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Fareed Zakaria GPS

Nationwide Protests Sweep Iran; Venezuela After Maduro. Venezuela After Maduro; Oil Executives Lukewarm On Investment In Venezuela; Interview With Former Danish Foreign Minister Jeppe Kofod; Interview With University of Buffalo History Professor David Herzberg. Aired 10-11a ET

Aired January 11, 2026 - 10:00   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

[10:00:57]

FAREED ZAKARIA, CNN ANCHOR: This is GPS, the GLOBAL PUBLIC SQUARE. Welcome to all of you in the United States and around the world. I'm Fareed Zakaria coming to you live from New York.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA (voice-over): Today on the program, Iran on edge. Protests against the government have spread all over the country. And the regime is cracking down.

I'll ask an expert what this could mean for the Iranian people and the regime.

Then Venezuela after Maduro. What is next for the nation following the capture of its longtime president? Trump says the U.S. will run the country. But how?

I have a panel on the political future of Venezuela.

Then President Trump set his sights on Greenland again, telling reporters --

DONALD TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: We need Greenland from the standpoint of national security.

ZAKARIA: Is this bluster? And what should the Europeans do about it?

I'll talk to Denmark's former foreign minister, Jeppe Kofod.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA: But first, here's "My Take."

Throughout history, the most powerful countries have often had a hard time finding friends. As a nation grows dominant, others tend to balance against it. Look at Russia's neighbors in Eastern Europe. Countries rushed into NATO the moment the world allowed it. Look at China's neighborhood in Asia, where Japan, India, Australia, Vietnam and others have steadily tightened their security ties with the U.S. and each other in response to Beijing's rise. But then look at the United States and the theory starts to wobble.

America is the world's most powerful nation, yet many of the richest and most capable countries do not balance against it. They ally with it. They defer to it on core security questions. They host its forces. They integrate their militaries with it. That is not normal in the long sweep of modern history. In fact, it is close to unique. Why? Not because the United States is saintly, but because it has often behaved unlike a classic hegemon.

For eight decades since World War II, it has usually tried to translate raw strength into something others can accept. Rules, institutions, and legitimacy. It built alliances rather than tributary systems. And it spoke the language of principle, collective security, self-determination, open commerce. Even when it fell short.

Consider an episode often held up as the icon of American unilateralism, the Iraq war. I'm not defending the war's wisdom. I'm making a larger point about America's attitude to the international system.

The Bush administration sought and obtained congressional authorization in 2002, and it went to the U.N., helping secure Security Council Resolution 1441. It also assembled a coalition of 49 countries supporting the effort. Washington felt compelled to make the case, to gather partners, to look for rationales that were broad and accepted by others. That effort to translate power into legitimacy is the hidden pillar of America's primacy.

When the U.S. acts like a rule-maker rather than a shakedown artist, it buys something more valuable than fear. Consent. Consent is what turns hegemony into leadership and leadership into a system that other states find preferable to the alternatives. It's also what keeps the balancing impulse from igniting.

And it is precisely what the Venezuela episode now puts at risk. It's not the raid on Maduro itself, but rather the utter disregard for law, norms, alliances and diplomacy that marked this break in American foreign policy.

[10:05:10]

In a CNN interview, White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller declared flatly, "The United States of America is running Venezuela," and dismissed international niceties, insisting the world is governed by strength, force, power, the iron laws of history.

President Trump, for his part, said the U.S. would run Venezuela until a transition and take its oil. This is explicitly a naked act of aggression to benefit America's coffers. If you're a Canadian, a German, a Korean or a Mexican, Miller's words will land like a chill. Not because America is about to invade Ottawa or Berlin, but because the logic has changed.

The argument is no longer that American power is used in service of broader principles others can embrace. Democracy, collective security, a rules based order. The argument is that power entitles. It rules because it can. That is exactly the kind of great power behavior that produces nervous neighbors.

Trump has invoked the "Monroe Doctrine" to justify the operation. It's worth remembering that the "Monroe Doctrine" was often seen after 1823 as anti-imperial, aimed at preventing colonial style interventions by Europe in the Western Hemisphere. It was only later, especially with Theodore Roosevelt's corollary in 1904, that the doctrine mutated into a license for U.S. intrusions across Latin America.

