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Fareed Zakaria GPS

Biden's National Security Advisor On Trump's War With Iran; Will War In Iran Embolden Russia? Aired 10-11a ET

Aired March 08, 2026 - 10:00   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

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[10:01:06]

FAREED ZAKARIA, CNN ANCHOR: This is GPS, The Global Public Square. Welcome to all of you in the United States and around the world. I'm Fareed Zakaria coming to you live from New York.

Today on the program, the U.S. and Israel's war with Iran is now eight days and eight hours old. We'll take a look at it from many angles, starting with an overview of the war and America's role in it with President Biden's National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan.

And the Kurds, their name is on everybody's lips, but just who are they and could they play a role in this war with Iran? I'll talk to an American diplomat who has been working with them for nearly 40 years.

Also, the U.S. has, by last count, struck over 3,000 targets in Iran. That is a lot of bombs, missiles, and other ordnance. America and its allies have also shot down thousands of incoming attacks. Will the Pentagon run out of munitions? Will Iran? I'll ask the economist's defense editor.

But first, here's my take. Regime change by jazz improvisation. That is how the respected scholar of Iran, Karim Sadjadpour, described the Trump administration's strategy in the war it has initiated with Iran. Sadly, it's the most accurate description of the scattered, shifting, and uncertain approach that emanates from Washington these days.

The President launched this war exhorting the Iranian people to overthrow their government.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

DONALD TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: It will be yours to take.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

ZAKARIA: Perhaps he had assumed that the regime would collapse instantly. But when it didn't, in a day or two, he changed course. He began musing about dealing with potential leaders within the regime and praising the U.S. intervention in Venezuela as the model to be followed. "Perfect."

Precisely because far from regime change, it only involved the arrest of two people. Pete Hegseth specifically denied that this was a regime change war, as did his senior aide, Avrish Kobe (ph). Both said the goal was merely to degrade Iran's military forces, many of which had been, "obliterated" last June in a 12-day bombing attack that included the use of stealth bombers.

But then, in a new twist, Trump reached out to Kurdish leaders in Iran and Iraq, promising them support if they would join the fight, presumably not to degrade Iran's military power, but to topple the government in Tehran, maybe even change Iran's borders. This weekend, however, the President backpedaled on this plan. Trump has also now proclaimed that there won't be a deal without unconditional surrender from Iran.

So, the goal isn't regime change, except when it is. The most dangerous element of this war, however, is not that the lead actor is improvising like a saxophone player. It is that the two countries waging the war have separate and perhaps incompatible agendas.

For Israel's Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, the war is clearly about destroying the Islamic Republic. In a video he released, he acknowledged that this war was the culmination of a 40-year-old dream. Israel's military strategy has been focused, brilliantly implemented, and aligned with their goal.

The Israeli strikes are decapitating Iran's leadership, destroying its military forces, striking its leadership compounds, even hitting police facilities. It is, as "The Wall Street Journal" reported, methodically destroying Iran's police state, leaving the regime ripe for a collapse. And on the current trajectory, Israel might well succeed in its objective.

And that will likely result in a power vacuum in the country, which could invite revolt, but will almost certainly result in a civil war. Keep in mind, whoever makes seek power, this regime will fight back. The appropriate analogy here is Syria, a country that was mired in a civil war for more than a decade, with hundreds of thousands dead and millions of refugees.

[10:05:22]

Iran is a country that could easily explode, as Tom Friedman has written. It's filled with ethnic groups, Kurds, Armenians, Azeris, with ties to neighboring countries. They've lived peaceably together, but as history demonstrates, from the Balkans to Iraq, when order collapses and a power vacuum develops, people retreat to their tribal groups and lose trust in others. And that's how a civil war begins.

What would fuel this war is the fact that Iran's government has a vast cadre of dedicated soldiers, armed to the teeth, who will fight against any new government or group. Its Revolutionary Guard is estimated to be almost 200,000 people strong, with an additional paramilitary force, the Basij, of several hundreds of thousands. And then there's the regular armed forces, which is around 400,000. Just as Saddam Hussein's army melted away after the American invasion, and then much of it reappeared as an insurgency, so too one could imagine the IRGC fighting in different garbs to deny any new government the ability to control the country.

