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Fareed Zakaria GPS

Trump Says U.S. Navy to Blockade Strait of Hormuz; Interview with Former Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Were The Gulf States For Or Against The Iran War?; Iran War Threatens A Lasting Energy Crisis. Aired 10-11a ET

Aired April 12, 2026 - 10:00   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

[10:00:42]

FAREED ZAKARIA, CNN ANCHOR: This is GPS, the GLOBAL PUBLIC SQUARE. Welcome to all of you in the United States and around the world. I'm Fareed Zakaria coming to you live from Washington, D.C.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA (voice-over): Today on the program, the fragile state of the ceasefire and what comes next. I have an exclusive interview with the former secretary of state, Antony Blinken. Bringing to bear his extensive experience negotiating with Iran, he tells me how he thinks this might all end.

Later in the show, we'll understand how the Gulf States are dealing with the war in their midst. And we'll take a look at the major energy crisis and whether it is over.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA: I'll bring you "My Take" at the end of the show. Let's first go to a breaking news. This morning, Donald Trump posted on Truth Social, quote, "Effective immediately the United States Navy, the finest in the world, will begin the process of blockading any and all ships trying to enter or leave the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, an appropriate moment we are fully locked and loaded, and our military will finish up the little that is left of Iran."

Let us try to understand how a blockade would work. I'm joined by Admiral James Stavridis, former NATO supreme commander.

Jim, how -- you've traversed these straits dozens, maybe hundreds of times. Tell us how a blockade would work and how much American naval power would be required to make it work.

ADM. JAMES STAVRIDIS (RET.), CNN SENIOR MILITARY ANALYST: Well, I certainly agree with one thing the president said was the United States Navy is the finest in the world. I'll take that. But this is not trivial work. Any blockade is difficult because it's an open seaway. Historically, we are enormous supporters of freedom of navigation. So when you conduct a blockade, it is an act of war, and it is something that has grave consequence in terms of how you execute it.

As to how many ships you would need, I'd say if I were the admiral in command and Brad Cooper, Admiral Brad Cooper, is the CENTCOM commander, he will probably want to put two aircraft carrier strike groups. So that's two carriers so he has plenty of air cover up above him. And then he'll want about a dozen destroyers and frigates. All of this would be arrayed in the southern part of the Gulf. All the way down outside the Gulf would be the U.S. forces.

And then inside the Gulf, Fareed, you've got probably half a dozen American warships, and you'd want to bring in the Emirati Navy, the Saudi Navy, and so you try and bottle it up on both sides. Bottom line, this is a big task and it's a big gamble.

So final thought here. What's the play? Why are we doing this? I think is going to be the question on most people's minds. And it's an economic squeeze. So if you think of this on a scale that runs from doing nothing, walking away from the table, ceasing hostilities, that runs to destroying the civilization of Iran, an economic blockade like this is right in the middle.

It puts economic pressure on Tehran without destroying the oil facilities, which you'd want to preserve into the future. So big, complicated undertaking. Hardly a trivial move on the chessboard we've been watching.

ZAKARIA: And so far, Jim, Iran has found asymmetrical ways, often quite cheap, to, you know, to maintain its control of the strait by essentially just spooking insurance companies enough that there is no traffic. Is there an asymmetric -- is there something the Iranians can do? What do you imagine would be their kind of countermeasure?

STAVRIDIS: Let's do it from the inside out. So let's look at the strait itself. The asymmetric play there would be smuggling. It would be trying to run the blockade.

[10:05:01]

Think what the confederate south did in the United States when Abraham Lincoln put an enormous blockade around the entire southern states. It's pretty porous. And so they could certainly try smuggling. That will be very difficult. Secondly, they could put more mines in the water. Fortunately, CENTCOM has destroyed, according to reports, 90 plus percent of the 5,000 pre-war mines.

But Iran could put a lot more mines into the water and they could come off small boats or dhows, which are the ubiquitous indigenous craft of the Gulf. Moving out from the Gulf itself, I would start to really worry about cyber. And what I mean by that is here's China, an expert cyber nation, alongside Russia, another expert cyber nation. Here's a way that they could assist Iran by using cyber.

