Return to Transcripts main page

Fareed Zakaria GPS

The New Dangers in Syria After Assad's Fall. Interview With U.S. Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm; Interview With International Rescue Committee President And CEO David Miliband. Aired 10-11a ET

Aired December 15, 2024 - 10:00   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

[10:00:40]

FAREED ZAKARIA, CNN ANCHOR: This is GPS, the GLOBAL PUBLIC SQUARE. Welcome to all of you in the United States and around the world. I'm Fareed Zakaria, coming to you from New York.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA (voice-over): Today on the program, the scenes coming out of post-Assad Syria are extraordinary. Prisoners freed, families reunited, a missing American found. Now comes the tough part -- putting a country of dueling factions and religious sects back together under the leadership of a group that's deemed a terror organization by the U.S. and many other countries. I'll talk to Richard Haass and Kim Ghattas about Syria's uncertain future.

And beyond Syria, what are the other global crises that the world cannot afford to ignore right now? David Miliband of the International Rescue Committee will brief us. Plus, Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm on the Biden administration's work to fight climate change before the Trump team comes to power.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA: But first, here's my take.

The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria should be a reminder of a general truth that often gets obscured in the blizzard of conflicting and contradictory news that absorbs us day to day. The West's adversaries are often weaker than we think. Recall how, for decades, the U.S. overestimated the strength of the Soviet economy and armed forces. The surety with which it claimed that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and the frequent scares around the Islamic militant groups like al Qaeda and more recently Hezbollah.

And yet, over time, what often becomes apparent is that these governments and groups are repressive, corrupt and dysfunctional, not attributes that help them thrive in the modern world. Assad's fall points to a direct lesson. Russia's growing weakness. Moscow has been a serious patron for over half a century. Syria was Russia's last major client state in the Middle East. Moscow had spent huge amounts of blood and treasure supporting Assad over the last decade. To lose that position is to become what Barack Obama dismissively

called Russia, a regional power. In fact, even in its own region, Russia's relations have deteriorated with Armenia, a longtime ally that Russia failed to defend from Azerbaijani aggression as it was bogged down in Ukraine. Russian forces in Africa are also increasingly facing pressures from a variety of militant groups.

Putin's Russia now resembles the Soviet Union in the 1970s. While it is still assertive and interventionist abroad, its economy at home is increasingly weak and distorted by its conversion into a wartime operation. But just as the external expansionism and internal mobilization could not mask Soviet decay forever, so today, Putin's bravado should not scare us. Think about it. If Russia were winning in Ukraine, would he threaten to use nuclear weapons?

Two scholars, Mark Devore and Alexander Mertens, note in "Foreign Policy" that Russia is losing around 320 tank and artillery cannon barrels a month and producing only 20. Citing open sources they note that Russia has lost almost 5,000 infantry fighting vehicles since invading Ukraine. Russian defense contractors can only make around 200 a year.

Its labor shortages are acute in virtually every sector, something even Putin has acknowledged. In the military the starkest sign is that the Russian army has had to invite North Korea to send in troops to help it out. Noel Foster of the Naval War College writes that Moscow's desperation can be seen in the rising salaries and bonuses it has to offer to new recruits. As of July 2024, recruits from Moscow received a $21,000 enlistment bonus and wages amounting in total to just under $60,000 in their first year of service, effectively earning more per month than privates enlisting in the U.S. Army at the same time.

[10:05:16]

Keep in mind that average Russian income is roughly one-fifth that of America's. All these weaknesses are obscured for now by a massive wartime transformation of the Russian economy. Defense spending is projected to be about 40 percent of the Russian federal budget next year. In addition, another 30 percent will be spent on various national security and classified matters. Inflation is now around 9 percent.

Perhaps most telling, its main sources of revenue are under severe pressure. Gazprom, the natural gas giant that in 2022 provided about $40 billion to Russian state coffers, announced a $6.9 billion loss in 2023, its first in more than 20 years.

Now is not the time to ease up on the pressure on Russia. In fact, in an essay in "Foreign Affairs," Theodore Bunzel and Elina Ribakova point out that there are many ways to tighten the economic screws going forward.

