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Fareed Zakaria GPS

Interview with Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Interview With Carnegie Endowment Senior Fellow Karim Sadjadpour; Interview With American University In Cairo Former President Lisa Anderson; Interview With Center On Global Energy Policy At Columbia SIPA Founding Director Jason Bordoff. Aired 10-11a ET

Aired March 15, 2026 - 10:00   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

[10:01:03]

FAREED ZAKARIA, CNN ANCHOR: This is GPS, the GLOBAL PUBLIC SQUARE. Welcome to all of you in the United States and around the world. I'm Fareed Zakaria coming to you live from New York.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA (voice-over): Today on the program, as America, Israel and the Gulf States struggle to defend against attacks by Iranian Shahed drones, I have an exclusive interview with the leader whose country has extensive experience defending itself from them, Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY, UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT: We count on you and the Americans can count on us.

ZAKARIA: Then Iran elevated a new supreme leader, the son of the former supreme leader. I have a great panel to discuss what to expect from Mojtaba Khamenei.

Finally, this war has triggered one of the worst oil shocks in decades. But could oil really reach $200 a barrel? I will ask an expert.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA: But first, here's "My Take."

For around 15 years, many American leaders, including all three presidents in that period, have believed that the country was too deeply entangled in trying to reorder the societies of the Middle East. They felt the more pressing challenges were rebuilding America's industrial base at home and confronting the rise of China.

Yet here, America is once again fighting a war to reorder a society in the greater Middle East. And like Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, this seems unlikely to turn out quite as its proponents hoped.

Why does this keep happening? To understand the present, let's look at the past, at the only country

in modern history whose global reach matched that of the United States. Britain at the turn of the 20th century was the world's sole superpower. The British empire's share of global GDP reached roughly 25 percent in the late 19th century, about the same as the U.S. today. And London was the world's financial capital.

Britain had thwarted Napoleon's bid to rule the European continent and Russia's effort to expand more into southeastern Europe during the Crimean War. It presided over a vast empire that spanned the globe and set the agenda for international life, much as Washington does today.

Over the course of those decades, roughly from the 1880s through the 1920s, Britain found itself responding to instability, nasty regimes and power vacuums all over Asia and Africa. It sent troops and asserted control in places like Sudan and Somalia, Iraq and Jordan. These missions all seemed compelling at the time, but had the effect of keeping London distracted by an endless series of local crises in peripheral parts of the world, often at great cost.

The Iraqi rebellion of 1920 required more than 100,000 British and Indian troops, and tens of millions of pounds to put down at a time when the estimated total budget for education in Britain was roughly the same as the cost of that Iraqi excursion.

While British leaders passionately debated their strategy in Mesopotamia they fundamentally neglected the real economic and technological challenge that they faced. As Britain battled with tribes in the Middle East and Africa, across the Atlantic, the United States was quietly building the most advanced industrial economy the world had ever seen. In Europe, after World War I, a defeated Germany steadily rebuilt its industry and a highly mechanized military apparatus.

Britain, distracted by the chaotic periphery, was being systematically surpassed at its core. The result over time was that Great Britain collapsed as the world's leading power.

[10:05:09]

America today is at least as powerful as Britain ever was, but it is succumbing to some of the same imperial temptations. It responds to genuine crises in the Middle East. It sees a logic that is political, military and moral in responding. But ultimately grand strategy is about prioritizing finite resources.

The U.S. does not possess infinite political capital bandwidth, military capacity or economic resilience. Every airstrike on Tehran, every anti-drone interceptor shot over the Persian Gulf, and every hour administration officials spent debating the nuances of Iranian political succession is energy diverted from the true tectonic challenges defining the 21st century.

The primary, indispensable role of the United States is to anchor the global system against the revisionist ambitions of Beijing and Moscow. China is not getting bogged down in Middle Eastern quagmires. It is relentlessly investing in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, solar and wind, power batteries and robots. The technologies that will determine the balance of global power.

Russia remains fiercely committed to disrupting the European security architecture and undermining Western democracies through hybrid political military warfare that has proved hard to detect and even harder to defeat.

