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Fareed Zakaria GPS
Fallout from Israel's Strikes on Iranian Military Sites; Israel's Endgame in Gaza and Lebanon; North Korean Troops Working with Russia. Interview With Former Senior CIA And State Department Official Jung Pak; Interview With The American Institute For Boys And Men President Richard Reeves. Aired 10-11a
Aired October 27, 2024 - 10:00 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
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FAREED ZAKARIA, CNN ANCHOR: This is GPS, the GLOBAL PUBLIC SQUARE. Welcome to all of you in the United States and around the world. I'm Fareed Zakaria coming to you live from New York.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
ZAKARIA (voice-over): Today on the program, is the tit-for-tat between Israel and Iran over at least for now. Ronen Bergman joins us from Tel Aviv.
And as many hoped for a ceasefire in Gaza, I talked to Ryan Crocker, who was ambassador in Iraq and Afghanistan as America fought its battle against insurgents. He talks about what is likely to come next.
Plus, The United States says North Korea has sent thousands of troops to train in Russia. I sat down with a former CIA analyst to discuss what the U.S. Defense secretary called a very, very serious escalation.
Then recent polls have Trump with a roughly 15-point advantage with men and Harris with a similar advantage with women. Stunning statistics. I talked to the writer Richard Reeves about what is behind them.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
ZAKARIA: But first, here's my take.
Last week's cover of "The Economist" was a special report on the American economy. The headline, "The Envy of the World." Yet the strongest economy in the world has not paid off for President Biden, who had the second worst third-year average approval rating of any modern president nor is it giving Kamala Harris a commanding lead in the polls? It is yet one more powerful signal that our politics are in the midst of a great upheaval as economic issues give way to cultural ones.
The economic paradox is even more profound when you consider that the Biden administration's economic policies have been specifically designed to benefit the working class, made up largely of men without a college degree. And they've disproportionately benefited this group, and yet the Democratic nominee is on track to receive the lowest share of this group's votes in decades with a deficit nine points worse than Biden's in 2020, according to "New York Times" polls. Add to this consistent polling that shows that black and Hispanic men are moving away from the Democratic Party in historic numbers.
What is going on? In my latest book, "Age of Revolutions," I argue that decades of revolutionary change, the massive expansion of globalization, the information revolution have upended our politics. We're seeing a realignment in which the old categories of economic status and race or giving way to new categories like social status and cultural divides around gender. We are likely at the beginning of this transformation of the political landscape.
It used to be relatively easy to predict a person's voting pattern based on economics. The rich and upper middle class voted right. The poor and working class voted left. Race was another durable factor after the Civil Rights Movement. White people disproportionately voted for Republicans. People of color largely voted Democratic. But today there seems to be a more prominent divide than race.
Professionals appear far more likely to vote for Harris and blue- collar working class voters have become the new solid base of the Republican Party. You see the great divide in America today is not economic class, but social class defined by college education.
The other strong predictors of a person's voting behavior other than college education or gender, geography and religion. So the new party bases in America are uneducated, urban, secular, and female left and a less educated, rural, religious and male right. These new divisions are even overwhelming those deepest of divides, race and ethnicity.
More and more black and Hispanic men are finding themselves comfortable with the Republican Party, and it's especially pronounced with young people. A recent GenForward poll had a quarter of young black men and 44 percent of young Latino men voting for Trump.
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Hulk Hogan tearing off his shirt at the RNC may hold more appeal than talk of unisex bathrooms and gender-affirming treatments.
On the other hand, Kamala Harris a biracial woman, may yet receive more of the white vote than did Joe Biden, an old white guy. Professional white women see themselves represented by Harris because social, class, and gender Trump raised.
Democratic elites have been slow to understand the shift. They have persisted in believing that the working classes somehow deluded or has been conned by the right into voting against its own interests. That's why the party under Biden has made a broad shift to the populist left on economic policy, from tariffs to manufacturing subsidies, and yet it has not wooed back the working class.
