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Trump Defends Waltz after Texting Breach; White House Insists No War Plans Discussed; U.S. Intel Officials Face Senate Panel after War Chat Mishap. Aired 10-11a ET
Aired March 25, 2025 - 10:00 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
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UNIDENTIFIED MALE (voice-over): Live from CNN Abu Dhabi, this is CONNECT THE WORLD with Becky Anderson.
BECKY ANDERSON, CNN HOST (voice-over): Well, welcome to the second hour of the show from our Middle East programming headquarters. I'm Becky Anderson
in Abu Dhabi where the time is just after 6 pm. It is 10 am in Washington, where two major events are unfolding right now.
A Senate hearing on national security that about to begin one day after jaw-dropping revelations about U.S. war plans accidentally shared with a
political journalist.
And we've just heard new reaction from Donald Trump to this security breach. More on that coming up.
Also happening this hour. President Trump's pick for U.S. ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, about to take questions in his confirmation hearing.
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ANDERSON: Well, this hour, top U.S. intelligence officials can expect to get a grilling over a stunning intelligence breach, the accidental texting
of plans for a U.S. military strike on Houthi targets in Yemen.
Those plans to the editor in chief of "The Atlantic." Today's hearing, meant to focus on global threats to U.S. security and will include
appearances by the heads of the FBI and CIA and the Director of National Intelligence.
Well, in an interview last hour, president Donald Trump defended one of the officials involved in what is this text chain. National security adviser
Michael Waltz saying he has learned a lesson and is a good man.
Jeffrey Goldberg published the story on the breach for "The Atlantic," which included non-sensitive texts from the chat held over the Signal app,
which security experts say should never be used for classified government communications.
President Trump previously said he didn't know anything about the breach and tried to downplay its significance. Goldberg is questioning the
president's claim of ignorance.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
TRUMP: I don't know anything about it. I'm not a big fan of "The Atlantic." It's, to me, it's a magazine that's going out of business. I
think it's not much of a magazine but I know nothing about it.
You're saying that they had what?
QUESTION: They were using Signal to coordinate on sensitive materials and --
(CROSSTALK)
TRUMP: Having to do with what?
QUESTION: Having to do with what?
TRUMP: What were they talking about?
QUESTION: The Houthis.
TRUMP: The Houthis?
You mean the attack on the Houthis?
QUESTION: Right.
TRUMP: Well, it couldn't have been very effective because the attack was very effective. I can tell you that. I don't know anything about it. You're
telling me about it for the first time.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
JEFFREY GOLDBERG, "THE ATLANTIC": I alerted the White House shortly after 9 in the morning. And that was -- that was emails and texts and calls to
Mike Waltz, Stephen Miller, Susie Wiles and so on.
I found it interesting -- and again, I want to figure this out -- the president said he didn't know, you know, three or four hours later. That
struck me as noteworthy and worth more exploration.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
ANDERSON: Well, the White House press secretary also responding today in a post on the X platform by criticizing Mr. Goldberg and insisting that the
text chat did not contain war plans or classified material.
Look, there is a lot to work through here. Juliette Kayyem joins us with more on the national security implications here.
Maura Gillespie is a political consultant and former Republican staffer to John Boehner and Adam Kinzinger.
CNN's Clare Sebastian has the view from London.
And Stephen Collinson is in Washington.
Right. Well, thank you all for being with us today.
Juliette, Goldberg spoke to CNN last night. Let's have a listen.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
GOLDBERG: Nobody raised the question, why are we talking about this over Signal?
And nobody said, hey, who is JG?
You know, because you show up in a little bubble as your initials. And no one at any point said, who's JG?
And when I withdrew from the group -- you formally remove yourself, you hit a button -- it says "JG has removed himself from the group."
I assume that somebody would say, hey, who just removed himself from the group?
Nothing.
KAITLAN COLLINS, CNN HOST: You didn't hear from Mike Waltz or anyone else after that?
GOLDBERG: No, no. Nothing at all. I mean, it's a level of incuriosity. I guess that's the polite way of saying it. It's the level of recklessness
that I have not seen in many years of reporting on national security issues.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
ANDERSON: Juliette, what are the national security implications of this for the United States?
Let's start there.
JULIETTE KAYYEM, CNN NATIONAL SECURITY ANALYST: Well, let's start with just the communications as they were ongoing at any moment, because they
are clearly not in secure in SCIFs and secure facilities. They are not on computers or what, you know, what we call high side apparatus that protect
what's going on during it at any moment.
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We and the CIA has already confirmed that there's worries about infiltration of Signal so that, even though the communications might be
encrypted, if someone can get into the communications, they're going to be able to see what's going on.
We also know that some members of this mass -- it's over 12 people -- group exchange were abroad and one was actually in Russia at the time of these
communications. So during it, that could have disrupted the planning.
And you're kind of grateful that it was Jeffrey Goldberg who was added and not someone else who may have disclosed this information to our enemies.
The long term aspects of it may be legal, although it's very unlikely our attorney general will investigate this.
This is actually the reaction by this national security apparatus, both domestic, United States and international in terms of confidence in this
group; its sloppiness, its lack of curiosity, as Jeff Goldberg said.
And also, I mean, its sort of fixation on a sort of, you know, being sort of brutal and crude and mean to the outside world. And then you see them in
it and they're being more careless than anyone else.
I think in particular, it's going to be hard for Hegseth to have much effectiveness or authority, both within the Pentagon and outside of it,
given that he disclosed specific information.
