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Fareed Zakaria GPS

Interview With Ratan Tata; Interview With Henry Kissinger

Aired November 30, 2008 - 13:00   ET


FAREED ZAKARIA, HOST, GLOBAL PUBLIC SQUARE: This is GPS, the GLOBAL PUBLIC SQUARE. Welcome to all of you in the United States and around the world. I'm Fareed Zakaria.
The big, sad story, of course, is the gruesome terrorist attacks in Mumbai, which has stunned India and the world.

I have to confess to a personal interest here. I grew up in Mumbai.

My mother works at the Taj Hotel. Luckily, she was not there when the attacks took place.

My brother-in-law and niece were in their apartment, on the other hand, right next door to the Oberoi Hotel, when all this began. There were commandos in their apartment. They traded fire with the terrorists. My niece is keeping the bullets as souvenirs.

I know some of the people who lost their lives.

The Taj and Oberoi are icons that have been meeting places for Bombayites for decades. The terrorists were attacking symbols of India's progress, but also its diversity and its cosmopolitan nature. The people who died were of all religious backgrounds, all ethnicities.

This is a time when you see the worst of human beings, but also the best. I was told many stories of Taj Hotel employees who made sure that every guest they could find were safely ferreted out of the hotel, at grave risk to their own lives. The freed hostages tell tales of the bravery of the Indian commandos who arrived at the scene.

But not everything went so well. This crisis has highlighted one of the peculiarities about India. Its society, economy, private sector are amazingly dynamic. The same cannot be said of the Indian state. Government in India is too often weak, divided, incompetent.

If this is India's 9/11, it's a chance for the country to get its government in order, to make sure that these kinds of attacks are prevented, or at least handled with maximum dispatch and efficiency.

Was this an al Qaeda attack? I don't know. But my gut is that it is unlikely to have been directed by that organization. Far more likely is that there are connections with Pakistani groups. Perhaps -- though this is less likely -- with some elements of the Pakistani government. But when assigning blame, let's always remember, it is first, and importantly, with the terrorists -- those evil men who deliberately and brutally killed innocent men, women and children. That's who's at fault. That's who did it.

The country will persevere. The city will bounce back.

And those of you with plans to visit India should not be deterred. Remember that this kind of terrorism can happen anywhere.

I have a trip to Mumbai planned in two weeks, which I will do as scheduled. And I will make a special point to visit the Taj Mahal Hotel in Mumbai -- which will be humming with life, I am sure.

Now, on the program today, I have an exclusive interview with the man at the center of all this, the chairman of the Tata Group, which owns the Taj Hotel, Ratan Tata.

We also have the former secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, to discuss the complicated geopolitics that surround terrorism in South Asia. And we have more. So, stay with us.

ZAKARIA: Ratan Tata is the chairman of the Taj Group of hotels, and also the Tata Group -- the largest private corporate group in India. It has interests in steel, cars, communications, computer technology, power -- and, of course, hotels. Their revenues last year were $62.5 billion.

Ratan Tata is often described as India's David Rockefeller. He joins me today to talk about how the attacks affect his hometown, the country and business in India.

Tell me how you felt when you first heard about the attacks.

RATAN TATA, CHAIRMAN, TATA GROUP AND OWNER, TAJ HOTEL: I've got to say that I was truly emotionally overcome when I saw this old, venerable, rather beautiful building going up in flames, and I kept hearing the grenades or explosives going on inside, the sound of gunfire, the fact that there were several hundred people in the hotel, either at dinner or living there. And I just felt tremendously helpless.

We can only say that -- you know, I have to say, the heroes of that evening were members of the staffs, many of them who lost their lives. But people used their heads and saved so many, and sheltered so many of the guests who were there either for dinner or otherwise, and got them out. But we've had a horrible loss of life, a completely wanton destruction of property.

And this morning, finally, after almost three days, we understand from the commandos that all of the militants are eliminated.

ZAKARIA: You must have known personally some of the people who lost their lives.

TATA: Yes, I did. And it was tragic, because some of the people had -- one in particular husband and wife were there to celebrate their anniversary. The husband made it, the wife didn't.

I knew several of the staff members -- not well, but obviously by first name -- and they were gone. Some of them were gone just in cold blood, I understand, just shot in the head or shot at point-blank range. Others were shot in a wanton, sort of random fire that took place.

And all in all, it was just a horrible event that I never thought we would ever see in India, leave alone at the Taj.

