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Fareed Zakaria GPS

U.S. Strikes Three Iranian Nuclear Facilities; Why the U.S. Attacked Iran. What Is Iran's Next Move After U.S. Strikes? Aired 10- 11a ET

Aired June 22, 2025 - 10:00   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

[10:00:42]

FAREED ZAKARIA, CNN ANCHOR: This is GPS, the GLOBAL PUBLIC SQUARE. Welcome to all of you in the United States and around the world. I'm Fareed Zakaria coming to you live from New York.

Today on the program, a new reality has dawned in the Middle East. The United States entered the conflict early this morning in Iran, striking three of Iran's key nuclear facilities.

How effective were the strikes?

I'll first talk to the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Rafael Mariano Grossi. It was his team that were monitoring these sites.

What has he learned in the hours since then?

And we'll look at how the attacks will change the Middle East and America's role in it. That's with retired Admiral James Stavridis and Richard Haass.

Also, will Iran fight back? And what's Israel's next move?

I'll talk to Vali Nasr, one of the world's foremost experts on Iran, and a top Israeli journalist, Nadav Eyal.

"My Take" will be back next week. But let's dive right into these events.

U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities were America's biggest military intervention in decades. The Pentagon says B-2 bombers dropped 30,000 pound bunker buster bombs on the Fordow nuclear site, built inside a mountain. More bunker busters were dropped on another site, Natanz. More than two dozen Tomahawk missiles were also fired from U.S. submarines on a third site, Isfahan.

The president said the attack obliterated Iran's nuclear sites.

Did it?

Well, in a press conference this morning, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was more careful, saying only that Iran's nuclear ambitions had been obliterated.

Joining me now is Rafael Mariano Grossi, the head of the world's nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Rafael, welcome. Good to see you. I wanted to know, you've been in these sites. You've been in Fordow. You've been in Natanz. Based on what you know, what is the extent of the damage? Have they been destroyed completely?

RAFAEL MARIANO GROSSI, DIRECTOR GENERAL, IAEA: Well, hello, Fareed. Thank you very much. And it's good to see you again. Well, there is, I would say the picture is mixed here. We have been, as you can imagine, following this from the very, from the very beginning. And when you look at the different places site by site, you will have a different assessment of the degree of damage that has been inflicted so far after these attacks initially by Israel from the -- from June 13th and as of last night, the United States as well.

What we have seen, of course, analyzing the images we have and on the basis of the deep knowledge we have of all these sites, which, as you rightly said, my inspectors see all the time, and I have myself been there a few times. So on the basis of this, we can say that Fordow has been attacked, yes, last night. And there are clear indications of impacts. But as for the assessment of the degree of damage underground on this we cannot pronounce ourselves.

It can be important, it can be significant. But no one, no one, neither us, nobody else could be able to tell you how much it has been damaged. Different is the case, for example, in Natanz, where we know very, very clearly that the above ground facility has been completely destroyed and the -- even the back, the underground centrifuge halls have suffered a lot because of the combined effect of lack of external power supply, which was also caused by the attacks and subsequent direct attacks, or Isfahan, which has been sustaining damage and attacks for several days, including last night.

[10:05:17]

So overall, all in all, we can say that there is a very significant damage already there, which we can confirm. As Fordow, because of the morphological characteristics of the site and the plant, yes, we can say it has been, of course, it has been said by the United States and Iran has confirmed, there has been a direct kinetic impact. Internally we cannot judge. But of course, one cannot exclude that there is significant damage there.

ZAKARIA: With Natanz, what we know is that once you cut the power supply, the centrifuges are almost certain to malfunction. Can you say that about Fordow that that the damage probably has had the effect of cutting the power, which would mean it becomes largely inoperable?

GROSSI: No, it's a different situation there, Fareed, because in the case of Fordow, which is very well-fortified and well-protected, there were also internal, independent power supplies as alternatives and even perhaps emergency generators. So you cannot say that automatically the lack of external power supply may have damaged that. But all of this is very hypothetical. There might have been damaged.