ANDERSON: Juliette --
SEN. TOM COTTON (R-AR), CHAIR, SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE: -- the Director of National Intelligence --
ANDERSON: -- thank you. I want to get live to this Senate Intelligence Committee hearing now. Let's listen in.
COTTON: -- the director of the National Security Agency and Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, General Tim Haugh and the Defense Intelligence Agency
director, Lieutenant General Jeffrey Kruse.
Thank you all for your appearance. Thank you for your leadership. I also want to recognize the hard work and dedication of the thousands of men and
women in our intelligence community, whom you're here to represent today.
Their successes are seldom celebrated, their accomplishments are often unseen but our nation is grateful to each one for the vital work they do to
keep our nation safe, prosperous and free.
Our annual worldwide threats hearing allows for the American people to receive an unvarnished and unbiased account of the real and present dangers
that our nation faces. As we will hear from our witnesses, many of the threats we face are truly existential.
Communist China is actively working to replace the United States as the world's dominant superpower. China uses coercive military, economic and
influence operations short of war to shape a world favorable to its interests and hostile to ours.
These methods include the biggest peacetime military buildup in history, rapidly expanding its nuclear forces, providing critical assistance to help
Russia withstand U.S. sanctions, obscuring its role in accelerating the spread of COVID-19 beyond Wuhan.
Turning a blind eye to Chinese companies that enable the production of fentanyl flooding into the United States and putting space weapons on
orbit, among other tactics.
Iran,, despite setbacks inflicted on its so-called axis of resistance by Israel over the last year, still aims to destroy what it calls "the little
Satan," the State of Israel, and what it calls "the great Satan," the United States.
It continues to arm Yemeni rebels to attack global shipping, though these outlaws have suffered terrible losses over the last two weeks, thanks to
decisive action by President Trump and our brave troops. I commend the president, Mike Waltz, Pete Hegseth and his entire national security team
for these actions.
Iran also continues its decades-long effort to develop surrogate networks inside the United States to threaten U.S. citizens.
Furthermore, Iran's nuclear program continues apace. It's actively developing multiple space-launched vehicles, which are little more than
flimsy cover for an intercontinental ballistic missile program that could hit the United States in a matter of years.
But all this will soon come to an end. The supreme leader of Iran now faces a stark choice, thanks to President Trump. The supreme leader can fully
dismantle his nuclear program or he can have it dismantled for him.
Finally, today's report also acknowledges that illicit drug production endangers the health and safety of millions of Americans. For the first
time, the Annual Threat Assessment lists foreign illicit drug actors as the very first threat to our country.
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As the report highlights, Mexican-based cartels, using precursors produced in China, continue to smuggle fentanyl and synthetic opioids into the
United States. Last year alone, these deadly drugs tragically killed more than 52,000 Americans, more than the number killed in attacks by foreign
terrorists or foreign nations.
Given these threats, we have to ask, are our intelligence agencies well- postured against these threats?
I'm afraid the answer is no, at least not yet. As the world became more dangerous in recent years, our intelligence agencies got more politicized,
more bureaucratic and more focused on promulgating opinions, rather than gathering facts. As a result of these misplaced priorities, we've been
caught off guard and left in the dark too often.
I know that all of you agree that the core mission of the intelligence community is to steal our adversaries' secrets and convey them to
policymakers to protect the United States.
At the same time, it's not the role of the intelligence agencies to make policy, to justify presidential action or to operate like other federal
agencies.
After years of drift, the intelligence community must recommit to its core mission of collecting clandestine intelligence from adversaries, whose main
objective is to destroy our nation and our way of life.
The reason is not that our Intelligence Community lacks dedicated patriots who show up to work every day to protect the American people. On the
contrary, it has an abundance of them. The reasons are a misuse of resources, bureaucratic bloat, a default to play it safe and a past
administration that prioritized social engineering over espionage.
Coupled with recent failures, the finding of today's worldwide threat report should be a wakeup call to all of us to get our house in order. The
status quo is proving inadequate to provide the president and Congress with the intelligence needed to protect the American people.
As more storms gather, America's intelligence capabilities require urgent reform and revitalization. As the chairman of this committee, I look
forward to working with each of you to strengthen America's intelligence edge and refocus our intelligence community on its core mission, stealing
secrets. The American people deserve nothing less.
We've assembled an impressive team to get this done and I look forward to hearing your comments.
Now I recognize the Vice Chairman for opening remarks.
SEN. MARK WARNER (D-VA), RANKING MEMBER, SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And good morning, everybody. I want to thank all of the witnesses for being here.
I got to say, I've been on the committee now for 14 years. And this year's assessment is clearly one of the most complicated and challenging in my
tenure on the committee. Now I want to get into that in a moment. But I want to first of all address the recent story that has broken in the news.
Yesterday, we stunningly learned that senior members of this administration and, according to the reports, two of our witnesses here today were members
of a group chat.
That discussed highly sensitive and likely classified information that supposedly even included weapons packages, targets and timing and included
the name of an active CIA agent.
Putting aside for a moment the classified information should never be discussed over an unclassified system, it's also just mind-boggling to me
that all of these senior folks who were on this line -- and nobody bothered to even check -- security hygiene 101.
Who are all the names, who are they?
Well, it apparently included a journalist. And no matter how much the Secretary of Defense or others want to disparage him, this journalist had
at least the ethics to not report, I think, everything he heard.
