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Fareed Zakaria GPS

Gaza's Day After, and the Day After That; The Future of Palestinian Leadership; Interview With Greenmantle China Director Alice Han; Interview With Retired Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy. Aired 10-11a ET

Aired October 19, 2025 - 10:00   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

[10:00:50]

FAREED ZAKARIA, CNN ANCHOR: This is GPS, the GLOBAL PUBLIC SQUARE. Welcome to all of you in the United States and around the world. I'm Fareed Zakaria.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA (voice-over): Today on the program, President Trump took a victory lap this week declaring an end to the war in Gaza. The next steps of his plan include Israel's further withdrawal and Hamas's disarmament. And Trump warned if Hamas didn't disarm, the U.S. would disarm it.

DONALD TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: It will happen quickly and perhaps violently.

ZAKARIA: What happens next?

Then the U.S. trade war with China escalated last week when Donald Trump threatened to impose an extra 100 percent tariff on Chinese imports. He later wrote on social media it will all be fine. Why the escalation? And will it really be fine? I'll ask China scholar Alice Han.

And America's system of checks and balances is as old as the Constitution itself. I'll talk to former Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy about the threats the system faces today from an aggressive executive branch.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA: But first, here's "My Take."

Last week's ceasefire in Gaza was an undisputed success for President Trump and his style of foreign policy. He and his team engaged in intense personal diplomacy, persuading Israel to hold its fire and coaxing the Qataris, Egyptians and Turks to lean on Hamas. For a president who relishes deals and drama, the grand signing ceremony in Egypt was a natural stage.

But as the Middle East quieted, another much more important theater grew more discordant. That involving U.S.-China relations. In this arena, Trump has lurched from threat to retreat to confusion. First, he threatened new 100 percent tariffs and warned that he would cancel a planned meeting with Xi Jinping. Then, as Beijing refused to blink, Trump quickly softened, posting a conciliatory message on social media about wanting to help China, not hurt it. Aides reversed course saying the Trump-Xi summit would take place after all.

The pattern -- loud threats, quick back downs and ensuing uncertainty -- has become familiar. The problem is that Trump's diplomatic playbook, effective in the Middle East, fits poorly in the longer, larger struggle with China. Trump's approach works where America has overwhelming leverage, and the politics are personal. In the Middle East, Washington holds the purse strings, the weapons systems, the security umbrella, cutting edge technology and the U.N. veto.

The region's leaders, Netanyahu, Sisi, Erdogan, Mohammed bin Salman, are strongmen who respond to presidential pressure and transactional incentives. Trump loves this world. He can call a leader, threaten, flatter and then make a deal. The Hamas-Israel ceasefire was precisely that kind of performance -- personal, visible and theatrical.

The contest with China, by contrast, is structural. A rivalry between two great powers bound by mutual dependance. Here, Trump's instincts misfire. He prefers bluffing to planning. Pressure to partnership. But Beijing has the strength to call his bluffs. When he first imposed sweeping tariffs, China retaliated immediately with sweeping counter tariffs of its own and with the restrictions on rare earth exports that are essential for American defense electronics and carmakers.

Washington has real leverage over China. China depends on the U.S. and its allies for advanced chip design, aerospace technology and access to Western markets. But America depends on China for about 70 percent of its rare earth imports, more than 70 percent of lithium ion battery imports, many low end semiconductors and pharmaceuticals.

[10:05:10]

China's size and scale give it some commanding leads, particularly in manufacturing, which it dominates. But as Rush Doshi and Kurt Campbell explain in "Foreign Affairs," while the U.S. alone cannot make every critical technology, the U.S. plus its allies can. The combined economies of America, the European Union, Japan and India represent over 50 percent of global GDP and more than 50 percent of world R and D spending.