In Libya, more than 14 years after Gaddafi fell, there is still no one group that controls the entire country. It's much easier to destroy a state than to rebuild one. For Israel, this is an acceptable outcome. It rids the country of its greatest foe, and if that produces chaos in Iran, so be it. The Syrian civil war actually improved Israel's security because it did not face a major Arab state dedicated to fighting it anymore.

But an Iranian civil war is not in America's interests, and it's not in the interests of America's closest Arab allies, who depend on the region being stable and predictable so that oil, goods, money, and people can flow freely and easily through it.

Washington needs to find a way to ensure that it secures the gains it has made in this war, a disarmed and defanged Iran, but without pushing the country into civil war. There are still ways to bolster the achievements and close out this war. As usual, Qatar could play a useful role as an intermediary.

But time is running out. At some point, this war will reach a tipping point, and no one will be able to control the spillover. Go to fareedzakaria.com for a link to my "Washington Post" column this week, and let's get started.

There's a lot to discuss. Let's get straight to it with Jake Sullivan. He was one of the key negotiators of the Obama administration's nuclear deal with Iran in 2015 that Trump pulled out of. More recently, he served as President Biden's national security advisor. He is also the co-host of a terrific new podcast called "The Long Game." Jake, welcome.

When you look at the situation right now, put yourself back in the White House and in the Situation Room, what are you seeing that encourages you, or what are you seeing that worries you?

JAKE SULLIVAN, FORMER U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR: Well, look, Fareed, on the encouraging side, the U.S. military is just simply remarkable. It's remarkable at being able to achieve tactical objectives, to execute operations with skill, professionalism, and courage. And that has been proven out here over the course of the past week.

But the discouraging part is we are asking the U.S. military to put itself in harm's way, and we've already lost six service members, pointed towards a completely unclear objective. The administration has not been able to say with any clarity whatsoever what the ultimate goal of this war is. And in fact, they've given perhaps a dozen different explanations, shifting by the hour by the day.

And here a week into the war, to have that level of muddiness, that muddle, I think is a huge challenge because it suggests that this war got launched without being fully thought through, and that the end of this war is something that we have no kind of core concept as to what it will bring or how the President will ultimately come out and say, OK, I'm done, I'm moving on. And that leaves us in an extremely precarious position.

ZAKARIA: Do you think, you mentioned the skill of the U.S. military, which really is extraordinary. I wonder whether the success of the Venezuela operation, the ability to extract these two people, Maduro and his wife, so seamlessly, in a sense gave President Trump too much confidence in using military force without thinking through that question of what is the strategy behind that tactical genius?

[10:10:24]

SULLIVAN: You know, it's interesting, Fareed, my co-host on the podcast, "The Long Game," Jon Finer and I wrote an op-ed in the New York Times shortly after the Venezuela raid, and in it we basically said President Trump is going to draw the wrong lesson from this. He's going to think we can use military force anywhere, anytime, for any purpose, and it will all work out just fine.

And we also pointed out that when you start using military force, the appetite grows with the eating. And I think President Trump saw that Maduro raid, saw what our special forces could do, looked to Iran and said, hey, let's try to put them to use there, too, but could not identify a clear set of objectives at the end of the day, and obviously could not identify an imminent threat to the United States, necessitating the launching of this war at this time in this way.

And so now a weekend, I think what they're doing is sitting in the Situation Room and basically saying, OK, what do we do? Should we just call it now? Do we have to get to full regime change? Do we have to actually put boots on the ground, as we've seen some reports they're considering? They're sitting around looking at one another and kind of shrugging their shoulders, and this, I think, is the core strategic problem of the conflict at this point.