The question I raise is, like, you know, everybody on this committee gets briefed on security protocols or told you don't make calls outside of SCIFs
of this kind of classified nature. We don't know what I'm going to ask obviously.
Director Gabbard, is exacting (ph) a charge at all, keeping our secrets safe or these government devices or the personal devices?
Have devices been collected to make sure there's no malware?
You know, there's plenty of declassified information that shows that our adversaries, China and Russia, are trying to break in to encrypted systems
like Signal.
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And again, I just say this: if this was the case of a military officer or an intelligence officer and they had this kind of behavior, they would be
fired. As I think this is one more example of the kind of sloppy, careless, incompetent behavior, particularly toward classified information, that this
is not a one-off or a first-time error.
Let me take a couple minutes and review some of the other reckless choices that this administration has made regarding our national security.
We all recall -- it seems like it wasn't that long ago but -- less than two months ago, in the first two weeks, the administration canceled all U.S.
foreign assistance.
Now some may say how can that -- how can -- bad can that be?
It's foreign assistance.
Well, U.S. foreign assistance paid for the units in Ukraine that provide air defense to civilian cities being attacked by Russia.
Foreign assistance paid for guarding camps in Syria where ISIS fighters are detained.
Foreign assistance paid for programs abroad that ensure that diseases like ebola don't come home.
And until recently, it paid for the construction of a railway in Africa that would have helped given the United States much needed access to
critical minerals in Congo. Now that project, China's going to try to finance it.
As well, in the first two weeks, Director Patel, the administration fired several of our most experienced FBI agents, including the head of the
Criminal Investigative Division, the head of the Intelligence Division, the head of the Counter-Terrorism Division.
The heads of the New York, Washington and Miami field office, all individuals who were distinctly and directly responsible for helping to
keep America safe.
The irony in a little bit was that currently, of the recently dismissed head of the Counter-Terrorism Division was involved in disrupting the ISIS
attacks planned for Oklahoma City and Philadelphia and helped lead the effort to bring to justice the key planner of the Abbey Gate bombing in
Afghanistan that killed 13 U.S. servicemen and 150 civilians.
That very Abbey Gate effort was actually praised by the president in his State of the Union address. Yet the response -- the administration's
response to these agents', I believe, good works and years of service was to force these folks out. It's hard to imagine how that makes our country
safer.
Nor can I understand how Americans are made more secure by firing more than 300 staff at the National Nuclear Security Administration, including those
responsible for overseeing the security and safety of the nuclear stockpile, or by ousting 130 employees at CISA, the agency directly
responsible for trying to take on China's Salt Typhoon attack.
Again, after Salt Typhoon, I would have thought folks on that group chat might have thought twice.
Or how we're made safer by sacking 1,000 employees at the CDC and NIH, who are actually directly working on trying to keep our country safe from
disease, or by pushing out hundreds of intelligence officers. The amazing thing is that our intelligence officers, they're not interchangeable like a
Twitter coder.
These intelligence officers -- our country makes $20,000 to $40,000 of an investment just in getting a security clearance. It literally goes into six
figures when you take the training involved.
Can anyone tell how firing probationary individuals without any consideration for merit or expertise is an efficient use of taxpayer
dollars?
And just to make clear that yesterday's story in "The Atlantic" was not this rookie one-off. It's a pattern.
And I want to acknowledge, Director Ratcliffe was not here in his position when this took place. But again, earlier in the administration, when a
nonclassified network was used, thereby exposing literally hundreds of CIA officers identities, those folks can't go into the field now.
How does that make our government more efficient?
You know, again this pattern of an amazing cavalier attitude toward classified information is reckless, sloppy and stunning.
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And perhaps what troubles me most is the way the administration has decided that we can take on all of our problems by ourselves without any need for
friends or allies. I agree that we've got to put America's priorities first.
But America First cannot mean America Alone. The intelligence we gather to keep Americans safe depends on a lot of allies around the world who have
access to sources we don't have. That sharing of information saves lives. And it's not hypothetical.
We all remember it, because it was declassified, last year when Austria worked with our community to make sure -- to expose a plot against Taylor
Swift in Vienna. That could have killed literally hundreds of individuals.
However this -- these relationships are not built in stone. They're not dictated by law. Things like the Five Eyes are based on trust, built on
decades. But so often that trust is (INAUDIBLE) now breaking literally overnight.
Yet suddenly and for no reason that I can understand, the United States is starting to act like our adversaries are our friends. Voting in the U.N.
with Russia, Belarus and North Korea, that's a rogues' gallery if I ever heard of them.
Treating our allies like adversaries, whether it's threats to take over Greenland or over the Panama Canal; destructive trade war with Canada or
literally threatening to kick Canada out of the Five Eyes, I feel our credibility is being enormously undermined with our allies.
Who I believe -- and I think most of us on this committee, regardless of party, believes makes our country safer and stronger.
But how can our allies ever trust us as the kind of partner we used to be when we, without consultation or notice, for example, stopped sharing
information to Ukraine in its war for survival against Russia?
Or how can our allies not only not trust our government but potentially not our businesses with such arbitrary political decisions?
Let me give you a few examples. You know, as a result of a lot of work from this committee and others, in Congress, we made sure America's commercial
space industry is second to none.
From SpaceX to launch, to commercial sensing and communications, the United States has taken a record lead. Yet overnight this administration called
into question the reliability of the American commercial tech industry, when Maxar and other commercial space companies were directed to stop
sharing intelligence with Ukraine.
