. The four aircraft hijacked on 9/11 like all aircraft traveling above 10,000 feet were required to emit a unique transponder signal while in flight.
On 9/11, the terrorists turned off the transponders on three of the four aircraft. With the transponder turned off, it may be possible, although more difficult to track an aircraft by its primary radar returns. On the morning of 9/11, the existing protocol was unsuited in every respect for what was about to happen. What ensued was the hurried attempt to create an improvised defense by officials who had never encountered or trained against the situation they faced.
JOHN AZZARELLO, 9/11 COMMITTEE MEMBER: At 8:00 on September 11th, 2001, American Airlines flight 11 began its takeoff roll at Logan Airport in Boston. A Boeing 767, flight 11 was bound for Los Angeles with 81 passengers, 11 crew, and 24,000 gallons of jet fuel. By 8:09, it was being monitored by the FAA Boston Center located in New Hampshire. At 8:13, the controller instruct the flight to "turn 20 degrees right." which the flight acknowledged.
This was the last transmission to which the flight responded. Sixteen seconds later, the controller instructed the flight to climb to 35,000 feet. When there was no response, the controller repeated the command seconds later. And then tried repeatedly to raise the flight. He used the emergency frequency to try to reach the pilot. Though there was no response, he kept trying to contact the aircraft. At 8:21, American 11 turned off its transponder. Immediately degrading the available information about the aircraft.
The controller told his supervisor that he thought something was seriously wrong with the plane. At this point, neither the controller nor his supervisor suspected a hijacking. He became even more concerned as its route changed moving into another sector's air space. Controllers immediately began to move aircraft out of its path and searched from aircraft to aircraft in an effort to have another pilot contact American 11. At 8:24 and 38 seconds, the following transmission came from American 11 --
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: We have some planes. Just stay quiet and you'll be OK.
AZZARELLO: The next transmission came seconds later.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Nobody move. Everything will be OK. If you try to make any moves, you'll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet.
AZARRELLO: At 8:28, Boston Center called the Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, to advise management that it believed American 11 had been hijacked and was heading towards New York Center's air space. By this point in time American 11 had taken a dramatic turn to the south. At 8:32 the Command Center passed word of a possible hijacking to the operation center at FAA Headquarters.
The duty officer replied that security personnel at headquarters had just been discussing the hijack situation on a conference call with the New England regional office. The Herndon Command Center immediately established a teleconference between Boston, New York, and Cleveland centers so that Boston Center could help the others understand what was happening. At 8:34, the Boston Center controller received the third transmission from American 11.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Nobody move please. We are going back to the airport. Don't try to make any stupid moves.
AZARRELLO: At 8:37 and 52 seconds, Boston Center reached NYAX. This was the first notification received by the military at any level that will American 11 had been hijacked.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Hi, Boston Center TMU, we have a problem here. We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New York, and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble some F-16s or something to help us out.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Is this real world or exercise.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: No, this is not an exercise manifest.
AZARRELLO: F-158 fighters were ordered scrambled at 8:46 from Otis Air Force Base but NYAD's did not know where to send the fighter aircraft. "I don't know where I'm scrambling these guys to, I need a direction, a destination." Because the hijackers had turned off the plane's transponder, NYAD's personnel spent the next minutes searching their radarscopes for the elusive primary radar return. American 11 impacted the World Trade Center's north tower at 8:46 and 40 seconds.
Shortly after 8:50, while NYAD's personnel were still trying to locate American 11, word reached them that a plane had hit the World Trade Center. Radar data showed the Otis fighters were airborne at 8:53. Lacking a target, they were vectored toward military controlled air space off the Long Island Coast. To avoid New York area air traffic and uncertain about what to do, the fighters were brought down to military air space to "hold as needed."
In summary is NYAD received notice of the hijacking nine minutes before it impacted the North Tower. The nine minutes' notice was the most the military would receive that morning of any of the four hijackings.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
WHITFIELD: We've been listening to a dramatic report from the 9/11 commission's final hearing on Thursday that tells how decisions were made as the horrors of that day unfolded and why in the end U.S. Air defenses were unable to stop what the terrorists had set in motion.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
AZARRELLO: At 8:48, the New York Center manager provided the following report on a command center tells conference about American 11 including information that had been relayed by the airline.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: This is New York Center. We're watching the airplane. I also had conversations with American Airlines and they have told us they believe that one of the stewardesses was stabbed and that there are people in the cockpit that have control of the aircraft. That's all the information they have right now.
AZARRELLO: The New York Center controller and manager were unaware that American 11 had already crashed. At approximately 8:55, the controller in charge notified a New York Center manager that she believed that United 175 had also been hijacked.
The manager tried to notify the regional managers and was told that the managers were discussing a hijacked aircraft; presumably American 11 ran and refused to be disturbed. At 8:58, the New York Center controller searching for United 175 told another New York controller "we might have a hijack over here, two of them." Between 9:01 and 9:02 a manager from New York Center told the Command Center in Herndon.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: We have several situations going on here. It's escalating big, big time. We need to get the military involved with us.
