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Fareed Zakaria GPS

Trump's Strategy In Iran; Europe's Reaction To The Iran War; How Iran Sees The War. The State Of Iran's Nuclear Program; How Iran's History Shaped The Modern State; Iran's More Important Revolution? Aired 10-11a ET

Aired April 05, 2026 - 10:00   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

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[10:00:50]

FAREED ZAKARIA, CNN ANCHOR: This is GPS, the global public square. Welcome to all of you in the United States and around the world. I'm Fareed Zakaria coming to you live.

Today on the program, in a primetime address to the nation this week, President Trump said the war was nearing completion but threatened to bring Iran back to the Stone Ages where they belong. He scolded allies for inaction and said Americans would soon be free of Iran's nuclear blackmail. What should the world make of this messaging? And what is the path out of the conflict? I'll talk to Richard Haass, Zanny Minton Beddoes, and Ali Vaez about Trump's speech and all that has unfolded since.

Plus, Trump repeatedly said Iran had been a threat for 47 years. We'll talk to a British-Iranian historian about why Iran's history can help us understand what is happening today.

But first, here's my take. Well into the second month of the U.S.- Israeli war, it is worth taking stock of where things stand. Here's what things look like in Iran and its neighborhood before the war began in late February. In June 2025, Iran's nuclear enrichment facilities had been, in President Trump's words, completely and totally obliterated by 12-day bombing campaign by U.S. and Israeli forces using American stealth bombers and 30,000 pounds bunker busting bombs. The head of Israel's Defense forces agreed with Trump saying, "We have set Iran's nuclear project back by years and the same goes for its missile program."

That conclusion was reiterated by Israel's Atomic Energy Commission, which added that the achievement can continue indefinitely as long as Iran did not get access to nuclear materials and that access was actively being denied. Iran's military capabilities had been substantially weakened by separate Israeli air campaigns in 2024 which killed key Revolutionary Guard leaders, destroyed air defenses and struck ballistic missile facilities. Israel also heavily bombed Iran's most deadly militia ally, Hezbollah, killing several layers of its top leadership and by many analyses, crippling the military strength of the organization. It had already taken apart Hamas in Gaza. Finally, Israel's campaign against the Iran backed militias that supported the Syrian government played a part in the collapse of that regime in December 2024.

In other words, Iran was in very bad shape militarily. In addition, its economy was a mess, destroyed by the tightening of sanctions and its own corrupt regime. Hardly anyone could argue that Iran posed a threat to its neighbors, let alone to the United States, which sits roughly 6,000 miles away. Donald Trump effectively admitted this on Wednesday.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

DONALD TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: We don't have to be there, but we're there to help our allies.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

ZAKARIA: It's worth noting that none of America's European or Asian allies were consulted, and many have spoken out against the war. In fact, reports suggest that Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu sold Trump on this war not because Iran was an imminent threat, but because its unprecedented weakness provided an opportunity to strike hard to effect regime change. Why else would Trump have closed his brief announcement at the start of the war by urging the Iranian people to rise up and overthrow the regime, a call echoed by Netanyahu in his own message?

So far, aside from devastating Iran and crippling its already weak military, which was predictable in such a one sided contest, few of the desired results have been achieved. The regime has not fallen. Key leaders have changed for the worse. The 86-year-old Ayatollah Khamenei, who famously banned the development of nuclear weapons, was killed and replaced by his son, who is said to be more hardline than his father. In general, the Revolutionary Guards, who have always been more militant, seem to be ascendant, which makes sense in times of war.

[10:05:14]

The Strait of Hormuz, which was free and open despite many threats through 47 years of U. S.-Iran tensions, is now blocked by the new leadership, whom Trump terms much more reasonable. President Trump says that after a few more bombing runs, the strait will open naturally because Iran will want to export its own oil. This misreads the situation. The strait is not closed. It is open to Iranian oil, which is flowing freely, especially to China.