That flourish of American imperialism did not last long and did not end well for the region or for America's reputation. Over the last four decades, Republicans and Democrats forged a new bipartisan approach to the region. It encouraged Latin American countries' moves from juntas to a democracy. It fostered trade, investment and support for institutional reform, and worked with countries to deal with drugs and migration.

Mexico is the emblem of that shift. A country once defined by deep suspicion of Washington became one of America's closest economic partners, bound by dense supply chains and daily law enforcement cooperation. And, by the way, net migration of Mexicans into the U.S. has been close to zero for much of the 21st century.

This strategic capital, built over decades, is now being squandered, and in the long run, an America that behaves like an utterly self- interested predator on the world stage will not grow stronger. It will grow lonelier. Allies will hedge, partners will search for options. Neutrals will inch away, and the balancing that history predicted all along may finally arrive. Not because America became weak, but because it forgot the real source of its strength.

The Trump administration's aspirations seems to be, to have America act like Putin's Russia, an aggressive state that nakedly pursues its own interests. And Miller is right to note that that's how the strong have acted through much of history, except America.

The United States, fitfully and with many mistakes, followed a different path for the last eight decades and built a new world, one that is now being recklessly dismantled.

Go to FareedZakaria.com for a link to my "Washington Post" column this week, and let's get started.

Nationwide, anti-government protests have swept the streets of Iran in recent days. At least 162 protesters have been killed in the crackdown, according to a U.S. based Iranian human rights organization. The protests were triggered by the deepening of Iran's currency crisis, when the riyal plunge to an all-time low against the dollar two weeks ago.

Joining me now to discuss is Holly Dagres, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute and the curator of the weekly newsletter, "The Iranist."

Holly, let's get right to it. This seems like it's huge. It seems bigger than really anything we've seen. Maybe the Green Movement at its peak was like this and broad based. You know, this is not a set of specific demands like the woman life movement, but what, you know, there have been moments like this in the past, and they have been put down. You wrote in the times that you think this time it's different.

What is the principal kind of evidence that this time, this regime might actually be on the verge of collapse?

HOLLY DAGRES, SENIOR FELLOW, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY: Well, for starters, I think that since Women, Life, Freedom, we seen Iranian consistently call for the ouster of the regime, the Islamic Republic.

[10:10:06]

But what really sets apart this from Women, Life, Freedom is the newfound fragility of the Islamic Republic. We're operating in a post October 7th world, where the Islamic Republic's proxies have been maimed. They've lost their top ally in Syria. They had a 12-day war in Israel, where they were unable to defend their airspace. There's been Israeli infiltration, their nuclear programs in shambles.

And then on the ground, Iranians are unable to feed their families. There are power outages in this resource rich country. And the real possibility that Tehran, the capital, will run out of water. And that's what's really different from a domestic and foreign policy perspective. But the big picture here is also the Sword of Damocles, which is Israel and the United States, and how they could tip this balance as well.

ZAKARIA: So I wanted to ask you about a very interesting thread on Twitter, on X that Danny Citrinowicz, the former head of Israel's defense intelligence, put out where he says, look, everything you said is true, but don't forget, the regime is very tough. They are brutal. And there is no single opposition leader. There's no opposition movement. People would worry about a vacuum of authority and a collapse into chaos. And so he was more cautious.

And it does seem this problem of -- these protests are spontaneous, which is amazing. But do they need to be organized by an opposition figure? You need a kind of Nelson Mandela like figure to make this -- to actually push this regime out.

DAGRES: I'm familiar with Danny's work, and I just think I should start by saying there are many Nelson Mandelas in Iran. Many of them are in prison. There are two Nobel Laureates, one is living in exile, Shirin Ebadi. One is currently languishing in solitary confinement, Nargis Mohammadi. And we also have other options as well abroad. We've seen that former crown prince Reza Pahlavi has actually called himself a transitional leader, and I think it's noteworthy that the protests, some of the chants and it's extraordinary because his father was ousted just this January, 47 years ago.