In a social media post after Assad's fall, Donald Trump said that Russia was in a weakened state because of Ukraine and a bad economy, noting that 600,000 Russian soldiers lay wounded or dead in a war that should never have started. That is exactly right. He also wrote that it was time for Putin to

act, implying that the problem with getting a ceasefire or peace deal is Russia, not Ukraine. This is a refreshing shift from what had seemed in the past his tendency to blame Ukraine for getting invaded. In that post, Trump also said that he knew Vladimir well. Then, he surely knows that on this issue, the chief challenge that he will face once back in the White House is getting Vladimir to abandon his dream of reconstructing Russia's tsarist empire.

Putin has pursued that vision since his first days in office, launching a savage war in Chechnya soon after coming to power, invading Georgia in 2008, annexing Crimea in 2014, and attempting to conquer all of Ukraine in 2022. If Trump can convince Vladimir, his friend, of that, he will be able to do what he has always said was his goal -- end the war in Ukraine.

Go to CNN.com/Fareed for a link to my "Washington Post" column this week, and let's get started.

Syrians flooded the streets after prayers on Friday to celebrate the ouster of the brutal dictator, Bashar al-Assad. It was a moving spectacle, showing the joy and relief of people free at last from one tyrannical regime. But it stands in stark contrast to the potential dangers that the new Syria might face. Balkanized rule, attacks on minorities, perhaps a resurgence of ISIS. As Secretary of State Blinken told reporters Friday, having put ISIS back in its box, we cannot let it out.

Joining me now are Richard Haass, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, and Kim Ghattas, a longtime foreign correspondent.

Richard, talk a little bit about what you think certainly in the next few weeks and months is likely to happen? Because people forget, you know, Syria, yes. You have this group that has taken over what Assad controlled. But there are places that ISIS controls, very small pockets. There's a large part of Syria that the Kurds control, but the Turks are now moving in on that area.

And presumably there are some places where the old Syrian army still has some control, and the Russians have a naval base. So it's a fairly complicated jigsaw puzzle.

RICHARD HAASS, PRESIDENT EMERITUS, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS: No. Absolutely right. What comes to mind a little bit, Fareed, is the Balkans. You know, we tend to think of countries as singular entities. That's a possibility for Syria ultimately, though we also have to be wary that there are, shall we say, malign singular entities. We could have a Taliban like future for Syria.

But I think the more likely one for the foreseeable future is what you've suggested, more of a patchwork quilt of fiefdoms of sort. The Kurds here, Turkish backed groups in parts of the country. The Israelis have moved in in a limited preventive way along their border. This principal group that led the overthrow, the HTS, will have their areas. And then, you're right, there could be pockets still of Alawites and so forth. So we should expect that. [10:10:02]

And I think the real question is how long does that last? How violent might it be? And ultimately, what does it lead to? I think all of this says, as hard as it is to oust a regime, it's even harder to build a functioning country.

ZAKARIA: Kim, when you look at it, the other complexity here is this is the end of a civil war that has been going on for 13 years. What does that mean?

KIM GHATTAS, CONTRIBUTING EDITOR, FINANCIAL TIMES: Fareed, I think it means that Syrians have gone through the pain and hard work of understanding what it means to be in a civil war, fighting each other, fighting the regime. And I think that that should give us some hope that they will know how to lead this process forward, having gone through the infighting, and I don't think it's about being naive, but about making sure that we're not fatalistic about the potential chaos that could unfold in Syria.

I think Syrians deserve support. They deserve encouragement, and they deserve for us to have faith in them after what they achieved pretty much on their own. This was the Syrians who started it in 2011, and it was the Syrians who ended up bringing down Bashar al-Assad in such a rapid way over the last two weeks or so. And they deserve credit for that because this means that this is not Iraq, where there was a U.S. invasion that deposed Saddam Hussein.

And this is not Libya, where there was a U.N. led intervention. This is a Syrian led process. And I think that's why we should be a little bit more optimistic and supportive of Syrian efforts to make sure they can take that path forward now towards stability, even though, yes, there will be chaos in the short term as they figure this out, and it is possible that the country ends up being divided. But I think we should be more hopeful than fatalistic.

ZAKARIA: Yes, I think that's a very good note. I think the point you were making is that it's sort of already divided that that, you know, what HTS will control is a part of Syria, not all of it. How do the many external actors that have equities here, how are they likely to play? And most importantly, the Iranians and Hezbollah were really the two key local allies. The Russians from afar.