ZAKARIA: When you were on your cell phone, trying to deal with this situation, did you feel that the police was responsive? Did you feel as though you were getting the cooperation you needed?

TATA: Well, you know, we were getting the cooperation that they could give us, but the infrastructure was woefully poor. Fires raged for almost three hours before we could get, on that first night, any fire engines who were there to respond with water. The police were woefully inadequate in terms of equipment and in terms of being prepared.

And it was only after the army and the commandos came in -- and even they were, in relative terms, ill-equipped against these militants, who were very well trained, seemed to have a plan of action.

And it has led me to believe that what the city really needs is a crisis management group that could step into action instantly when we have a situation like this, where there's a plan of action, where they can deal with these kinds of crises instantly and well and professionally, and the people get equipped to do so.

We had people who died being shot through bullet-proof vests. And all in all, they've been ill-equipped.

ZAKARIA: It does appear from the outside -- many people are wondering why there weren't more commandos there earlier, why they didn't storm the hotel with hundreds of them to overwhelm them, why they didn't use teargas.

Are these questions being asked in India?

TATA: Yes, they are. They're being asked by us. We were told that their instructions were to minimize the collateral damage to the property. But that's a question mark, because much of the property went up in flames and was allowed to flare -- for all of you who watched it on television have seen that happen.

But I think, you know, something I want to say is that, rather than have us succumb to this kind of terror, what it has done is, I think, given us a resolve that nobody can do this to us. It has united us in the Taj.

The staff has been fantastic. The spirit of the staff -- you know, we lost -- the general manager lost his whole family in one of the fires in the building. And I went up to him today, and I told him how sorry I was.

And he said, "Sir, you know, we're going to beat this. We're going to build this Taj back into what it was. We're standing with you. We will build this thing back. We will not let this event take us down."

And that, I think, is the feeling that they have. And I have a feeling that that's pretty much echoed throughout the country. We're indignant, but we're not scared. If there's a view that has pulled us down, I think it'll unite the country that much more.

ZAKARIA: Do you worry that it will scare foreign investors, that they might be spooked in some way by this?

TATA: Yes. I have no doubt that, certainly short term, that may happen. And if it does, it would be natural that it take place, because, if you talk to some of the people who have had to go through this experience, either in our hotel or the Oberoi or elsewhere, this doesn't happen very often. And when it does, it spooks a lot of people, and rightly so.

So, we will have to do something as a nation to be able to deal with this kind of terror, if it is now being addressed to us, or directed to us. We've been very complacent, because we've really not had this kind of terrorism inflicted upon us.

And I think, as we look forward, we will have to put this into our equation of things we need to be prepared for. And crises infrastructure, I think is one that we will just have to address.

And if we need to get expertise from outside, we should not stand on ceremony to hold back. We should go to the best place possible to get expertise, and have that installed with us in terms of hardware, in terms of training, in terms of strategy.

ZAKARIA: Did you get this feeling that the terrorists seemed to know the hotel, and seemed to have plotted this very carefully in terms of the layout, where they moved?

TATA: Yes. There seems to be no doubt that they knew their way around the hotel, that they seemed to know it in the night or in the daytime. They seemed to have planned their moves quite well. And there seemed to have been a lot of pre-planning in terms of what they did, and how they managed to carry on for three days and sustain themselves during that time.

ZAKARIA: Could anyone have had some kind of inside connection?

TATA: I wouldn't know. I think this would be something that the investigation will show up.

Certainly, they had a lot of planning that went into it. Whether it was themselves, whether it was assistance from inside, or whether it was just a very well planned, very well organized investigation of the property, I really don't know.

ZAKARIA: And we will be back.


ZAKARIA: You had been warned that there was some danger of some kind of attack. You had elaborate security measures. And it appears that the terrorists waited until you relaxed them at the Taj Hotel, which again suggests some kind of either inside connection or very careful watching of the situation.

TATA: Yes, you know, it's ironic that we did have such a warning, and we did have some measures to, you know, where people couldn't park their cars in the portico where you had to go through a metal detector.

But if I look at what we had, which all of us complained about, it could not have stopped what took place. They didn't come through that entrance. They came from somewhere in the back.

They planned everything. I believe they -- the first thing they did was, they shot a sniffer dog and his handler.

They went through the kitchen. They knew what they were doing, and they did not go through the front. All our arrangements were in the front.