And so there are options. The issue here is the international community doesn't want to accept that for a very long time activists on the ground have called for a constitutional assembly, for a referendum. And now Mohammadi and other 17 activists have called for a transition, but nobody seems to be paying attention to that reality. So there are options, but they don't want to listen to them.

ZAKARIA: Is there a danger that what you end up with is other elements within the regime? Ali Larijani, the former speaker of the parliament, members of the Revolutionary Guard will, you know, effectively do a kind of soft regime change and just -- so I wonder whether, you know, you lose some of the theocratic element, the face of this regime but the military dictatorship, the men with the guns, stay in power.

DAGRES: That is a real reality. And something I mentioned as a scenario in my "New York Times" guest essay. My big worry is that a member of the IRGC trades his fatigue for a suit and wrapped themselves in the flag of Iranian nationalism and says, I'm going to lead the country. But the thing is, this would just be a new facade of the clerical establishment. And that's something the Iranian people don't want.

They don't want the Islamic Republic and they made that very well- known through their chants over the years. And for them, they've lost trust. This regime has been irreformable and irredeemable for a long time. And so I don't think they will be satisfied with that because this is not what they want anymore.

ZAKARIA: We've got 30 seconds, if you had one thing to tell President Trump or the Trump administration to do now, what would it be?

DAGRES: For starters, I would tell the Trump administration to turn on direct to cell for Starlink. Right now Iranians like -- Iranian Americans like myself are unable to contact our families because there is an internet shutdown and the phone lines are dead. Secondly, I would tell President Trump and the international community to heed the calls of the Iranian people and call for a democratic transition in Iran because that's what the Iranian people are asking for.

ZAKARIA: And do you think that these street protests could eventually turn into something where the regime voluntarily leaves or there will actually be an insurgency that will topple it?

[10:15:02]

DAGRES: You know, that's a lot of speculation right now. I think we should be putting our faith into the Iranian people, and instead of bringing skepticism about what they're doing, we should be giving them support. And that's something I said in 2022 on your show as well. And I think that's something we need to pay attention to because they're literally risking their lives for freedom, knowing full well that they'll be killed in the streets.

And there's been some documentation right now that there were over 2,000 killed. And that's supposed to be a credible number. And that's also been reported by Iran International.

ZAKARIA: Holly, always so fascinating to hear from you. Stay in touch with what's going on in Iran. We may well be back to you next week.

Next on GPS, we will talk about Venezuela.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[10:20:04]

ZAKARIA: It's been over a week since President Trump claimed the U.S. would run Venezuela following the stunning operation to capture the country's strongman, Nicolas Maduro.

For more on what's next, I'm joined by two experts. Juan Gonzalez served in the Biden administration as senior director for the Western Hemisphere on the National Security Council, and Francisco Rodriguez is a Venezuelan economist and professor at the University of Denver.

Francisco, let me ask you, you're Venezuelan. You worked in the national assembly there in the early 2000s. When you look at this, is this a foreign military intervention to affect regime change in Venezuela, or was this a palace coup where the vice president essentially gave up President Maduro so that the rest of the regime could stay in power?

FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH: Well, this is a decapitation without regime change. It's a choice by the Trump administration to work with Venezuelan authorities. And there's a lot of information coming out that suggests that this has been for months in the making, that there's been communication between the Trump administration and the Delcy Rodriguez, former vice president.

And definitely -- and now president, interim president. And definitely they're working together very rapidly. President Trump has said that they have a good working relationship. In fact, they've just even coordinated to seize some tankers that were shipping Venezuelan oil. That is, together, the interim authorities of Venezuela, with the U.S. government. So it's hard to think that there wasn't previous planning here.

Now, the reality is that there's a structure that's governing Venezuela right now that has been kept in place, and the Trump administration has chosen to work with it.

ZAKARIA: So, Juan, you have actually negotiated with Delcy Rodriguez and her brother, who's very powerful, the head of the national assembly. Tell us about her. Tell us about him. You know, are they -- what are they like to deal with?