Are they sort of -- have they withdrawn? Are they -- how are they going to play this, do you think?

HAASS: I think their roles going forward will be much less. I don't know about you, Fareed, I underestimated just how central Hezbollah was to the maintenance of the Syrian regime. And Iran would ship arms across Syria to get to Hezbollah in Lebanon. I think all of that is unlikely to continue as it was. Hezbollah has its hands full reconstituting itself in Lebanon if it can. Iran has its hands full. Israel has demonstrated a real capacity to essentially act almost with, what, impunity over Iran.

So I think they're both distracted. Russia has got its hands full with Ukraine. So I think the most important outside force right now is Turkey. It's got the advantage of proximity, has lots of incentives to have millions of refugees come home, real economic opportunity. Unfortunately, they also have an incentive to go after the Kurds. And we have to worry about that.

The other outside power that matters is the United States. And we're going to have to decide not so much whether we help, but to what extent do we condition our help on certain types of behaviors against terrorism, potentially human rights type considerations, and so forth?

ZAKARIA: Kim, what do you think of that? Are the Iranians and Hezbollah out? Because presumably the new HTS regime will not be friendly to them? Those are the guys the Iranians and Hezbollah, who've been killing them for the last 13 years. And what should the U.S. do?

GHATTAS: Absolutely, Fareed, I think what we're seeing is a real reordering of powers and positioning in the region, and that is an opportunity for the U.S. to lead diplomatically and to fill the void because its foes are otherwise occupied and weakened, and its allies don't necessarily see eye to eye. Turkey, the UAE, Saudi Arabia don't necessarily see eye to eye on what comes next in Syria.

And that's an opportunity for the U.S. because part of why we ended up here is because the U.S. did not have a strategy over the last decade, you could say, and allowed a void to be filled by Syria, by Iran, Hezbollah and Russia when it decided to step back in 2013 and 2015.

ZAKARIA: Stay with us. This is all fascinating. When we come back, I want to ask our guests about the new superpower of the Middle East, and I'll explain that when we come back.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[10:19:13]

ZAKARIA: And we are back with Richard Haass, who's the senior counselor at Centerview Partners, and the veteran journalist Kim Ghattas.

Richard, I want to ask you about what I've been on for a while as the superpower of the Middle East, which is Israel. It feels to me like Israel is now just has a stronger position, stronger security position than any time in its history. It has destroyed Hezbollah. It has destroyed all Iran's air defenses. So Iran is literally naked to an Israeli attack.

It has now destroyed all Syria's air defenses, sunk the Syrian Navy, occupied a large buffer zone, passed the Golan Heights. It really does feel as though for, you know, a country that was, in any case, with its nuclear arsenal, secure and had a deterrent, it now is in an extraordinary commanding position.

[10:20:07]

Are there dangers here? How do you see Israel in all of this? HAASS: Pretty much with, as Al Haig used to say, two caveats here. One

is, given the relationship with Iran, how does the United States and Israel come together to essentially get Iran out of the business of supporting proxies? We don't want to see them reconstitute Hezbollah, Hamas. They still have the Houthis. And then, second of all, to put a ceiling that's verifiable on their nuclear program. So that's still one challenge, opportunities there, and the question is, is it a military answer, a diplomatic answer, or what have you?

Secondly, I still think the Achilles heel of Israel is the Palestinian issue, Fareed. If Israel is going to remain over the long term, a secure, prosperous Jewish and democratic country, I do believe it needs to satisfy, in part, Palestinian nationalism, not as a favor to the Palestinians, but as a favor to itself. It's got to figure out a way of separation, and Israel has refused.

ZAKARIA: But given how strong its security position is, isn't there a danger of hubris and of not trying to solve the Palestinian issue for precisely that reason?

HAASS: Hundred percent. A lot of history, interestingly, you know, we talk a lot sometimes about isolationism, what people call under reach, over reach, hubris is a real problem here. And Israel has refused to introduce a political dimension into its policy in Gaza. So they've defeated Hamas militarily, but they haven't marginalized Hamas politically. And battlefield with victories are one thing. Enduring victories, though, require a political dimension.

