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Fareed Zakaria GPS

Iran Launches Barrage of Strikes Toward Israel; Interview With U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen; Interview With U.S. Ambassador To Japan Rahm Emanuel. Aired 10-11a ET

Aired April 14, 2024 - 10:00   ET



FAREED ZAKARIA, CNN ANCHOR: This is GPS, the GLOBAL PUBLIC SQUARE. Welcome to all of you in the United States and around the world. I'm Fareed Zakaria coming to you live from New York.

We'll start today's program with Iran striking back against Israel with a barrage of drones and missiles. What is next in this highly dangerous tit-for-tat. I talked to Vali Nasr and David Sanger. Plus Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen on her trip to China, and Ambassador Rahm Emanuel on the Japanese prime minister's state visit to Washington, D.C.

I'll give you my take in a moment, but first the breaking news. The world has wondered for two weeks how Iran would respond to the attack that destroyed its consulate in Damascus and killed a handful of top military officials. Now we know. Last night's retaliation was a show of force with several hundred missiles and drones sent to attack Israel. It was also the first time that Iran has attacked Israel directly from Iranian soil.

But 99 percent of the drones and missiles were intercepted before they reach Israeli territory. Indeed, Israel says there was little damage and only one known casualty. The big question is how is Prime Minister Netanyahu thinking about this.

Joining me now from Tel Aviv is CNN's chief international correspondent Clarissa Ward.

Clarissa, welcome. What are you hearing about what Israel and Prime Minister Netanyahu are thinking about what the situation is now and what do they do?

CLARISSA WARD, CNN CHIEF INTERNATIONAL CORRESPONDENT: So, Fareed, the war cabinet has now been in session for just over an hour. We expect to hear a televised statement from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Once that wraps up, we have also heard a statement from the centrist war cabinet minister Benny Gantz, who describes putting together a regional coalition and acting to exact a price from Iran at the time of Israel's choosing.

Now we also know of course that President Biden has told Prime Minister Netanyahu that the U.S. will not be involved in any kind of a retaliation. He has urged Israel not to escalate the situation further saying take the win.

And for many here, Fareed, this is being seen as a gift or a lifeline to Prime Minister Netanyahu because it deflects away from the situation in Gaza. Israel increasingly isolated on the world stage and it also deflects from these protests that we have seen every single week. They have been gathering pace demands for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to step down. On the other hand, you have these sort of hardliners in his coalition. They are pushing very hard for a big response.

They say its desperately important to re-establish deterrence, but important for our viewers to remember that they are not part of that war cabinet. And ultimately, it will be the three members of that war cabinet, the three observers who determine what the response will be. And we will likely learn more about that in the coming hours -- Fareed.

ZAKARIA: Thanks, Clarissa. As always, terrific reporting.

Now let me bring in today's panel. David Sanger covers the White House and National Security for "The New York Times" and is a CNN political and national security analyst. He also has an excellent new book out Tuesday, which you should all read. It is called "New Cold Wars: China's rise, Russia's invasion, and America's struggled to defend the West."

Vali Nasr is a professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Vali, let me to begin with you. This in some senses begins on April 1st, when Israel attacks that Iranian embassy in Damascus, the consulate building in the Iranian embassy. Iran and Israel had been having a shadow war in a sense, each hitting various things of the others. Iran through Hezbollah and other militias.


This was the break. Israel decided to actually attack what would technically under international law be considered Iranian territory. Why do you think that happened?

VALI NASR, PROFESSOR, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY: I think the Iranian understanding, which is important here, was that this was a deliberate calculated step taken by Israel, not in response to anything in particular, to divert attention from what was happening in Gaza, to help fix the rift between United States and Israel over the Gaza war, and essentially to even draw the United States into the war in the Middle East by baiting Iran into a major reaction.

ZAKARIA: Do you think, Vali, the Iranian reaction was major? It seems like they almost signal, you know, this is what we're going to do, almost roughly when we're going to do it, and they've just announced that's it. You know, this is the end of our response.

NASR: Well, it did create a dilemma for Iran. Iran could not just roll over and be seen within -- by its on population and in the region to essentially taking such a provocative escalation from Israel without responding. On the other hand, they did not want to throw Prime Minister Netanyahu a lifeline of basic shifting the attention from Gaza to Iran and Syria, and even drawing the United States into a war with Iran.