In fact polling has often shown that Bernie Sanders and his economic policies are much more a popular with the educated elites in the Democratic Party, than with working class voters. Democratic elites do not want to believe that their problem is not that they move too far right on economic policy but rather that they move too far left on social and cultural issues. You see for them, economic policy is a matter of choice, practical decisions that can easily be changed. Social issues are a matter of core rights and to be against them is to be a bad and bigoted person. And so even when Democrats quietly shift policy as they did on immigration, they cannot bring themselves to articulate why.
The right has its own problems. It is enthralled to a personality cult of Donald Trump, whose extreme positions and rhetoric turned off many voters. With the most economically vibrant parts of America trending left, Harris has far outrace Trump in donations in recent months by more than three to one margins in September. For the Democrats, the problem is that non-college educated voters still make up the majority, around 65 percent of registered voters in 2020. And they may feel alienated by some of the Ivy League liberalism.
Whether Harris or Trump wins, this new cultural landscape will define American politics for decades to come.
Go to CNN.com/Fareed for link to buy my book, "Age of Revolutions," and to read my "Washington Post" column this week. And let's get started.
Early Saturday morning, explosions lit up Iran's skies as Israel carried out its long anticipated retaliation for Iran's ballistic missile attack earlier this month. Prime Minister Netanyahu said today that the attacks severely damaged Iran's capacity and its ability to produce missiles that are used against Israel. For its part Tehran played down the strike saying they caused only limited damage.
For more I'm joined by Ronen Bergman, who is a staff writer for "The New York Times" magazine. He's also the author of "Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassinations."
So, Ronen, first thing one notices is something I've written about earlier, which is the mismatch. Israel's air force was able to essentially destroy all Iran's defenses, air defenses, right? Leaving it very vulnerable for the possibility of another strike. How likely do you think that follow-on strike is from Israel?
RONEN BERGMAN, STAFF WRITER, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE: Yes. Hi, Fareed. Thanks for the invite. Israel tried to signal to Iran, if the first, after the first Iranian missile attack in April and Israel's reaction back then was only one missile, fired from some 1500 kilometers. So much, much, much further away than the distance of even the most advanced air defense of Iran, Russian S-300.
And they directed and targeted the radar system and the command and control caravan of that will basically blind it. The Israelis were hoping that Iran will get the message, meaning that Israel has the capability to send these super missiles, one of Israel's most secret weapons from afar and exploding that. And so Iran understand. But for whatever reason, the message maybe was not received and Iran went for further attacks on Israel.
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And this time, Israel decided to take all the S-300, the S-200, so the advance Russia air defense is basically leaving Iran defenseless, Tehran blind, and much of the aerial control, the military aerial control of southern Iran also destroyed and Iran not being able to -- not to defend itself and its some areas according to what we hear from American and Israeli sources. In some areas, not even able to understand what's happening. It is all scarred.
ZAKARIA: So what happens next? They're waiting I presume to see what Iran will respond. The Iranian rhetoric seems to be to try to deescalate, to try to make this smaller. So the hope is that Iran does something very minor, or maybe not at all, and then Israel draws down.
Is there a danger of escalation here?
BERGMAN: The Israeli assessment for now is that it's more likely that Iran will react. It's based on intelligence and also some announcements from the radio supreme national security council. They said what Israel has done is weak, but we need to react. If Iran react, if Iran retaliates, I think the next move in this ping-pong, from Israel will be much more severe.
Fareed, we have to take in consideration this time Israel restrained itself following requests from the U.S. not to go against the energy facilities or the nuclear facilities before the U.S. elections. But we are just there. Maybe after the elections Israel will feel much more -- a better freedom to do and attack these sites and its one specific place in Iran, Israel destroyed the same battery that was guarding the biggest industry park for energy, for gas and oil in the country.
Not touching it, but the Iranians told my colleague (INAUDIBLE) simply we understand Iranian officials, we understand this was the hit, that next time this could be on the military industrial civilian complex.