Plus, and people aren't really talking about it, the situation on the West Bank where, what, 60 or so percent of Palestinians live, three million, that's gotten a lot worse. We're seeing militias. We're seeing gangs. We're seeing expanded violence and settlement activity and settler violence. So there I think, again, it's the Achilles heel of Israel because it could become a real drag on its security. It could challenge its domestic fabric, and it could have real repercussions, as we've seen over the last year here, with its relations to the United States.

So Israel is poised. You're right. I don't take away your -- I don't disagree with your basic premise, but the real question is with turning points, do you turn? Do you take advantage of them? So Israel has an opportunity here. Will they take advantage of it?

ZAKARIA: Kim, what do you think it looks like in the region when people are looking at what Israel has been able to do?

GHATTAS: I think it is incumbent upon the outgoing Biden administration and then the incoming Trump administration to make clear that continued military operations could throw the region further into chaos, undermine the ceasefire in Lebanon, and add a real element of instability -- further instability in Syria with the military strikes there and the land grab. That's not a great gift to the Syrian people who have just overthrown Assad, to grab land from the Golan Heights.

And so, indeed, at what point do you turn and turn these military victories in Israel's eyes into a political path forward, which is going to be very important in conversations with Saudi Arabia that the Trump administration will most likely have when President Trump comes to power in January.

ZAKARIA: Pulling back, Richard, we often don't think enough, in my opinion, about good news, about, you know, when things go right. I mean, when you and I started at all this, the Middle East was full of deeply anti-American regimes, many supported by the then-Soviet Union. You're down now to this was the last main Middle Eastern state that was virulently anti-American other than Iran, the last Arab state.

And it's no longer in that position. So if you think about it, in the long run, you know, Iraq has essentially become mildly pro-American or maybe at least neutral. Syria might become neutral. I mean, it does feel like the U.S. is in a more commanding position in the Middle East than it's been in for a while.

HAASS: Well, absolutely. As you know, one of the goals has been to reduce how much the Middle East sponged up of American effort. That said, we haven't quite arrived. Iran is down, but not out. And the real question seems to me is whether, again, coming back to the word, you introduced, hubris or overreach, we avoid that with Iran. I don't think regime change is in the offing. This is not as personalistic as brittle a regime as Syria. I think it is more institutionalized.

And the question is, can we intelligently press for policy change on the proxies on the nuclear program? That to me would be a massive improvement in the region.

ZAKARIA: Can we lock in some kind of political gains out of these military?

HAASS: Hundred percent. We have that opportunity now. The question is whether we seize it.

ZAKARIA: Kim Ghattas, Richard Haass, always a pleasure. Thank you.

Next on GPS. Donald Trump has vowed to slash environmental regulations when he takes office, pledging to --

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

DONALD TRUMP (R), PRESIDENT-ELECT: Drill, baby, drill.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

[10:25:03]

ZAKARIA: What could that mean for Biden's hard fought progress on climate change? I will ask the energy secretary, Jennifer Granholm.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

ZAKARIA: For the past four years, the Biden administration has pursued a bold climate agenda from cutting carbon emissions to championing electric vehicles to investing in wind and solar. But now Donald Trump, a vocal climate skeptic, is set to return to the White House in January, vowing on day one to --

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

TRUMP: Drill, baby, drill.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

ZAKARIA: He's even pledged to roll back parts of the Inflation Reduction Act, Biden's signature climate law.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

JOE BIDEN, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: The most important climate bill in the history of our country.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

ZAKARIA: This included things like providing thousands of clean energy jobs and billions in tax credits for environmentally friendly products. So, will all this progress now be undone? Joining me now is the outgoing energy secretary, Jennifer Granholm. Pleasure to have you on, Secretary.

JENNIFER GRANHOLM, U.S. ENERGY SECRETARY: Thank you, Fareed. Great to be on.

ZAKARIA: So, what's the answer to that question? How much of this stuff can be rolled back? Not will be but --

GRANHOLM: Well, you have to have the support of Congress, of course, to roll back the components of the Inflation Reduction Act, and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, and the CHIPS and Science Act, which are the three laws that really undergird the industrial strategy of the Biden administration.