I've got to tell you, I'm not a business guy. I can't say longer than being an elected official but pretty close. That shock wave across all of
commercial space and frankly not just commercial space. I've heard it from some of our hyperscalers in the tech community has sent an enormous chill.
Who's going to hire an American commercial space company. government or foreign business, with the ability to have that taken down so arbitrarily?
And it's not just in the case of commercial space. We've seen that Canada, Germany, Portugal, have all been saying they're rethinking buying F-35s.
I've heard from Microsoft and Google directly and Amazon, that they're having questions about whether they can still sell their services.
We've also seen foreign adversaries and friends take advantage of this rift in our national security areas and our scientists. Germany has already put
out ads, trying to attract some of our best scientists who've been riffed.
And the Chinese intelligence agencies are posting on social media sites in the hopes of luring individuals with that national security clearance, who
have been pushed out, perhaps arbitrarily, to come into their service.
So, no, the Signal fiasco is not a one-off. It is, unfortunately, a pattern we're seeing too often repeated. I fear that we feel the erosion of trust
from our workplace, from our companies and from our allies and partners, can't be put back in the bottle overnight. Make no mistake, these actions
make America less safe.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
COTTON: Before I turn to the witnesses' hearing, I want to welcome everyone in our large audience today.
I also want to note that we will not tolerate any disruptions of the witnesses' testimony or senators' questions and the witnesses' answers.
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You'll note that we have a large contingent of Capitol Police in the room. Any disruptions either opposed or in favor to the witnesses will result in
prompt removal from the hearing room.
And my encouragement to the U.S. attorney to throw the book at the person disrupting the hearing. No offense but we all came to hear the witnesses,
no one else in the room.
Director Gabbard, I understand you'll make a statement for the panel of witnesses.
TULSI GABBARD, U.S. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Vice Chair, Members of the Committee, thanks for the opportunity for us to be here to present you the Intelligence Community's 2025 Annual Threat
Assessment.
I'm joined here this morning by my colleagues from the CIA, DIA, FBI and NSA. Our testimony offers the collective assessment of the 18 U.S.
intelligence elements making up the U.S. intel community.
And draws on intelligence collection and information available to the IC from open source and private sector and the expertise of our analysts.
This report evaluates what the IC assesses most threatens our people and our nation's ability to live in a peaceful, free, secure and prosperous
society. As you know, we face an increasingly complex threat environment that is threatening us here at home and our interests abroad.
I'll begin by focusing on what most immediately and directly threatens the United States and the well-being of the American people: nonstate criminal
groups and terrorists, putting American lives and livelihood at risk. Then I'll focus on the key nation states who have the capability to threaten the
interests of the United States.
In this complex environment, nonstate and state actors are able to exploit or take advantage of the effects of each other's activities. Conventional
and asymmetrical capabilities, even the traditionally weakest of actors, are able to acquire from available advanced technologies, creates an even
more complex and serious threat landscape.
First, I'll highlight the threats presented by several nonstate actors.
Cartels, gangs and other transnational criminal organizations in our part of the world are engaging in a wide array of illicit activity, from
narcotics trafficking, to money laundering, to smuggling of illegal immigrants and human trafficking, which endanger the health, welfare and
safety of everyday Americans.
Based on the latest reporting available, for a year-long period ending October 2024, cartels were largely responsible for the deaths of more than
54,000 U.S. citizens from synthetic opioids.
Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations or TCOs are the main suppliers of illicit fentanyl to the U.S. market.
And are adapting to enforcement and regulatory pressures by using multiple sources and methods to procure precursor chemicals and equipment primarily
from China and India, many of which are dual-use chemicals used in legitimate industries.
Independent fentanyl producers are also increasingly fragmenting the drug trade in Mexico. The availability of precursor chemicals and ease of making
illicit fentanyl have enabled independent actors to increase illicit fentanyl production and smuggling operations in Mexico.
Cartels are profiting from human trafficking and have likely facilitated more than 2 million illegal immigrants encountered by law enforcement at
the U.S. southwest border in 2024 alone, straining our vital resources and putting the American people at risk.
Criminal groups drive much of the unrest and lawlessness in the Western Hemisphere. They also engage in extortion, weapons and human smuggling and
other illicit and dangerous revenue-seeking operations, including kidnapping for ransom, forced labor and sex trafficking.
These and other human traffickers exploit vulnerable individuals and groups by promising well-paying jobs while confiscating their identification
documents. They operate in the shadows, exploiting lawlessness in various areas and using coercion and intimidation to control their victims.
While these key drivers of migrants are expected to persist, heightened U.S. border security enforcement and deportations under the Trump
administration are proving to serve as a deterrent for migrants seeking to illegally cross U.S. borders.
U.S. Border Patrol apprehensions along the southwest border in January 2025 dropped 85 percent from the same period in 2024.
Transnational Islamist extremists, such as ISIS and Al Qaeda and affiliated jihadi groups, continue to pursue enable or inspire attacks against the
United States and our citizens, abroad and within the homeland, to advance their ultimate objective of establishing a global Islamist caliphate.
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While the New Year's Day attacker in New Orleans had no known direct contact with ISIS terrorists, he was influenced and radicalized by ISIS
ideological propaganda, as one example.
Al Qaeda and its affiliates continue to call for attacks against the United States as they conduct attacks overseas. These groups have shown their
ability to adapt and evolve, including using new technologies and tactics to spread their ideology and recruit new followers.