And all of this, Fareed, as you've reported on over the last couple of months, comes at a time when A.I. is making cyber tools much more accessible and available. So this emerging strain of cyber threat is one stream and then aid from Russia and China is another stream of threat. It's like in "Ghostbusters," you don't want those streams to cross. So there are three things they could think about.

ZAKARIA: Jim, as always. We get so much smarter listening to you. Thank you.

Next on GPS, the former secretary of state, Antony Blinken.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[10:11:02]

ZAKARIA: As the sun was rising in Islamabad this morning, J.D. Vance and his delegation left the Pakistani capital. This came after 21 hours of talks with the Iranians, which failed to secure a lasting peace deal to end the war in Iran. As of this moment, there is still a ceasefire in place, but it feels more fragile than ever.

I wanted to help us all understand what it is like to negotiate with the Iranians. I could think of few better people to explain that than Antony Blinken. He was, of course, secretary of state under President Joe Biden, but he was also President Obama's deputy secretary of state when the nuclear deal with Iran was negotiated in 2015. I asked him on Thursday to share his thoughts with me.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

ANTONY BLINKEN, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE: I mean, look, in the whole history of the Revolutionary Republic, 47 years, they've only made a fundamental compromise and come to a fundamental conclusion on something twice, ending the eight years of the war with Iraq and then the nuclear agreement with the Obama administration, which took us two and a half years to get to.

And so I think what we've seen is, you know, President Trump has taken an offramp. Maybe he was tired of all that winning. The question is, is this offramp to a rest stop, which seems the most likely thing? Is it to some kind of destination or is it some kind of dead end? And the challenge he has is he's really put himself into a corner over the last few weeks that's going to be very hard to get out of.

ZAKARIA: And you don't think he can restart the war because that is an option?

BLINKEN: It is an option. But my sense of this has been that the president has had two guardrails on what he's done. Markets and munitions. Very sensitive to markets understandably, price of oil, gasoline, natural gas, fertilizer, the bond market, the stock market, et cetera. That's one guardrail.

The other guardrail has been munitions. Our supply of both offensive and defensive munitions. And these in some cases are significantly depleted such that our deterrence is diminished, including with regard to China.

But the other problem is this, Fareed. You can have a tactical success, which on one level clearly we've had. The military has always does a brilliant job prosecuting its target lists, doing remarkable things. But you have tactical success and strategic failure, at least strategic setback, because what are we left with at the end of this? We're left with a regime that's still in place with a younger, albeit maybe injured ayatollah. We're left with Iran still holding on to the highly enriched uranium that it had before, as well as centrifuges that it can spin up.

We're left with an Iran that is battered. It still has missiles. Fewer, but it can rebuild the production capacity. And of course, critically, a new, huge advantage, the Strait of Hormuz, something that didn't exist before. Both Iran and the United States and others, always came up to the line about the Strait of Hormuz many times in the past. There was always this question mark and we always factored in what might Iran do in the strait to make life really difficult.

It never got to that. The Iranians never pulled the trigger on the strait because they thought that would invite an existential crisis and threat from the United States and others, Israel. And we always were very careful to make sure that we push things, but not so far that the strait would be endangered. Now, break glass moment. That's happened. The net result is Iran emerges with tremendous leverage.

And so I think the issue is this. The president has to decide whether he wants to, if there's no durable agreement reached in two weeks, either, as you said, go back to war. And that means -- what does that mean? An escalation of air power? Ground troops? Highly risky, highly costly. Or is there some kind of negotiation and a negotiation that probably has to give something to the Iranians, including the possibility of continuing to collect tolls in the Strait of Hormuz and enriching themselves in the process? Maybe sanctions relief?

And that's why I say this looks right now like tactical success, but strategic failure.

ZAKARIA: So let's talk about those negotiations because you have spent a long time.

[10:15:03]

You were part of the JCPOA, the Obama nuclear deal.

BLINKEN: That's right.

ZAKARIA: You tried to negotiate with them afterwards when -- and during Biden, you tried to get them back into the deal. The Trump administration's position is no enrichment. Now, this has for a long time been the sticking point. The Iranians say we have a right to enrichment. We are signatories to the NPT.

Is there a compromise based on what you saw in the past, which they -- where they may be willing to forego that right, or to assert it in theory, but not in practice?