So they had to react, but they had to react in a way where the emphasis was not really on retaliation, but on deterrence. And I think the deterrence was achieved not just by the military act they carried out yesterday but essentially by the very effective psychological campaign that they managed through this escalation, both in Israel and also in Western capitals.

ZAKARIA: David, do you think that the Israeli government is willing to, you know, take what win they have? I mean, the air defenses were extraordinarily effective. It's worth pausing for a moment. Just think about this has got to be the most successful air defense, 99 percent of these missiles intercepted, three layers of defense. You know, the Iron Dome being the core of it. Some of it Israeli technology. Much of it American technology.

Will Israel, you think, take the win or does Bibi need to -- does Bibi Netanyahu need to do something in return?

DAVID SANGER, CNN POLITICAL AND NATIONAL SECURITY ANALYST: My suspicion is, Fareed, that he will feel great pressure to do something in return. And the question is, can he calibrate that to be modest enough that we don't get into a cycle.

As you suggested, on the one hand, the Iranians went into territory here they've never gone into before. By doing a direct attack they have basically gone a last step and no one will ever be able to stuff that back in the bottle. If the Israeli's debate in the future whether they could attack Iran directly, they would probably cite this as the precedent. On the other hand, it is the greatest ad for missile defense that we've ever seen in battle.

I mean, here they were able to discriminate among 200 to 300 drones, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and have 99 percent success rate, at least from the early reports. That's remarkable and 10 years ago would not have been the case, and so the question is, could the Israelis basically argue they have established deterrence? They've established the deterrence that comes from making it clear to an adversary that they could not successfully attack even with an overwhelming number of missiles.

ZAKARIA: Vali, what about this idea that in a way that Clarissa pointed out that this has thrown a lifeline to Benjamin Netanyahu? Nobody is talking about Gaza, nobody is talking about the famine, you know, which Samantha Power, the director of USAID says has already begun in Gaza. You know, the Western world certainly has coalesced around Israel to support it.

I mean, is this at some level a kind of Iranian miscalculation?

NASIR: Well, if it continues, but it does come at a huge cost. In other words, a tit for tat process does put enormous amount of psychological pressure on Israeli public, which were in a high state of anxiety the past week. It does tax Israel's economy every time he goes into high alert. And we saw that it also got the international community, European capitals, Washington, extremely worried about an uncontrolled escalation in the region.

So it's not as if, you know, you keep going down the path of escalation with Iran is cost-free for Israel. And I think last week we had a lot of diplomatic engagement with Iran to persuade them to calibrate their response. And now Israel is also going to face similar kind of pressure from the international community to calibrate its response because nobody wants an unchecked escalation between Iran and Israel.


And I think all the international pressure is going to be on Iran and Israel to observe certain red lines which then will take us back essentially to the Gaza war because I would expect that in a week's time if we don't see a major escalation that this will be tamped down.

ZAKARIA: All right. Stay with us. We're going to come back. When we come back, I will ask David Sanger and Vali Nasr where this Gaza war will go and where the rift between Joe Biden and Benjamin Netanyahu stands, and will it will it get exacerbated, when we come back.



ZAKARIA: And we are back David Sanger and Vali Nasr.

David, ever since the start of this Israeli war with Hamas in Gaza, President Biden has faced a tough challenge, which is he wants to show unwavering, unqualified support for Israel. And yet he has had deep reservations about Bibi Netanyahu's war strategy, urging him to be more restrained, more targeted, to be careful not to escalate. My understanding of this, some reporting on this, that they counsel the Israelis against the kinds of escalation that involve the attack on Iran's facilities -- consular facilities in Damascus.

Where does that relationship stand? And will Biden you think be able to have any influence on Israeli policy, which so far he seems to have had limited influence?

SANGER: That's right, Fareed. I mean, I would say that Biden has been extraordinarily frustrated in his dealings with Bibi Netanyahu, in part because every time that he has gone to counsel some form of advice that Israel was not acting as long-term interests that it needed to allow in more aid, that it needed to put off a certain military strikes, that it needed to stop using 2,000-pound bombs in crowded and urban areas.