The best China strategy, then, involves coalition management, coordinated investment, technology partnerships and shared deterrence. That requires patience, consistency and trust. Trump's record here is dim. He alienated Europe and Canada with punitive tariffs. He began a review of the AUKUS submarine pact, which binds the U.S., U.K. and Australia in a critical Indo-Pacific partnership.

He has repeatedly questioned NATO's value and he has upended nearly three decades of patient diplomacy with India, the only country with the scale to balance China economically, technologically and militarily over time. By slapping sky high tariffs on India and publicly courting Pakistan, now a de facto Chinese defense ally, he has managed to enrage New Delhi for little discernible gain.

The critical aspect of any competition with China is, of course, internal, rebuilding. U.S. capacity by investing in research, supporting critical industries and attracting global talent. Yet, federal R and D funding as a share of GDP had fallen to barely 0.6 percent by 2023. Around half its Cold War average. And that was before Trump's massive research cuts this year. Visa restrictions and other Trump administration actions have driven international student arrivals down 19 percent since last year, and support for homegrown technology has been pushed aside, replaced instead by tariffs and more tariffs.

Consider Washington's strategy towards Taiwan. For half a century, U.S. policy has maintained a fragile but stable equilibrium, supporting Taipei militarily while avoiding provocation. That balance has endured through administrations of both parties because it's grounded in strategic consistency, careful signaling and institutional memory. U.S.-China relations is not the place for impulsive tweeting.

Trump's deal in the Middle East shows that his style of diplomacy can deliver bursts of success where personalities and asymmetries rule. But the China contest is slower, harder, more technical, less theatrical. It requires statecraft, not showmanship, patience, not bravado. The stakes couldn't be higher. If Trump continues to treat Beijing the way he treats the Gulf. America might discover that the art of the deal is no substitute for the architecture of strategy.

Go to CNN.com/Fareed for a link to my "Washington Post" column this week, and let's get started.

This week saw the beginning of a fragile truce in the Middle East with the release of the final living Israeli hostages and some 2,000 Palestinian prisoners. The next phase requires Hamas to lay down its arms, but it is unclear at this point whether it's willing to do so, and recent videos have shown its militants violently cracking down on rivals in Gaza.

For more on what's next, I'm joined by Matthew Levitt and Shira Efron. Matthew is a counterterrorism expert and a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Shira is the distinguished Israel policy chair and senior fellow at the RAND Corporation.

Welcome.

Shira, when you look at the situation as it stands now, does it seem to you that there's any indication that Hamas is going to demilitarize?

SHIRA EFRON, DISTINGUISHED CHAIR FOR ISRAEL POLICY, RAND: Hamas said that they will not demilitarize and they will hand over their arms only when there is a Palestinian state. So at the moment, there is no incentive for Hamas to demilitarize and lay down their arms. However, I think that under the right pressures from the mediators, Qatar and Turkey, there could be some formula where Hamas hands out some of their weapons. [10:10:04]

We're talking about the -- what they would call offensive weapons and keep the defensive weapons in a long term effort that will require enforcement from external forces as well, including by the IDF.

ZAKARIA: So, Matt, where does that therefore leave things?

MATTHEW LEVITT, SENIOR FELLOW, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY: In a complicated space. Trump's 20-point plan makes it very clear Hamas must be demilitarized. Hamas agreed to release the hostages, but not to demilitarize. And now there's some deal about maybe somehow freezing their weapons but not handing them over to somebody else.

In order to get to phase two of the deal, the Israelis are going to have to be convinced that Hamas no longer poses the kind of threat they did before, and that involves dealing with their weapons, dealing with their personnel, and dealing with their money. And so the very first among those is addressing Hamas's weapons.

I don't see the Israelis saying, sure, let's go on with stage two of the deal and Hamas maintains whatever weapons it has. They'll say that's an expressed violation of President Trump's 20 plan -- points.