BLINKEN: Absolutely. And my understanding is, at various points over the last year and a half in the discussions that the administration was having with the Iranians, the Iranians put something like that forward. It's not clear whether the folks we had at the table fully grasped what they were getting from the Iranians. We never conceded their right to enrich. But as a practical matter, under the JCPOA, we moved out 97 percent of their highly enriched uranium, but they retain some capacity at a very low level.

And the net was this. They could claim that they continued to be able to enrich. We could say that they didn't have a right to enrich. But as a practical matter, they were doing it. And the main thing was the uranium they were enriching was kept at such a low level, in such a low quantity that had they decided to break out of the agreement, it would have taken them more than a year to produce enough of the fissile material that they needed for a nuclear weapon. A weapon, by the way, that they didn't have and still don't have.

But the point is this, and you're right. Yes, you could come to an agreement that gave the Iranians, in a sense, as a practical matter, the ability to continue enriching at very low levels with a very small stockpile, doesn't concede the right, but gives them a face saver.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA: Next on GPS, I will ask the former secretary of state what advice he would give Donald Trump in the unlikely event the president asked for his counsel.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[20:21:11]

ZAKARIA: And we are back with my interview with the former secretary of state, Antony Blinken.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA: When you came in as secretary of state in the Biden administration, there were many people in the administration saying, you should now go back and join the Iran nuclear deal.

BLINKEN: That's right.

ZAKARIA: Trump withdrew. You could easily go back in. And who knows where that could have taken us to a very different trajectory. Why did you guys not do it at the time?

BLINKEN: So we tried and there were two fundamental problems. One was that because President Trump had torn up the agreement and the Iranians had sped ahead, not only in producing more fissile material, but also developing and spinning more sophisticated centrifuges. The breakout time that we had under the original Obama agreement, how much time to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon, had gone from a year to how do we return to the JCPOA six or seven months. So we would have to decide whether is that good enough.

Second, the Iranians, having signed the agreement, having actually adhered to the agreement, and this is not just me saying it. It's not just the international inspectors saying it. Our own intelligence concluded that. They said to us, what guarantees do we have that another administration won't come along and do exactly what President Trump did the first term and tear it up? So they wanted some kind of guarantee, maybe congressional approval of the agreement, as a treaty. Incredibly hard to do with our politics. So we were a little bit stuck on that. But we made pretty good progress.

Then we have midterm elections, very hard to do this in the context of a political election. After that, we started looking at a less for less agreement where we basically freeze things in place, freeze what they were producing, freeze their stockpile, freeze our sanctions, no new sanctions, as a way of at least holding things in abeyance and then having a roadmap for a longer -- longer and stronger agreement.

Had there been a second term, that's where we would have gone.

ZAKARIA: In the Obama nuclear deal, you guys went to sign the agreement and with the full draft documents, everything agreed on, and it took like three or four weeks more of negotiating. Give us a sense as to what is it that happens with the Iranians? Like, why is it so hard for them? Do they have internal divisions? Is it that they bring up last-minute demands?

BLINKEN: So there are two things going on. Well, more than two things, but at least two things that I can think of. One is, one of the biggest mistakes one makes about Iran is to see it as especially then, maybe now, unfortunately, a little bit different. But then certainly as a political monolith. It wasn't.

ZAKARIA: Right.

BLINKEN: There are factions. There are very different views. There are politics that were playing out in real time and making negotiations complicated, making concluding a final deal complicated, and lining up all of these folks in Iran on any final agreement wasn't easy. So that's part of it. But the other thing is these are master negotiators, and we've been hearing a lot about civilization in recent days.

Well, this is a great civilization. And even this heinous regime has some of the positive attributes in a sense of that civilization, which is an extraordinary track record of being able to negotiate, to be incredibly challenging to deal with. We tried to flip the script on them. I was, you know, doing a lot of the policy on this, but people like Wendy Sherman were leading the negotiations in the field, and we'd be talking all the time. And then John Kerry.

And on several occasions at least, we packed our bags, our delegation packed their bags, put them in the airplane and said, OK, we're leaving. And then, oh, no, no, no, no, come back, come back. So these end games are really, really challenging.

ZAKARIA: The reporting out of "The New York Times" on how this decision to go to war was made is really quite stunning.