ZAKARIA: Ronen, there must be people in the Israeli elite military and government elite who think, look, we are succeeding beyond anyone's predictions, you know, look at what we've done in Hezbollah, look at what we did to Sinwar, look at what we've been able to do to Iran. We need to take this moment and once and for all completely change the balance of power and the deterrence system. There must be that feeling. Is there?
BERGMAN: Yes, and some people, some sources told us that they are sure that even Prime Minister Netanyahu is playing with this idea that this is a historical epic moment and it's not just to teach Iran a lesson according to what they think. And not just facilitate the bomb and to take out the nucleus site, but also to lead a regime change.
Now the CIA, the United States tried that in the '70s and '60s all over. It didn't work very well, but still I think that some intelligence services will be so successful they tend to confuse between doing something very targeted and trying to inflate massive protests and there are people in Israel who believe that maybe I'll try to convince Prime Minister Netanyahu that it's doable, that they can lead a regime change and if this is the case, then it's not just about teaching a lesson, but we will be looking at something much longer than any kind of people, even if Iran decides not to react this time.
ZAKARIA: Ronen Bergman, always a pleasure to hear from you. Thank you, sir.
Next on GPS, more on Israel on those two wars and its immediate neighborhood. I'll ask a veteran diplomat why he thinks both the conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon could actually last for years.
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ZAKARIA: Secretary of State Antony Blinken said this week that with the death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar Israel had accomplished its goals in Gaza of effectively dismantling Hamas and eliminating its leaders. He urged Israel to make a deal to end the war and get the hostages back. But Israel is continuing to wage war in Gaza and in Lebanon against Hezbollah.
For more on where this is all headed, I wanted to talk to Ryan Crocker. He was U.S. ambassador to Iraq and Afghanistan while the U.S. was battling insurgencies there. Among his earlier jobs, he served as ambassador to Lebanon. He is now distinguished chair and diplomacy and security at Rand.
Welcome, Ambassador. I wanted to ask you about this sort of fundamental question that everyone has, which is, when -- what is the objective of the Israeli operation? When would it be possible for Israel to say that it has defeated Hamas, for starters?
RYAN CROCKER, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ AND LEBANON: The Israeli prime minister has set the bar very high, the total defeat of Hamas. But that can be a flexible notion.
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And I think Secretary Blinken gave the Israelis some good advice to say that that they have accomplished their main mission, which was eliminating the senior leadership of Hamas, effectively eliminating its ability to project force into Israel and this would be a great moment to declare an end to hostilities because otherwise this is going to grind on indefinitely. I don't see an end to it other than a declaration by Israel that they have achieved their objectives and it is time to cease hostilities. That is the only way to get the hostages back, by the way.
ZAKARIA: Because you don't think that Hamas is ever going to, in effect, surrender?
CROCKER: Well, I don't. We've seen these kinds of insurgencies before, Fareed, in Gaza and the West Bank. I experienced it in Iraq and Afghanistan, certainly in Lebanon. There is not going to be a point at which Hamas runs up the white flag and accepts an unconditional surrender. They will fight on in some form, some form of militancy is going to be an indefinite part of the landscape, I'm afraid.
ZAKARIA: What about the death of Yahya Sinwar? Does it -- is it a game changer?
CROCKER: Well, clearly it is very important. I would liken it in some ways to the killing of Osama bin Laden by the United States in 2010. It is very important symbolically. I think it's questionable how much operational control he had over the remnants of Hamas at the time he was killed, though. So whatever resistance is left, I don't think is going to be dramatically affected by his passing.
ZAKARIA: When you look in the north, Ambassador, you were around during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. What do you, what do you think Israel is doing right? And what is it doing wrong?
CROCKER: Well, clearly the targeted actions against Hezbollah's leadership were highly effective and I certainly shed no tears for their passing. They have enormous amounts of blood on their hands, including American blood. I was a survivor of the embassy bombing of 1983. And of course just a few days ago, we marked the 41st anniversary of the marine barracks bombing.