But while Moscow and Beijing challenged the basic architecture of America's world order, Washington is preparing once again to spend blood and treasure policing the Middle East, and trying to pick the leaders of one of its countries.

History suggests that great powers often succumb to the allure of small wars, precisely because they tempt the strongest nation to use its awesome military might and offer the illusion of quick political and moral victories. Unfortunately, these tactical successes rarely translate into strategic gains and more often serve as the first step toward long-term exhaustion.

Even if the intervention in Iran succeeds, it would require that America get deeply involved in the fate of that country.

Is that ultimately where America's time and energy would be best devoted over the next decade?

The lesson from Great Britain is clear. Great powers do not usually fall because they are conquered by foreign armies. They fall because they overextend themselves on the periphery while neglecting the core.

Go to FareedZakaria.com for a link to my "Washington Post" column this week. And let's get started.

One country that has played an unexpected role in the Iraq war is Ukraine. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said the U.S. and many Arab nations have asked Kyiv for help in fending off large scale attacks by Iranian Shahed drones. This is because Ukraine knows these weapons well. Officials in Kyiv say Russia has launched more than 57,000 Shahed drones at Ukraine since the war began in 2022.

Now, Ukraine is sharing what it's learned, sending experts to the Gulf to help bring these drones down. Here's my exclusive interview with Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA: President Zelenskyy, as always, a pleasure to see you again.

ZELENSKYY: Pleasure. Pleasure to see you again, too. Hi, Fareed.

ZAKARIA: So tell me, how worried are you that this war in Iran is going to divert attention and even resources from Ukraine? After all a lot of American made weapons were being bought by the Europeans and then given to you. Are you worried that these weapons will now all be diverted to the war in Iran? ZELENSKYY: Yes, of course we have big risks. I think so. And of

course, I think that we can have deficit with air defense, especially PAC-3, PAC-2, for Patriot Systems, for defending our sky. And you know, after such difficult winter, such massive attacks using Iranian Shahed, by the way 500 per day of Shahed, and dozens of ballistic missiles. And of course for us, it's very difficult, sensitive question. And of course, if the war will continue, of course we will have the -- with these challenges and the challenges will only increase.

[10:10:06]

ZAKARIA: Do you get -- do you have intelligence or any information about this report that the Russians are providing Iran with intelligence, specifically providing Iran with intelligence on where American troops are, where American assets are, so that the Iranians can strike and kill Americans?

ZELENSKYY: First of all, Russia gave drones already. The Shaheds. They are using Iranian licenses, you know, that they built and produced a lot of drones. They gave them. I have 100 percent facts that they -- that the Iranian regime used against American bases and against our Middle East -- in Middle East, I mean, Middle East neighbors of Iran, they used these drones. We saw intelligence shared with us some details and it was Russian details in these Iranian drones.

They said the first, and the second point is my intelligence told me next that they think that they share information, intelligence with Iranian regime. They helped them. And also they told -- my intelligence told me that they said if Europe and the United States can help Ukraine with intelligence in this war, it means that Russia can help Iranian regime. This is their point of view on this so it's a fact. And you see that it's not a big secret.

ZAKARIA: Now, you have been able to do something extraordinary. You've been asking for weapons from the West, but now you are providing weapons to the Gulf States and perhaps even to America, because Ukraine is very advanced in drone and anti-drone warfare.

Will that -- will you be able to afford to continue to provide these kind of weapons to Saudi Arabia and the UAE and the U.S.?

ZELENSKYY: So we've got messages from the United States. Also, I spoke with Emirates and Saudi, and we spoke also with Qatar and Jordan. And we understand what does it mean at the very beginning of the war when you are under big, massive attacks. We remember this and I said that we, with Americans, we are partners. We are ready to help Americans, and we are ready to help also Middle East allies.

So we are ready to help to save the lives of civilians. And I moved three big group of experts, military experts, from our army, and they will help.