ZAKARIA: So, Shira, that means they are unlikely to withdraw. Israel still controls 53 percent of Gaza. And so it sounds like what you end up with is pretty much what kind of the last peace deal looked like when -- a ceasefire looked like when Biden negotiated it. There was a transfer, you know, they released some hostages, but then went back to fighting. Will they -- will they actually go back to fighting?

EFRON: I don't think so. And the reason does not lie with the Israeli decision making. Frankly, I think it all depends on what President Trump says and does. And so far, and the president said it in different words, but he basically said, I will decide what constitutes a violation. The question now lies if there are enough forces and pressure by the U.S., by President Trump to push the sides to continue with a variety of thorny issues.

Disarmament is one. But there's also the bigger question of who governs Gaza and who controls Gaza and who controls the money that goes to Gaza. All these questions have to be addressed now. And I'm not sure that the veto on the negotiation to the next phase is being held in Jerusalem.

ZAKARIA: Matt, would you agree with that? It does seem like, you know, President Trump has enormous leverage over the Israelis, and he's using it. And Hamas is so battered that you could imagine a situation where violence doesn't erupt. But Israel is still in control of most of Gaza. And then you get to the question of, you know, can you come up with a new Gaza ruling elite?

LEVITT: Between now and then there are two things that have to happen in the immediate. One is some type of temporary international force to go into Gaza to patrol the streets. And the second then is an interim government of some sort. And one of the concerns in the immediate is as much as President Trump wants this ceasefire to stick, and he will be the one to determine what is a violation, it's going to be very hard to get other countries to pony up soldiers to go into Gaza if they think they're going to be fighting Hamas.

No Arab or Muslim force wants to go in to fight Hamas. And so at a minimum, it will take time to fully demilitarize. If ever there has to be some kind of process that starts where Hamas hands over at least some of its weapons, where forces go in and start destroying tunnels where weapons were being developed and stored, so that we'll be able to get to the point. And it has to happen fast for an interim force to come in because otherwise we see what happens already.

The IDF withdrew from some places, and Hamas forces went in, renamed under, you know, Gaza police force, seeking retribution against Gaza families and clans that opposed them during the two-year war.

ZAKARIA: All right. Stay with us.

So who will actually rule Gaza and where does that leave the idea of a Palestinian state? When we come back.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[10:18:42]

ZAKARIA: And I am back with Shira Efron, a senior fellow at the RAND Corporation, and Matthew Levitt, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Shira, in your "Foreign Affairs" article, you say that the plan for a technocratic Palestinian government in Gaza is all well and good, but it does not deal with one very important factor, which is legitimacy.

How do these Palestinians have legitimacy with the people? And we sort of saw this in Iraq as well. You can put in very smart people. But if there's a sense in which they were appointed from above, from on high by foreigners, they do lack that legitimacy on the ground. Yet Israel won't accept anyone who has a background with Hamas or with the Palestinian Authority, which it regards as feckless and corrupt, with good reason. So who are these Palestinians going to be?

EFRON: So there is a list of 15 folks who were agreed by Palestinians, Egypt and several other countries to be on this technocratic committee. It's still murky whether Israel agreed or not. They are from Gaza. Those are people. And we won't go into names, but those are people that Israel has worked with throughout the years, including in Gaza, and they do have legitimacy on the ground.

[10:20:07]

To your point, though, I think the big question is also in terms of framing. If we have an international umbrella, we have the board of peace, and it comes to substitute a legitimate Palestinian governance body, that will not work. However, if this comes to support and not substitute and create the basis and enforcement and capacity building then we can have this legitimacy that is so needed on the ground. On the Palestinian Authority, you know, we have to make a distinction

between two things. There is the symbolism of the Palestinian Authority. Mahmoud Abbas, Abu Mazen riding back into Gaza, which is something that the Israeli political echelon at the moment says is a red line. However, when we talk about the Palestinian institutions, this is a lot of smoke and mirrors. Israel works with the Palestinian Authority all the time in the West Bank and also in Gaza.