The net result of the war is that Iran now makes about twice as much on its daily oil sales compared to before the conflict. In addition, if it continues to charge a reported $2 million per passing ship, Tehran will make hundreds of millions of dollars in additional revenue every month, enough to rebuild its military and more. America's Gulf allies now face a far more unstable and tense environment than they did before the war. Their business models require peace, stability and economic integration. Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had mended ties with Iran in 2023, but because he wanted to calm geopolitical waters to pursue his ambitious program of modernization.

Today, all that progress is in jeopardy as oil exports are crippled and the region has gone from having a path to be an oasis of stability rather than a cauldron of conflict. The obvious winner is Russia, which would make billions of extra dollars every month as the price of oil rises and America waves sanctions against it. Ukraine loses as weapons it needs are diverted to the Middle East. Europe loses as it faces crushing energy costs, and Trump demands that NATO fight his war and threatens to pull out of the organization if it doesn't. It's worth noting that NATO is a defensive alliance and did not fight in the wars in Korea, Vietnam or Iraq. China gains as America gets mired in another Middle Eastern conflict and loses its focus on Asia.

Meanwhile, Beijing's massive investments in green technology shield it from many of the costs of this war, and it appears to the world as a more responsible, less disruptive superpower. Of course, things could change. Wars are unpredictable. But so far, has any American military action ever racked up so many costs for so few gains? Go to faridzakharia.com for a link to my Washington Post column this week, and let's get started.

Today we saw an end to a dramatic search and rescue operation deep inside Iran. It began on Friday after Tehran shot down a U.S. F-15 fighter jet. And this morning, President Trump announced U.S. Special Forces had rescued a missing service member in a high stakes mission. Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic continued its attacks on the Gulf this weekend, hitting further energy targets. I'm joined by Richard Haass, the president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, and Zanny Minton Beddoes, the editor-in chief of the Economist.

Richard, the American forces were able to do something extraordinary, really quite spectacular. But what the president is now asking them to do next appears to be to bomb the basic energy infrastructure, power plants that provide civilians with energy. That has traditionally been considered a war crime, and it's certainly on plain reading is a violation of the Geneva Convention. What do you think of this idea and could it -- is it possible U.S. military personnel who are told not to follow illegal orders might have some qualms about actually executing an order like this?

RICHARD HAASS, FORMER DIRECTOR OF POLICY PLANNING, U.S. STATE DEPT.: Well, several things there, Fareed. First of all, you're right. The rescue mission was operationally extraordinary and it's consistent with this war where the operational capabilities of the U.S. military have been -- have been phenomenal. But all that said, it doesn't necessarily mean the United States is winning the war strategically. There's a strong argument we are not.

What you raise is the idea of going after infrastructure. I think it does raise fundamental legal questions, also raises real policy questions, because what Iran has shown is its willingness and ability to respond in kind against the water plants, the energy infrastructure of all of its neighbors. Whether individual soldiers would balk, I think that's unlikely simply because there are those making the argument that because energy, for example, somehow contributes to military activities or leadership activities, my guess is it's in something of a gray area. But this is the responsibility of the commander in chief and the kind of post that the president put out on Truth Social, which really raises fundamental questions about his judgment and then urging these kinds of attacks. Again, I would think this does the opposite of reassuring our partners and allies, and I don't think it intimidates Iran.

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ZAKARIA: Let me just read for those who have missed it. This is a Trump tweet that Richard is referencing, and it says, and I am now quoting, and there is explicit language, but I am quoting the president of the United States. "Tuesday will be power plant day and bridge day all wrapped up in one in Iran. There will be nothing like it. Open the fucking strait, you crazy bastards, or you'll be living in hell.

Just watch. Praise be to Allah."

Zanny, when you -- when you listen to this, the question I have in a way is the problem Trump seems to have found himself in is anything he does to punish Iran is almost certainly going to raise the price of oil because Iran will respond to energy infrastructure in the Gulf because they will keep the Strait of Hormuz closed. That is close to non-Iranian oil. So it feels as though Trump has sort of backed himself into a corner, assuming the Iranians will absorb pain, which they seem willing to do.