ZAKARIA: Do you worry, though, that you still have not been able to persuade President Trump, it seems to me, because he tweeted out saying, "If America does not have enough weapons, it's because Joe Biden gave them all to Zelenskyy," and he compared you to P.T. Barnum.

It does seem that President Trump still has some anger or resentment toward Ukraine and even toward you personally.

ZELENSKYY: I don't know, Fareed. To be honest, I'm looking just to the facts. So what Middle East countries and American bases, what they need now, just to be in more strong security. So they need interceptors. It's drone interceptors. It's new technologies. It's our technology. So President Biden, we are thankful to America and bipartisan support, and to President Trump, but we never got drone interceptors from the United States.

So we never asked. It's just new technologies. But we've got Patriot missiles and we are thankful to America that we could get some missiles, but also at the same moment, I want to underline that Middle East partners had more missiles for Patriot than we've got from the United States and Europeans during all the war. They used more missiles. They used more than 800 Patriot missiles during first attack, during first 24, 36 hours. So more than we had during all the months.

But when we speak how to close the sky, I mean, we gave what we had, and what our American friends, they don't have, or European friend they don't have.

[10:15:04]

I mean, such a big system of these experts. They have more other things very strong things, but not this. And Middle East countries asked us exactly about this.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA: Next on GPS, Ukraine says it has retaken control of a portion of Eastern Ukraine. I'll ask President Zelenskyy about these gains when we come back.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

ZAKARIA: As the Iran war captures the world's attention, Ukraine has now entered its fifth year of defending itself against Russian aggression.

More now of my exclusive interview with Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

[10:20:06]

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA: Let me ask you about the situation in -- between Russia and Ukraine because the reports that I'm hearing from the ground are that Ukraine is now gaining territory for the first time in two years, in the area around Zaporizhzhia. Can you tell us a little bit about this? And if so, what has changed that has allowed Ukraine to now start taking back some territory from Russia? ZELENSKYY: Fareed, Russia prepared new big offensive operation and

they wanted to begin it at the end of last year. And to continue it spring this year and they prepared this operation. We -- it was our counteroffensive steps, parallel steps. And so we wanted to do it not to give possibility Russia to attack us massively on the battlefield. So we began the operation at the end of the year, and we got back control on 434 kilometers and it was successful story not only about the land because, you know that this is not about the land, it's more about people and it's more about how to destroy the big offensive operation on Russia.

So, and these steps been very successful and it's all about -- not only about our steps on the battlefield, it's also about our drone tactics, about our projects of drone and drone operations. So Russia began to lose 30,000, 35,000 people per month because of drones, because of FVS and other drones, which we used on the battlefields. It's not deep strikes. It's all about our forces, our army.

So we prepared for the offensive operations, destroyed their operation and destroyed so many -- so many Russian soldiers.

ZAKARIA: You mentioned recently that the Russians seem to have backed off from peace talks. The Americans suggested holding them in America. The Russians are saying they want them in Europe. Do you think this is a -- is this a signal that the Russians now think maybe with the price of oil going up, maybe with America distracted in Iran, they don't need to even try to pretend that they're engaging in peace talks?

ZELENSKYY: First of all, they never want it, you know, it's my opinion. I'm sharing just my opinion. I know that my colleagues from the United States and they -- sometimes they have different views, but we are partners. I mean, we share very openly what we think about it. So Putin never wanted to stop the war. They've been afraid of steps of President Trump and pressure from America that's why he played this game that he wants negotiation.

And I still sure that America has to make big pressure on Putin, otherwise he will not negotiate. He wants only ultimatums from us that we have to withdraw from our territory. But he will not end with this. No, no, it's not enough for him. Of course, this situation in Iran gives him more money. And the process of taking off the sanctions, these new sanctions policy, also helpful for him personally.

And that's why of course it gives more sure to Putin that he can continue the war. And we will see. Now we are asking our partners from the United States that we have to fix the date of trilateral meeting. We always supported this format, supported President Trump and his team. Now the American side postponed because of Iran, postponed the meeting. But if we really want to stop the war we need to meet, we need to meet on tactical groups.