A range of nonstate cyber criminals are targeting our economic interests, critical infrastructure and advanced commercial capability for extortion,
other coercive pursuits and financial gain.
These actors use a variety of tactics, including phishing, ransomware and denial of service attacks to disrupt our systems and steal sensitive and
lucrative information using available technologies and U.S. cyber vulnerabilities.
Ransomware actors last year attacked the largest payment processor for U.S. health care institutions. And another set of criminal actors conducted
cyberattacks against U.S. water utilities.
Some of these nonstate cyber actors also operate as proxies for or emulate similar activities carried out by major state actors. While these nonstate
cyber actors often seek and intellectual property gains, they also carry out cyber operations for espionage purposes, targeting our critical
infrastructure.
Turning to key state actors, the IC sees China, Russia, Iran and North Korea engaging in activities that could challenge U.S. capabilities and
interests, especially related to our security and economy.
These actors are, in some cases, working together in different areas to target U.S. interests and to protect themselves from U.S. sanctions. At
this point, the IC assesses the Chinese are most capable strategic competitor.
Under the leadership of president Xi Jinping, the People's Republic of China seeks to position itself as a leading power on the world stage,
economically, technologically and militarily.
Beijing is driven in part by a belief that Washington is pursuing a broad effort to contain China's rise and undermine CCP rule. China's most serious
domestic challenge is probably China's slowing economy and potential instability if socioeconomic grievances lead to large-scale unrest.
Growing economic tensions of the United States and other countries could also weigh on China's plans for economic growth and domestic job creation.
China's military is fueling capabilities, including hypersonic weapons, stealth aircraft, advanced submarines, stronger space and cyber warfare
assets and a larger arsenal of nuclear weapons.
While it would like to develop and maintain positive ties with the United States and the Trump administration to advance its interests and avoid
conflict, China is building its military capability in part to gain advantage in the event of a military conflict with the United States.
Around the issue of China's efforts toward unification with the Republic of China or Taiwan. China's military is also expanding its presence in the
Asia-Pacific region with a focus on disputed territorial claims in both the East China and South China Seas.
Beijing is advancing its cyber capabilities for sophisticated operations aimed at stealing U.S. government and private sector information and pre-
positioning additional asymmetric attack options that may be deployed in a conflict.
China's cyber activities have been linked to multiple high-profile breaches, including last year's massive compromise of U.S. telecom
infrastructure, commonly referred to as Salt Typhoon.
Beijing currently dominates global markets and strategically important supply chains, for example, with the mining and processing of several
critical minerals.
In December, China imposed an export ban to the United States on gallium, germanium and antimony, all important to the production of semiconductors
and our defense technologies.
This was in direct response to U.S. export controls on chips designed to broadly limit PRC access to advanced chips and chipmaking equipment.
China also aims to compete in other critical global industries, including AI, legacy semiconductor chip production, biomanufacturing and genetic
sequencing and medical and pharmaceutical supply production.
Leveraging often heavily state subsidized production at greater scale, lower costs and weaker regulatory standards than required in the West,
Beijing's strategy has given it a leading position in sectors and supply chains that support them.
In 2023, for example, China had five first-in-class domestic drug approvals and three FDA approvals.
[10:35:00]
Turning to Russia, Russia's nuclear and conventional nuclear and military capabilities, along with its demonstrated economic and military resilience,
make it a formidable competitor.
Moscow has more nuclear weapons than any other nation that could inflict catastrophic damage on the United States and the world in the event of a
major war that Russian leaders feared put them and their regime at serious risk.
In late 2024, Russia announced updates to its public nuclear doctrine, expanding the conditions under which Russia would consider using nuclear
weapons. Russia is building a more modern and survivable nuclear force designed to circumvent U.S. missile defense through a reliable retaliatory
strike potential.
Russia intends to deter the U.S. by holding both the U.S. homeland at risk and by having the capabilities to threaten nuclear war in a conflict.
Russia has developed advanced cyber capabilities and has attempted to preposition access to U.S. critical infrastructure for asymmetric options
and make it a persistent cyber threat.
Russia's cyber activities have been linked to multiple high-profile breaches, including the 2023 hack of Microsoft. Russia is also fielding new
capabilities and anti-satellite weapons meant to degrade U.S. and allied space infrastructure.
Among Russia's most concerning developments is a new satellite intended to carry a nuclear weapon as an antisatellite weapon, violating long-standing
international law against such activity and putting the U.S. and global economy at risk.
Iran continues to seek expansion of influence in the Middle East. Despite the degradation to its proxies and defenses during the Gaza conflict, Iran
has developed and maintains ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and UAVs, including systems capable of striking U.S. targets and allies in the
region.
Tehran has shown a willingness to use these weapons, including during a 2020 attack on U.S. forces in Iraq, and in attacks against Israel in April
and October 2024.
Iran's cyber operations and capabilities also present a serious threat to U.S. networks and data. The IC continues to assess that Iran is not
building a nuclear weapon and supreme leader Khamenei has not authorized the nuclear weapons program that he suspended in 2003.
The IC continues to monitor if Tehran seeks to reauthorize its nuclear weapons program. In the past year, we have seen the erosion of a decades-
long taboo in Iran of discussing nuclear weapons in public, likely involving nuclear weapons advocates within Iran's decision-making
apparatus.
Iran's enriched uranium stockpile is at its highest levels and is unprecedented for a state without nuclear weapons.