ZANNY MINTON BEDDOES, EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, THE ECONOMIST: Absolutely. I mean, the first thing to say is I was shocked hearing you read that post as I was reading it myself. And it is -- I mean, and I use this word advisedly, it sounds unhinged. That that is the President of the United States, is just profoundly shocking. And I think we've all become somewhat inured to statements by the president of the United States.

But even by his standards, that was very shocking. And I wasn't surprised when I looked on my phone just a few minutes ago to find several people asking whether this was actually real. So I think, you know, let's just take a breath about the kind of language being used by the president. But yes, you're absolutely right. I think this is a mark of his frustration and his frustration with a situation where Iran clearly has the upper hand in strategic terms because he has no good options, President Trump.

If he tries to escalate, it is likely that Iran, which has already shown that it will escalate itself, will damage more oil installations, the price of oil will go higher. If he somehow declares victory and moves away, then the straits are likely to stay closed. And so right now this is a very difficult situation and one where I think the president of the United States is showing us just how frustrated he is. But if those threats were to be carried out, I don't for a second think that it would do anything other than increase Iran's resolve to maintain the straits being closed.

ZAKARIA: Richard, so then how does this resolve itself? Because let's assume that, you know, there isn't a kind of totally dramatic escalation where you have a complete free for all, but Trump decides to do more bombing and then just quits in, say 10 days or two weeks. The strait remains closed. At that point, is it left to, you know, countries like Saudi Arabia to find some way to negotiate with Iran and open the strait?

HAASS: Fareed, there's two great unresolved issues. One I know you'll talk about later, which is the nuclear issue. And we could be looking at, if you will, open ended bombing by Israel and the United States kind of rather than having a formal negotiator arrangement kind of redlines. And if and when Iran were to move against them, there would be recurring military activity on the strait. It's what I've described as we broke it, you own it. The president could simply walk away and say, as he's posted, that the United States is not directly dependent on energy moving through the strait.

And then I think it's unrealistic to expect the local Arab countries or the Europeans to free it up. So I think then we're looking at a long term situation where Iran derives enormous revenue, not to mention political leverage, from operating the strait. And I would think that ought to be an unacceptable situation.

If you had those two things together, the strait and the nuclear, talk about being worse off after initiating a war of choice that didn't have to happen strategically and economically. The United States and the world, as your opening take suggested, would be far worse off than it was five weeks ago.

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ZAKARIA: Richard, Zanny, stay with us, and all of you stay with us. When we come back, I'm going to ask whether the other thing that this war could break is the U.S.-European alliance for good when we come back.

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ZAKARIA: We are back with Zanny Minton Beddoes and Richard Haass.

Zanny, I wanted to ask you what the European perspective here is, because it does seem that Trump, in his frustration, is really lashing out at Europe. He has people like Marco Rubio talking about the end of NATO. And the Europeans must feel that this is, you know, they're bearing the brunt of a war they were not consulted on. They were not, you know, they believe is illegal. And yet, you know, they will possibly suffer the consequences.

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What is, you know, what is Europe thinking about this and what could they do?

BEDDOES: Well, exactly as you say, Fareed. I mean, I think the Europeans are partly furious about a war that they consider to be illegal, misguided, and they certainly weren't consulted on. They're furious about being called cowards and other insults by the president of the United States when, remember, you know, the only time NATO's Article 5 has been invoked was after 9/11 and thousands of Ukraine Europeans and NATO forces served with distinction in Afghanistan.

And they are also, however, worried about what this means for the European economy, which is really quite considerable. Europe is a big net importer, relies on -- relied on fossil fuels from the Gulf. They see the impact on their economy. And on top of that, now they have the President of the United States and the Secretary of State basically saying, you know, NATO's finished. And I think they're really worried about that.

And you know, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutter is going to Washington this week to make a speech and to talk to President Trump. But I think there's a growing realization in Europe, even amongst those European countries that have always seen the glass half full and have always hoped that they can maintain some kind of a special relationship with the United States, that this time something really might be different. And Radek Sikorski, the Foreign Minister of Poland, put it, he said, we cannot pretend that the United States president isn't saying what he is saying. And I think on top of everything that's happened in the last year, from the tariffs to the earlier pushing to get the Europeans to spend more money on defense, which frankly was a good idea, then to the, you know, attacks on -- verbal attacks on Greenland, now this, I think there's a recognition in Europe that, you know, maybe this is a divorce.