This is something that we are going to be assessing as, you know, as information becomes available. And don't forget one thing, unfortunately, and because there is a state of war, our inspectors are not seeing this. We have our inspectors, our inspectors there in Iran, but they are not allowed. And of course, this is a logical thing. Every nuclear site, every sensitive facility in country, in the country is closed down and we do not have access. We expect to be able to return there as soon as possible.

ZAKARIA: Let me ask you about the trigger for these American attacks, or indeed the Israeli attacks. The director of National Intelligence testified that Iran had not made a decision to weaponize the -- its nuclear energy program and that they were confident that the decision made in 2003 not to weaponize had not been overruled. The president said that he believed they were moving towards nuclear weapons.

From what you can tell, what was the situation? Was Iran beginning to weaponize its program?

GROSSI: We didn't have any indication to that effect. And this is something I must point out, Fareed. It's very important because there has been a lot of speculation about what the IAEA said or what it didn't say. Even before this military operation started, we very clearly indicated in my last report to the Board of Governors of the IAEA, I indicated very clearly that we did not have elements to prove that Iran had a plan or a systematic effort towards a nuclear weapon.

Of course, the analysis of nations and individual countries may differ, and they very often, as it has been the case in the United States and elsewhere, they also refer to what they assess their intentions are. They will move or they will not move. The IAEA does not get into judging intentions as you can imagine. What we report is what we see. And we did not see any anything of that.

You rightly mentioned that in the early 2000, there was even a systematic plan called the Amad Plan that had a number of elements in order to move with technologies that were related to nuclear weapons. But this is not the case at the moment. Of course there is -- there was international concern. There were some very important, respected Iranian high figures saying that -- basically that they had all the pieces of the puzzle.

And I pointed out that that was not helpful because of course, if that was the case, there were things that they were not informing the IAEA about. But all of that is a little bit water under the bridge.

ZAKARIA: Let me ask you now.

GROSSI: I think now we are dealing with --

ZAKARIA: Let me ask you, though, about -- I'm going to put up a chart that you can't see, but you know well, which is just the number of installed centrifuges in Iran.

[10:10:05] If you look at it, they start out in the early, you know, in 2011 with a few hundred, then it goes up to maybe 1,000 or 2,000 or so. Then the Iran nuclear deal happens and they go to zero. Trump pulls out of the deal. They start slowly climbing back. And they move in the last few months, really the last year, to a very high number of installed centrifuges. This is with 60 percent enrichment, which is one step away from weaponized -- you know, 90 percent enrichment.

You were dealing with them all this time. Did they explain why they went -- why were they so rapidly escalated the number of centrifuges to 60 percent, which is far beyond what you need for peaceful nuclear energy?

GROSSI: Correct. And this is one of the sources of the concern internationally, I would say, not only in the United States or in Israel. There was an international concern about this because while enriching uranium per se is not forbidden, and my Iranian counterparts keep reminding me of that. And yes, of course, that is the case. Well, when you are the only country in the world that is enriching 60 percent and keeps on doing that, there is, of course, a concern and there is a connotation for that.

For example, when there was something that Iran didn't like, a resolution against them at the Board of Governors or even some statements, then they would respond by enriching more or adding more cascades or adding centrifuges. And in my conversations with them, I have always been insisting that this sort of dynamic was not a healthy dynamic because it was pushing the envelope and indicating that they were having this stockpile with the, you know, underlying connotation of ulterior motives, which we cannot say what they would be. But the concern, the concern was obviously there. It was -- we were also --

ZAKARIA: Rafael, I know you have to leave, but I want to ask you one last question, which is you're one of the few people who has negotiated with the Iranians. How do you think they will respond to this?