He was basically ignored. And just before this incident unfolded, of course, you saw Biden hit a breaking point. One in which he said, if you don't follow our advice, including on not attacking in Rafah, this could require a broad rethinking of the relationship. So the breach was pretty open. The question now is, does it remain that way or can he use this as a turning point since it was the U.S. that was there helping intercept missiles last night.

One of the big questions is, who else can we bring into this? He's meeting the G7 today, but missing in that, Fareed, are the two countries that have the most influence with Iran -- Russia and China. And, you know, I argue in "New Cold Wars," but we've also discussed other moments that the defining moment, the defining issue in this particular moment is that at this point, the allies who sat or the countries that sat with the U.S. to try to restrain Iran and its nuclear program seven, eight, nine years ago have now flipped over to the other side, and Iran and Russia are part of the so-called axis of resistance.

ZAKARIA: Vali, I noticed that Washington asked China to restrain Iran. Washington has no influence with Russia, but do China and Russia, they do seem to act broadly speaking in concert in the sense that as David says, they are all opposed to the kind of American lead world order and Middle Eastern balance of power. But does Russia or China -- do Russia and China have influence with Iran?

NASR: I mean, the short answer is yes, they have much more influence with Iran now that, say, Europeans or the United States has. But as David points out in his excellent book, you know, this brewing cold war between U.S., China, and Russia now becomes much more complicated when you actually need their help in something with Iran. They may have their own interests why they don't want a war with the Middle East.

But they're not just going to be letter carriers for Washington without sort of being engaged on also issues that matters to them. And also the difference between with Gaza and what's happening with Iran is that their -- the USA influence with Israel was about how Israel handle the war and what it meant for global public opinion or domestic public opinion. But the escalation with Iran could potentially actually get the United States into a war and that really does feature on China and Russia's own calculations when they themselves are at odds with the United States.

So the U.S. has to have a much more comprehensive view of these sets of global relations and think in terms of the Middle East as part of that global rivalry with Russia and China.

ZAKARIA: David, as you pointed out in your book, it really is a sea change from 10 years ago, Obama administration, Russia and China, were effectively allied with the United States in putting sanctions on Iran.


Then, you know, the Iran nuclear deal in which all the Security Council major powers joined together. And now here you have Russia and China as part of the axis of resistance. You touched on this in your book. Henry Kissinger always felt that one of the core goals of American foreign policy should be to avoid Russia and China forming an alliance, to kind of heightened the divisions between Russia and China.

Do you think that that is still a strategy left for the U.S.? I mean, is there a way and it really be -- to wean China, you know, to have a better working relationship with China and wean it off its unqualified support for Russia?

SANGER: It's the sort of defining question of this time, Fareed. And I'm glad you raised it because Kissinger's idea by doing the opening to China and Nixon's of course was to create that division and it worked for 60 or more years. What's happened now is that we missed to some degree Russia's move toward authoritarianism. And we failed to understand that it would be taking over territory.

We made a parallel mistake with China and then we were pretty slow to recognize the degree to which they were coming together. Putin and Xi have met more than 40 times. President Biden has met Putin one time in his time in office, and that will probably be the last one. So we're at a moment right now where the strategy we need to look at is, how do you contain the worst aspects of their behavior but also so prevent them from working together? And that's the new mission in Washington. And so far I would have to say we are not very far down that road in developing that strategy.

ZAKARIA: Vali, very quickly before we go, I got to ask you, Iran is also in the midst of a kind of leadership change, right? I mean, there's talk about what happens after the supreme leader who is the longest serving, I think, leader in the world right now, what happens after he goes? Unfortunately you have 30 seconds but give us a quick preview of what's happening.

NASR: It's going to be definitely a big change for Iran. Anytime a leader of that long duration leaves, there's going to be change. But more key is that all Iranians, including the supreme leader are aware of it. And I think at this point in time, he prefers stability rather than tumult in regional issues, domestic issues, because a succession goes much better if Iran is not at war with Israel or the United States, and is in a much better position. That does give an opening to the West if you would to try to manage relations with Iran.

ZAKARIA: Vali Nasr, David Sanger, very smart analysis. Thank you so much.

I will be back with my take next.



ZAKARIA: Here's my take.