AZARRELLO: Meanwhile a manager from Boston Center reported they had deciphered what they had heard in one of the first hijackers transmissions from American 11.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: You still there.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes, I am.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I'm going to reconfirm with downstairs but the -- as far as the tape, but seem to think that the guy said we have the plane. I don't know it was because we have the accent or if there's more than one. But I'm going to reconfirm that for you. I'll get back to you real quick with that.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Appreciate it.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Planes, as in plural. It sounds like we're talking to New York and that there's another one headed to the World Trade Center.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: There's another aircraft?
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: The second one just hit the Trade Center.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: OK. We've got to alert the military real quick on this.
AZARRELLO: The first indication that the Norad Air Defenders had of the second hijacked aircraft, United 175, came in a phone call from New York Center to NYAD's at 9:03. The notice came in at about the time the plane was hitting the South Tower. At 9:08, the mission commander at NYAD's learned of the second explosion at the World Trade Center and decided against holding the fighters in military air space away from Manhattan.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: This is what I foresee that we probably need to do. We need to do talk to FAA, tell them that this stuff is going to keep on going. We need to take those fighters and put them over Manhattan, that is the best play right now. Tell them if there's more out there, which we don't know -- get them over Manhattan. At least we got some kind of play.
AZARRELLO: At 8:54, American 77 began deviating from its flight plan. First with a slight turn toward the south. Two minutes later, it disappeared completely from Indianapolis radar. The controller tracking American 77 told us he first noticed the aircraft turning to the southwest and then saw the data disappear. By 9:25, FAA's Herndon Command Center and FAA's Headquarters knew the following -- they knew two aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center, they knew that American 77 was lost.
They knew that a hijacker on board American 11 had said "we have some planes." Concerns over the safety of other aircraft began to mount. A manager at the Herndon Command Center asked FAA Headquarters if they wanted to order a "nationwide ground stock." While executives at FAA Headquarters discussed it, the Command Center went ahead and ordered one anyway at 9:25. Norad did not know about the search for American 77. Instead, they heard once again about a plane that no longer existed, American 11. At 9:21, NYAD's receive a report from the FAA.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Military, Boston Center, I just had a report that American 11 is still in the air and heading towards Washington.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: The American 11 is still in the air and heading towards Washington?
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Another aircraft hit the tower. That's the latest report we have. I'm going to try to confirm an ID for you, but I would assume he's somewhere over either New Jersey or somewhere further south.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: OK, so American 11 isn't a hijack at all then, right?
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: No, he is a hijack.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: American 11 is a hijack.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: And he's going into Washington.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: He could be a third aircraft.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
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WHITFIELD: We continue now with some of the most compelling details to emerge from the 9/11 commission hearings this week. We turn our attention now to the story of United flight 93.
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JOHN FARMER, COMMITTEE MEMBER: Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from unknown origin." The controller responded seconds later "somebody call Cleveland." This was followed by a second radio transmission with sounds of screaming and someone yelling "get out of here, get out of here." Again from an unknown source. The Cleveland Center controllers began to try to identify the possible source of the transmissions and noticed that United 93 had descended some 700 feet.
The controller attempted again to raise United 93 several times with no response. At 9:30, the controller began to pull the other flights in his frequency to determine if they heard the screaming. several said they had. At 9:32, a third radio transmission came over the frequency, "Keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board." The controller understood but chose to respond, "Calling Cleveland Center, you're unreadable, say again slowly." He notified a supervisor who passed a notice up the chain of command.
By 9:34, word of a hijacking had reached FAA Headquarters in Washington. Between 9:34 and 9:38, the controller observed United 93 climbing to 40,700 feet and immediately moved several aircraft out of its way. The controller continued to try to contact United 93 and asked whether the pilot could confirm that he had been hijacked. There was no response. Then at 9:39 a fifth radio transmission came over the radio frequency from United 93.
ZIAD JARRAH: Uh, this is the captain, would like you all to remain seated. There is a bomb on board and are going back to the airport and to have our demands (UNINTELLIGIBLE). Please remain quiet.
FARMER: The controller responded, "United 93, I understand you have a bomb on board." Go ahead. The flight did not respond. At 9:41, Cleveland Center lost United 93's transponder signal. The controller located it on primary radar, matched its position with visual sightings from other aircraft and tracked the flight as it turned east then south. At 9:49, 13 minutes after getting the question from Cleveland Center about military help, Command Center suggested that someone had headquarters should decide whether to request military assistance.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: They are pulling (UNINTELLIGIBLE) talk about United 93.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Do we want to think about scrambling aircraft?
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Oh, God, I don't know.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: That's a decision somebody's going to have to make probably in the next ten minutes.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Uh, you know everybody just left the room.