GROSSI: Well, quite clearly, there is one thing, Fareed, that we have to recognize. This is a country at war, not only with Israel, now, apparently, with the United States. So this changes the whole dynamic of what has heretofore been like a long saga. And you have been yourself following this for many, many years. We have discussed this in many, many places, where you have good moments, bad moments, moments of tension, moments of optimism, moments of pessimism.

But now there has been an attack. Several. And this is continuing. So obviously Iran will respond. I don't know, militarily, maybe they will defend themselves. This is not my area. What -- and I would like to finish on this note. I think the nonproliferation regime has been one of the few stabilizing elements we have had in an otherwise very, very unstable and even more so as you every week described so ably, international scene.

I think the unraveling of the nonproliferation regime would be a tremendously serious consequence. So I think that now we need to try to go back to the negotiating table as soon as possible. We have to allow the IAEA inspectors to return, because don't forget that there was this stockpile of 400 kilograms of 60 percent uranium are there. And Iran has made no secret that they have protected this material.

We -- I could, my inspectors saw them for the last time paradoxically, on June 10th, just a couple of days before the whole situation changed. So I think that for whatever peaceful outcome that we all need and want to proceed successfully, we need to ensure that we are not moving towards a situation where the unthinkable would happen. This being Iran going towards a nuclear weapon.

This is the challenge of the day. The IAEA is ready to work. We have been talking to Iran. We have been talking to the United States, having constant dialogue with Ambassador Witkoff and with Foreign Minister Araghchi.

[10:15:06]

And even now, in the middle of this terrible crisis, we have to keep our cool. We have to keep our vision very clear and work for peace. Now is the moment.

ZAKARIA: Rafael, thank you very much. Pleasure to hear from you, sir.

How will Trump's decision to strike Iran change the regional dynamics in the Middle East? Richard Haass and Admiral Stavridis next.

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ZAKARIA: Has America once again been pulled into a war in the Middle East? And how does the United States' strike on Iran change politics in the entire region?

[10:20:01]

These are two of many questions that linger in the aftermath of Trump's decision to enter Israel's conflict with Iran.

Joining me to discuss are Richard Haass, president emeritus at the Council on Foreign Relations, who writes a terrific newsletter on Substack called "Home and Away," and retired Admiral James Stavridis, he was NATO's Supreme Allied commander for Europe and is a partner at the Carlyle Group. He serves on the Board of Advisers of a handful of defense related companies.

Richard, let me ask you. To me, the big picture, in a sense, is when you look at that rise in centrifuges and over the years, I think the way the Israelis see this is, look, the Iranians have been playing footsie with going nuclear for a long time. 15 years ago, maybe we had to put up with it. And the best we could hope for was deterrence. We are now so strong. We don't need to put up with that. We're going to take this battle to the enemy. We're going to destroy as much as we can. Why did the United States join in?

RICHARD HAASS, PRESIDENT EMERITUS, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS: I think you're right about Israel, by the way. They are given, particularly the demise of Hezbollah many ways, they had a window. For us, though, this is a classic war of choice. We didn't have to do what we did. We certainly didn't have to do it when we did. President could have let it play out. It was not an act of preemption. What Iran had was a gathering threat, not an imminent threat. So the United States had remarkable discretion.

President, when he spoke last night, Fareed, he didn't make it clear. Was there anything new? Like, for example, were the Iranians carting away all the centrifuges and the enriched uranium to some other place? If so, he didn't mention it. Does he think they were on the brink of having a weapon? So I actually think he's made a -- not just a big political gamble, but a strategic gamble.

Taking a step back, I'm struck by how much of the last, what, 35 years since the end of the Cold War, where have we been? Not in Asia, not in Europe. It's in the Middle East, beginning with the Gulf War. Then you had the war of choice that was the Iraq war, the expansion in Afghanistan, other things, you know, Libya, Syria. It is remarkable.