Iran will likely continue efforts to counter Israel and press for U.S. military withdrawal from the region by aiding, arming and helping to
reconstitute its loose consortium of like-minded terrorists and militant actors, which it refers to as its axis of resistance.
Although weakened, this collection of actors still presents a wide range of threats, including to Israel's population. U.S. forces deployed in Iraq and
Syria and to U.S. international and commercial shipping and transit.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is pursuing stronger strategic and conventional capabilities that can target U.S. forces and allies in the
region as well as the U.S. homeland to bolster North Korea's leverage and stature, defend its regime and achieve at least tacit recognition as a
nuclear weapons power.
Kim's recently cemented strategic partnership with Russia supports these goals by providing them greater financial, military and diplomatic support,
reduce reliance on China and providing North Korean forces and weapons systems authentic warfighting experience.
Kim views his strategic weapons advances since 2019, its deepening ties with Russia and North Korea's economic durability is strengthening his
negotiating position against Washington's demand for denuclearization and lessening his need for sanctions relief.
North Korea is probably prepared to conduct another nuclear test on short notice and continues to flight test its ICBMs to demonstrate their
increasing capabilities as leverage in future negotiations.
Since 2022, China, Russia, Iran and North Korea have grown closer. Removing the accelerant of the war in Ukraine is unlikely to revert these bilateral
relationships to a prewar 2021 baseline, leaving room for new strategic priorities and world events to create new incentives or challenges to their
currently high levels of cooperation.
Russia has been a catalyst for much of this expanded cooperation.
[10:40:02]
Driven heavily by the support as is needed for its war effort against Ukraine, including protection from U.S. and Western sanctions.
In addition to its exchange of military and other resource capabilities with North Korea, Russia has relied more heavily on China's financial and
defense industry backing and also has increased combined military exercises with China to signal shared fortitude against the United States and U.S.
allies in the Asia-Pacific region.
With Iran, Russia has also expanded financial ties to mitigate sanctions. Iran has become a critical military supplier to Russia, especially of UAVs,
in exchange for Russian technical support for Iranian weapons, intelligence and advanced cyber capabilities.
In conclusion, the threats that we see to U.S. national security are both complex and multifaceted and put the lives, safety and well-being of the
American people at serious risk.
As the heads of the American people's intelligence community, we will continue to provide the president, Congress and our warfighters with
timely, unbiased, relevant intelligent to keep the United States secure, free, prosperous and at peace.
To the American people specifically, our intelligence community exists to serve you and ensure your safety, security and freedom. Thank you.
COTTON: Thank you, Director Gabbard.
As I mentioned in my opening remarks, the Annual Threat Assessment for the first time lists cartels and traffickers at the very first threat.
Director Patel, I am pleased to say that the FBI's Little Rock field office has been doing its part in addressing this threat. The field office, along
with other federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, have arrested nearly 300 immigrants in my state, in 2025 so far.
Could you provide some color about the nature of the threat these illegal immigrants have posed, not just to Arkansas but our nation, perhaps
including some of the details of the horrific offenses they have committed against the American people?
KASH PATEL, DIRECTOR, U.S. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. --
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: (INAUDIBLE) security --
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: (INAUDIBLE).
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: (INAUDIBLE). Stop funding Israel. Stop funding Israel. Stop funding Israel.
COTTON: That protester was a CODEPINK lunatic, saying the greatest threat to world peace is funding Israel.
I will observe, for the benefit of the audience here on television, that CODEPINK is funded by Communist China as well, which simply illustrates --
Speak up now if you want to be removed as well, whoever is saying that.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: (INAUDIBLE).
(OFF MIKE COMMENTS)
COTTON: If anyone else would like to join them, speak now, please. We will not have any more disruptions.
As I was saying, the fact that Communist China funds CODEPINK, which interrupts a hearing like this about Israel, simply illustrates director
Gabbard's points that China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and other American adversaries are working in concert to a greater degree than they have
before.
Director Patel, back to my question.
Could you give us some color about the threat that illegal migrants impose not only to my state, which has resulted in 300 arrests in 2025, but to the
nation at large?
PATEL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman and members of the committee. I appreciate the time to address you all.
Specifically to Arkansas, Senator, the priorities of the FBI, which I identified during my confirmation hearing and since, is attacking violent
crime along with national security. And every single state in this country is a border state. Arkansas is no exception. Allow me to highlight the work
of the men and women in the FBI and state and local law enforcement in the state of Arkansas.
Since February 5th alone, we have had 220 illegal immigrants arrested on charges varying from violent offenses, weapons offenses, narcotic offenses
and serious, violent felonies; 253 separate individuals have been charged related to those offenses.
Here is something I want the American people to hear about narcotics and counter narcotics: thousands of pounds of narcotics were seized in these
three weeks in the state of Arkansas. Thousands, worth tens of millions of dollars.
Everything from fentanyl to meth to cocaine to heroin to marijuana and more, and also including manufactured drugs. The FBI does have the biggest
footprint in Arkansas.
[10:45:00]
But we cannot achieve this mission without our state and local law enforcement partners, which has been one of the priorities since I took the
helm at the FBI.
They provide the greatest ground-level intelligence to conduct these operations in Arkansas and every single state across the union. Since
February 5th, we have assisted with the arrest of hundreds of criminals and illegals throughout your state. And that was just a three-week operation.
Prior to that, Senator, there was a bust of 17 federal indictments relating to a meth lab in the state of Arkansas in the southwest corner of your
state. All of those individuals are now facing prosecution for hundreds of pounds of illegal opioids, guns and other illicit material.