ZAKARIA: You've been back now and seen the hotel. What did it look like?

TATA: It's -- I've only been in the lobby and into the restaurant where the last shootout took place. And I went there this evening just before coming here. It's a very, very sad and depressing sight.

The lobby is relatively untouched, at least at first glance. The restaurant where the firefight took place is riddled with bullet marks, and the walls are scarred with grenade blasts. And it looks like it's been hit by a bomb.

And, you know, I have to say that the commandos that faced this were very courageous people. Those who lost their lives in this, I think really gave their lives for the job they had.

And the reason I say that we got cooperation is that the commandos really did whatever they could, given what they had. And they paid a penalty for it in terms of loss of life of some of their leaders -- very good officers.

And the staff also went far beyond the call of duty to serve the guests. So, on the whole, I would say that we really are very grateful for the people that did what they did.

And the whole affair is just devastating, because it was so well planned and it did so much damage. It took such a loss of life. People were shot point-blank. They were -- they sprayed bullets from automatic weapons. They lobbed grenades.

And they did this for three days. And that's truly devastating. I understand the top floor of the hotel is gutted.

But we're all committed that we will build back this hotel to what it is. However long it takes, whatever it takes, this hotel will stand.

I can only say that it somehow epitomizes the will of my great- grandfather, because it stood up to all the abuse it has. And we will have it in shape, hopefully, for another 100 years.

ZAKARIA: And in broader terms, India's economy and India's business -- you're also going through a global slowdown, a financial crisis, at least in the Western world.

How will India handle this? Are you bullish about India's prospects?

TATA: Well, I think that India doesn't suffer from the same cause of economic turndown that is plaguing the West at this time. And I believe that, with an adequate infusion of capital and credit into the Indian economy, which the government can easily do at reasonable rates, that we can invigorate, or reinvigorate, the economy on a domestic basis, so that we can go through this period of downturn without too much strain in India.

But it will call for the government being bold in terms of what it puts back into the banks, and what it almost mandates the banks to do in terms of getting the credit to the consumer.

ZAKARIA: But you see domestic demand as being strong enough to keep things going at a reasonable growth rate.

TATA: Yes, I do. And mind you, we don't have toxic paper. We don't have subprime and mortgage problems.

The issue is that money had been drawn out of the economy to combat inflation. And if we can live with a slightly higher inflation, it is my probably uneducated view that we can reinvigorate the economy.

The global -- I mean, the domestic demand is quite strong. What is happening now is that there is no credit in the market, and whatever there is, is at very, very high interest rates.

ZAKARIA: And if you had a message to the world, who have witnessed all this and seen your hotel -- the hotel that your great- grandfather built -- go up in flames, what would it be?

TATA: I think my message would be that this has been a terrible blow to us, but we will, in fact, overcome the challenges that are ahead. It has not, in fact, diminished our commitment to go ahead with what we had in our minds, and that we will rebuild what has been damaged or destroyed, and that we will only come out stronger and, in fact, more determined than we were before this very unfortunate event took place.

ZAKARIA: Mr. Tata, our condolences to all your staff. TATA: We will not be defeated.

ZAKARIA: Thank you.

TATA: Thank you.

ZAKARIA: We'll be right back.


ZAKARIA: Terrorism in India is part of a broader, complicated geopolitical game between India, Pakistan, Afghanistan -- and, of course, the United States plays a role.

Joining me now to talk about all this, the complicated geopolitics of it, is the former secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, who worked with both countries during the Indo-Pakistani war in 1971, and has maintained ties to the region since then.

Henry, thank you for doing this.


ZAKARIA: You know that, whenever one of these terrorist attacks takes place, the Indian government often casts aspersions on the Pakistani government. In this case, there does appear to be some significant link to Pakistan.

How should India handle this, in your view? Should it try to deal with it at a domestic level? Should it -- how can it not involved Pakistan and implicate it?

KISSINGER: Well, the Indian government is in a very complicated situation. It's of course aware that there are 150 million Muslims living in India. And therefore, the possibility of terrorism becoming an established fact in India is something that has to be of deep concern to any Indian government.

Secondly, there are elections coming up in April, in which particularly the governing Congress Party will have to prove that it is a vigilant defender of Indian security.

And thirdly, there's the objective situation that you described at the beginning, of the relationship between India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the region. In the abstract one would say that this could be an opportunity in which Pakistan and India get together to suppress terrorism, and in which Pakistan learns that its situation becomes increasingly precarious, if they can be plausibly blamed for supporting or not suppressing terrorism.