For a third straight month, inflation has been higher than expected, suggesting that the Federal Reserve will find it difficult to lower interest rates, which could slow down the economy and that endangers Present Biden's reelection prospects. Economists aren't sure as to why inflation has persisted. Some of it is surely a persistent hangover from the pandemic. But some of it could well be that a feature of recent economic policy of both the Trump and Biden administrations has been to ask consumers to pay more for goods and services.

Both administrations goose the economy with large pandemic relief packages, which without question added to inflationary pressures. But beyond those bills, which have by now probably work their way through the system, there is another possible cause. Donald Trump had few tangible achievements in office but he can credibly point to breaking with decades of bipartisan economic policy on tariffs.

Trump raised tariffs on China as well as on many of America's closest allies in the West. While candidate Biden criticized those tariffs, President Biden has kept most in place. In addition, the Biden administration has imposed tight buy America provisions in large spending bills such as the Inflation Reduction Act and the Infrastructure Act. All of these policies ask Americans to pay more to achieve certain political goals. Less dependence on China, greater resilience, subsidizing green energy, boosting domestic manufacturing.

Even the IRA has three economists have persuasively shown, is about five times more expensive as a way to cut carbon emissions compared to a simple carbon tax. All of the political goals Biden is promoting might well be worthwhile. But they do come at a cost. And one wonders if the cost will be permanently higher inflation. The tariffs are the most egregious of all these policies. Despite Trump's rhetoric to the contrary, they are a tax on American consumers.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection estimates that so far Americans have paid more than $230 billion in these taxes. In addition, tens of billions of dollars have been handed out to farmers to compensate for their losses in agricultural exports as a consequence of China's retaliatory tariffs. It's hard to find anyone who believes that tariffs have been effective. They have not altered China's policies one iota, and they have cost the American economy in money and lost jobs.


According to the Tax Foundation, each year, the tariffs cost the U.S. economy nearly 200,000 jobs and 0.25 percent of its GDP, or roughly $70 billion in annual output. Or to put it another way, enacting a modest set of liberalization policies proposed by the Peterson Institute in 2022 would reduce inflation by about 1.3 percentage points, which works out to almost $800 of savings per American household.

The office of the U.S. Trade Representative promised to review the tariffs to determine whether they have been effective or not. It has been working on this review now for over two years with no end in sight despite apparently having little on its agenda these days since it has abandoned in its core business of promoting trade. A senior administration official confessed to me that the reason is that if the USTR admits that the tariffs have failed, it will also have to recommend that they be lifted, which the Biden team does not want to do.

There is also a foreign policy cost to this rising protectionism in America. President Biden met with his Japanese counterpart this week in a bid to strengthen the alliance between America and one of its longest and closest allies. And yet his administration has announced its staunch opposition to a Japanese company buying U.S. steel, a company that has been foundering for years and is a shadow of the behemoth it once was.

Nippon Steel, the Japanese company, promises to invest in U.S. steel, honor its labor contracts, and retain all its workers into 2026. In short, it would rescue an under-performing American company. But for the Biden administration, it seems the optics are more important than the substance.

The conventional wisdom of the last several years has been that America hollowed-out its manufacturing by embracing globalization and efficiency, which in turn led to the rise of right-wing populism. That argument doesn't stand scrutiny since countries like Germany and France, which protected workers and invested massively in retraining, have also seen right-wing populism boom.

Declines in manufacturing are part of the economic rise of countries. Notice that even China, which has prized its factories above all else, has seen manufacturing decline as a share of its economy from 32 percent in 2011, down to 28 percent in 2022.

People around the world, especially in America, have gotten used to the dramatic declines and costs that globalization has brought them over the past three decades. The cost of clothes, appliances, telecommunications, and air travel have all plummeted in that period. It's been easy to pocket these gains and complain about the ills of trade.

But inflation hits everyone, not just the small percentage of unemployed. And when people are forced to bear the costs of higher prices, they tend to lash out at those in power. What an irony it would be if policies designed to keep populism at bay end up punishing mainstream politicians instead.

Go to for a link to my "Washington Post" column this week. Next on GPS, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen is fresh back from China, and I asked

her about her trip and whether anything important was accomplished.



ZAKARIA: This week Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen was in China to stress that Washington doesn't seek to decouple from Beijing. But she also went to press China on what she calls its unfair trade practices such as flooding the global market with cheap subsidized products like electric vehicles and solar panels.