[10:25:05]

And it really does seem that Prime Minister Netanyahu came to the White House with a video presentation and convinced Donald Trump that he would be a great man in history, a great liberator if he did this. Did Prime Minister Netanyahu, at various points, try to convince the Obama administration, the Biden administration, to do things like this?

BLINKEN: To my knowledge, he's tried to convince virtually every administration since he's been in office to do what President Trump finally did. He came to the Obama administration and tried this. He came to the Biden administration and tried this, and he finally found a willing customer in President Trump. But this is President Trump's decision. This wasn't Bibi Netanyahu's decision. It was President Trump's decision.

Look, it's not that previous administrations, whether it was President Bush, whether it was President Obama, whether it was President Biden later, didn't take the challenges and threats posed by Iran deadly seriously. They did. The question that they posed was, what is the best way to deal with it? When it came to President Biden, we had two extraordinary moments where Iran attacked Israel, in April of 2024 and then again in September.

And in each instance, we came to Israel's defense actively for the first time with American forces on the line. We rallied other countries in the region and beyond to do the same thing. But we also worked with the Israelis to cap in their response, to avoid getting to something that produced a huge escalation, and in particular, calibrated in a way that the regime didn't think that it was being directly threatened because all of a sudden, if the regime thinks you're aiming to take it down, it becomes existential, and that's when they're likely to do pretty much anything.

And then it becomes a fight for life, a fight for death. And under those circumstances, the Iranians have tremendous tenacity.

ZAKARIA: In the unlikely event that President Trump would call you in, what would you tell him at this point? We are where we are. It has escalated beyond control. All those things have happened. What would you tell him now?

BLINKEN: Don't go back to -- don't go back to fighting. It's not going to be in our interest. It's going to do tremendous additional damage, tremendous additional risk and danger. But that threat is always there, but don't go back to that. Keep the pressure on the Iranians by other means. Try to bring other countries together in doing that and engage in diplomacy for however long it takes to get a deal.

And a deal is going to involve some compromise. Decide where you're willing to compromise. Decide what you need to get. I think right now from my perspective, the Strait of Hormuz is the most important thing because all of the ramifications that it has.

ZAKARIA: But that's a problem created by the war.

BLINKEN: Yes. As well as the, it's the arsonist putting out the fire in this case. But I would put the focus there. And you've got to have strategic patience. And I think the record shows that this can be done. And the JCPOA is probably the best example of that. It can be done. But you've got to play the long game on this.

ZAKARIA: Tony Blinken, always a pleasure to hear from you.

BLINKEN: Thanks for having me.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA: Next on GPS, what do Gulf leaders make of this conflict and the fragile ceasefire with Iran? I'll speak to Harvard University professor Tarek Masoud, next.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[10:32:47]

FAREED ZAKARIA, CNN HOST: Since the beginning of the war with Iran, the Islamic republic has repeatedly launched retaliatory strikes against America's Gulf Arab allies, countries like the UAE, Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and others.

I want to dig into what this has done to relations between Washington and the Gulf as it weakened or strengthened them.

Joining me now to discuss this is Harvard University professor and director of Harvard Kennedy School's Middle East initiative, Tarek Masoud.

Tarek, welcome. Tell us, at the start of this war, what had the gulf states been telling Washington?

TAREK MASOUD, PROFESSOR OF DEMOCRACY & GOVERNANCE, HARVARD UNIVERSITY: You know, there's a lot of reporting in the lead up or once the war started, when the narrative was that President Trump had been snookered into this war by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, that in fact, the Saudi crown prince, who is the de facto leader of that country, had also been pushing the president to get into this war.

My understanding from talking to some of my Saudi sources and talking to Gulf sources more broadly, is they actually did not want a war. There was definitely a spectrum of Gulf opinion with respect to Iran, and that spectrum is anchored on the one side by Oman, which is basically been a mediator with Iran. And lately has almost sounded a bit like Iran -- Iranians' lawyer.

And then on the other end of the spectrum by Bahrain, which has a large Shia population that the Iranians sometimes incite. And for more than a decade, they've had no diplomatic relations with Iran.

But all the other countries were somewhere in the middle of this spectrum. And broadly not wanting conflict the war that started basically on October 7th to come to their shores and disrupt their region.