ZAKARIA: Richard, that could also mean an extraordinary cost to the United States. One of the things people don't think about is Europe buys a huge amount of American defense equipment. In fact, you could even almost say the deal is the United States has offered to protect Europe, and Europe in return buys American kit. I think I saw -- the number I saw was $800 billion of European defense spending over the next, you know, five or six years is now going to be diverted almost entirely to non-American producers. All of this seems to suggest, you know, the kind of the breaking down of the west as a strategic alliance, as a military alliance, as a political alliance.

HAASS: Look, Fareed, I wish I could disagree with both of you, but I can't. We are dismantling the foundations of what has provided peace and stability for the best part of the last eight decades and we are dismantling it. NATO is a shell of its former self. I can't believe there are many Europeans left who believe that if Russia were to do something in parts of Europe, the United States could be counted upon to come to their defense. The problem is Europe is not ready to become self-sufficient.

So this has created a real opening for Russia which is already, as you pointed out, the principal beneficiary of this war. I think it's also created opportunities for China. So strategically we've, if you will, undermined a set of policies in an era that works so much to the American advantage. What we haven't done is put in place anything else, much less anything better. So we've created a moment in history, shall we say, that if you're not uneasy, if you're not worried, you're really not paying attention.

ZAKARIA: Richard Haass, Zanny Minton Beddoes, always a pleasure to talk to you. When we come back, Iranian officials threatened to go after U.S. and Israeli infrastructure this week, saying they would open the gates of hell if the attacks against Iran continued. What did they mean? What is Iran thinking about all this? Ali Vaez will explain the Iranian mindset when we come back.

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ZAKARIA: President Trump said today Iran would be living in hell in if they do not open the Strait of Hormuz. And this weekend, Iranian officials said they would open the gates of hell if attacks against Iran continued. So what do these threats mean and how is the current leadership of Iran thinking? Joining me to discuss is Ali Vaez, the International Crisis Group's Iran Project director, one of the smartest observers about Iran.

Ali, I want to ask you what do you -- what do you think Trump's rhetoric, bombing you back to the stone ages, Iranians are evil. What is it doing inside Iran? Because, you know, there are plenty of people in Iran who are unhappy with the regime, but it does feel like they are -- they are facing a huge amount of bombing, which all of which must be having some kind of effect on their day to day lives.

ALI VAEZ, IRAN PROJECT DIRECTOR INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP: It's great to be with you, Fareed. Look, it is definitely alienating a lot of regime opponents who were hoping that as the president promised, he would come to their rescue and he would bring help, not more harm. It is also energizing the regime's base. It's kind of validating the narrative that the Islamic Republic had out there for more than four decades, that the animosity of the United States is not just against the regime, but against Iran as a state. So going after infrastructure, after historic sites, these are all things that are provoking a sense of nationalism.

And in fact, the regime could not have hoped for any better propaganda during this war in support of his own narrative.

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ZAKARIA: What do you make of the current leadership? You know, President Trump says there has been regime change, which obviously that area hasn't. It's the same system in place, just a new set of leaders. But how do you characterize these guys compared to the old guys?

VAEZ: So there are two things that have happened, Fareed, the regime is still the same. There are new faces. And these new faces are in the category of uber-hawks in Iran. Just to give you an examples, the new head of the IRGC and the new National Security Advisor, these were people who were involved in the Iran-Iraq war.

In which Iran actually regained the territory that Iraq had occupied in the first two years of the war, and yet extended that conflict for another six bloody traumatizing years in order to gain the upper hand. So this is the kind of people we're dealing with right now.

And the other thing that has happened is that power has gravitated away from the office of the supreme leader towards the Revolutionary Guards. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed in the opening act of this war had the revolutionary guards really subservient to him. But his son, the new supreme leader is actually no longer supreme. He is subservient to the Revolutionary Guards because he owes his position and the survival of his regime to them.