ZAKARIA: And it really has widened in a way that frankly is greater than I would have guessed. The Iranians are, I mean, these are pinprick strikes, but they are affecting commerce. Daniel Yergin just wrote in the FT that this is the largest disruption in oil production and transport in history. What are you hearing from the region? You have -- you still have very, very strong contacts with the rulers of the Gulf and other Arab countries.

SULLIVAN: Look, the level of concern across the region, and you're right, I do speak with many people there on a daily basis, is sky high. But what these folks tell me is this was anticipated in a way, maybe not as broad, but the basic concept was anticipated.

Why? Put yourself in the shoes of the Iranian regime. You're getting pummeled by the U.S. and Israel. What are your options? Your best option from their perspective is to try to disrupt energy flows, to hit technology, to hit tourism, to hit finance.

And they're selecting their targets across multiple countries very clearly to achieve the result of imposing greater and greater economic pain on the entire world and on the United States. Why? With a goal to try to hasten the end of this war. Because the sooner this war ends, from their perspective, the better in terms of their ability to survive and to reconsolidate power.

So at the moment, this is basically a race between the U.S. trying to impose, and Israel trying to impose as much damage as possible. And I thought your opening comments were spot on in what Israel's trying to achieve here. And the Iranian regime trying to raise the price and the costs as high as possible.

And who's suffering? The world is. The American people are. Gas prices, for example, have jumped dramatically just in the last week and promised to go even higher. And this is all part of the strategy of a much weaker opponent playing the hand that they have. And that is something that the administration should have anticipated coming into it.

ZAKARIA: Yes, it seems to me if you launch a kind of existential war against Iran, don't be surprised if they have an existential response, which is, you know, we're just going to blow up everything we can because this is regime survival for us.

[10:13:57]

Anyway, stay with us, please. When we get back, I'm going to ask Jake Sullivan what this war means for Russia, for China, for America's adversaries, when we come back.

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ZAKARIA: I'm back with Jake Sullivan, who served as national security advisor in the Biden administration. Jake, when President Trump was asked what he made of the fact that Russia was now providing material intelligence support about targeting and information on where U.S. troops were to the Iranians, he said he thought that was a stupid question. I'm not sure I understand. If it turns out that Russia is actually participating, in a sense, in the war, isn't that a big deal?

SULLIVAN: Oh, it's a huge deal. And I think his answer kind of tells you everything you need to know, because he didn't want to answer that question. So he lashed back, and he didn't want to answer the question, because it raises a deeply uncomfortable truth.

Russia is an adversary of the United States. They're an adversary who, reportedly, is actually supplying intelligence so that Iran can pinpoint locations where U.S. service members are present or where U.S. capabilities like our most sophisticated air defense radars are present. And Iran has, in some cases, been able to hit those capabilities.

So this is a huge deal. And it's just one piece of the way in which Vladimir Putin is trying to take advantage of this war. He's looking at rising oil prices and seeing an opportunity to get cash for his war machine.

[10:19:59]

He's seeing the United States move all of its air defense interceptors to the Middle East and stop giving them to Ukraine. And so he's firing more missiles and drones at Ukraine, who has less to be able to defend itself. So as far as things go right now, one of the big winners in all of this is Vladimir Putin and Russia.

ZAKARIA: Yes, the oil prices have gone up. They've told the Russians they can now sell. They've told the Indians they can buy Russian oil. And as you say, the Ukraine battlefield is transformed. President Zelenskyy pointed out that the United States has fired 2,000 Tomahawk missiles in this, you know, eight days of the war. He has asked for 200 and was never given them. Air defenses are not available to him now because they've all been diverted.

As a kind of broader strategic issue, talk about the fact that we've gone from a war that we were supporting Ukraine in, which we kind of have to win, versus a war of choice here that we initiated without a clear purpose and without any provocation.

SULLIVAN: You know, it's really interesting because President Trump, from the very beginning, has basically blamed the Ukrainians for this war. He said at one point that it was the Ukrainians, not the Russians, who started it. He said it is the Ukrainians, not the Russians, who are the obstacles to ending it. And both of those things couldn't be further from the truth.