ZAKARIA: And the Saudis normalized relations with them in 2023, I think, and had a kind of modus vivendi with them. MASOUD: Yes, absolutely. That was a Chinese brokered agreement, and

it got the Saudis relief from the periodic Houthi rocket attacks that they were experiencing. And so, yes, the Saudi sort of attitude had been one of lessening the temperature, lowering the temperature between them and Tehran.

Now, today, the story is different.

[10:35:01]

Okay? If you look at the that spectrum again, I mean, the Omanis are still kind of where they are, but countries like Qatar, the UAE, which, you know, had a lot of trade and traffic with Iran, they have received a lot of Iranian fire, ostensibly because they host U.S. military bases.

So, everybody's kind of shifted towards the, you know, anti-Iranian end of the spectrum. But here's the thing. There are two outcomes. They want to avoid. The one outcome is an Iran that controls the Strait of Hormuz, and that retains missile capacity to continue and drone capacity to continue to threaten Gulf states. They definitely want to avoid that outcome.

The other outcome they want to avoid is a failed state. Okay. And when you know, which could be a place of civil war, flooding them with refugees, you could have warlords like you had in Syria who start producing narcotics and shipping them to the Gulf. And here's the thing, when they look at the Americans, when you have a president who says, oh, you know, maybe well have the Strait of Hormuz be a joint venture between me and the ayatollah. It makes you think, oh, so could America be okay with the first bad case scenario?

Or when you have advisors or people adjacent to the current administration saying things like, were going to arm Iranians or were going to arm the Kurds to bring down the regime. You think, you know, it looks like America could accommodate itself to these two outcomes that are absolutely anathema to most of the Gulf countries.

ZAKARIA: And in a sense, the civil war scenario would, could mean the militias start fighting with them. I mean, again, there are Shias in Saudi Arabia, there are Shias in Bahrain, as you say.

MASOUD: Absolutely. In the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, it's about 30 percent, maybe, Shia Bahrain, about half Shia. And yes, you could imagine that this would result in some domestic instability as well.

ZAKARIA: What has this done to the Gulf States view of America? Do they think that being American allies and having bases is an asset, or did it actually make them vulnerable to these attacks?

MASOUD: Well, you definitely see this, you know, sort of, among those who are maybe more friendly to Iran, they say, look, the you, Gulf countries, put these or allowed these bases to situate themselves in your -- on your territory, thinking that it would protect you. But in fact, the reason you're taking all of this fire is because of these bases. So, as you say, the American bases are a liability. America is not an asset. It's a liability.

The fact of the matter is that you know, one could argue that these countries would have experienced a much more difficult security situation had there not been the American guarantee, but broadly, there are and have always been two camps in the Gulf in most Gulf countries, with respect to the United States.

On the one hand, there's what I'd call the pro-American camp. Okay? And this is mainly the leadership of most of these countries are pro- American. They remember America's defense of Kuwait in 1990, 1991.

And they put all of the -- want to put all of their eggs in the American basket. They, you know, not just in terms of military, but also in terms of trade, in terms of even the way they structure their institutions.

Okay. There's another camp which has always been there. It's in every Arab country, and I'd call it the nonaligned camp, the camp that says we should diversify our relationships. We should not be a client of the United States. We should go to the Chinese, et cetera. That latter camp is definitely ascendant.

And then finally, and then I'll be quiet. I do think one of the things that the Gulf countries are rethinking is their relationship with Trump. The there was nowhere on this planet except for Trump Tower that greeted Trump's victory in his second term with greater joy than in the Gulf.

They felt. We understand him. He respects us. And now, when they see the degree of chaos and also the degree, the lack of concern that the Trump administration seems to have with their views, I think they're starting to rethink. And I think in the future, they'll try to diversify their relationships within the United States as well.

ZAKARIA: Tarek Masoud, always so good to hear from you. Thank you.

Next up, we will talk about energy markets. Is oil going to hit 125, 150? Next.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[10:43:55]

ZAKARIA: What will a U.S. blockade do to oil prices, and what will it do to the global economy? What is it all already doing?

Joining me now is Karen Young. She's a senior research scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University.

Karen, so first of all, tell us, where do things stand right now? It does seem like the markets are assuming that this will all resolve itself because the price of oil isn't actually that high, given what's happening.