ZAKARIA: Ali, you are by training a nuclear scientist. So tell me what clearly the Iranians must be thinking. You know, maybe we should have had a nuclear bomb because then we wouldn't have been attacked in this way, you know, the kind of North Korea option. Could they get a nuclear bomb at this point? With all this bombing, with all the pressure and observation, can you do something underground that is viable or feasible?

VAEZ: So Fareed, the intent is now higher than ever before because number one, as we discussed, the military is now in charge. And for the military, the ultimate deterrent in the form of nuclear weapons is always very attractive, especially when you're very close to it.

Plus, Iran's regional deterrent and its conventional deterrent in the form of ballistic missiles did not deter the U.S. and Israel from attacking it twice in the course of less than a year. One of the political obstacles to a nuclear deal, which was Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is also removed. He had a religious edict against nuclear weaponization, which died with him. And he was afraid of a war and on the pathway to get nuclear weapons, and that war has already happened.

There is also more bottom up supports, again, going back to your initial question because a lot of people who are very angry about the damage to civilian infrastructure and the civilian toll of this war, want the country to have an ultimate deterrent. Now there is a shortcut, a pathway to nuclear weapons that is still open to Iran.

It actually doesn't need to enrich more material. It still has a stockpile of 60 percent enrich uranium. So it has the material, it has the manpower in the form of hundreds of scientists, and it has the machinery in the forms of hundreds of advanced centrifuges that are unaccounted for.

Now with 60 percent, you can't generate a very high yield sophisticated device, but you can create a crude nuclear device. And in fact, depending on the design, they have enough for about four to six nuclear weapons similar to the ones that the U.S. used in in Hiroshima, for instance. These are big, bulky, not very high yield, but all we need Fareed is a flash in the desert, and by that point, the game is lost because we will enter into a phase of nuclear ambiguity, not knowing whether they only had one that they tested or they have more.

ZAKARIA: That is a very sobering thought. I have 30 seconds left. Ali, just a quick question. The premise of American strategy seems to be that the Iranians will buckle under pain. Just your reaction to that knowing this regime. VAEZ: Well, I think if anybody understood the culture of this regime of Notre Dame and resistance. I don't think they would've considered capitulation an option. And let me say, Fareed, that they don't need necessarily a weapon of mass destruction in order to take their adversaries hostage. They have already discovered a weapon of mass destruction in the form of their control over the Strait to Hormuz.

ZAKARIA: So two weapons in a sense, the Strait to Hormuz and potentially nuclear alibis. Pleasure to have you on. Fascinating conversation.

[10:34:58]

Next, Iran is one of the world's oldest civilizations. How much does that history inform its present? I ask a great historian.

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ZAKARIA: One event towers over Iranian history in the minds of many, the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which saw the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini and the birth of Iran as a religious state. The event set the stage for the conflict we see today. But to view Iran simply through the prism of 1979, neglects the unusually long and storied history. It has is one of the world's oldest civilizations.

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So what are some of the features of that history and how does it inform the present? Joining me now is Ali Ansari Professor of Iranian history and director of the Institute for Iranian studies at the University of St. Andrews. Professor Ansari, welcome.

ALI ANSARI, HISTORY PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS: Very good to be with you.

ZAKARIA: When we think about, you know, we often people make the analogy to what happened in Iraq and what happened in Syria, the breakdown of the state, the chaos. And I'm just struck as a layperson at the fact that Iraq and Syria were states created by the British and French after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, you know, in the 1920s. Iran is very different, right? Tell us about the Iranian state in comparison to that of its neighbors.

ANSARI: So I think you're absolutely right to draw attention to that because I think there's far too much of an attempt to translate the sort of the Broadly called, you know, what we say the lessons of history from one state to another. It is a very old state, I mean it is a real a very old state by the comparison with many of the others in the region.