The kicker is, Fareed, since the passage, particularly of the Inflation Reduction Act, only a couple of years ago, over 900 factories have announced that they are opening or expanding or coming to the United States. Those factories, where are they located? Eighty to 90 percent are in red counties, red districts, red states.

So, those representatives in Congress are not likely to be supportive of uprooting what is a huge economic opportunity When you think about the number of jobs that are embedded in these 900 factories. And right now, because its only two years old, right, so the announcements of all these factories have happened. But -- and it's -- honestly being that sound you hear is another one saying that they're coming because it's so far since the law is still in effect, but those factories have maybe -- done the announcement, maybe they've done groundbreaking, but they haven't done ribbon cutting, meaning that they haven't -- the steel is not necessarily in the ground yet.

So, over the next few years, you're going to see all of this employment, all of these factories in these red places. I'm sure the Trump administration would want to take credit for that. But nonetheless, it is a bad strategy to turn your back on all this investment reshoring of manufacturing jobs.

ZAKARIA: But when you listen to the -- I mean, the new energy secretary, it could not be more hostile to clean tech and talks about how, you know, the real energy future is all oil, gas. They're even in favor of coal. Do you -- you know, there is a lot of money that would be saved if they were to withdraw these, right? I mean, this is all subsidies. These are -- right?

GRANHOLM: OK. Here's -- we've had over half $1 trillion of investment in these clean energy projects. But for every $1.00 invested by the public sector, $6.00 has been invested by the private sector. And, you know, businesses want certainty.

So, it would be -- and let's just say Republicans and Democrats agree on certain things. They want to bring the supply chains back home. They want to reshore manufacturing. They want to make sure that the United States is not dependent upon China for critical minerals. We want to be energy independent.

All of that is happening. Those 900 factories, a lot of that is critical minerals, critical mineral extraction or processing, or the anodes, the cathodes, the separator material for batteries, for electric vehicles, those are all being built in states that are represented by Republicans.

ZAKARIA: Let me ask you about one of the signature parts of the -- of the program, support for electric vehicles.

GRANHOLM: Yes.

ZAKARIA: What you found -- what one finds when you when you listen in "The New York Times" story on this, public is not really as attracted to this idea as policy wonks seem to be. Hertz announced that it was going to have all these electric vehicles. They had to give back most of them because it couldn't use them.

Is it possible that you guys went a step further than the consumer? The consumer seems to like hybrids. EVs require a network of charging stations that don't really exist yet.

GRANHOLM: Well, let's just -- let's just take that. There are now 204,000 charging stations, publicly facing charging stations across the country. That has been explosive, the growth.

There's 24,000 more that are in the pipeline from what the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law funded. The goal was to get to 500,000 by 2030. We're going to get there sooner. So, that one piece of thing which caused people to be nervous about whether I should get a full-on electric vehicle, that is -- that is shaping out, that's happening now across the country.

If you ask the auto industry, who have invested in these vehicles, they'll -- year over year, there is significant growth. And, you know, the public has got incentives to purchase electric vehicles. And you can stack the federal incentives so you can get a $7,500 tax credit to buy an electric vehicle from the federal government. And in some states, they also have tax credits. You can stack them. I mean, you can get an electric vehicle for cheaper than an internal combustion engine in many places and with many models. So -- and it's much cheaper to operate, obviously.

[10:35:01]

So, this is happening. I mean, you see this in other countries. Once this, you know, reaches a tipping point, people understand it. There was a report out this week that 98 percent of those who have purchased electric vehicles won't go back to internal combustion because they like them so much. So, we'll see. I mean, it will -- it will continue to progress.

ZAKARIA: Jennifer Granholm, pleasure to have you on.

GRANHOLM: Great to see you, Fareed.

ZAKARIA: Next on GPS, which country is facing the greatest humanitarian crisis in the world today? It's not Syria or Lebanon or Ukraine. David Miliband will tell us when we come back.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[10:40:16]

ZAKARIA: When you think of current wars, Israel's multi-front fight in the Middle East likely springs to mind. Russia's war against Ukraine as well. But by one estimate, there are more than 100 ongoing armed conflicts worldwide. Add to that an astonishing 23 coups or coup attempts globally in the past three years. Mix in the general political instability seen around the world. And the result is a massive amount of humanitarian risk for ordinary people.