On the other hand, this is sort of a schoolbook solution, because the Pakistan government may not be strong enough to do this, and it's going through a difficult process of civilianizing itself.

ZAKARIA: You put it exactly right when you said that this could forge cooperation, it seemed to me. But it is a bit of a textbook solution. That is to say, it ignores the fact that there are deep historical enmities and national interests.

I mean, when you've dealt with the Pakistanis, do you feel that -- or the Indians, really -- that there is enough -- there is a relaxation of suspicion that might allow for some kind of cooperation here?

KISSINGER: Barring this incident, based on my recent visit to India, I had the impression that the Indians were thinking seriously about re-forging their relationship with Pakistan, if it could be done on a basis that protects their security. This incident will make it very tough for them to do this.

On the Pakistani side, the problem is that the new president of Pakistan -- civilian, the husband of the assassinated Bhutto -- has made some very positive, formal statements prior to this incident. On the other hand, his capacity to implement any of this was extremely questionable, since his control of the army seems to be very limited.

Ideally, one would -- what might happen out of this crisis is that all countries will come to the view that, unless these terrorist cells are suppressed, the world will be intolerably risky.

Now, I know one cannot suppress all terrorist cells. But if all the key governments would agree not to permit on their territory any of these organizations, which are used to collect funds and to transfer weapons, then the freedom of movement of the terrorists and their capacity to plan operations would be severely limited.

And India is a country of such crucial importance to the stability of the region and to the progress, one would say, of the world, that they cannot be asked to submit themselves to periodic hit- and-run attacks, which in this case were obviously carefully planned and very professionally executed. So, they could not result largely from local conditions.

ZAKARIA: We will be back with Henry Kissinger right after this.


ZAKARIA: We're back with Henry Kissinger, former secretary of state, to talk about the implications of the terror attacks in Mumbai.

Henry, how should the United States handle this?

KISSINGER: We have to know what we really think about this situation. And this can only be done by the closest cooperation between the incoming and outgoing administrations. It cannot be defined entirely by the Bush administration, even though we have only, obviously, one president at a time.

Secondly, India has to know that we are committed to its stability and to its security, and that we are prepared to discuss with them cooperative measures -- always leaving them in the position that they are the ones that are designing the policy for their own security.

Third, we should have a very serious conversation with Pakistan. Pakistan has been a traditional friend. We have cooperated with Pakistan. They helped us in the opening to China in an indispensable way. And they were cooperative in many phases of the war on terror.

But they have to understand that they cannot -- that it is an ultimate threat to their own security if they permit conditions to exist on their territory, where it simultaneously threatens all the major neighboring countries.

And where Pakistan has a right to be told that we respect its territorial integrity, that we discourage attacks on its territorial integrity, but that in the end, it has to be a good citizen in its neighborhood, especially with respect to the threat that is now becoming paramount simultaneously in Afghanistan and significant in India.

And it has to understand, in my view, that its biggest security threat now are the entities that it is permitting or tolerating on its own territory. We should act here as a friend, but we should make clear what our understanding of the situation is.

ZAKARIA: When I have talked to some Pakistani military people, privately they will say to me, "Look, the problem is you Americans. One day you will leave, and we will be left in the neighborhood. And here is what the neighborhood looks like to us -- an India that will dominate us, an Afghanistan that would be allied with India and allied with Russia. So, we have to maintain some options."

In other words, there is a basic geopolitical sense that having an unstable Afghanistan may help Pakistan, having some ability to destabilize India cheaply through the use of jihadis benefits Pakistan.

Can we -- can the United States really change that strategic conception in Pakistan?

KISSINGER: It cannot change that perception in a week or two, or a month or two.

A prerequisite for any successful policy in the region is to contribute to the conviction, and bring about the conviction, that we are not going to withdraw from the region. We may withdraw troops from this or that place for tactical reasons, but that we will remain a major factor in the region for our own self-interest, because the radicalization of the whole region would ultimately threaten American security and wellbeing.

Secondly, to keep Afghanistan in turmoil and India under constant threat will, in the long run, destroy Pakistan's security.

The notion that India's only foreign policy is the destruction of Pakistan -- which might have had some foundations in the early years of the independence -- will not be relevant really in the role that India will be playing on the global scene. And it cannot be in the Indian interest to add more disaffected Muslims to its own area of control.