And at a critical point in the negotiations, at a moment when President Trump could have come in in massive support of Ukraine, with massive pressure on Russia to drive this to a just peace where the Ukrainians would finally know a just peace for themselves, President Trump decided instead to launch this massive adventure in the Middle East, leaving Ukraine with less to defend itself, leaving Russia with more money pouring into its coffers, and leaving Russia with an opportunity to work with Iran against the United States.

And meanwhile, President Zelenskyy, despite all of that, is trying to actually help America defend itself by offering up Ukrainian capabilities that have been honed over the last four years to shoot down Russian drones, Iranian drones, out of the skies. So we have one leader who is a great friend of the United States, who we should be supporting, and instead are castigating, another leader, Putin, who is a foe of the United States, who, in effect, we are rewarding by having launched this war of choice in the Middle East.

ZAKARIA: You've spent more time talking to the Chinese than I think almost anybody in recent decades. You've spent hours with Wang Yi, who is the kind of foreign policy supremo. What is the lesson you think China is taking from what's happening?

SULLIVAN: I think they're taking two major lessons, one a bit more tactical, one strategic and more long term. The more tactical lesson that they're taking is that they need to continue to take steps to shore up their energy supply. They're nervous about the fact that the Straits of Hormuz are closed right now, and they've gone out of their way to try to convince the Iranians to allow Chinese ships, unlike any other ship, to actually pass through the Strait of Hormuz unmolested.

And in fact, we've seen a couple instances of that happening. They're also trying to massively build up their petroleum reserve, their stockpile of oil in their country, and they'll keep doing that. But the larger strategic lesson that they're going to learn from this, Fareed, is that we're in a new era of geopolitics, where big countries who have, from their perspective, longstanding challenges can act with force without any reference to international law, without any reference to imminent threat.

And I think this is going to make them believe, over time, that they have a greater window to be able to use military force against Taiwan than they did before, and that the world will be less united, and the United States will be less resolved, and frankly, less well-postured to push back against them. And I think that is a hugely dangerous lesson for the Chinese to draw, but my guess is that's what Beijing is seeing right now.

ZAKARIA: Jake Sullivan, always a pleasure to talk to you. Thank you so much.

[10:24:23]

Next on GPS, Trump did a 180 yesterday on whether he wanted the Kurdish forces to join the war in Iran. Well, who are the Kurds, and what is behind Trump's change of heart? We'll explain when we come back.

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ZAKARIA: Many sources tell CNN that the CIA has been working to arm Iranian Kurdish militias in hopes of inciting an uprising in Iran. President Trump has been having discussions with Kurdish leaders and said on Thursday that it would be "wonderful," if the Kurds would consider an attack in Iran. But now he seems to have changed his mind.

Trump told reporters yesterday that the conflict is complicated enough without the Kurds getting involved. The Kurds, to remind you, are a mostly Muslim ethnic minority in the Middle East with significant populations in Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Armenia.

Joining me now to discuss the role of the Kurds in this conflict is former U.S. ambassador and a former informal adviser to the Kurdistan Regional Government in Northern Iraq, Peter Galbraith. Peter, welcome.

First, tell us what you can about why President Trump seems to have had a change of mind about encouraging the Kurds to join in this fight.

[10:30:07]

PETER GALBRAITH, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR: I think the principal reason he's had a change of mind is that the Kurds have declined to join the fight. The Iranian Kurds are based in Iraqi Kurdistan, which has been a de facto independent country since 1991. It has very good relations with the United States, but it is also Russia right next to Iran and has had reasonable relations with Iran. So, it would be at risk if an attack emanated from Iraqi Kurdistan and the Iranian Kurds are aware, as the Iraqi Kurds of America's history, a 51-year history of using the Kurds for military action and then betraying them.