So here again, where are we? We are back in the Middle East. And right now, what's so interesting to me, one last point, this war began 10 days ago or so. It was Israel's initiative. Then in the last 48 hours, America's initiative. Guess what? It's Iran in the driver's seat right now. Iran decides what's the nature of this conflict going forward. Was this a one-off? Will revenge be served cold? Will it be served hot? And how?

So right now Iran decides to what extent, what are the implications, if you will, of Donald Trump's gamble.

ZAKARIA: Jim, when you looked at the military strikes, do they strike you as effective as you expected more so, and particularly with Fordow, which I imagine you have participated in wargaming on? What's your sense? Is it destroyed? What, you know, what should we assume about it?

ADM. JAMES STAVRIDIS (RET.), CNN SENIOR MILITARY ANALYST: Can I start, if you'll permit me, by just observing? This is a pretty remarkable feat of arms. This was a tight OPSEC. It was precision strike. These were long, long flights. It incorporated the entire joint force. From all we can see, very well executed. We ought to just take a pause and say, whether you support this strike or not, you ought to admire the young men and women who conducted it, and the professionalism with which they did it.

That brings us to your question. And it's really three letters, right? B-D-A. Battle, damage, assessment. I think as you go from the president to the secretary of Defense and then to the uniformed chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Caine, you see increasing levels of, shall we say, caution about declaring mission accomplished because we just don't know yet. So over the next two or three days, we'll get a certain level of battle damage assessment based on signal intelligence, human intelligence, overhead sensors, all of that will be put together.

But we won't really know the answer, I think, until we see what the Iranian package of responses look like because that will tell us how damaged that nuclear program is.

ZAKARIA: Richard, that gets to your point, which is now it is the Iranians who will decide what happens next, how they respond. Do you think that they are now in kind of regime survival mode, where they will focus in on that, or are they going to, you know, do they think they're at war with the United States? You know, what's your sense?

HAASS: Potentially both. You know, what comes to mind is 1988, when the initial Ayatollah Khomeini basically settled with Iraq, not because he wanted to, but to preserve the revolution.

[10:25:09]

The question is whether in the first instance, that's now the Iranian priority to preserve the revolution, keep what leadership they still have intact, not spread the war, because they don't -- for example, they don't want to see their export -- the oil export terminal bombed. So that might be the near-term priority.

I think the more interesting thing other than retaliation, Fareed, is reconstitution. What lessons did the Iranians draw? It's quite possible they will decide that this never would have happened had they had nuclear weapons. So I think it's possible their retaliation is relatively modest. And what they really want to do is put themselves on a trajectory where some years down the road, when there's another crisis, they're in a different position, and that's something we're going to have to think about.

So this may not be quite as neat as we think. This could actually play out not just over weeks and months, but over many years.

ZAKARIA: All right. Stay with us both of you.

When we come back, I want to talk about what is the regional dynamic. What are the Gulf states thinking? What is going on in, you know, Iran's allies, Russia, all of that when we come back.

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[10:30:37]

ZAKARIA: And we are back with Richard Haass and James Stavridis. Jim, I think we're all struck by Iran's weakness in these -- in these recent months. What are its realistic military options?

STAVRIDIS: Let me start with this. We tend to underestimate the Iranian psychology. We tend to think of Iran as this kind of annoying middle-sized power, kind of always fermenting disasters in the Middle East. A lot of that's true.

However, they don't see themselves that way. They see themselves as the inheritors of the Persian empire. They have very large plans, a lot of which have been degraded significantly, almost entirely by Israel, in the last two years. So, they are weakened, but they, I think, will continue to try and find their path forward. So, what are their options? Number one, they could curl up into a fetal ball and announce they're ready for negotiations. Put that down as zero percent chance of occurring. Number two, Richard's point, I agree with it. Likely they will conduct some modest retaliation, try to avoid a full-scale U.S. response, and try to get that nuclear program hidden away in ways that can elude the IAEA and inspectors.