So that I could imagine -- and I had the impression on my visit to India -- that, were it not for this incident, a discussion of a long-term, constructive relationship between India and Pakistan is possible. And the United States could contribute to that in a significant way.

The problem will be how to manage the next three to six months without their getting out of control, because one could imagine that the idea will arise in India that they must take very drastic measures to prevent the repetition of recent events.

ZAKARIA: Henry Kissinger, thank you very much.


ZAKARIA: I've brought in two of the most intelligent analysts of the South Asian scene. They join me from Washington.

Stephen Cohen has studied India and Pakistan for two decades, written several books about them. He's a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Ashley Tellis was a special adviser to the American ambassador in New Delhi during the Bush years, and is often described as the man behind the Indian nuclear deal. He is now at the Carnegie Foundation for International Peace.

Welcome, gentlemen.

Steve, your first reaction to these attacks. Does it seem to you that this is entirely a Pakistani issue, a mixture of Pakistani and local? How does it strike you?

STEPHEN P. COHEN, SENIOR FELLOW, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION: I think it was a coalition operation -- possibly al Qaeda, possibly elements from Pakistan, or with a Pakistani connection, maybe Indian.

If you look at the four targets that were hit, there was a Jewish center, there was a railway station named after a famous Hindu nationalist, Shivaji, and then, of course, two hotels which are frequented by Americans. So, I think it was an all-purpose attack, which would satisfy the needs of both al Qaeda, radical Indian Muslim groups, and possibly Pakistanis.

ZAKARIA: Ashley, anything to add to that?

ASHLEY TELLIS, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE: Well, I think it has all the hallmarks of an LET attack -- that's a Lashkar-e-Taiba attack. I think, in principle ...

ZAKARIA: That is a Pakistani-trained group that has operated in Kashmir.

TELLIS: That's right. It's a group that was founded and supported by the ISI for many years in the '90s, and began its operations in Kashmir, but today is really a terrorist organization of global reach.

LET operates today in Afghanistan. It operates in Chechnya. It's been noticed in Iraq. It has fund-raising operations in Western Europe, in Africa. And, of course, it continues to operate in Kashmir.

ZAKARIA: Steve, how would you respond to the question that I put to Henry Kissinger, which is, can the Pakistani military be convinced that it really is not in their interests to have these flirtations with jihadi groups, when these have been, from their point of view, a kind of successful policy in the past?

They use them at very low cost. They're able to stabilize India at times. They're able to destabilize the Afghan government, if they feel that a strong Afghanistan is going to be a threat to them.

Is there a possibility of a kind of reorientation of the Pakistani strategic mind?

COHEN: Well, Pakistan, especially the army, is like the Titanic heading towards an iceberg. And it takes a long time to turn a ship like that. But if they don't turn, they're going to run right into the iceberg.

You've got two or three generations of Pakistani officers who still regard India as a strategic threat, which is not to mean that they would support this kind of operation directly against India. But it means that they've tolerated groups in Pakistan, including Lashkar- e-Taiba, which have targeted India. And of course, they've been supporting groups such as the Taliban, which have targeted Afghanistan, including the Indian presence in Afghanistan, which they greatly exaggerate.

So, I think it's a question of turning the Titanic. We have warning signs. We know there's an iceberg ahead.

But I'm not sure whether the Pakistan army itself can bring itself to establish the kind of control and enforce the writ of the Pakistani state over groups which are carrying out acts, which they might have supported in the past, but which are really going to destroy Pakistan or else lead to an India-Pakistan crisis.

ZAKARIA: Ashley, is this going to lead to frictions between India and Pakistan inevitably? You're at the American embassy in New Delhi. Describe what you think is likely to happen between these two countries.

TELLIS: I think the key question is going to be whether the intelligence investigative -- the Indian intelligence and investigative services -- can actually identify a group that conducted this operation with Pakistani links.

If such an identification is made in the days and weeks ahead, then I think it's going to cause very severe stresses in the relationship, because the Indian people, who are both horrified and angered by the events of the last three days, are going to ask what kind of relationship India ought to have with Pakistan.

And the pressures for some kind of a response -- not necessarily a military response, but some kind of a response that communicates Indian displeasure -- will grow.

ZAKARIA: We're also dealing, Steve, with two weak states in different senses of the word, are we not?