FARMER: United 93 was spotted by another aircraft and at 10:01 Command Center advised FAA Headquarters that one of the aircraft had seen United 93 "waving its wings." The aircraft had witnessed the radical gyrations in what we believe was the hijackers efforts to defeat the passenger assault on the cockpit. The United 93 crashed in Pennsylvania at 10:03, in 11 seconds, 125 miles from Washington, D.C. five minutes later, Command Center forwarded this update to headquarters. UNIDENTIFIED MALE: There is now on United 93, there is a report of black smoke in the last position I gave you, 15 miles south of Johnstown.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: From the airplane or from the ground.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: They're speculating it's from the aircraft who hit the ground. That's what they're speculating. Speculation only.
FARMER: NYAD was never able to locate United 93 on radar because it was already in the ground. The news of a reported bomb on board United 93 spread quickly at NYAD. The air defenders search for United 93's primary radar return and tried to locate assets to scramble toward the plane. NYAD's called Washington Center to report.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: United 93, have you got information on that yet?
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes, he's down.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: He's down?
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: When did he land?
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: He did not land.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Oh, he's down.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes. Somewhere northeast of Camp David.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Northeast of Camp David.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: That's the last report. They don't know exactly where.
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WHITFIELD: America is under attack those four words whispered in the president's ear belie the complexities of what was unfolding on the morning of September 11th. Listen as we learn how America's leaders were made aware of the chaos underway and what they did.
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DANA HYDE, 9/11 COMMITTEE MEMBER: In Florida, the president's motorcade was just arriving at the Emiet (ph) E. Booker Elementary School where President Bush was to read to a class and talk about education. White House Chief of Staff Andrew Carr told us he was standing with the president outside the classroom when senior advisor to the president, Karl Rowe, first informed them that a small twin- engine plane had crashed into the World Trade Center.
The president's reaction was that the incident must have been caused by pilot error. At the White House, the vice president had just sat down for a meeting when his assistant told him to turn on his television because a plane had struck the North Tower of the World Trade Center. The vice president was wondering, "how the hell a plane can hit the World Trade Center" when he saw the second aircraft strike the South Tower.
The president was seated in a classroom of second graders when at approximately 9:05; Andrew Card whispered to him "a second plane hit the second tower. America is under attack." The president told us his instinct was to project calm, not to have the country see an excited reaction at a moment of crisis. The national press corps was standing behind the children in the classroom. He saw the phones and pagers start to ring.
The president felt he should project strength and calm until he could better understand what was happening. The president's motorcade departed at 9:35 and arrived at the airport between 9:42 and 9:45. During the ride, the president learned about the attack on the Pentagon. He boarded the aircraft, asked the Secret Service about the safety of his family and called the vice president. According to notes of this call, at about the 9:45, the president told the vice president, "sounds like we have a minor war going on here. I heard about the Pentagon. We're at war, somebody's going to pay."
News of an incoming aircraft later discovered to be American 77 prompted the Secret Service to order the evacuation of the vice president just before 9:36. The vice president entered the underground tunnel that led to the shelter at 9:37.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: At 10:0 2, the communicators in the shelter began receiving reports from the secret service of an inbound aircraft, presumably hijacked heading toward Washington. That aircraft was United 93. At sometime between 10:10 and 10:15, a military aide told the vice president and others that the aircraft is 80 miles out. Vice President Cheney was asked for authority to engage the aircraft. The vice presidents reaction was described as quick and divisive, "and about the time it takes a batter to decide to swing." He authorized fighter aircraft to engage the inbound plane. He told us this was based on his prior conversation with the president. It is not clear how the order was communicated to the Continental Region Headquarters but we know that at 10:31 General Larry Arnold instructed his staff to broadcast the following message over NORAD chat log. 10:31 "vice president has cleared us to intercept traps of interest and shoot them down if they do not respond per CONR/CC. General Arnold."
In upstate New York NYAD's personnel first learned of the shoot down order from that chat log message.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: You need to read this. The Region Commander has declared that we can shoot down aircraft that do not respond to our direction. Copy that?
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Copy that.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: So if you're trying to divert somebody and he won't divert -
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Do --
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: It came over the chat. You got a conflict on that direction?
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Right now no, but...
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: OK, you read that from the vice president right?
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Vice president has cleared. Vice president has cleared us to intercept traffic and shoot them down if they do not respond per CONR/CC.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
FREDRICKA WHITFIELD, CNN ANCHOR, NEXT@CNN: And by the time Vice President Cheney's orders were confirmed, the last of the hijacked planes had crashed. The confusion led to what may have been the boldest statement in Thursday's hearing, it came from the leader of Norad. The North American Areao Space Defense Command. He said that all four planes could have been brought down had the FAA notified the military as soon as it knew of each hijacking. The panel will issue its report and recommendations by July 26.
NEXT@CNN begins right after this short break.
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