The very least, the current Iranian state within the boundaries, the broad boundaries that we see today is about 500 years old. But the idea of Iran itself is obviously much, much longer and goes back you know into late antiquity and into the ancient world. And a lot of this has a profound effect on the way in which the Iranians see themselves and the world around them. ZAKARIA: The Iranian Empire is also very old, right? The idea that this is a powerful state that has influence beyond its borders, and so when I think about Iran today with its, you know, it has proxies and allies, this is again something that's kind of deeply rooted in Iran, is it not?

ANSARI: It is. And I mean the Islamic Republic itself has this sort of two-faced to -- faces two ways if I can put it that way. It -- on the one hand It's a sort of a revolutionary state, a sort of a insurrectionary state. On the other hand, it sees itself as an imperial state the heir of a great imperial tradition and the sort of the oldest state in the region. And by virtue of being the oldest kingdom of the world, they saw themselves as having a sort of a -- the priority place in the sort of line of great civilizations that gave them a certain stature in the world that they thought others should respect.

And you can see this sort of being echoed certainly not only in the in the monarchy that was overthrown in 1979. But clearly the Islamic Republic has sucked at this table and basically absorbed it. And absorbed it with some enthusiasm it has to be said, an enthusiasm with so much contradicts the sort of revolutionary narrative that we're more familiar with.

ZAKARIA: And what about Islam? How important was Islam in Iranian history?

ANSARI: So it's enormously important in shaping identity, of course, and I mean it was a enormously influential idea that comes obviously with the Arab Muslim conquest in the 7th century. But of course what people forget is that even the Arab Muslims started to adopt many of the things that they found when they got into when they conquered the Sasanian, the last of the Persian empires. They absorbed it wholesale.

So what you see going forward actually in the Islamic world is the sort of the -- is the Iranians essentially turning Islam from an Arab religion into a universalist religion one which they could be co- equals with their Arab conquerors in many ways. And of course it plays a very, very seminal role in the way in which Iranians see themselves. But it's one of the many layers that shapes Iranian identity.

And I think, you know, in the Islamic Revolution people tried to say certainly the sort of the political thinkers that shaped the Islamic Revolution wanted to say that Islam was the most important aspect of Iranian identity. We mustn't forget that, you know, the Islamic Republic is itself as its name suggests has adopted very, very enthusiastically from Western ideas. There's no such idea as a republic within Islamic thought for instance.

ZAKARIA: You said something very interesting. You said that the Iranians universalized Islam that before that it was an Arab religion and it's only after the Persians that it becomes this thing that spreads into Central Asia, that spreads into India. Is that, again, one more example of this Iranian kind of, you know, kind of more outward looking orientation? ANSARI: There is. There's a tremendous sort of both cosmopolitanism and humanism in a sort of Iranian intellectual tradition. And of course for a period they were seen as a subject peoples to the, you know, the Arab Muslims. But after, you know, after a century or so they began to sort of work through that system. There's a wonderful phrase of captive Persia takes prisoner her conquerors.

[10:45:00]

And I think that sums up very much exactly what happens. And of course Persian, we have to remember the language, never disappears and actually returns much invigorated with the Arabic alphabet and becomes essentially the lingua franca of the Eastern Islamic world.

ZAKARIA: That's a fascinating example. In the rest of the Arab conquests, they impose Arabic on those new countries. Whereas in Persia, it is Persian that it is Farsi that becomes the language of Central Asia and Afghanistan all the way into India, right?

ANSARI: It is absolutely right. I mean, it's one of the real exceptions. So for instance, the two really ancient civilizations that the Arab Muslims conquer, one is Iran in the east, the other is Egypt to the west. But actually Egypt does become, you know, to all intents and purposes an Arab country, Arab speaking and so on and so forth. Iran never does. Iran remains a very distinct aspect of the polity with its own distinct language, Persian, which flourishes as a literary language And a governing language, a language of politics in actual fact but also with its own historical traditions that continue through.

ZAKARIA: Next on GPS, Ali Ansari thinks there is a more important revolution than the Islamic revolution if you want to understand Iran. He'll tell you what it is, next.