The International Rescue Committee released its 2025 Emergency Watchlist this week, calling the situation "a world out of balance." Here to tell us about the biggest trouble spots is the IRC's president and CEO David Miliband.

David, welcome. What do you mean, fundamentally, by "a world out of balance"?

DAVID MILIBAND, PRESIDENT AND CEO, INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE: Thanks, Fareed. We're saying that if you look at the symptoms of political failure in the number of refugees, the number of people in humanitarian need, they speak to, first, hard power triumphing over soft power, diplomacy is in retreat. They speak to the fact that people and planet are out of balance because in the top 20 countries on our watchlist, 16 of them are among the quartile of most vulnerable to climate disaster.

We're also speaking to the imbalance between, frankly, civilians and soldiers. Because civilians are taking the heaviest toll of the civil wars that are going on around the world. And then finally, there's an economic imbalance, not just the traditional global north, global south, but even within the countries that we're talking about, growing disparities that are hitting the poorest, the extreme poor the hardest.

Here's -- here's the thing that I think is really striking. Over the last 20 years, the number of extreme poor in stable states has gone down 30 to 40 percent. In these unstable, conflict-ridden states, it has gone up by 85 percent. That's the modern geography of poverty today.

ZAKARIA: And nowhere is this more acute than a place we think nothing about, which is Sudan. For you, this is number one on your watchlist. Many people who have been there, who are studying it say, this is the worst humanitarian catastrophe in decades.

MILIBAND: Yes, it's 30 million people in humanitarian need. So, 10 percent of the total -- global total in humanitarian need. That's out of a Sudanese population of about 45 million.

A vicious civil war, sponsored and supported each side by external powers from around the region in an -- unusual coalitions that are supporting each side, well-founded claims of war crimes on both sides, terrible abuse of civilians, but also denial of aid and no end in sight.

ZAKARIA: And that feels like it's all about nothing. By which I mean to say it is fundamentally a power struggle between these two warlords. There's no great cause. There's animating it. It's -- it's literally a struggle for booty, power, control.

MILIBAND: A hundred percent. That is exactly right. It's two different factions of the former Bashir regime.

People will know about Darfur from 20 years ago. They may even remember Operation Lifeline Sudan from the late 1980s. This is the modern incarnation of an old conflict with the added twist that there's external sponsorship of a very fundamental kind that keeps the war going.

ZAKARIA: Why is that happening? Why? I mean, the United Arab Emirates is supporting one of these two factions.

MILIBAND: You've got the UAE. You've got Iran. You've got Saudi Arabia. You've got Egypt in a constellation. You've also got Russia. Wagner group well-founded reports of them being there.

It's a battle for control. It's a strategically very important part of the world. Obviously in northeast Africa, Horn of Africa, very significant there.

And also, the viciousness is creating regional destabilization, refugees flowing to Chad, refugees flowing to South Sudan. What we know is South Sudan is one of the poorest countries in the world. If you're fleeing to South Sudan, things must be absolutely desperate where you're coming from.

ZAKARIA: Number two on your list is the occupied Palestinian territories. What do you think people don't understand about that situation? MILIBAND: In Gaza, there has been a lot of coverage, obviously, utterly desperate situation. If anything, the diplomatic effort is on the back burner at the moment because of a successful attempt to get a cease fire in Lebanon.

But in Gaza, you've got 2 million people who are desperately in need. All of the evidence that comes from very sober minded assessments say that there is massive food insecurity, which means essentially catastrophic levels of hunger, especially in the north of Gaza, maybe 175 to 100,000 people there pretty much completely cut off.

And it's incredibly important that that issue of Gaza being left out of this reshuffle that's going on in the Middle East doesn't go on, because if the attention goes away from there, it's just an absolutely boiling cauldron for the people who are -- who are there, of course, including the 100 hostages that are still held hostage.

[10:45:05]

And the -- the key to this is the ceasefire effort. Because what does each side now fighting for? The way to get aid in, the way to get hostages out, the way to establish some kind of stability there is through the ceasefire route.

ZAKARIA: Syria, which is on your list, is number four.

MILIBAND: Yes.

ZAKARIA: There's a bit of good news. You have been dealing with these, the group that is now in control, at least of Damascus, and the area around it. And you say they've been -- you've been able to deal with them.