So we will continue to do that work. We will work it six, seven days a week, 365 days a year, not just in your state, Mr. Chairman, but every
state.
COTTON: Thank you, director Patel.
As director Gabbard highlighted from the annual threat report, director Ratcliffe, many if not most of the chemical precursors for deadly fentanyl
produced by Mexican drug cartels originates in China.
China, of course, is a techno totalitarian police state. They have technology to monitor their own people that Soviet Russia could have only
imagined.
Is there any reason, director Ratcliffe, to believe that China could not monitor and crack down on this flow of chemical precursors to Mexico if it
chose to do so?
RATCLIFFE: Thank you, Senator, for the question.
No, there's nothing to prevent China, the People's Republic of China, from cracking down on fentanyl precursors. As you well know, Senator, one of the
reasons that they don't is there are more than 600 PRC-related companies that produce those precursor chemicals in an industry that generates $1.5
trillion.
That is one of the reasons that we see that Chinese efforts to affect the fentanyl precursors are really limited in nature and intermittent in nature
and not a dedicated effort to enforce their own laws and regulations to crack down on this.
COTTON: Thank you, director Ratcliffe. I had many more questions I could ask but I'm going to try to lead by example and stay within the five-minute
limit for the benefit of senators. I remind everyone there is a vote scheduled at noon.
I hope to finish the open portion of this hearing before that vote closes, after which time we will move to the closed portion.
The vice chairman.
WARNER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will be happy to take your 13 seconds.
But I want to go back to what I addressed at the outset. This was not only sloppy, it not only violated all procedures but if this information had
gotten out, American lives could have been lost.
If the Houthis had these information, they could reposition their defensive systems. So I want to get a little more information about this.
Director Gabbard, did you participate in the group chat with the Secretary of Defense and other Trump senior officials discussing Yemen war plans?
GABBARD: Senator, I don't want to get into this --
WARNER: Ma'am, we want a -- you're not going to be willing to --
(CROSSTALK)
WARNER: -- you're not -- are you denying -- please answer my question, ma'am.
You were not TG on this group chat?
GABBARD: I'm not going to get into the specific --
WARNER: You refuse to acknowledge whether you were on this group chat?
GABBARD: Senator, I'm not going to get into this --
WARNER: Why do you (INAUDIBLE) specifics?
You just-- is it because it's still classified?
GABBARD: Because this is currently under review by the National Sector --
WARNER: Because it's all classified?
It is not classified. Share the text now.
GABBARD: As the White House previously --
WARNER: Is it classified or nonclassified information on this chat?
GABBARD: I can confirm --
WARNER: Director Ratcliffe, were you on the group chat?
RATCLIFFE: I was on a Signal messaging group.
WARNER: So you were the John Ratcliffe on that chat?
RATCLIFFE: I was.
WARNER: Thank you.
RATCLIFFE: Can I provide some context, Senator, to that?
WARNER: Yes, but I've got a series of questions --
(CROSSTALK)
RATCLIFFE: -- but I think it's important because, at the outset, you made a couple of comments about Signal messaging using encrypted apps. So that
we are clear, one of the first things that happened when I was confirmed as CIA director, was Signal was loaded onto my computer at the CIA, as it is
for most CIA officers.
One of the things that I was briefed on very early, Senator, was by the CIA records management folks about the use of Signal as a permissible work use.
It is. That is a practice that preceded the current administration to the Biden --
WARNER: Dr. Ratcliffe, I've got a series of questions. I -- do you -- if you're making --
(CROSSTALK)
WARNER: Well, you're making the statement that Signal is a secure channel.
[10:50:00]
RATCLIFFE: No --
(CROSSTALK)
RATCLIFFE: -- can I answer that?
(CROSSTALK)
RATCLIFFE: -- encryption so --
(CROSSTALK)
RATCLIFFE: -- permissible to use to communicate and coordinate for work purposes, provided -- provided, Senator -- that any decisions that are made
are also recorded through formal channels.
So those were procedures that were implemented --
(CROSSTALK)
RATCLIFFE: -- my staff implemented those processes, followed those processes, complied --
WARNER: So are you saying --
RATCLIFFE: -- and finally, just please, so my communications, to be clear, in the Signal message group were entirely permissible and lawful and did
not include classified information.
WARNER: We will make that determination, because, if it is not classified, share the texts with the committee. You know, let me go on.
Director Gabbard, you are the security executive and set access guidelines for classified information.
Did you contact the Defense Secretary or others after this specific military planning was put out and say, hey, we should be doing this in a
SCIF?
GABBARD: There was no classified material that was shared in that --
WARNER: So if there was no classified material, share it with the committee. You can't have it both ways. These are important jobs, this is
our national security. Bobbing and weaving and trying to filibuster your answer -- so please answer the question.
If this was a -- Director Gabbard, if this was a rank-and-file intelligence officer who did this kind of careless behavior, what would you do with
them?
GABBARD: Senator, I will reiterate that there was no classified material that was shared in that --
WARNER: -- if there is no classified materials, share. And then you -- if there's no classified materials, then answer -- you can't even answer the
question whether you were on the chat. This is strangely familiar.
I think my colleagues will remember when you couldn't answer the question, is Edward Snowden a traitor?
I have serious doubts about your -- anyway.
Director Gabbard, (INAUDIBLE) tweeted just 11 days ago, and I'm quoting him, "Any unauthorized release of classified information is a violation of
the law and will be treated as such."