We need to meet on the level of leaders. We need more pressure on Russia. If we will not do these steps, we will not be closer to the peace.

ZAKARIA: President Zelenskyy, always a pleasure to talk to you, sir. Thank you.

ZELENSKYY: Thank you very much, Freed. Thank you. And thanks very much to American people whom -- who stay with us and we stay with you. Yes, we count on you and Americans can count on us. And we are ready in the Middle East. We are helping not because we are waiting something from American side. By the way, I just wanted to tell you and just to tell people, because I know that these soldiers, I mean they have family. They have they have children or if they are very young, I mean, their children, their children for their parents.

[10:25:03]

So of course we remember what America made for Ukrainians all these years. But it's not about money. It's not about weapon. It's just because of our relations. And we are sharing the same values. That's why we wanted -- we wanted just to help so you can count on us. If we can help more, we will.

ZAKARIA: Thank you again, sir. Thank you.

ZELENSKYY: Thank you so much, Fareed. All the best. Good luck.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA: Next on GPS, President Trump said this week that the war in Iran would end when, quote, "I feel it in my bones," unquote. What will it actually take to end it? We'll dig into that.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

ZAKARIA: The war in Iran has now entered its third week, and there are at least three weeks to go, according to the Israeli Defense Forces. As for America's side of the war Donald Trump told NBC News that Iran wants to make a deal, but he's not interested because the terms aren't good enough yet.

Joining me now is Karim Sadjadpour, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment focusing on Iran and U.S. foreign policy, and Lisa Anderson, professor of International Relations at Columbia and a former president of the American University in Cairo.

Karim, so explain to us what Iran is thinking right now as best you can tell. Because they seem to have gone for this widen the war strategy, attacking a whole bunch of Arab countries, mostly in the Gulf, even places like Dubai, where a lot of Iranian money is laundered and runs through. Is this a kind of blow it all up strategy?

KARIM SADJADPOUR, CNN GLOBAL AFFAIRS ANALYST: I think so, Fareed. This is a regime which came to power in 1979 by taking American diplomats hostage, and they've now taken the global economy hostage. And their game is, obviously, to divide American public opinion, turn American public opinion against this war by spiking the price of oil and asking Americans to ask the members of Congress and President Trump, how on earth have we gotten into another conflict in this region?

And destroying things is very easy. You know, these economies in the Gulf, they are spending trillions of dollars on transport and A.I. and other kinds of technology. And Iran has come by with $20,000 drones and threatened their existence.

ZAKARIA: So when you look at that issue, Lisa, the way in which Iran has been attacking the Gulf states, is it a miscalculation? Because it seems to me that what the Iranian strategy was will attack the Gulf states, they will run to Washington and say, stop this war.

In fact what's happened is the Gulf states have become increasingly incensed at Iran and are in some way giving the United States and Israel a kind of legitimacy to wage the war.

LISA ANDERSON, FORMER PRESIDENT, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO: I think that's true at least in the short run. I think one of the strategies for Iran is also, of course, to keep this going for a long time. That makes it more expensive for the world, and it makes it more expensive for all of the Gulf states as well.

So, if it had been as the Trump administration and the Netanyahu government clearly thought it would be, quick, then it was a miscalculation. But over the course of time, it doesn't seem unlikely that many of these countries will start pressuring the United States to say, you know, we've had enough. This is too hard now.

ZAKARIA: Because for places like Dubai, the instability is killing the entire raison d'etre.

ANDERSON: All of the -- exactly. All of the promises that this was a stable, open, easy place and so forth, obviously, have evaporated. So, the oil and gas producers are unhappy. And the sort of business community is unhappy. This is -- this is hard to sustain for a long time.

ZAKARIA: What do you think it tells us about Iran that Mojtaba Khamenei was appointed, elected? It feels to me like this is almost like a coup by the Revolutionary Guard. The guys with the guns are now in power. He was their candidate. What is -- if A -- would you go in B? What does it mean?

SADJADPOUR: I agree 100 percent. The Revolutionary Guards are the main power in Iran and they have closed ranks around the son of the supreme leader. And this is a regime which has gone back to original principles.