It happened in 1975, again in 1991 when Bush Sr. called for an uprising and then didn't help. But then Donald Trump has been a serial betrayer of the Kurds. 2017, he permitted an Iranian backed Shia militia headed by a guy, a convicted terrorist, to attack the Kurds in the city of Kirkuk. In 2019, he -- he gave President Erdogan of Turkey a green light to attack the Syrian Kurds just months after they had been America's ally in defeating the Islamic State.

And then earlier this year, he cooperated, or the Trump administration cooperated with the new government in Syria in military operations against the Kurds.

ZAKARIA: So, their feeling is as some, I think I read somewhere, you know, America comes, America goes, but Iran stays.

GALBRAITH: That's precisely right.

ZAKARIA: And tell us a little bit more about the, you know, the nature of these minorities in Iran. You hear about the fact that Iran has a bunch of minorities, Kurds, Azeris, Armenians, but they've never really, as far as I know, kind of there are not a lot of armed ethnic insurgencies within Iran in its history.

GALBRAITH: That's right. There is. The Kurds have at times been an armed insurgency in 1979, when the Shah's regime collapsed, the Kurds rose up and really governmental authority collapsed and the Kurdish peshmerga of the fighters came in not large numbers, but there was not, they were still able to take over. There's been some military resistance, armed resistance on the part of the Baluch, who also been fighting in Pakistan and Afghanistan, like the Kurds there divided among three countries. But yeah, there's been very limited armed opposition. The most important is, has been the Kurds. But there are only about 4,000 Kurdish fighters, if that many.

And even if there was a collapse of authority in Iraq, in Iranian Kurdistan, it's very far from Tehran. It wouldn't topple. It wouldn't topple the regime.

ZAKARIA: So, in a way, the Iranian government might even say, look, if there is some small part of the periphery that gets taken over, we don't care. Iran is Tehran and Isfahan and those central cities.

GALBRAITH: Well, yes, I would doubt very much in this war that they would divert resources to a fight in Iranian Kurdistan. They would assume that this was a problem they could deal with later.

ZAKARIA: Peter Galbraith, thank you so much. You know so much about this and have such a long history with it. It was very valuable to get your thoughts.

GALBRAITH: Thank you.

ZAKARIA: Next on GPS. Will Iran's attacks on its Gulf neighbors change the geopolitics of the region? I'll explore that next.

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[10:38:28]

ZAKARIA: On Saturday, Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian apologized to Gulf neighbors for his country's assault on American bases there. But today he seemed to walk back the apology as Iran continued to strike the Gulf.

Earlier today, drones targeted a government building and fuel storage facilities in Kuwait. Bahrain reported attacks on a water desalination plant. A particular target has been the UAE, which until recently was an oasis of calm in a chaotic region.

Joining me now from that country is Mina Al-Oraibi, Editor-In-Chief of The National. Mina, a pleasure to have you on. What does it feel like where you are right now? Do you feel like there's still a kind of conflict raging?

MINA AL-ORABI, EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, THE NATIONAL: You know that there is a conflict raging in large part because of the alerts we get ahead of missiles and drones being launched from Iran towards the UAE. So, we get alerted. You hear the thuds of interceptions. The UAE military and armed services have been incredible intercepting over 90 percent of everything that has been launched at the UAE.

So, you hear the thuds, which of course is disconcerting. But for many people, there's also now the comfort of hearing the thud, knowing it's been intercepted. And then of course, we get an alert to say the all clears there and people get on with their everyday lives. There's a real sense of concern that what do the Iranians want to achieve? Because certainly the attacks have been on civilian targets also from airports through to just day to day targets that people did not expect. But in general, people feel also protected.

[10:40:12]

We had a message come out from the UAE President Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed, saying not only for the Emiratis of the people of this land, but also everybody who lives here, they are guests and a second family to the Emiratis. And so, there's been a real sense of camaraderie, people coming together, but also, of course, uncertainty.

ZAKARIA: And talk about that. The UAE is full of people who come from Lebanon, who come, you know, from the Palestinian territories, from other places. Are they, you know, is there a great deal of concern about, you know, the people in the region in general?