JUAN GONZALEZ, FORMER SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: Well, I mean, they're very efficient operators within Chavismo. I think Delcy Rodriguez, in my opinion, is probably the most qualified and efficient of those that were around Maduro. In my experience, when I traveled to Venezuela in March of 2022, I spent hours talking to her and to Jorge, and Delcy is no nonsense. She says she's going to do something. She will do it. She certainly, I think, ideologically aligned with the Chavista ideology of socialism in Venezuela, but is also, I think, very much a pragmatist and a survivor, the both of them are survivors. And so she's developed very good links with the oil and gas sector and

the financial community. And I think she reflects really a lesson learned from the Iraq invasion, where this administration is not de- Baathifying the country, but rather keeping the institution in place for the sake of stability. Jorge is also an expert negotiator and is somebody who's been able to really bring together the coalition. Chavismo those around Maduro are not monolithic. They're a group of actors that are attention and brought together by economic interests and survival.

And so I think if there are two people that are actually capable of governing right now and providing some stability would be them.

ZAKARIA: But, Francisco, the people who have the real power are the defense minister and the interior minister. Are they going to be on board with this strategy? They seem so right now. But have they been given assurances, do you think?

RODRIGUEZ: Yes. Well, it's not clear. There are a lot of divisions. Remember, the interior minister is named in the indictment against the -- on which Nicolas Maduro was apprehended. So it's not clear how much the U.S. is going to press on this. I think that if Chavismo is offered a way of surviving and a way of governing the country, they'll fall in line. And I think that the ideology will become much less important over time.

I don't think it's important right now. I mean, they basically agreed to an oil deal in which all oil revenues are being given to the U.S. to be administered by the U.S. under the oversight of the U.S. So this is a complete abandonment of the Chavista ideology. So I think that right now, for them, it's survival. If this offers them a way to survive, I think that they'll go along with it. If the U.S. demands, for example, that Diosdado Cabello, Vladimir Padrino are handed over, then that's going to be a different game.

I think that here the U.S. really has to think about what are its objectives. Its objectives are maintaining stability in the near term and recovering this economy so that ultimately you can get it to a democratic transition, then you have to work with the people who are there.

ZAKARIA: All right. Stay with us. What we're going to talk about when I come back is oil and democracy. What's going to happen in Venezuela on both those issues?

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[10:29:03]

ZAKARIA: I'm back with former Biden administration senior official, Juan Gonzalez, and Francisco Rodriguez, who is a Venezuelan economist.

Juan, let me ask you whether you agree that the Trump administration seems pretty focused, really just on oil there. There doesn't seem to be -- they don't seem to care about the drugs anymore. I mean, the defense minister and interior minister are the ones who are implicated in that. They don't seem particularly interested in talking to the opposition anymore. What is the oil objective here in your opinion?

GONZALEZ: Yes, certainly. I mean, I would say also, I think just building on what Francisco said, there's a very real scenario where the Trump administration pulls this off, where you have a year from now stability in the country, economic security. You have the invitation of U.S. oil companies to develop Venezuela's reserves. The concern here on the democracy side is at the end of the year, Trump may actually forget about the question of free and fair elections. And I think that the idea is that military intervention really brings stability in the short term, but long-term, rarely does it actually work out. And this is usually where the United States stumbles.

Or they may have elections where, you know, Delcy Rodriguez is actually competitive against a member of the opposition. These are -- I think, is an area where this administration really needs to continue to focus on rights and freedoms in order to actually have a sustainable outcome.

But the theory of the case here is that they're going to bring in oil and gas companies to develop the oil market. I think the challenges are that this is something that won't see a payoff until perhaps when Donald Trump leaves office. Right now, you're having financiers that are going to be planning trips in March to try to look at investment opportunities.

But it's not just oil and gas as well. You have -- Venezuela has the largest gold reserves in all of Latin America. There hasn't been a formal survey, but there are estimated significant reserves of rare earth minerals.

And I think whoever manages the economics really manages the transition in this country. And the question is, again, will the -- will the United States focus on a democratic transition? As we know, in July of 2024, Edmundo Gonzalez won the election but was not allowed to take office.

Or number two, is this really going to be about the benefit to the United States? And I think that balance is going to be very hard to find. And potentially ensure whether Delcy Rodriguez is able to govern or whether others fill the vacuum.