And I can give you some examples, including the Rafah crossing that is supposed to open, reopen in the next few days is going to be manned by the -- on the Gazan side of the crossing by Palestinian Security Forces in uniform and with a flag. The Palestinian Water Authority from Ramallah coordinates with Israel the fixing of water and sanitation equipment in Gaza today. Same goes for the monetary authority and even the ministry of health.

The Hamas-led Ministry of Health has a PA, Palestinian Authority, arm that engages in referrals, and there are going to be many of them now, and procurement of medicine. So this whole taboo on a Palestinian Authority, I just don't buy it. I think it's a framing and borrowing from a U.S. term, some sort of don't ask, don't tell, could work very well here and it would not interrupt -- it is not something that I expect to see much opposition to in Israel.

ZAKARIA: Matt, would you agree with that? I think the issue with the Palestinian Authority is I'm not sure it has much legitimacy with Palestinians. In fact, it's deeply unpopular. And the Israelis, certainly Prime Minister Netanyahu, doesn't want it because it would then suggest the beginnings of a Palestinian state if that authority is running both the West Bank and Gaza.

Is there a way where the Palestinian Authority, in your opinion, gets some kind of control of the day-to-day operations in Gaza?

LEVITT: Over time yes. At the end of the day, the Palestinian Authority is what we have, and the international community has been calling for serious reform within the PA for quite some time. This is the opportunity to put that in place. If you want to have a role in post-war Gaza, if you want to have a place in governing both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, we have to see serious reform.

Whether it continues under the name Palestinian Authority or it renames into something else, is yet to be seen. But I think she is absolutely right. It's important to note that the Israelis cooperate with the Palestinian Authority, especially in the West Bank, on a myriad of issues on a day-to-day basis because it's what's there.

Netanyahu does not like the Palestinian Authority because he doesn't want there to be a two-state solution. But I think he's going to have to give significant rope on this because President Trump wants this ceasefire to work. The Gulf states, the Arab states want there to be movement towards a Palestinian system of self-rule. There's going to have to be a system to enable reconstruction in Gaza.

Theoretically, we could have a better situation than we did before in terms of the kind of rule that Palestinians are able to live under in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, that can coordinate with the people next door in Israel.

ZAKARIA: Shira, finally, is it worth then having elections? Because part of the reason the Palestinian Authority has no credibility with Palestinians is Mahmoud Abbas, you know, on the, whatever, the 19th year of his four-year term, there haven't been elections there forever because the PA thinks that, probably correctly, that they would lose badly.

EFRON: That is correct. And elections would have to come. They have to draw their legitimacy from the people. But, you know, the Palestinian arena is largely a two-party system. It's Fatah or Hamas. For a long time it was very convenient for everyone, for the Palestinians not to have elections because we dreaded Hamas winning. After reforms and I completely agree with Matt and I think dangling the Gaza card is the best way to leverage and affect the Palestinians Authority into reforms.

They would have to go through reforms to have a new cadre of leadership that enters the scene and be given an opportunity alongside with other reforms. But we just don't have anything else.

ZAKARIA: All right. On that note of agreement, thank you both for a very insightful conversation.

[10:25:02]

Next on GPS, as I told you earlier, the U.S.-China trade war has ramped up again. What is the core of Beijing's strategy in dealing with Donald Trump? I'll ask a China expert next.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

ZAKARIA: This month has brought a new round of tit-for-tat in the trade war between America and China. Last week, China announced new export restrictions on rare earth minerals, which are considered vital for the U.S. defense and tech industry. President Trump responded with fury and threats of an additional 100 percent tariffs on China, but quickly softened his tone.

I gave you my take earlier on the Trump administration's handling of the U.S.-China relationship. Let's look at the other side of the coin. Now, Beijing's strategy vis-a-vis Washington.