If you read the maiden speech of Mojtaba Khamenei there was no new ideas. It wasn't -- he didn't once use the word modernity. He used the word martyrdom and resistance something which a majority of Iranian society is not interested. And that's the ideology that's gotten Iran into this mess.

And I don't expect, Fareed, that he is going to be a powerful leader like his father, who ruled for 37 years. You know, Lisa's one of the great scholars of North Africa and wonderful observation, which in North African scholar made in the 14th century, Ibn Khaldun, that empires are built and destroyed over three generations. First generation are the builders. Second generation, consolidate. Third generation squander. I don't -- Mojtaba Khamenei is a third generation leader of this Islamic Republic. I don't expect he's going to be anything more than a transitional figure.

ZAKARIA: All right. We'll talk about where this conflict goes and where it could widen when we come back.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[10:39:00]

ZAKARIA: And we are back with Lisa Anderson, professor of International Relations at Columbia, and Karim Sadjadpour, who focuses on Iran and the Middle East for the Carnegie Endowment.

Lisa, you heard in the earlier segment, we were talking about how Israel says, we're three weeks in, but we have three weeks to go. What that means is not only will they totally destroy Iran's military capacity and they're destroying the factories where weapons are produced, they're also destroying Hezbollah root and branch. What is the -- what is the Middle East going to look like? And how are the Arabs going to view Israel or countries like Saudi Arabia at this moment?

ANDERSON: Well, look, I think one of the things that the region had been characterized was a sort of balancing between Iran and Israel from the point of view of the Arab countries. In the absence of Iran, Iran decimated in the way the Israelis say that they're going to be able to do, then you have an Israeli hegemony in the region which isn't, I think, exactly what people calculated.

[10:40:06]

Even the Gulf countries, even the Abraham Accords' members didn't particularly see the region as having only one hegemonic power or aspiring hegemonic power. So, I think it's going to be very complicated because, you know, when you have Israeli officials saying they're going to do in southern Lebanon what they did in Gaza, when the guns stop, if there's that kind of devastation also in Lebanon which is in a sense not a combatant, I think, there's going to be a very -- you know, a sort of heart rending conversation within the Arab world about where they want to position themselves.

ZAKARIA: And if this bombing continues, Karim, is it possible that you can -- you can get some kind of weakening of the regime that then over time maybe leads to regime change? It feels to me, I find it difficult to imagine, no matter how unpopular the regime, that when a foreign power is bombing you that the population will suddenly revolt. You know -- I mean, that does tend to produce a kind of rally around the flag.

SADJADPOUR: Iran is a deeply polarized society. It's not polarized 50/50. I would say it's probably polarized 20/80. I don't think the regime has more than 20 percent popular support. But for dictatorships to survive, you don't worry about the breadth of your support. You need the ruthless devotion of a small minority.

ZAKARIA: Right.

SADJADPOUR: And this regime's -- the ruthless devotion of the minority in Iran has been reawakened by this and as they say there's no factions in foxholes. You know, it's a regime fighting for its survival. It showed last January it's willing to kill tens of thousands of people to stay in power. And I think they're going to continue to have their fingers on the trigger for the foreseeable future.

ZAKARIA: And the more that this kind of bombing devastates the economy -- I mean, the thing -- what I noticed about Syria was civil society is very difficult to build and to flourish in that situation. The guys with the guns usually win, right?

SADJADPOUR: You know, we know from history that revolutions tend to happen, not when populations feel most destitute, but when their lives are actually starting to improve, their expectations rise, and then those expectations are unfulfilled. It's what they call the J-curve theory.

In Iran now we have a population that's been traumatized by its own regime. And now this war has devastated society. This is a snapshot of today. Six months from now it could be different. But at the moment it doesn't seem to me this is a population which is eager to mobilize again, despite the fact they hate the regime.

ZAKARIA: Lisa, do you think President Trump could declare victory and leave? What would that look like? I mean, this is the off-ramp. I think so many in the business community hope he's going to take.