However, Israel would do very well to remember how Hezbollah was created in the first place, Hezbollah did not exist until the Israeli invasion of 1982 and the subsequent military occupation of South Lebanon. That gave birth to Hezbollah and this current invasion and occupation for however long it lasts, is not likely to end it.
Just on Friday we saw I think 10 Israeli soldiers killed in south Lebanon. That is a much more potent organization. It was born in conflict and an occupation. It certainly is not going to be ended by that same conflict and occupation.
ZAKARIA: So it sounds like you think, Ambassador, that these operations, obviously they have had extraordinarily positive effects from Israel's point of view, for Israeli security, eliminating these leaders destroying the military hardware.
But do you think on the ground they are kind of radicalizing another generation of militants in the way that people sometimes talk about?
CROCKER: Well, that is the danger and Israel, through its occupation in those 18 years from 1982 to 2000, lost some 1,100 Israeli troopers and left as a legacy one of the most potent insurgent groups that the world has ever seen. The radicalization of the population in south Lebanon occurred during that occupation and the current wave of offensive attacks, which have not exactly been precise in their nature, run the risk of doing exactly the same thing to a new generation of Lebanese who have seen this movie before. It did not go well, not for Israel, not for the United States. Right now whether it's Gaza or south Lebanon. I think there is an urgent need for a ceasefire, cessation of hostilities and an effort toward a more stable, if not formal peace. At least some quiet insecurity for both sides of the border. ZAKARIA: Ambassador Crocker, thank you for your insights borne of deep
experience. Thank you, sir.
CROCKER: Thank you.
ZAKARIA: Next on GPS, what in the world are North Korean soldiers doing in Russia? And what does that presence that tell us about Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un. I get some answers from the former top intelligence official on North Korea when we come back.
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ZAKARIA: There was startling news this week from the White House which announced that some 3,000 North Korean troops have been sent to Russia to train. And Ukraine confirmed late this week that North Korean troops have been spotted near Kyiv's military operations in Russia's Kursk Region.
What is going on? Jung Pak joins me now. She is a former senior CIA and State Department official with deep expertise on North Korea. She's the author of "Becoming Kim Jong-Un."
Jung Pak, welcome. What should we make of this rather startling news? 3,000 North Korean troops in Russia.
JUNG PAK, FORMER SENIOR CIA AND STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Fareed, I think this is yet another episode in the deepening and expanding of ties between Russia and North Korea. In a lot of ways this has been a boon for North Korea. It lends a lustral legitimacy to the regime. It had been a pariah state.
But, I think, what we should see from this report is that these two allies are united in their anti-West, anti-U.S. stance. And North Korea seems to think that it's in their interests to actually help Russia in its war against Ukraine.
ZAKARIA: So, for me, it seems like it does suggest that Putin is having some trouble. He needs more troops. He doesn't want to try and get more recruits out of Russia, for whatever reason. What is Kim Jong Un getting out of this?
PAK: That's right. That should be of great concern. Kim has always wanted some advanced technologies from Russia. Russia in the past has been standoffish on giving some of the more advanced technologies. But Kim gets on the ground experience, military experience. He gets legitimacy in the eyes of the world, and he gets money. Presumably he's getting some sort remuneration for these efforts.
ZAKARIA: But what is it that North Korea could want on the nuclear side from Russia? Russia does have one the largest nuclear arsenal in the world.
PAK: Kim Jong Un has said that he wants to multiply his weapons capabilities. And I think what North Korea might want from Russia is these advanced nuclear, maybe nuclear submarine technologies.
But it's unclear if Russia would be willing to show the family jewels. And I think Russia would want to make sure to calibrate what they're giving to the North Koreans to make sure that they're not making a -- creating a monster as they are looking to even win -- to win this war against Ukraine.