Number three is the most dangerous course, and that's if they decide to go big. And we would be irresponsible not to be thinking about them making a choice like closing the Strait of Hormuz, conducting targeted assassinations, maybe not a military or political figures, but business leaders, expats in the Middle East. They could certainly launch massive ballistic strikes against U.S. facilities, scooping up our allies and partners. And then hovering over all of it, Fareed and Richard, is, of course, could this lead to regime change? Answer, nobody knows.

Certainly, you can find instances in history that look like this that then rattle into a regime change. So, I think they go with option two, as Richard and I just outlined it. But the U.S. needs to get that battle damage assessment, be ready in case the Iranians do go big, and above all, I think, at this point, let's get our allies involved in this.

ZAKARIA: Richard, what do you think the regional dynamic is here? The Saudis, the Gulf states, have always been foes of Iran, but now they must be watching them. You know, Israel, become the superpower of the Middle East and say to themselves, wait a minute, do we really want to live in an Israel -- in an Israeli dominated Middle East? What do you think is the dynamic?

HAASS: I think they're less focused on Israel than on Iran right now. And there are of two minds. On one hand, they like Iran being cut down to size. The last thing in the world they want is an Iran nuclear capability. That would put them in the position of maybe needing one themselves.

On the other hand, they're worried that they could be in the target line, that Iran might decide to widen the war, it's one of the options available, and they would be the obvious choice. So, I think they're uneasy.

But all things being equal, probably slightly more comfortable than not with this assertion of American power, just nervous about where it goes next. I think going farther afield, Fareed, I think the Russians are probably pretty happy because this means the price of oil is going up. I think the Chinese are probably pretty unhappy, potentially for the same reason.

I think who might be most unhappy are the Europeans who weren't consulted and Democrats and others in Congress here at home that this is -- you know, it's interesting. Donald Trump 2.0, whatever else he is, he's not isolationist. What we're seeing is a degree of unilateralism of the United States acting in the world but essentially listening to its own trumpet, not coordinating with others. ZAKARIA: Even the nature of the strike, the B-2s, you don't need -- you know, the bases are all in America. It's a -- it is a classic unilateral kind of Jacksonian move where you're saying, we can -- we can do it all alone. We barely need allies.

HAASS: Yes. And that was very consistent with his press conference with the Pentagon this morning. A real demonstration kind of triumphalism of America's ability to act. At the same time, still wanting to avoid a larger conflict with Iran.

[10:35:01]

We're only going after the nuclear. We're not interested in regime change. But don't mess with us because we're playing the game at a different level.

ZAKARIA: Right. Richard Haass, Jim Stavridis, thank you. How have the strikes changed the calculus for Iran and for Israel? We'll be back with that in a moment.

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[10:40:00]

ZAKARIA: Iran's foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, has said that the U.S. crossed a red line and that the Iranians have to respond. Meanwhile, Israel's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, hailed President Trump, saying his decision to strike Iran will change history. What's next for these two sworn enemy nations?

Joining me now is Vali Nasr, a former -- foremost expert on Iran and a professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. And Nadav Eyal, a columnist at the Israeli newspaper "Yedioth" and a senior scholar at Columbia University.

Vali, let me ask you. You have potentially the answer to the question everyone is wondering, because you have such deep knowledge about Iran's decision-making process. How do you think Iran is thinking about their options right now? And what is the -- what is the most likely scenario?

VALI NASR, PROFESSOR, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY: I mean, first of all, this is not -- this didn't come as a surprise to them. After the initial Israeli attacks, they have had time to think about what might happen if the United States or Israel targeted and killed the supreme leader and or targeted the nuclear sites. So, I think they probably thought this through.

I don't see a scenario in which they would not respond, because that would mean accepting unconditional surrender as President Trump had said it, and that it would mean accepting defeat. No regime, no government would survive that in in Iran in the long term. And I think they would look to find a way in which they would push back against the assumption President Trump might have that this was a one off, this is a clean attack. And after that, he can just go to the negotiating table. I think the aim is to show that Iran is still standing and it's resilient. And it might -- they might decide to attack Israel rather than the U.S., but I think an attack will be coming.