ANDERSON: The problem is that there are two other actors here. So he can say, we don't want to do this anymore. And the Iranians can say, well, then we won. Or he can say, we don't want to do this anymore. And the Israelis would say, well, we're not finished.

So, I think the problem for Washington is really how you work with the allies, obviously, the Israelis, and to some extent the Gulf states, and try and figure out a way that means you can tamp this down without giving the opportunity for the Iranian regime to say, they all chickened out.

ZAKARIA: At the end of the day for the Iranians, survival is winning, right?

SADJADPOUR: That's the famous Kissinger --

ANDERSON: Right.

SADJADPOUR: -- quote, that when a great power is fighting a guerilla fighter, the great power loses by not winning, and the guerrilla fighter wins by not losing. For this regime, what's paramount to survival, and for them this could be a propaganda victory.

I just say that we all agree, probably, that Trump began this as a war of choice. But now, I think, reopening the -- preventing the regime from taking the global economy hostage is now a war of necessity.

ZAKARIA: But the problem is, how do you fight it?

SADJADPOUR: How do you fight it?

ZAKARIA: Because the more you escalate, the more they escalate.

SADJADPOUR: Yes.

ANDERSON: Exactly.

ZAKARIA: Lisa, Karim, pleasure to have you on. Next on GPS, the Iran war has sent shockwaves through the global economy -- through global energy markets. Which countries are most exposed and which ones actually benefit? That's next.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[10:49:04]

ZAKARIA: The largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market, that was the International Energy Agency's blunt assessment this week as the war continues to fuel an escalating energy crisis. For more on what's next, I'm joined by Jason Bordoff, who served as a top energy policy official in the Obama White House. He's now the founding director of the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University.

Jason, you were very prescient. Early on you said this is going to be the biggest energy crisis. This oil is going to go above $100 a barrel. So, I'm going to do something difficult which is now tell you -- tell me where oil prices go from here and why.

JASON BORDOFF, FOUNDING DIRECTOR, CENTER ON GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY AT COLUMBIA SIPA: Well, I'm worried we haven't seen anything yet is the answer to your question. And I think the great interview you just did with Lisa and Karim explained the reason for that. People know the basics. By now, 20 percent of the world's oil supply flows through the Strait of Hormuz.

[10:50:00]

Twenty percent of the world's liquefied natural gas, most of that is offline, has been disrupted. So, that's about 15, 16 million barrels a day. We saw the largest ever release of strategic stocks from International Energy Agency countries, 400 million barrels, and oil prices went up the day that they did that, because you can only put a few million a day into the market.

There is no policy response large enough to deal with the loss of oil supply this large. And I think we saw an attack on Kharg Island on Friday, not the energy part, the other part. Trump went on social media yesterday and asked allies and adversaries to send warships to help reopen the strait, suggesting we don't have a lot of other good options right now. And if you don't get the strait reopened, oil prices are just going to keep going up from here. ZAKARIA: Oil is not just about gas at the pump, right? I mean, we use petroleum products for everything.

BORDOFF: Oil is used in a lot of products and petrochemicals in particular. And the Strait of Hormuz is central to not just oil but to liquefied natural gas, to fertilizer, to petrochemicals, to metals. We just saw overnight that Bahrain shut one of the largest aluminum smelters in the world. Aluminum prices have gone up about 10 percent. A third --

ZAKARIA: Fertilizer prices up like 70 percent.

BORDOFF: Yes. And about a third of the world's seaborne fertilizer trade and all the products associated with it, sulfur, urea, ammonia, those have all seen prices go up 30, 40 percent or more.

ZAKARIA: A lot of people say Russia is the big winner here. Would you agree?

BORDOFF: I think so. I mean, I think Putin -- we're seeing estimates of about $150 million a day in additional revenue. They're selling oil that was stranded because of sanctions. They couldn't get it to market. They're getting a higher price for every barrel they sell.

We may see more interest from countries like China to do business with Russia and build a natural gas pipeline between the two countries. But to be clear, Russia is really constrained in its ability to increase oil production in the long term, because we've really seen a lot of degradation because of sanctions and Ukrainian attacks to the Russian oil industry.