ZAKARIA: Francisco, is there a big benefit to be had? As you pointed out there, you know, the regime is happy to cut the deal on oil and bring these companies in. It's the companies that seem more reluctant because they would have to make massive investments. Maybe the payoff is 10 years from now. And even the holy grail, the gold mine, I mean, the oil and gold mine may not be as large as people think.

I have been reading about how we have come to believe that Venezuela has the largest oil reserves in the world. Chavez made it up. Chavez tripled the oil reserves of the country, claiming that there had been -- you know, they had done some surveys.

Right now, Venezuela, I think, is the 21st largest exporter in the world, exporting one percent of the world's petroleum. Is -- what do you think are the prospects for a real oil bonanza here? FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH: Well, but forget about reserves. Venezuela was producing 2.5 million barrels a day essentially for the past 30 years. And over the course of the past decade, that went down and now it's producing less than a million barrels.

And there was mismanagement. There was corruption. And there were also U.S. sanctions. U.S. sanctions were a big deal.

The U.S. stopped Venezuela from exporting to the U.S., the western countries from importing inputs. My research has shown that it has had significant effect. There's a huge scope for recovery just by going back to what Venezuela normally did for the past 30 years.

And there's definitely some low hanging fruits. Some of them are going to take more investment. Well, obviously, if the president gets a lot of oil executives into the room, then the oil executives are going to ask for guarantees. They're going to ask for protection. They're going to ask for the U.S. to backstop the investment. That's part of the normal dynamics.

What worries me is not so much the long-term. This economy has huge scope for recovery. What worries me is the short-term. Trump is saying that he's going to run the Venezuelan economy. President Trump hasn't the faintest idea, nor does his advisers of how to run the Venezuelan economy.

Right now, Venezuela has not gotten a dime in oil revenues since the blockade was imposed by President Trump. You have food stocks are running dangerously low. You need an emergency plan for Venezuela.

You don't need to be -- I mean, you need to be thinking about the long-term, but you need to be thinking about how you get the world food program in there to solve the food scarcity situation, how you get humanitarian organizations, how the country regains access to the international monetary fund so that it regains access to its international reserves, and you get a stabilization plan in there.

If you don't get the short-term, this country is going to go back into hyperinflation. And this whole idea about a democratic transition is just going to collapse in the next few months.

ZAKARIA: And, Juan, just finally and quickly and all that will then lead to uprisings on the streets, right? Which the regime will crack down with the U.S. essentially blessing that crackdown, because now it's in bed with the regime.

GONZALEZ: That's certainly right. I mean, certainly Venezuela is not Iraq. It's not Afghanistan. Venezuela is Venezuela.

I think we need to realize that there are pseudo paramilitary groups that sometimes listen to the regime, sometimes do not. You have cartels to the east. And you have a -- in Colombia and in the border of the two countries, hardened fighters that have been specialized in urban warfare against the Colombian government, have been doing that for over 50 years. And the idea that oil and gas companies are going to come in and they're going to be benefit of a safe environment, I think, does not really have any bearing on reality.

[10:35:00]

I think the question is, can this administration do it without actually having boots on the ground? And that is -- I think that's the key question. I think it's highly unlikely.

ZAKARIA: All right. Gentlemen, thank you. That was super enlightening. Thank you.

Next on GPS, the Trump administration has amped up threats to another country, Denmark, about annexing Greenland. I will talk to the former Danish foreign minister next.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

ZAKARIA: President Trump amplified threats to annex Greenland this week, saying that he wants to make a deal either the easy way or the hard way. The remarks have sparked outrage not just in Greenland but in Denmark, which controls the territory, and all over Europe.

Joining me now to discuss is former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Jeppe Kofod. When you hear those words it's going to -- we're going to do this either the easy way or the hard way.

[10:40:00]

What do Danes -- what do you think that means?

JEPPE KOFOD, FORMER DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER: Well, of course, it makes everybody very nervous about what President Trump will do or could do. And thereby it's increasing pressure on the kingdom of Denmark, Greenland and Denmark. And that is not making the situation more safe or easy. And therefore, it's -- of course, something that feels very disrespectful to at least to Greenland.