KAREN YOUNG, SENIOR RESEARCH SCHOLAR, CENTER ON GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY AT COLUMBIA SIPA: The price of oil isn't as high as we might expect it to be. That's exactly right. And there's also a lot of difference between the futures market and what's being sold, sort of ready to go barrels or the spot market.

And I think there's some wishful thinking of, you know, the, the ability to encourage more transit of barrels through the Strait of Hormuz. That's obviously not resolved. And so since the beginning of this crisis, we've thought about sort of two variables. One is the duration of the conflict and the duration of the impediment to transit and the damage to oil and gas infrastructure in the region.

[10:45:01]

So those two things are actually getting more serious and more detrimental to higher prices.

ZAKARIA: And what is the blockade do in that situation?

YOUNG: So, the blockade creates this extra layer. We had basically a diversion of the blocked oil supply going through the pipeline in Saudi Arabia, about 7 million barrels a day there. The pipeline in the UAE, about 1.8 million barrels.

And the Iranians themselves exporting about 1.6 million barrels a day. And the Omanis avoiding the strait completely. If we have a blockade, we still have the problem of a shortage in the market of about seven million barrels of crude, four million barrels of product not getting out. And we just added to that by making the Iranian barrels off the market.

ZAKARIA: Because the Iranian barrels won't get through. Exactly the price of oil, probably tomorrow will.

YOUNG: Probably tomorrow will be another Monday, where we had the sort of softening comments towards the end of the week by the Trump administration, the announcement of the ceasefire, and now again, a bit of a shock.

ZAKARIA: President Trump says this -- when this is all over, oil prices will go down. What is your reaction to that?

YOUNG: When this is over? It could be a long time from now. And that entails, you know, the resumption of traffic, no real damage to oil production infrastructure or LNG, and some sort of accommodating government in Iran. Those are huge variables which are really, really unsolved.

So, I think for now and into the end of 2026, were looking at elevated oil prices for certain, elevated LNG prices for certain because of this sort of time it takes to restart. And of course, the unknown of traffic flows getting in and out of the strait now.

ZAKARIA: The crisis in Asia is very acute. I mean, in Sri Lanka, they're, you know, they've shortened the school week and Thailand, they're telling government employees don't take elevators. People are being told don't use air conditioning.

Is it going to get worse in Europe? I mean, the U.S. is probably fine, but in places like Europe.

YOUNG: Well, we're not fine. I mean, these prices are global. And so, we are going to see inflationary pressure both on transit fuels and on food in the U.S. but yes, Asia has felt the pinch first. Any economy that is heavily dependent on energy exports, Philippines, Malaysia, you name it down the list, as you mentioned, those economies are hit the most, especially those also that use LPG as a cooking fuel. So, it's not just in crude or diesel and jet fuel. What we'll see in the coming week or two into Europe is really this jet fuel crunch and refined products.

So, this is spreading and it creates inflationary pressures that the whole global economy has to deal with. It also encourages countries to think about basically hoarding or not, you know, sharing supply. And those countries that have the benefit of stockpiles. South Korea, Japan, even India are going to be better off because they can shield their populations from some of that initial shock. Poorer economies can't do that.

ZAKARIA: And finally, it's not just oil, right? This is because petroleum products are part of fertilizer cement. I mean, just the plastics, you name it. Computer chips can't be made without them.

YOUNG: That's right. So, we're going to start seeing that inflationary pressure not just in transit but in fuel because of products like sulfur and ammonia, nitrogen that go into the construction of fertilizers. But also, anything you use that has a pet chem or polymer kind of base plastics, packaging, and that, you know, increases food costs too is, is going to be tough. So, you know, think about everything you buy at a -- at a retail big box store. It has some component that originally came from hydrocarbons.

ZAKARIA: And this will not get better until at best 2027.

YOUNG: I think, yes. I mean, looking at the time to restart oil production that has been shut in that adds weeks, if not months, and assumes that we get to some sort of normal level of traffic flows through the strait, that 7 million barrel a day crude deficit, the 4 million barrel a day product deficit is not relieved until the strait is open.

ZAKARIA: Karen, pleasure to hear from you. Thank you.