AL-ORAIBI: So, you know, it's quite interesting because in the UAE you have over 200 nationalities here, and different people are reacting to this differently from their own life experiences. But for those of us who come from other parts of the Arab world who have lived through different experiences of war, this feels much more in control and safer, frankly. Of course, you have Lebanese, Palestinians, Iraqis, Syrians, Yemenis,

where there's almost a sense of survivor's guilt that things are so well protected here. You know, we have all our basic and regular services running as is. And yet, of course, if you come from Lebanon or Palestine, I mean, Iraq has attacks from both sides of this conflict ongoing. You feel very privileged.

And there's also been a sense of the information flow has been incredible here in the UAE update. So people know what is happening, and yet there are many people who are concerned about families back in their home countries that don't have these privileges. So, it's a mixed bag.

There are people who are living here who have never gone through a sense of war or conflict. And of course, some of them are much more panicked than others. But I would say that this idea of those who come from the region feel a real sadness that there would be a targeting of the UAE. The UAE is a beacon for many people. It's a land of opportunity.

People have come here. If you even look at those who have been wounded from all different parts of the world. There's even been an Iranian that's been wounded by the Iranian strikes. Sudanese, of course, Emiratis, but also of different nationalities.

People have come to the UAE to make this their home. And as I said, the land of opportunity that is being targeted. Despite all the efforts not to be in this war, despite all the UAE efforts and other Gulf efforts to avoid us getting to a point of this regional war that we're witnessing now.

ZAKARIA: And Mina, when you think about it in those terms, who do you think people are blaming, Iran for the attacks or the United States and Israel for beginning the war?

AL-ORAIBI: I have to tell you, on the day that the war started, it was a Saturday morning, there was a real upset by people you spoke to that. Israel and the U.S. had gone for the military option despite hopes that negotiations could get some result. But very soon afterwards, as Iran started to strike the UAE and other Gulf countries, the rage and the sense of injustice really turned to Iran. Because the decision to target these countries comes at a point of almost let me burn everything in my pathway. That's how the Iranians are appearing to be at this end, at the receiving end of these attacks.

There's also a sense that the bombardment is quite random. They're trying to target whatever they can actually get to. And so there's a real sense of an attack on people's way of life and people's day to day life despite the efforts of the Gulf.

So, I would say there's much more anger towards the Iranian government for its dump. But, of course, there's a lot of concern that both Israel and the U.S. are changing what the actual aims of this war are and they've dragged this region into this war. Of course, the U.S. geographically doesn't end up paying the price that those of the region do. But also, there's a concern that Israel now with the attacks that are ongoing in Lebanon, of course, let's not forget what continues to happen in Palestine could be unleashed in a way that is bringing much more destruction and war across the region with open ended aims.

ZAKARIA: I only have about 30 seconds left, but I do have to ask you, does this change, you think, is this a permanent shift in geopolitics for the region? You know, because the UAE and Saudi have been trying to have a rapprochement with Iran. Is that all over, you think?

AL-ORAIBI: It will depend on how this war ends and what sort of regime remains or emerges in Iran. But for sure the trust deficit now is bigger than it has been for decades. So, there's concern about what Iran will be like as a neighbor once this war is over. But there are so many variables depending on how this war eventually will end.

ZAKARIA: Mina, what a pleasure to talk to you. Stay safe and thank you so much.

[10:45:05]

When we come back, the U.S. produces the most advanced weapons in the world. But does America have enough of them for an extended war in the Middle East? And what about Iran's arsenal? I'll explore that next.

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ZAKARIA: The U.S. Israeli bombardment of Iran has been dizzying, with the Americans striking nearly 2,000 Iranian targets in the first four days of the war alone, according to the Pentagon. President Trump has said that the U.S. has stockpiles of weapons that will allow it to continue its war, quote, unquote, "forever." But many say that key munitions, including American made interceptors that its allies use to defend against Iranian ballistic missiles, could be running low in the coming weeks. What does all this mean for America's ability to keep fighting?