So if this information is classified, what are you going to do?
GABBARD: Senator, two points here. First of all, there's a difference between inadvertent release versus --
WARNER: Careless and sloppy.
GABBARD: -- malicious leaks of classified information.
Second point is, there was no classified information that was on the --
(CROSSTALK)
WARNER: Director Patel, my time is about up and I'm going to use my 12 seconds that the chairman gave me.
Director Patel, has the FBI launched any investigation of this?
PATEL: Senator, I was just briefed about it late last night and this morning and I don't have an update.
WARNER: I would like to get an answer by the end of the day.
COTTON: At this point in the ordinary course of affairs I would recognize Senator Collins. She asked me to express to you that she is under the
weather this morning. She regrets her absence but anticipates submitting written questions, to which I would request your replies to the senator.
Senator Cornyn.
REP. JOHN CORNYN, (R-TX): Director Gabbard, I applaud president Trump's efforts to try to bring an end to the war between Russia and Ukraine. I
want to read a statement out of the Annual Threat Assessment and just confirm that you agree with this.
It says, "Russia views its ongoing war with Ukraine as a proxy conflict with the West and its objective to restore Russian strength and security in
its near abroad against perceived U.S. and Western encroachment has increased the risks of unintended escalation between Russia and NATO."
Do you agree with that statement?
And that is in the Annual Threat Assessment, correct?
GABBARD: Correct.
CORNYN: I would like to refer to an AP story, Associated Press, dated March 21, 2025. The title of the article is "Western officials say Russia
is behind a campaign of sabotage across Europe."
This AP map shows it.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent that this be made part of the record.
COTTON: Without objection.
CORNYN: The document that AP compiled, and I presume this is through open sources, documented 59 incidents, including cyberattacks, spreading
propaganda, plotting killings or committing acts of vandalism, arson, sabotage and espionage.
[10:55:07]
Is that consistent with your understanding and impression of what Russia is currently engaged in in Europe?
GABBARD: Senator, I have not seen that specific article but I can confirm that we assess Russia's attempts to conduct such sabotage activities in
Europe.
CORNYN: Thank you.
One of the things that I'm most concerned about following some of the discussions between Russia and Ukraine and the United States and our other
allies, obviously, as I said, peace between Ukraine and Russia is the desirable end state. I think you would have to be something -- you'd have
to be crazy to say otherwise.
But I also want to talk a little bit about the unexpected or maybe unintended consequences of European insecurity.
I know the incoming chancellor of Germany has talked about the possibility that Germany might share its nuclear weapons with Ukraine and suggested
that the U.K. would be part of that.
I know that Poland has talked about acquiring nuclear weapons and, perhaps other European countries, to make up for what they view as a receding of
the American umbrella of protection.
General Kruse, what would be the result of the proliferation of nuclear weapon-armed countries in Europe, if, in fact, that would occur as a result
of our -- the perception of Russia -- excuse me -- European insecurity?
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JEFFREY KRUSE, DIRECTOR, U.S. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: Senator, thank you for the question.
One of the things that the intelligence community works very hard on is to understand who has nuclear weapons throughout the planet.
And, as discussed in the opening statements both by the chair and by director Gabbard, the proliferation and the increase in the types and
lethality of nuclear weapons is one of the things that we have to track.
And we as a nation are going to have to face has changed dramatically in the last five years and will continue to change over the next five years.
The addition of additional countries, which have their own deterrence policies and will act in a nuclear dialogue or the presence of those
weapons, the security of those weapons, the movement and the threat of use of those weapons complicates the environment by which all of will operate.
It will complicate all of the decisions by which all future conflict in the political decisions that we support at the (INAUDIBLE) --
CORNYN: It makes the world a more dangerous place, does it not?
KRUSE: Senator, yes, it does.
CORNYN: And just by way of history, Ukraine used to be -- had the third- largest arsenal of nuclear weapons on the planet.
But as a result of negotiations between Russia and the United Kingdom, the Budapest memorandum documented commitment by Russia and the United States
to protect the territorial integrity of Ukraine in exchange for them giving up their nuclear weapons.
Did I correctly summarize the content of the Budapest memorandum back in 1994?
KRUSE: Yes, Senator, you did. And Ukraine willingly gave up its weapons for the protection of others.
CORNYN: Thank you very much.
COTTON: Senator Wyden.
SEN. RON WYDEN (D-OR): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And obviously my colleagues and I feel very strongly about the war planning meeting over unclassified phones. Obviously reckless, obviously dangerous,
both the mishandling of classified information and the deliberate destruction of federal records, of potential crimes that ought to be
investigated immediately.
And I want to make clear that I'm of the view that there ought to be resignations, starting with the national security advisor and the Secretary
of Defense
Director Ratcliffe and director Gabbard, have you participated in any other group chats with senior Trump administration officials, in which classified
information was shared, using phones that were not cleared for such information?
Question for the two of you.
RATCLIFFE: Senator, thank you for the question. I have -- your question was have I participated in any other group chats sharing classified
information?
To be clear, I have not participated in any Signal group messaging that relates to any classified information at all.
WYDEN: OK.
Director Gabbard?
GABBARD: Senator, I have the same answer, I have not participated in any Signal group chat or any other chat on another app that contained any
classified information.
WYDEN: Yes, and just I think it is important to follow through here, would the two of you cooperate with an audit to confirm that that is not the --
that is the case?
GABBARD: I have no objection.
END