So, what did she achieve on her trip? And where does it leave U.S.- China relations? Secretary Yellen joins me now. Welcome, Madam Secretary.

JANET YELLEN, U.S. TREASURY SECRETARY: Thank you. ZAKARIA: Let me ask you, when you talk to the Chinese do you have much leverage? Because in a sense you have all the Trump tariffs still in place. There are additional ones. You have export restrictions. You have the chip ban.

There's already American tariffs on Chinese EVs, electric vehicles. So, are you threatening more tariffs when you tell them, you know, we want you to change your behavior or else?

YELLEN: Well, look, we are concerned about the possibility of surges in Chinese exports to our markets in areas where they have a great deal of overcapacity. And so, I wouldn't take anything off the table as a potential response. But we really want to responsibly manage this relationship and I think that entails being very clear at the most senior levels with the concerns we have and trying to engage in joint discussion that helps us avoid misunderstanding.


In the case of overcapacity in certain areas of manufacturing, we agreed to launch an intensive exchange on balanced growth in the domestic and global economies. I've been very clear in my discussions with them that this is a concern not only to us but also to other countries, to Europe, to Japan and even to emerging markets, India, Mexico, Brazil. So, we want to talk about our concerns honestly. You know, we have a complex relationship.

ZAKARIA: You also spoke about their relationship with Russia. And I think it's pretty clear that one of the reasons the Russian economy has been able to survive fairly intense western sanctions has been China. They've been able to trade with, you know, the Indians, the Turks and such. But the Chinese, particularly in the technology area, have been the crucial supplier.

Do you get the sense that the Chinese government listen to you? Do you imagine there will be any change in Chinese policy towards Russia?

YELLEN: Well, we've been extremely clear and I was clear at the highest levels in my meetings that the United States will not tolerate violations of our sanctions by Chinese banks or firms that are aiding Russia in its war against Ukraine, and that if that's done that there will be consequences.

ZAKARIA: But did the Chinese seem responsive? Do you expect Chinese policy to change?

YELLEN: I think they clearly heard our concerns and will consider them very carefully.

ZAKARIA: Let me ask you about what I talked about in my opening commentary. It does seem the Biden administration is acting at cross purposes. It wants to bring inflation down and yet when you look at the Buy America provisions, you look at the tariffs, you look at the -- so many of the requirements, I think, I'm quoting President Biden correctly when he said, it used to be we look for the cheapest possible place to get goods. Now, we want it all made in America. What he doesn't say is often that means at significantly higher price. Aren't you -- aren't you pursuing policies that inevitably will lead to some structural inflation?

YELLEN: Well, it may push up prices a little bit, but I think when you take a hard look at the numbers it's very modest influence on inflation. And I think it's critically important that we create jobs in the United States, good manufacturing jobs in industries that is going to be increasingly important.

We've had parts of the United States that have industrial production is hollowed out and partly is a consequence of surging imports from China in the early 2000s after China joined the WTO. And we want to engage in trade that's mutually beneficial. There needs to be a level playing field and China has agreed with us on that.

And we're concerned about areas with the playing field clearly is not level. China is directing massive subsidies through their industrial policy on an ongoing basis. And when the demand isn't there, the Chinese firms do not go bankrupt as American firms do. They stay in the market and that can succeed in depressing prices to the point where very competitive American firms can be driven out of business. And Europe, Japan, and other countries feel the same.

ZAKARIA: Madam Secretary, always a pleasure to have you on. Thank you.

YELLEN: Thank you, Fareed.

ZAKARIA: Next on GPS, America's other most important relationship in Asia, Japan. I will talk to ambassador to Tokyo Rahm Emanuel when we come back.



ZAKARIA: Ukraine today, maybe East Asia tomorrow. Those were the words delivered by Japan's prime minister Fumio Kishida at a news conference this week at the White House during his state visit to the U.S.

Kishida's words underscore increasing tensions between China and its neighbors, and escalating fears of a military confrontation either in the South China Sea or Taiwan. That was the context of a trilateral meeting at the White House this week between Kishida, Biden, and Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the president of the Philippines.