[10:30:00]

Joining me to discuss all this is Alice Han. She is the China director at the geopolitical advisory firm Greenmantle. Alice, welcome. What I'm struck by is the speed with which -- the speed and kind of certainty with which China responds to these Trump threats, bluffs, provocations. Call them what you will. They always seem to have a very clear strategy. So, it feels as though they have been thinking about this and preparing for this for a while.

ALICE HAN, CHINA DIRECTOR, GREENMANTLE: Thanks very much, Fareed, for having me on the program. I would entirely agree with that statement. When I was in Beijing before the November election, I was actually hearing from factories on the ground that they had already figured out that Trump could win based on the number of flags, MAGA flags and caps that they were projecting that were far outpacing the Biden Democrat and later Kamala Democrat campaign.

So, it was very clear from Beijing's perspective that they were going to deal with the Trump administration 2.0. And what they've cultivated since 1.0, Trump's first term, is a policy in which it is trade related, it's tech related. It's even to some extent, geopolitics related.

And what struck me when they did flex the muscle of the critical minerals restrictions is that they have basically taken a page or a leaf out of the playbook of the Americans copying a system of export controls, foreign direct product rule that was used in the U.S. to basically expand the way in which they are cutting critical minerals and the technologies that use them to not just America, but the rest of the world.

So, this is an administration from Beijing that I think from the very beginning has understood what they can do to escalate and to deescalate. Now, my concern is that we are in an escalation framework right now. But to your point, Fareed, I think China has come prepared and done its homework.

ZAKARIA: And in so far, I think it's fair to say that Trump has backed down almost every time. He's issued these threats and then in various ways, you know, after liberation day, he backed down. And he now seems to be backing down again. Where do you think this goes?

HAN: Well, I would say that what worries me is that the Chinese now may be overestimating their capabilities. So, just to take a different tact from the position that you've just framed, Fareed, I would say that the Chinese, after the April fiasco and in the ensuing months, felt very vindicated by their escalation, dominance of tit for tat tariffs. And the way in which they saw Trump cave, I think, has vindicated to them that their policy and strategy have been very effective vis-a-vis Trump.

My concern now is that what they announced is creating an export control system that is potentially alienating other countries E.U., for instance, Japan, other G7 countries who have been for many years concerned about China's chokehold and dominance in critical minerals. But ultimately, I think both sides are reluctant to use the tariff tool. It is a blunt instrument, as Bessent and Greer knows know both from the economic side it's mutually assured economic destruction.

Now, Trump may call for tariffs and ultimately folding the issue, but he has other tools in his repertoire, mainly on the technology side in the form of export controls to counteract China's more aggressive posture in the last few days.

ZAKARIA: Treasury secretary Scott Bessent has said, you know, we're going to work with our allies to come up with a common front against China, which is kind of an odd way -- odd strategy or late in the day, since they have been pummeling their allies with tariffs, the Canadians, the Europeans. Do you think that strategy will work, or is Europe sort of alienated enough from America that they won't find common interest? Because there is common interest. China is being in some ways predatory towards Europe as well.

HAN: I think the coming month will be critical to deciding what side of the divide, the sort of nonaligned movement of countries, I would say, to borrow Cold War term will stand. Thus far Europe, Japan, a lot of southeast Asia have been hedging more towards, I would say, China. India has been a key example of this in this dance between China and the U.S. But certainly, if China doesn't fix its PR messaging with these critical minerals, export controls, I see the big risk that it actually could be pushing the G7 countries closer to Trump in the short and to medium run.

[10:35:01]

And the reason for that is China has such chokehold and dominance over critical minerals that there is a real and I think, valid fear in Brussels, in Tokyo and other capitals around the world that if China doesn't like a policy coming from another country, it will deploy and use the tactics of export restrictions on critical minerals to basically kneecap or hurt some of these other countries.

ZAKARIA: Alice, a pleasure to have you on. Thank you.

HAN: Thanks so much, Fareed.