ZAKARIA: And do you think that that is part of, at this point, just a kind of instinctive desire to respond and to show that they will not take this lying down? Or is it -- would it be an attack to reestablish some kind of deterrence, to show that they can do what they -- and then they would be willing to negotiate? In other words, is there is the attack part of a larger strategy which might get them back to the negotiation? Or are we now in a kind of low-grade war with Iran?

NASR: I think -- I don't think they would look at diplomatic negotiations as really conclusive. I think they think that President Trump at every turn has double crossed them. I don't think there's any trust that a negotiation would bring resolution. I think they want to show that they're still standing also to their own population. But I do think they need to establish a certain degree of deterrence and then prepare themselves for a longer war of attrition with both Israel and the United States.

ZAKARIA: Nadav, what is your sense of the Israeli sort of strategy here? Because the president and Hegseth and others have been very careful to say this is not about regime change. We are targeting Iran's nuclear program. That's what we want.

But Israeli senior officials have not been that restrained, shall we say. They have talked about, including Bibi Netanyahu himself, the idea of a regime change, how much better Iran would be without it, how the Middle East would be transformed.

What's the theory there? And do they not worry about something like Iraq?

NADAV EYAL, COLUMNIST, YEDIOTH AHRONOTH: Well, first of all, for them they are entertaining the idea, Fareed. OK? But they're not -- if you talk with the serious people in Israel, they don't think that Israel could lead to a regime change. It can undermine the regime. It can hurt and damage symbols of the Islamic republic. But it can't lead to a real regime change in Iran.

And they want this floating. They want to signal to Iranian opposition figures and maybe to movements within the Iranian society that Israel is out there and now could be an opportunity. But will they wait it out? Will they drag this war to see if there's a regime change in Iran? The answer is absolutely not, not at this point.

They understand that Israel has had a tremendous military success with this, and it had a diplomatic success with the U.S. green lighting the Israeli operations. And now with the U.S. joining they understand that the Israeli home front is taking these hits of devastation, and they just can't wait for regime change in Iran to happen as a strategy.

But will they help if they can or if they see demonstrations in the streets, which were not seeing right now? Absolutely. And this message -- this is not against the Iranians. It's against the regime. It's a very strong message coming from Israel. It relates to our history. Look, Israel and Iran, during the shah had a great relationship, diplomatic relations.

[10:45:06]

Flights of El Al (ph) were flying from Tehran to Tel Aviv directly all the time. And for Israel, this is really the crown jewel, if you can get a regime change there. But is it the strategy right now? The answer is no.

ZAKARIA: All right. We're going to discuss what the new Middle East looks like after these attacks. Because it really, as I've been saying, this shows that Israel is the superpower of the region, and what does that mean when we come back.

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[10:50:09]

ZAKARIA: And we are back with Vali Nasr and Nadav Eyal talking about the next moves for Iran and Israel. Vali, I wanted to ask you the regional context from Iran's point of view, because it must be very disappointed. Its allies have not really come to its rescue, Hezbollah, the Houthis. Obviously, not Hamas. Syrian regime is gone. Do they -- do they feel very isolated? In your view? What are -- you know, again, what are they -- what's the regional dynamic from their point of view?

NASR: Yes, I do think they feel very alone. I mean, there's a lot of support, diplomatic and emotional, from on the Arab street or calls for support and brotherly relations from their neighbors, but this does not amount to strategic support.

I think the way they see it is that the proxies were supposed to be a first line of defense, and also to deter Israel, that has collapsed. Now, Israel and the United States are fighting Iran directly inside its soil. And I think that plays into the mindset Iran needs to do is to create time and space to build a deterrence that would actually protect the country in the absence of the proxies and the fact that its missiles are not a match for Israel or the United States.