The Indian government is a somewhat dysfunctional, weak coalition government. The counterterrorism capacities are not that well developed. And the Pakistanis have very little control over these territories that some of these militants come from.

In this mix, is it sort of impossible to imagine a robust counterterrorism policy in South Asia?

COHEN: I think that's the deeper problem, not only India and Pakistan, but Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh. These are very weak states. In cases where the economy is thriving, as in India, the state itself is, in a sense, shriveling away.

They've been unable to modernize the military, to modernize their counterterrorism operations. They've modernized by expanding and buying new technology, but not by organizational change. And there's some question as to whether a society such as India or Pakistan is amenable to that kind of discipline.

Meanwhile, they're being attacked from outside by groups which are very well disciplined, highly motivated and have international support of various sorts.

ZAKARIA: Ashley, in your experience, do you think the Indians would look kindly on American help? Are they willing to use American know-how, cooperation on counterterrorism issues?

TELLIS: I think they would welcome that. In fact, for the last several years, the Indians have repeatedly asked for a variety of access to American technologies.

But I think they see the question of access and assistance as being only half the problem. The other half of the problem, which, you know, New Delhi and Washington have not been able to agree on, is the whole question of Pakistan and the role that Pakistan plays in fomenting terrorism.

I mean, there is a point that Steve made, which I agree with, that a good deal of this can be explained by state incapacity. But there is a dimension of state complicity, as well. And although that complicity has waxed and waned over the years, the central question of whether you can be an American ally in the war on terror, while still being part of the problem of terrorism, is an issue that needs to be confronted.

And I think that's where the Indians have been most anxious that the U.S. has not quite appreciated the gravity of the problem.

ZAKARIA: Has the U.S. confronted Pakistan on these issues, Ashley?

TELLIS: I think it has in bits and pieces, depending on how salient the problem has been, but that pressure has not been consistent. And it has certainly permitted Pakistan to divide the nature of its support.

So, for example, from 2001 to 2006, we focused very much on getting Pakistan to sever its ties with al Qaeda. We permitted Pakistan to go easy on the Taliban, to look, you know, with a certain degree of equanimity at various Kashmiri terrorist groups.

And I think some of the things that we've seen in the last few years -- both in Afghanistan and in India now -- really are examples of chickens coming home to roost.

ZAKARIA: Steve, how much of this is also part of the Afghan problem?

That is, we have a problem in Afghanistan. We are not able to fully eliminate al Qaeda, because there is some sympathy and support within some elements of the Taliban. They appear to have some degree of support within elements of Pakistan.

Is this all tied in with our al Qaeda problem?

COHEN: Well, it is in a sense that the Pakistanis have exaggerated Indian presence in Afghanistan. And they're afraid of Indian encirclement. Hence, they're supporting the Taliban as their tool against the Indian presence in Afghanistan.

And I think the Obama people have tried to deal with this by working backward and promoting India-Pakistan normalization. I'm afraid that events are going to outrun this diplomatic process, and I think you might well see a military crisis in the next couple of months.

The Indians have been developing a Cold Start strategy -- that's the name for it -- which would involve a short cross-border punishing raid in response to any major terrorist act. And this certainly is a major terrorist attack of unprecedented magnitude in India.

So, I think that diplomacy may not have time to work in effect in terms of bringing our two friends together, and you may be preempted by an Indian military attack or a conflict on the border between the two countries.

ZAKARIA: On that note, Steve Cohen, Ashley Tellis, thank you very much.


ZAKARIA: And now, the question of the week.

Last week I asked: If you had to buy a car right now, what would it be, and why?

We received our largest volume of e-mail response ever, by the way, and the news is not good for Detroit.

Toyota was the clear winner, and the vast majority of our viewers want to buy a hybrid. Many said they'd buy one from one of the Big Three, if only they were more readily available.

Now, to this week's question.

What do you think cities like Mumbai can do to better prepare themselves for terrorist attacks? What one suggestion would you have?

Now, I want to recommend a book with particular relevance to this week's events. It's called "Maximum City." It's written by Suketu Mehta. It's about Mumbai. It's a vivid, pulsating account of life at the top and at the bottom -- mostly at the bottom.

Or, if you haven't seen it, watch the movie "Slum Dog Millionaire." It is an absolutely delightful movie about life and love in Mumbai.

Remember, as always, you can visit our Web site,, for highlights from this program. You can e-mail me at And you can always find our weekly podcast on the Web site.

Thanks for watching. Have a great week.