ZAKARIA: Next on GPS, I'll ask former Supreme Court justice Anthony Kennedy if he thinks America's system of checks and balances is in danger of not working.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[10:40:20]

ZAKARIA: For 30 years, Justice Anthony Kennedy was one of the most influential voices on the nation's highest court. Nominated to the Supreme Court by President Reagan in 1987, Kennedy wrote landmark opinions on some of America's most divisive issues, abortion, gay rights, the death penalty.

I sat down with him recently to talk about his life, the court, and the importance of preserving freedom in America. He's just published a revealing memoir called "Life, Law and Liberty."

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA: Justice Kennedy, pleasure and honor to have you on.

ANTHONY KENNEDY, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE (RET.): It is my pleasure and honor to be with you.

ZAKARIA: You talk about how you grew up in the west and how -- it feels like that's a very important part of your life in the book. How does that translate into the way you think about America, the constitution, the law? KENNEDY: Well, we are proud of being in the west. Know that in the earlier days of our republic, the west was settled by people who were looking for new frontiers, for new opportunities, for new freedom. You know, the famous book "East of Eden" always says that, you know, you can always go west to find Eden because you're always east of Eden. And so, that's why people came west.

When you're in California, does Eden stop? We still think we're east of Eden because California has and the west have a tradition of openness, courtesy, friendliness. There are some negative sides of it, too, but a tradition of friendliness in which we together explore new frontiers.

ZAKARIA: And do you think that that sense of searching for freedom is manifest in the -- in the way the American system works in that compared to many countries, certainly in the old -- in the old country, in Europe, you're left alone. There's a great deal more of a sense of individual freedom and of civil society not being interfered in by the government.

KENNEDY: You're quite correct. The government gives us a zone, a space in which we can exercise our freedom together by working as a nation. And that's true of the whole nation.

ZAKARIA: You write in the book, that any -- if any one branch of government uses its -- tries to use its powers to an extreme, the constitution won't work. It feels like, by its own admission, the executive branch is trying to use powers much more aggressively than certainly I can remember, and certainly in 50 years, how much of a problem is that?

KENNEDY: It's central to preserving our freedom to remember that freedom isn't on automatic pilot. And you don't take a DNA test to see if you believe in freedom. Freedom is taught and teach and preserved as conscious acts. In many instances, there are -- the legislative and the executive branch can take action. That's not reviewable by the courts.

In this day and age, the legal profession has been remarkable in its capacity to put almost any social issue into a case so that the courts can hear about it. And that's caused the courts to be quite powerful.

But there are instances -- many instances in which what the legislature does, what the executives are not reviewable, and that doesn't mean they shouldn't pay attention to the constitution. It should mean they should pay more attention to the constitution. Every legislator, every executive officer has -- takes an oath to begin with to obey the constitution. And he or she should remember that every day in all that they do.

ZAKARIA: Would it be fair to say what you're saying is there are certain actions say that the executive branch might be taking that are extreme assertions of power? They may not be unconstitutional, but they may still be unwise.

KENNEDY: Well, of course and in any political era there are some people say this is unwise, this is a mistake.

[10:45:01]

That's the way democracy works. That's the way it ought to work. But, more than that, it seems to me that officials must remember that they are entrusted to preserve, protect and defend the constitution. And that requires them to think about the consequences of their acts in the long term.

And the book explains that the framers used the words life, liberty, and property. Framers used the word liberty as an expansive word because they trusted later generations to find the meaning of liberty that they couldn't see. They used a spacious word so that it could be -- its meaning could be discovered over time.