So, it gets them into a mindset that actually they perhaps they do need nuclear capability. And the name of the game is to stay in this fight long enough to get there. So, the idea of Iran being alone is not necessarily one that would provide a context for us to imagine that they would give up the nuclear program.

ZAKARIA: What do the Israelis think about this issue? You know, it does feel like it's pretty logical that the Iranians might say, look, we're all on our own. What we need now is a real nuclear program. Do Israelis worry about that?

EYAL: I think Israelis right now are basically thrilled at the military success, they didn't expect that. When the cabinet met and it was presented, Fareed, with scenarios as to what's going to happen in Israel, the army said it's going to be between 800 to 4,000 civilians that are going to die during this war. Now, Israel --

ZAKARIA: In Israel because of the --

(CROSSTALK)

EYAL: In Israel, in Israel. Because of the ballistic missile program of Iran. Right now, we're at 25 people who died, civilians who have died, no one Israeli soldier died in this campaign.

Iran, as Vali Nasr just said, doesn't have air defenses. The Israeli air force is basically flying free over Iran. And take a look at what these B-2 did. They bombed, but the U.S. didn't do any operation before that because it had a freedom of flying over beyond its stealth technology.

So, for Israelis right now, the idea that Iran would try to break for a bomb sounds a bit fantastic, considering that President Trump has committed himself to this position, that the Islamic republic cannot have a nuclear weapon, and that Israel has an operational freedom over Iran, it's not there.

And after October 7th, and I think this is the major point, something changed with the Israeli psyche. It's very much criticized around the world as a result of what's happening in Gaza. But this change is about Israelis saying, look, if you threaten us and if you say that your state policy or your organization policy is to destroy us, we're not going to be fearful as to the results of our actions anymore. We're going to do it. And this is to an extent, a consensus. And Netanyahu understood that consensus, and he's riding that consensus very successfully in recent weeks, specifically with Iran.

ZAKARIA: Vali, what about that? You know, Iran is going to be constantly monitored by Israel. They have no air defenses. You know, that's the context in which, you know, can they really reconstitute a deterrent of some kind while the -- the Israelis will be happy -- happily go in and bomb any movement they see around Fordow or Natanz or anywhere else.

NASR: Exactly. I mean, this is -- this is going to be a game of cat and mouse, a race between what the Iranians can do and what Israel or the United States can destroy, which means that for the region, they have to -- particularly the Gulf countries have to prepare themselves for a rough ride for a period to come.

I think the Iranians will try to kick out IEA inspectors. They will take their program underground. It would make it dark and it will not be as easy to see what they've been doing or what they're doing as it has been for the for the run up to these attacks.

ZAKARIA: So, what you're predicting, in a way, is a much more opaque Iran, Iran and a much more opaque Iranian program.

[10:55:00]

Quickly, we have 30 seconds.

EYAL: Yes.

ZAKARIA: But the big winner is Bibi Netanyahu. He gambled that, you know, Hezbollah would collapse. He gambled that, you know, the Iranians would collapse. And, you know, at least so far, they have done so. And he gambled that Trump would join in once the operation seemed successful.

EYAL: Yes.

ZAKARIA: And Trump did.

EYAL: He didn't only gamble. You know, to be honest with that, to be fair, he worked very hard. This was his raison d'etat, you know, in his career, attacking Iran, attacking Iran's nuclear program, saying this is the major threat, and convincing the U.S. president to do that.

The first U.S. president to do that is impressive. He's enjoying this in the polls right now. But let's remember October 7th and the memory of October 7th is still there, and Israel has 20 hostages in Gaza. Their situation hasn't changed as a result of the Israeli success in Iran.

ZAKARIA: Yes, but for now, he's probably savoring the victory. Thank you. And thanks to all of you for being part of my program this week. What a fascinating set of events. We'll be back next week.

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