Next on GPS, President Trump seems to be willing to use the Strait of Hormuz as a geopolitical football, but is that predatory approach what the United States should be doing? I will bring you my take next.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

ZAKARIA: Here's my take. It's a beautiful thing. Donald Trump said recently, musing about a joint venture with Iran to act as the gatekeepers of the Strait of Hormuz. The same day, he posted on Truth Social, "Big money will be made dealing with the traffic build up there."

These are revealing remarks, not because they are outrageous. Trump has said many outrageous things, but because they distill a worldview. They suggest a shift in how the United States might see its role not as the guarantor of a system, but as the participant in a deal.

For most of its history, the U.S. has taken a different view. Freedom of navigation has been treated not as a privilege to be sold, but as a right to be defended.

[10:55:02]

The young republic's first military intervention, the quasi-war with France, was fought in part over interference with American shipping. Soon after, the U.S. confronted the Barbary pirates, refusing to pay tribute for safe passage and instead using force to establish the principle that commerce should move freely across the seas.

That commitment deepened over time. In the modern era, the United States has patrolled the world's oceans, ensuring that critical choke points from the Strait of Hormuz to the Strait of Malacca remain open. It has done so at great expense not to extract tolls, but to sustain a global commons. Open seas would underpin open trade, which in turn would foster growth, stability and ultimately peace.

That is not how Donald Trump thinks. In his view, the Strait of Hormuz is not a global artery, but an asset, something to be monetized. Why provide security as a public good when it can be turned into a business venture? Why underwrite a system when you can charge admission?

This instinct runs deeper than a few words. It reflects his broader worldview that sees international relations less as the management of a shared order and of values, and more as a series of transactions. In that world, every commitment is negotiable. Every alliance conditional, every public good, a potential profit center.

After World War II, the U.S. emerged not just as the most powerful nation on earth, but as the architect of an international system built on rules, openness and cooperation. Washington promoted free trade supported multilateral institutions and maintained a security umbrella that extended far beyond its shores. It didn't do so out of altruism, but because it understood that such a system would serve its interests.

And they did. A world of open markets and secure sea lanes allowed global commerce to flourish, with the United States at its center. American companies thrived. The dollar became the dominant currency, keeping interest rates low for Americans as the country has borrowed more and more from foreigners.

U.S. influence extended across continents, not through coercion but through attraction and interdependence. And when Washington did coerce, its power often shrank rather than grew.

All this required a certain mentality. It meant looking beyond immediate gains to long term advantages. It meant accepting that some investments in security and institutions and alliances would not yield quick returns, but would pay dividends over decades. It meant understanding that legitimacy and trust are strategic assets.

Trump's approach flips that logic. It prioritizes the immediate over the enduring, the tangible, over the intangible. If allies can be bullied into paying more, that's a win. If trade partners can be squeezed for concessions, that's success. If strategic commitments can be turned into revenue streams, so much the better.

The costs in diminished credibility, frayed alliances, lost trust and a weakened overall system are diffused and deferred. The gains are immediate and visible.

The scholar Stephen Walt has called this behavior that of a predatory hegemon. The truth is, most hegemons were predatory. Great powers have taxed trade routes, extracted tribute and leveraged dominance for direct gain.

Rome did it, the Habsburgs did it. Napoleon's France and imperial Germany did it. Even Britain, often seen as liberal, ruled its empire in ways that enriched the metropole.

What made the United States different was not that it lacked self- interest, but that it pursued it in a broader way. It built a system others could join because it offered wide benefits. It restrained its power even as it exercised it.

It chose, in other words, to be an enlightened hegemon, one that understood that the surest way to sustain dominance was to make it acceptable. That choice is now in question.

To treat the Strait of Hormuz as a toll booth, rather than a global commons, is to misunderstand both history and strategy. The U.S. benefits most not from charging per ship for access, but from building a world in which commerce flows freely, and Washington's central position is reinforced.

To abandon that model for short term extraction is to trade a durable advantage for a fleeting gain. If the U.S. becomes just another predatory hegemon, it will discover what history has long shown. Such power is feared, resented and ultimately resisted. And in time, it is not sustained but overturned.

Go to FareedZakaria.com for a link to my "Washington Post" column this week. Thanks to all of you for being part of my program this week. I will see you next week.