ZAKARIA: Do you believe that if President Trump annexes Greenland, either by, you know, forcibly demanding it, wresting it out of control or, you know, some kind of military intimidation, maybe not even -- not quite a formal invasion, is that the end of NATO? Do you believe that Denmark would then -- you know, how would -- what would happen?

KOFOD: Yes, it will be the end of NATO. I mean, NATO is built on a very fundamental principle, of course, to defend the alliance from enemies outside NATO, but also internally to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and every NATO state.

And if, let's say, Trump will do what he maybe intends to do or kind of play with the words about taking Greenland, not excluding any means military, economic or whatever, and then, of course, it will be a gross violation of NATO and the North Atlantic Treaty. And de facto, I see that NATO will then be ending. I don't think he wants to do that, President Trump. I think he wants to increase pressure on Greenland and Denmark prior to the -- let's say, the offer that he will give Greenland and Denmark in the coming weeks and months.

ZAKARIA: And what do you think that offer will look like? Because it's -- to me, that's the puzzling question. Denmark has already negotiated that the U.S. can have, you know, as many military bases in Greenland as it wants.

The United States had, if you count all the weather stations, dozens and dozens of bases during the Cold War. It was the U.S. that shut them all down. I think there's one left now.

You know, it's hard to believe that all this pressure is being put for something that, as far as I can tell, Denmark would give the U.S. anyway if it just asked.

KOFOD: Yes. Yes, it's true. We have had the defense agreement since 1951. So, 75 years worked very well. And that means, in practical terms, that the U.S. can deploy the military means that they want to in Greenland. And they have now Pituffik Space Base, 150 military people there, maybe. But in the high days, they had more than 10,000 people and maybe 15 to 17 bases in Greenland.

And of course, Greenland and Denmark have said very clearly that they're very open to, of course, have more U.S. military in Greenland. And Denmark has decided in the recent years to really scale up its Greenlandic and arctic military footprint both Navy and also air and other type of defense.

So, if that is a discussion then it will be much more constructive how we can defend the security of the arctic and, of course, north America by being more present military. And I also think, frankly speaking, we should do more in that point. I mean, there -- Trump has a point in his first administration, but also now.

And NATO countries have said, well, we are willing and ready to do it. But forget this idea of taking over Greenland because Greenland is its own country, is its own sovereignty and territorial integrity. And it's only up to the Greenlandic people and nation what they want to do and what relations they will have to U.S. or Denmark or anybody else.

ZAKARIA: And, Ian, very quickly on that last point. Greenland has a prime minister. If you look at polls and if you look at what he's saying, they are fervently opposed to this. Presumably that you think that continues and will only grow if Trump threatens them more.

KOFOD: Yes. And it's -- I think the problem here is not only the formalities and the discussions. It's also the -- let's say, the emotional insecurity it creates. I mean, Greenlandic people, Danish people, we have been always very, very close allies to the U.S.

I was foreign minister in Trump's first term, first administration. And when he came with the offer to buy Greenland, that led to, I would say, after a good process of cooperation between United States, Greenland and Denmark, you know, expanding U.S. interest in Greenland from mainly military to also economic, political, reopening the consulate in Nuuk, that all benefited Greenland.

[10:45:09]:

And if you get back to that track then we can end this, I think, hopeless discussion over taking over Greenland because Greenland cannot be taken over. It's a sovereign country and it has to be respected like any other sovereign country in NATO.

ZAKARIA: Foreign minister, thank you so much. Always a pleasure. When we come back, drugs in Venezuela.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

ZAKARIA: For months, the Trump administration has said that its actions against Venezuela were about American security, accusing the Maduro regime of trafficking drugs into the United States.

[10:50:05]

Throughout Trump's second term, a central preoccupation of the administration has been foreign sources of illegal drugs brought into the U.S., particularly fentanyl. But is Venezuela a significant source of drugs coming into the country? Is there a connection between Venezuela and the fentanyl crisis?

Joining me to discuss this is David Herzberg, a historian of drugs at the University of Buffalo and the author of the book "White Market Drugs: Big Pharma and the Hidden History of Addiction in America."

Welcome, professor. So, let me ask you the question straight away. Is Venezuela a significant source of any of the drugs coming into the United States?