Joining me now to discuss the visit and the U.S.'s relationship with Japan is Rahm Emanuel, currently the U.S. ambassador to Japan. Welcome Mr. Ambassador. First, can I begin --


ZAKARIA: Pleasure. First, can I begin by asking you a broader question, which is Japan seems to be back. You know, 30 years ago we taught this was the Asian behemoth that was going to take over the world economy, then went into a 30-year stagnation. But things seem to have turned around in a big way. The stock market is finally where it was at its peak in 1989. Do you -- do you -- is that palpable when you are in Japan?

EMANUEL: Yes and no. I think, it's equally -- not only is the stock market up, its major companies are investing across the globe which we're doing today, highlighting the investments here in North Carolina, $13.9 billion investment by Toyota in an EV factory.

So technologically, it's making major advances. Economically, it's making major advances. And then something important for us as America in re-emphasizing our permanent pacific power and presence, our partner in this and our major partner is Japan.

They're the most trusted country in the region among the population. They've doubled their defense budget to become the third largest spender. They're acquiring very important 400 Tomahawk counterstrike capability. They're going to invest in a new joint operations center.

And then the week -- just think of it this week, we started with a naval exercise in the Philippines, South China Sea, with the United States, Australia, Japan, the Philippines. We had a major diplomatic first ever trilateral meeting between the United States and the Philippines led by President Biden. And we're closing out the week with a historic military exercise between the United States, Japan, and South Korea.

That tells you what this lattice architecture looks like. And the constant for the United States in Asia is Japan. And they don't want to just be regional. They're going to be a global partner for us in the preservation of democracy and the rule of law.

ZAKARIA: Do the governments you talk to worry that come November, you may have a very different president who has a very different view of America's role in the world?

EMANUEL: Yes. Yes and no. I mean, the one thing is we're putting our roots down very strongly in the investments in the diplomatic area, the development area, and the defense area. But make no doubt, the president has a view of allies and alliances that's different than Donald Trump, and there's a concern.

Now, Japan is doing things betting on the United States as their partner, and you have to have a view. And I will tell you this, having been in the region now for two years, that's a home game for China. It's a distant game for the United States. It's an away game.

You need our friends in the region to make it a home game. So, the idea that you're going to confront China alone from just a spatial point makes no sense. From a geo-strategic sense, it makes a place that makes no sense.

So, I would just say we're betting on our allies and our allies are betting on us. It's not a one-way bet and they can -- that -- it's going to be important for the United States. The credibility and our effectiveness to backing up our claims of being a permanent pacific power and presence is betting on the fact that we have allies in the region who want the United States to be a counter anchor to China's aggression.

They are in a conflict with India, a conflict with the Philippines, a conflict with China, and a conflict with us when we try to make sure the rule of law is the policy when it goes to normal international exercises and operations in waters. So, I would just tell you we actually benefit from our allies and our allies benefit from us.

ZAKARIA: So, let me ask you about on the strategic side. If China would use military force in Taiwan, are you confident that Japan would militarily respond in a significant way?

EMANUEL: I think, you know, there's not a clear answer on that, and Japan said that, I think, in a sense of ambiguity. I do think there's two lessons to be learned.

One is before you even get there, credible deterrence. And that's what China is getting frosty about and is being -- the rhetoric is getting hot because they see all the allies working together in this lattice structure that the United States is assembling and replacing the hubs and spoke.

Second, Japan's investment in its counterstrike capability brings a level of deterrence China had not seen or calculated on as recently as a year ago. And third, the type of exercises we're doing, not just in the southern tip islands of Okinawa but also in the Philippine area makes a strategic challenge on Taiwan.


Deterrence is the most important. On the other hand, it's not lost on Japan, that post Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, when there were those major exercises by the PRC, that they fired five missiles into the Japanese EEZ right off of Taiwan. Not just an exercise around Taiwan but they did something into Japan's EEZ.

So, Japan took note of that. And that was an aggressive step by China. And so, we understand the consequences of the Taiwan Strait to Japan's own economic security. So, Japan has a value -- vested interest and a strategic interest in the rule of law and abiding by international standards being adhered to by China, which is why the credibility of our collective deterrence, not singular, collective, is so essential to America's security and the security of our allies.

ZAKARIA: My thanks to Rahm Emanuel for joining me. And thanks to all of you for being part of my program this week. I will see you next week.