ZAKARIA: How do you think Beijing is reacting to this, to this closer deepening of ties? Because so far it used to be that if there was one country that had influence over North Korea, it was China. Because China provides a lot of the food and a lot of the fuel, the energy that North Korea uses.
PAK: Well, China has leveraged with both Russia and North Korea. But it's -- at this point, it doesn't seem as if Beijing is willing to do anything about this growing relationship. I think Beijing -- officials in Beijing are very concerned about this growing relationship. And China's main concern is stability on the Korean peninsula. And at what point are we going to see Russia and North Korea crossing that threshold for Chinese tolerance? That North Korea gets more emboldened as a result of what they're learning in the battlefield, their relationship with Russia, and how that might impact stability on the Korean peninsula.
ZAKARIA: Are we already seeing that? Because I was struck by something very strange that has happened. The North Koreans have shut down the ministry of reunification or the Department of Reunification. And Kim Jong Un has destroyed this monument to reunification that his father built.
It used to be thought that that was one of the things restraining North Korea, right, that they don't want to hold nuclear -- missiles into South Korea because they want to unify eventually. If this signaling, we don't think we're ever going to reunify, we are going to be in a state of adversarial confrontation between north and south forever, is that -- how are you reading this? Does it mean that, you know, there's a slightly greater propensity to maybe going to war?
PAK: I think so. North Korea now calls South Korea its principal enemy. And it's hard to back away from that. Now, theoretically and ideologically that line about reunification in a peaceful way as one people had been a strand through North Korean thinking and ideology for the past several decades. But Kim has jettisoned all of that to call South Korea its principal enemy and really amped up the hostile rhetoric against South Korea.
ZAKARIA: So, I just want to be clear for all of us. So, we have the Russian war in Ukraine. We have the Middle Eastern conflict going on. You have the growing tensions over Taiwan. And now U.S. policymakers have to worry about the possibility, the increased possibility of some possible conflict on the Korean peninsula.
PAK: Right. North Korea will take an opportunity where it can take any opportunity. And I think this new Cold War or whatever we want to call it in terms of how Russia and China are cooperating, and Iran and North Korea are finding scenes in that geostrategic competition to find opportunity for themselves. So, I think what this -- the implication is that what happens in Asia matters in Europe. And what's happening in Europe matters in Asia. And it really highlights how important it is for all of our allies and partners to be working together and collaborating.
ZAKARIA: Jung Pak, pleasure to have you on.
PAK: Thank you.
ZAKARIA: Next on GPS, the political gender gap is widening dramatically as women move to the left and men to the right.
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What explains this trend? I'll explore it with my next guest when we come back.
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ZAKARIA: Recent polling has revealed a startling political landscape. Donald Trump has a roughly 15-point advantage with men, while Kamala Harris has a similar advantage with women. What's behind it?
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Richard Reeves is president of the think tank, American Institute for Boys and Men, and the author of several books including "Of Boys and Men." Richard, your stuff is terrific but I want you to -- if you would explain -- trying to explain to somebody who has no knowledge of this issue and simply wants to say why is it that you see this massive gender divide among the political parties, what would your answer be?
RICHARD REEVES, AUTHOR, "OF BOYS AND MEN": I'd, say there are two aspects to it. One is the cultural one, which is what's the idea of masculinity today and who's offering a model of masculinity that might appeal to me, or at least sending a signal that we see men, we value the role of men.
So, I think there's a cultural element to it. You saw that it wasn't subtle but at the RNC Hulk Hogan tearing off his shirt. It's done with a degree of humor. And it also gets away from what a lot of men are feeling, is a bit of a stifling conversation about gender on the other side of the aisle. And so, on the other side of the aisle, what we're seeing is an attempt now to talk more about men and masculinity.
But up until this point, for understandable reasons, the real focus on the left has been about women and about the rights of women. And obviously reproductive health is a big issue now. And so, as one Democrat strategist put it like, we are the women's party.