[10:50:18]

Joining me now to discuss is Shashank Joshi, Defense editor at the Economist. Shashank, welcome. So, is President Trump, right? I mean, obviously there's a rhetorical flourish here, but does the United States have, you know, vast stockpiles that can last for weeks and weeks and weeks, maybe months?

SHASHANK JOSHI, DEFENSE EDITOR, THE ECONOMIST: Well, the United States has vast stockpiles, but it's also conducting expenditure on a vast scale. And so, I think while the President is right, that if you look at certain categories of weapons, particularly relatively short ranged GPS guided gravity bombs, yes, there is a pretty plentiful supply and we can get onto that.

But I think if you look at other categories of weapons, and here the two I would highlight are really long-range standoff munitions like the Tomahawk land attack missile and air defense interceptors, which are being consumed, or at least have been consumed in the early days of this conflict at a prodigious rate. Stockpiles are very much not unlimited. They are quite scarce.

And at current rates of depletion, which admittedly may not last, may change, you would begin to see issues arising within a period of weeks rather than a period of months. My concern is not that the U.S. runs out. My concern would be much more that actually the impact on the stockpile is reducing America's capacity to fight a protracted conflict, particularly with China in the Pacific, and that China will be aware of that and that this will have an effect on deterrence.

So, my concern is not an immediate crisis point in munitions availability. It is the long run impact on the ability to stay in the fight in the Pacific.

ZAKARIA: What about these air defense interceptors and particularly the allies, the Gulf states, are they running out of them? And when they're damaged, my understanding is some of these things take a long time to repair. I mean, this is not an interceptor. But I read about radars in Qatar that have been damaged that could take a year and a half or two to repair by Raytheon or Northrop Grumman at, you know, billions of dollars of cost.

JOSHI: I think you're absolutely right. We have two issues here. One of them is these exquisite radars which are of course fundamental to operating these extremely high-end air defense systems, notably the Patriot and the THAAD, the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense System. And we have seen evidence from satellite images that Iran has mounted some successful attacks on these early warning radars which puts the, effectively can put the entire battery out of action in some ways. But in addition to that, even if these systems are mostly intact, and they mostly are, I don't think Iran has put most of these out of action. You are still seeing huge consumption of the interceptors that take out the ballistic missiles.

We heard from President Zelensky of Ukraine, in fact that he was -- he estimated that in a few days the Gulf states and the United States had used up more Patriot interceptors than Ukraine had been given in the entire war to date. We know that annual production of these is very low, although the administration is trying its best to raise it aggressively. And we know that it is not easy to replenish these. But also, they are in very high demand elsewhere, particularly from Ukraine.

European countries have been trying to buy them for Ukraine and have been rejected and also from U.S. forces in Asia. So again, I'm not so concerned about interceptors running completely dry. What you would begin to see is rationing.

ZAKARIA: What about Iran? Is Iran running out of drones in particular?

JOSHI: I don't see any sign Iran is running out of drones or missiles. It had a pretty sizable stockpile of missiles. We don't know exactly, but the officials we speak to suggest upwards of 2,000 ballistic missiles, but perhaps an order of magnitude or more drones.

And of course these are The Shahed drones, Shahed 136 being the most recognizable, big sort of crude one way attack munition that we recognize from these Russian barrages against Ukraine. There are absolutely huge numbers of these. It is still the case though that these are being suppressed by American and Israeli airstrikes against launching positions, but I think Fareed more importantly against stockpiles and production facilities.

And so that's why if you looked at the comments made by General Dan Caine, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs, what we saw him say is that the launch rate of Iranian drones has also fallen in recent days by more than 70 percent. So, while the stockpiles may be sizable, I think Iran is having serious trouble actually just getting these things launched and up in the air without being detected and struck.

[10:55:16]

ZAKARIA: Shashank Joshi, Pleasure to have you on.

JOSHI: Thanks very much, Fareed.

ZAKARIA: And thanks to all of you for being part of my program this week. I will see you next week.

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