ZAKARIA: And what about China? China is the -- I mean, it does import a lot of oil, but where does it sit here?

BORDOFF: Somewhere in the middle, I think. I think it is -- half of its oil imports come through the Strait of Hormuz, a third of it is LNG. So, it is going to feel pain with higher prices, just like we all do.

But there is a way in which this crisis kind of validates the energy security strategy that China has pursued for the last 20 years. China has tried to reduce its imports of oil and gas. More of its economy is electrified. It has a strategic stockpile of 1.5 billion barrels. While the U.S. has been selling off our strategic stockpile thinking we don't need it anymore.

And if the rest of the world, like say in Europe, wants to reduce imports of oil and move toward a more electrified economy, what do they need? They need batteries, they need EVs, they need critical minerals, they need solar panels, all of which comes from China.

ZAKARIA: So, we've talked about the degree to which all of this is, you know, what happens if somehow the this continues. What if it does go on for three weeks? The Israelis continue to bomb. And three weeks later, President Trump finds an off-ramp. At that point can this all be unwound and stuff starts flowing and the price of oil and it turns out to just be a one month long disruption?

BORDOFF: It takes time. I mean, as we said before, this is everything. It's not just oil. It's LNG and petrochemicals. The global supply chains are in chaos right now. The insurance has been canceled. All the ships need to be repositioned. It's going to take months to sort itself out.

We've seen about 7 or 8 million barrels a day of oil supply in the Gulf that has been shut in. They have nowhere to store it anymore and they can't export it so they stopped producing. It can take a couple of weeks to bring that supply back online.

And then there's a question about the long term implications and whether countries around the world are going to look differently at the reliability of supply through the Strait of Hormuz, and think differently about the energy choices that they might make.

ZAKARIA: President Trump has threatened to, you know, bomb Kharg Island, not just the -- the whole thing, you know, the energy producing part. Am I right that that's kind of a hollow threat? Because if you do that then oil really will go to $200 a barrel.

BORDOFF: Well, I think it's the reason on Friday the president said we attacked Kharg Island, but not the energy part. So, Kharg Island is the critical piece of energy infrastructure for Iran. And Iran has long said, if you target that, we will retaliate on other energy infrastructure in the region.

And we should remember that for all of the price spike we've seen so far, energy infrastructure in the region has mostly been spared physical attack. So, your question of how long this could go on if we see an attack on Kharg Island and the Iranians retaliate with an attack on a key Saudi facility like Abqaiq, then you have damage that could take months to repair.

ZAKARIA: What would -- what would it take to get oil to 150 and for it to stay there, those kind of attacks?

BORDOFF: Those kind of attacks and the strait remaining closed. Again, if you have most of that supply, say it's 15, 16 million barrels a day, a little more, a little less, there is no way to deal with a supply disruption that large. And I think oil prices, as long as the strait remain closed when markets open tonight and every day after, unless people see an off-ramp coming, we're just going to see oil prices continue to march upward.

[10:55:06]

ZAKARIA: And is it fair to say that -- not just China, when every country looks at this, they're going to say, we need to diversify more into solar. We need to diversify more into wind. It's become a kind of energy security argument.

BORDOFF: There's a potential for that. I don't want to overstate it. We said that after the attacks in 2022 that Europe would move away. And mostly what they did was reduce gas use through de- industrialization and buy more natural gas from the United States.

But it is worth remembering that the largest reduction that we ever saw in fossil fuels as a share of the economy came in the decade after the Arab oil embargo, not the decade after the Paris Agreement. And energy security can be a much more powerful driver to make governments move than climate can. And that's why you might see import dependent regions like Europe move more toward electrification and then domestic sources of electricity like renewables or nuclear.

ZAKARIA: Jason Bordoff, that is very, very interesting smart conversation. Thank you so much.

BORDOFF: Thank you.

ZAKARIA: Thanks to all of you for being part of my program. I'll see you next week.

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