But if you do that and you don't say enough about some of the issues that are facing boys and men, or if the only kind of masculinity you hear about on that side of the aisle is toxic masculinity, it sort of feels like there's a choice almost between a very performative, almost a tongue in cheek counter-cultural masculinity on the right. And a kind of toxic, very earnest mansplaining discussion of masculinity on the left. And I think that's left many men, especially many young men, up for grabs politically in a way that they weren't before.
ZAKARIA: And your work suggests that this is all happening at a time when there is a real crisis of manhood. Explain what that is.
REEVES: Yes. What's underneath this is a series of social and economic changes that have made life more challenging for many men, especially men of color and especially men from working class backgrounds and often rural areas. So, you've seen stagnant wages for men without college degrees. So, men with four-year college degrees better off than their fathers. Men without college degrees, worse off than their fathers.
We've seen a huge rise in male suicide. That's the most tragic symptom of the mental health crisis for men. The male suicide rate has risen by more than a third among men under the age of 30 just since 2010. And we're now losing 40,000 men a year to suicide alone. And then in education, we see huge gaps opening up.
Actually, the chances of a man enrolling in college straight from high school today are no higher than they were in 1984 and again flatlines here for a lot of men.
ZAKARIA: And, you know, all this is about a post-industrial economy that values knowledge, work, and less work with hands and the kind of work that non-college educated men used to do. You said something on Derek Thompson's podcast that I thought was stunning. You said that, in analyzing these suicides than men do, the words that come up most often in the suicide notes and the messages is a feeling of being worthless or useless, not being needed.
REEVES: Yes. In the old world, the more sexist world of male breadwinners, male protectors and of an economy, as you said, that actually did require, in some ways, more physical strength for where that was valuable.
For all of the problems with that world, and to be clear they were very significant, they did offer a very clear script for men and they sent a very clear message to men of why they were needed. My father never questioned his economic role in our family, he was the breadwinner, or in his community. And so, one of the byproducts of the incredibly positive rise that we've seen in women's economic position, as well as I would argue, the more negative consequences of post- industrial change has just been to leave many men feeling unneeded, unmoored, uncertain of their role.
ZAKARIA: Now, you have a political piece where you tried to explain what the Democrats could do in terms of policy programs and, you know, all of which are very sensible. More apprenticeships, recruit male teachers, support community colleges. The fascinating thing is the Republicans don't need to do anything, right? There's something fascinating about that culturally at a tribal level they're saying, we get you.
REEVES: Right.
ZAKARIA: So, they don't need to we have any program. REEVES: There's no substance. Right.
ZAKARIA: In fact -- in fact, they don't -- whereas the Democrats would have to bend over backwards and do this 10-point program you're suggesting.
REEVES: Well, that's the irony is that the Republicans are sort of winning on style point but there's no substance there. And by that, I simply, mean that they are reaching out through different podcasts and different audiences. There is a sort of, as I said, a cultural acceptance of masculinity being OK but not much discussion of apprenticeships, suicide prevention strategies, technical high schools, the need for more male teachers.
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Whereas on the Democrat side there are actually quite a lot of policies that are quite pro male. One of my favorite examples is the infrastructure bill which created lots of jobs for working class men. But the Democrats would never say that.
And so, there's this very weird moment we're in right now where you've got Republicans talking a lot about the importance of men, but not doing very much. And Democrats who potentially have a lot of policy ideas in their locker but refusing to talk about them as pro male policies because -- I think it's because they're trapped in a zero-sum frame.
They genuinely think that to come out and have a pro male policy agenda would undermine their claim to be a party on behalf of women. I think that's wrong but I think that's where we are.
ZAKARIA: Really fascinating.
REEVES: Thank you.
ZAKARIA: Thank you, Richard.
REEVES: Thank you.
ZAKARIA: Next on GPS, remember the BRICS, those large developing countries that were supposed to take over the world order? Well, we'll tell you why they didn't when we come back.