ZAKARIA: Justice Kennedy, an honor and a pleasure to have you on.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA: Next on GPS, in Trump's victory lap over the Gaza deal, he received a lot of praise from foreign leaders but one stands out. I'll tell you who and why when we come back.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[10:50:49]

ZAKARIA: And now for the last look. More than 20 world leaders gathered at the Egypt summit this week for the signing of the Gaza ceasefire deal. And if praise for Donald Trump were an Olympic sport, there would have been a clear victor.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

SHEHBAZ SHARIF, PAKISTANI PRIME MINISTER: I genuinely feel that he is the most genuine and most wonderful candidate for Peace Prize. I think that you're the man this world needed most at this point in time. God bless you. God give you long life to serve like this for all time to come.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

ZAKARIA: That's Pakistan's prime minister, Shehbaz Sharif, whose five- minute ode appeared to overwhelm even Donald Trump himself, a man not known to stop people from praising him.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

DONALD TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: Wow. I didn't expect that. Let's go home. There's nothing more I have to say.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

ZAKARIA: The episode actually reflects something bigger, a very real change in the relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan. For years, American presidents have kept Pakistan at a distance, turning towards its rival India, instead hoping India would become a counterweight to China in the region. Pakistan was seen as an unreliable partner, a haven for terror groups, not to mention a long time China ally.

But Donald Trump has shifted that orientation almost overnight. In his first term, Trump had a bromance with India's prime minister Narendra Modi. But now he has developed a particular fondness for Pakistan's army chief Asim Munir, who he referred to at the Egypt summit as my favorite field marshal.

It's more than just effusive speeches at summits. In July, the U.S. and Pakistan reached a deal on tariffs after announcing a joint effort to tap Pakistani oil reserves even though it's not clear that those reserves amount to much. Pakistan is also wooing Trump as a potential partner to mine its vast reserves of critical minerals. And Pakistan's crypto council signed a letter of intent in April with the Trump family backed crypto firm World Liberty Financial to advance innovations in blockchain.

What changed Trumps attitude? Well, it seems to have started last April when a terror attack killed 26 people in Indian administered Kashmir. India claimed the militants were backed by Pakistan, a charge Pakistan denied. India then launched an assault on its neighbor. For four days, the world watched as two nuclear armed rivals seemed on the brink of a larger war.

Then a ceasefire was announced by Donald Trump on Truth Social. In doing so, he preempted India's announcement and has repeatedly taken credit for the breakthrough. Pakistan wholeheartedly agreed with this narrative, and in June nominated Trump for a Nobel Peace Prize.

New Delhi, which has long held that negotiations with Islamabad should be bilateral, rejected the idea that the U.S. brokered a ceasefire. According to "New York Times'" reporting in June, Trump called Modi and implied that the Indian leader ought to nominate him as well. But Modi refused.

The next day, Trump hosted Pakistan's army chief at the White House for a highly unusual lunch. Absent any civilian head of government, a meeting that raised eyebrows in New Delhi. In its dealings with Trump, Pakistan was able to play its weakness for strength. India has long had a nonaligned foreign policy, attempting to stay above the fray of superpower rivalries. It also has a competitive democracy, with opposition parties waiting to pounce on any appearance by Modi that he was a lackey of America.

Pakistan, by contrast, is a step away from an authoritarian regime. Its officials operate with more impunity, and the country itself is weaker, doesn't have an image of itself as independent from great powers like the U.S. and China. That has allowed its leaders to kowtow to Trump with abandon.

[10:55:00]

Pakistan has drawbacks as an ally, but it also has real attractions for the U.S. As the analyst Uzair Younus argues, the thaw in relations may have also resulted from a realization in the U.S. that Pakistan is a competent military partner that can play a security role in the Middle East. In the skirmish in May, Pakistan was able to not just deflect elements of India's air attack, but reportedly shot down several Indian fighter jets.

Pakistan's military ability clearly influenced Saudi Arabia, which just signed a mutual defense pact with the country. The future of U.S. Pakistan relations, particularly after Trump, is unclear. But for now, the generals in Islamabad have shown themselves surprisingly enterprising and flexible in knowing how to woo and win over the president of the United States.

Thanks to all of you for being part of my program this week, and I will see you next week.

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