MILIBAND: Well, two points on that. First of all, we've never taken Syria off our watchlist. People were saying over the last four or five years, the war is over. Assad has won.

We always said, it's not over, not when there are 6 million refugees out of the country, 8 million internally displaced, an unfrozen conflict inside the country.

But secondly, we've had people working in the northwest of Syria, the Idlib province. We work through the civil authorities as a coalition of opposition armed groups. And what I can report is that we've been able to do our work there. Including after the earthquake last year, we've not had our money interfered with, we've not had our distribution of aid interfered with, we've not had our work on education or healthcare interfered with.

And so, the only hope for Syria, the thing that is making Syrians dare to hope at the moment, is that its diversity will be recognized, and the governing structures, and the things that have been said so far about recognizing five percent Christians in the Syrian population are giving some encouragement. Obviously, it's actions that count. But we can say that we've been able to work properly over the last 12 years. ZAKARIA: I have to say, David, in all these horrible, complicated, you know, fascinating situations, one does sometimes forget the toll it takes on just ordinary people. And I think you and the IRC do such important work. Thank you.

MILIBAND: Thank you for saying that, Fareed.

ZAKARIA: Next on GPS, inflation is still too high in the U.S. I'll explain what America screwed up housing market has to do with it all when we return.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[10:51:43]

ZAKARIA: And now for the last look. The economy is booming and everyone knows it except for the American people. So begins a working paper from earlier this year by Larry Summers and three colleagues. They set out to explain why, despite moderating inflation and other strong economic indicators, Americans felt so gloomy about the economy. That negative sentiment, of course, helped Donald Trump win in November.

The economists argue that too much attention has been focused on inflation, the cost of goods and services, and not enough on interest rates, which is essentially the cost of money. Inflation has come down a lot since the 2022 peak, but interest rates are still high, which means it's expensive to borrow money, whether in the form of a new mortgage, auto loan, or credit card debt.

Before 1983, the government used to measure housing inflation differently than today, including by factoring in mortgage rates. There are sensible reasons why the approach was changed. For example, the Fed looks at prices to decide whether to raise interest rates. If interest rates are included as a price that distorts the picture.

Still, Summers and his colleagues note that the cost of money does affect how people feel. They calculated that under the old model, the 2022 inflation peak would have been 18 percent, compared to nine percent under the current method. That discrepancy, they found, went a long way toward explaining why consumer sentiment was so bad, much worse than would otherwise be expected in a strong economy.

Interest rates aren't the only problem for people who want to buy a home today. Home prices are hovering around record highs. Housing is, in fact, the biggest contributor to stubborn inflation. This week, overall inflation came in at 2.7 percent. Using the modern method of calculating if you exclude housing that shrinks to 1.6 percent.

There's a puzzle here. High home prices come when too many buyers are chasing too few houses. When mortgages get more expensive, that should dampen demand for buying a house, which should cause the prices of houses to drop. So, why aren't high interest rates driving down home prices?

Well, most houses are already occupied and the owners need to be willing to sell. They'd likely need to take out a mortgage themselves to buy a new home. But many owners enjoy rock bottom rates on their current mortgages, which they locked in years before the Fed started jacking up rates recently.

So, homeowners are sitting tight and waiting for mortgage rates to drop before they put their homes on the market and buy a new home with a new lower mortgage. This year, the U.S. is on track for the fewest home sales since 1995. The housing market is thus caught in a catch 22.

Donald Trump and J.D. Vance claim mass deportation would improve the situation by freeing up more housing. That could indeed help a bit in the short term. But in the longer term, it could actually raise housing prices because many undocumented immigrants work in construction.

[10:55:03]

Another recent working paper studied a previous large-scale deportation and found that although home prices initially dropped after people were deported, prices soon shot up as there were fewer houses being built. And building more houses really is the only solution to this problem. But that takes time and money and has become difficult to do in a country where development is tied up by red tape and interest groups.

Unfortunately, these zoning laws and other regulations that hold back construction are mostly governed at the local level, so there's no quick fix. If only Elon Musk could bring his DOGE, or Department of Government Efficiency, to every city and town across America to unleash new construction that would make most Americans feel that good times were back.

Thanks to all of you for being part of my program this week. I will see you next week.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)