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ZAKARIA: And now for the last look. This week, more than a dozen world leaders gathered in Russia on the banks of the Volga River for the 16th annual BRICS summit. No longer just Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, the bloc has expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, the UAE, and Iran. In fact, the group now represents nearly half the world's population.
The summit was perhaps most meaningful for a toast, President Vladimir Putin, who is eager to show the West that his country is not a global pariah. He made the typical grand pronouncements that the grouping represented the rise of a multi-polar world order, and that the countries represented they are essentially the drivers of global economic growth.
So, is BRICS going to become an all-powerful anti-Western alliance? It's pretty unlikely. The BRICS grouping has never delivered on its early promise.
The term BRIC was coined by the then chief economist at Goldman Sachs, Jim O'Neill, in a paper published in November of 2001. It was primarily an economic concept. O'Neill believed that four large countries in the developing world, Brazil, Russia, India, and China, would drive global growth for decades to come.
By 2050, he predicted they would dominate the global economy with China becoming the world's largest economy by 2041. The idea took off. As the FT notes, dozens of investment firms created BRIC funds. Multinational corporations developed BRIC business strategies. Business schools launched BRIC courses. A BRIC think tank was born in Rio.
And for the first decade after 2001, those four countries lived up to the hype, mostly. They clocked impressive growth, especially China, with growth rates often in the double-digits. India, China, and Brazil were remarkably resilient against the shock of the 2008 financial crisis. And then an idea born in an investment bank became a geopolitical reality.
Russia held the first BRIC summit in 2009 at Yekaterinburg, Russia. The heads of state from those four original countries agreed to reduce reliance on the U.S., move away from the dollar, and advocate for a larger role for developing countries and global decision-making. In 2010, South Africa joined the bloc. Hence, BRICS.
It seemed that Goldman's predictions were coming true but then it fell apart. Russia was hit by oil price volatility, high inflation, and stalled reforms. A commodities boom had driven Brazil's economy in the arts, but it never fully recovered from the subsequent bust.
China is in one sense the star of the BRICS, the biggest economy in the bloc by far. But its collapsing real estate sector, indebted state-owned enterprises, and its government's crackdown on its tech sector have very recently stalled growth.
As a geopolitical entity, BRICS hasn't accomplished much either. It formed the new development bank in 2014 as an alternative to institutions like the World Bank which are dominated by the West. But it has remained ineffectual. As Foreign Policy notes, it planned to make eight to $10 billion worth of loans last year compared to the World Bank's 73 billion. And it can't loan to Russia due to U.S. sanctions.
Part of the problem is that the BRICS are a random assortment of countries. They don't have much by way of common interests. Russia and China are autocracies with hardened anti-Western stances. India and Brazil are large democracies and American allies. They prefer not to antagonize the West. India and China are often openly hostile neighbors.
These countries don't even have economic common cause. Brazil and Russia, energy exporters, who do well as energy costs rise. India is an importer that favors low energy prices. And even Jim O'Neill, the former Goldman economists who delivered us the term with so much optimism two decades ago, admitted in an op-ed last week that the BRICS still don't matter. Criticizing the bloc for, among other things, not committing to more open trade.
Where these countries are drawn together, writes Keith Johnson at Foreign Policy, is in a growing resentment of Western hypocrisy and hegemony.
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A feeling that has grown over expanded U.S. sanctions, the dominance of the dollar, and the war in the Middle East. Shared resentment might make for lively dinner conversation, but it is not enough to forge a formidable bloc.
Say what you will about the G7. That grouping works because its constituent countries, all advanced economies, all but Japan, western powers, have affirmative values in common. All are committed to free markets and democracy. All are committed to the rule of law, at least in principle. Though, members sometimes fail in the even application of that principle.
If the countries of the BRICS want to truly prepare themselves for a multipolar world or even to hasten its arrival, they should find some positive shared values and work earnestly on realizing them.
Thanks to all of you for being part of my program this week. I will see you next.
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