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[10:51:01]

ZAKARIA: And we are back with Ali Ansari, Professor of Iranian History at the University of St. Andrews. We talk a lot about the Iranian Revolution by which we mean the '79 Islamic Revolution. But there was an earlier revolution in the early 20th century that set the stage for modern Iran in some very important ways, right?

ANSARI: I think so. And I've often argued, I argue very heavily that the 1906 Constitutional Revolution is, from a historical perspective, a far more important political development than the 1979 Revolution. I think the 1979 Revolution is important to us because of the proximity. We're close to it. It was highly traumatic. It was a televised revolution particularly for the Americans of course with the hostage crisis.

And it's in a sense warped the way in which we look at Iranian history by forcing us to look at everything through an Islamic lens. But I think actually the Constitutional Revolution which was in many ways a product of enlightenment thinking really and the adoption of enlightenment ideas among 19th century Iranian intellectuals I think has had a much more profound impact on the way in which the country has sought to develop.

ZAKARIA: Describe if you will briefly that revolution, you know, what came before it and why was it so pivotal?

ANSARI: So I think prior to that for, you know, a hundred years you have the Qajar dynasty that rules Iran in a -- at least has the pretense of an absolute monarchy. It's not actually that effective in practice. But nonetheless there are no constitutional limitations on the king. There's nothing approximating the rule of law. And faced with the challenges that were coming from European imperialism in the 19th century, most notably the Russians and the British, there was this view that if Iran was going to develop, it had to develop not simply on the sort of a performative surface element of say for the sake of argument, developing a strong army which some of them argued.

They said actually what we need to do is we need a root and branch, restructuring of our political system. We have to understand what the secret of Western success is. And they came to the conclusion that the secret of Western success is the idea of liberty. And that what they had to do was to adopt these ideas, root and branch, throughout society, throughout the state and to develop a notion of a constitution with the dominance of the rule of law.

And in 1906, with at the time the help and support of the British it has to be said. They were able to launch a revolution. And they pushed very forcefully for the Shah at the time, the king, to accept their demands for a constitution and a parliament and so on and so forth. And I think in the political psychology of Iran, this was an enormously important moment when the Shah finally relented in 1906. In practice of course it has never really been implemented in full. But the ideas have been extremely powerful within the Iranian political class.

ZAKARIA: How to think about Iran and Islam? So on the one hand it is true that Shia Islam is different, political authority and religious authority have a certain kind of association that they don't, you know, you can see it in Iraq for example where people when they freely choose to vote often vote for very religious Shia parties.

On the other hand, when I've been to Iran I find that, particularly in Tehran, people seem very irreligious. You know, the mosques seem empty. Try -- help me understand those two realities.

ANSARI: I mean it's very interesting that you say that I mean it's the fact that if you've lived under a fairly oppressive and repressive Islamic government for 47 years, it tends to put you off religion. And I think this is what's happened in Iran. Iran has had an experience that is quite different from -- in the rest of the Muslim world. What you have is, is you've had secular rulers of one sort or another nationalists.

[10:55:01]

And people have reacted Islam has been the insurgent force. So people have tended to go towards Islam as a means of voicing their protest. But when Islam is part of the establishment, you react against that. And in Iran in particular, society has become immensely secular. And the people often say, as we say that Iran is the most secular society in the Middle East. And survey after survey shows us that.

That should be -- that's not the same as irreligious by the way. I mean people I think retain a certain degree of spirituality. But they're very keen to separate what we may term church and state. They don't want religion in politics anymore.

ZAKARIA: Finally, personally how are you reacting to what you are watching on television, what you are hearing, what you are reading?

ANSARI: I react in some ways. It's an extremely stressful time. I react with a degree of horror at what I see at what's happening. It's a huge tragedy. I think I've spent most of my working life trying to build bridges between Iran and the West. And to see it come to this is really tragic. It's really, really tragic.

ZAKARIA: Professor Ali Ansari, thank you so much for joining us.

ANSARI: Thank you.

ZAKARIA: Thanks to all of you for being part of my program this week. I will see you next week.

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