DAVID HERZBERG, HISTORY PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF BUFFALO: As far as we're able to tell, Venezuela is not a significant source or a source at all, actually, of fentanyl. And it does play a minor role in the cocaine traffic. And obviously cocaine does come to the U.S., but it's certainly not a significant player globally or in the U.S.

ZAKARIA: So, then let us start with understanding the drug crisis itself. What caused the fentanyl crisis in America?

HERZBERG: The fentanyl crisis in America started with the opioid crisis that people may remember, began with the overprescription and massive hyper sales and marketing of opioids in the United States starting in the mid-1990s and early 2000.

When communities that were flooded with pills like oxycontin, powerful opioids, when they began to experience an addiction crisis, authorities responded in the traditional American way with advice from the pharmaceutical industry, which is focus on the people who've become addicted. They called them abusers. They said the problems were their fault, and they said the solution should be to lock them out of what I call white markets. These are the legal medical markets that sell the drugs that viewers probably have in their own medicine cabinets.

So with things like prescription drug monitoring programs implemented in the states, people who were addicted to those pills began to be unable to buy them. So, you had a mismatch between supply and demand. You had a high demand for opioids, but the supply had been cut off.

They had an addiction, but they were unable to buy from the white market. So, they turned to those informal markets or illicit markets. But there wasn't anybody to sell to them. And that created a mismatch between supply and demand that drew in new players, new people who said, oh, we can profit from meeting that demand.

In this case, it brought in modernizers who brought synthetic precursors from China into factories in Mexico that could turn them into a finished product of fentanyl. These were folks who said, OK, wait a minute, this is the 21st century. We don't need to have big opium poppy farms and have people cutting open flowers to extract goo. And then this incredibly complex supply chain with all these moving parts that's very susceptible to policing. Instead, modernize in the 21st century, one, by getting a synthetic product. And two, by bringing the product to where people who want to buy it live.

ZAKARIA: So, would the answer be to this kind of thing, do you crack down with China? You crack down with Mexico, and that that would stop it?

HERZBERG: Well, if by crackdown you mean try to prohibit the supply chain, then the answer would have to be no. Because we've already seen when you successfully stop one source of supply without doing anything about the demand that just disrupts the market. Temporarily you may see a drop in supply but that's -- there's still money to be made, attracting new suppliers to step in.

The longer it goes on and the more desperate the consumer demand gets, the more money there is to be made. And in that disruption, there's a kind of a Darwinian competition, survival of the fittest, to see who's going to make the money, meeting that demand. And the people who win that kind of competition in an illegal market are not the kind of people you want to -- that you want supplying you a product that can be dangerous.

ZAKARIA: Yes. When you put it that way, it seems to me -- I think about the American war on drugs for decades, right? It starts in Miami, in "Miami Vice" and all that stuff. And then we crack down hard on the supply, and then it shifts to Panama.

So, we invade Panama, arrest its president. And then it shifts to Colombia. And then we spent 15 years helping the Colombians fight a war against the drug cartels. And it shifts to Mexico. And as you say, part of it has now shifted to China because it's synthetic. Is the only durable solution do something about demand?

HERZBERG: Demand has got to be part of the equation. Supply does too, by the way, but demand has got to be part of the -- part of the solution. Because let's get to the big question.

[10:55:01]

Why does drug trafficking exist in the first place? It's because of that mismatch between supply and demand. Reality is, there are a lot of people in America who want to use drugs outside the medical system, and it's essentially a system of incentives for drug traffickers to startup businesses to export these products to America.

So, it's a little bit -- it's not going to work to get rid of a particular actor who's involved a particular supply chain, but leave all the incentives still in place. We would expect people to continually respond to those incentives. That's what the whole system of capitalism is based around.

And so it would be irrational of us for -- to think, well, we can make it better by stopping this supply chain or that supply chain. You can have temporary wins, but it tends to -- in that moment of disruption tends to produce even worse supply chains run by even worse people, more violent, closer to home.

ZAKARIA: Professor Herzberg, thank you.

HERZBERG: Thank you for having me.

ZAKARIA: Thanks to all of you for being part of my program this week. I will see you next week.

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