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Fareed Zakaria GPS

Trump's Hot-and-Cold NATO Summit; Would the U.S. Defend a NATO Ally?; Interview with Rahm Emanuel. Interview With Former Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel; Interview With Author Loubna Mrie. Aired 10-11a ET

Aired July 12, 2026 - 10:00   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

[10:00:53]

FAREED ZAKARIA, CNN ANCHOR: This is GPS, the GLOBAL PUBLIC SQUARE. Welcome to all of you in the United States and around the world. I'm Fareed Zakaria coming to you from New York.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA: Today on the program, Trump takes on NATO again. At this week's summit, he said the leaders of other NATO countries told him --

DONALD TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: We love you.

ZAKARIA: This came after Trump roared that he still wanted the U.S. to control Greenland and that he didn't want to trade with Spain any more at all.

How did it all shake out? I'll talk to the former foreign ministers of Denmark and the Netherlands.

And former White House chief of staff Rahm Emanuel went to Tel Aviv to deliver a speech highly critical of Benjamin Netanyahu.

RAHM EMANUEL, FORMER WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF: The prime minister and his government have led Israel into a dead end.

ZAKARIA: He also offered a new path forward for peace in the region. Not a two-state solution, but a 23-state solution. What is that? I'll ask him.

Finally, France's President Emmanuel Macron was the first Western leader to visit Damascus since the fall of Assad and bombs exploded near his hotel. I'll talk to a Syrian journalist about the current state of her country.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

ZAKARIA: But first, here's "My Take."

Even people who dislike Donald Trump tend to give him credit for one thing. Getting NATO to pay its fair share. American presidents have long grumbled about burden sharing. Trump has been crude, theatrical and transactional. But the sentiment he expressed was broadly shared. And Europeans got the message. Non-American NATO countries spent 1.4 percent of GDP on defense in 2014. In 2025 it was close to 2.3 percent.

But be careful what you wish for. The usual assumption is that if Europe spends more, America will spend less. This is demonstrably wrong. European defense spending is at its highest level in decades. Yet Donald Trump has proposed a staggering $1.5 trillion defense budget for fiscal 2027.

American defense spending has never been determined by the needs of NATO. It reflects America's role as a global superpower with bases, fleets and commitments across the world. Washington wants to deter Russia, counter China, project power in the Middle East, protect global sea lanes, defend the homeland, maintain nuclear superiority, dominate space, lead in drones and artificial intelligence, and preserve the ability to fight far from home.

In fact, the International Institute for Strategic Studies calculated in 2018 that direct spending on defense in Europe made up only about 5 percent of America's total defense spending. As Europe's spending increases, the continent will become less dependent on America and therefore less deferential to it.

For more than 75 years, Americas dominance within NATO has given Washington enormous advantages. The U.S. has over 30 military bases across Europe, and these have allowed it to project power not just in Europe but in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. U.S. operations in the Middle East, including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and more recently with Iran, have depended heavily on access, basing and overflight rights in Europe.

Often NATO countries have allowed the U.S. to use its facilities even when they disagreed with the war being waged. But as Europeans see that America is unreliable or even hostile, they will feel less need to accommodate Washington. The U.S. has assumed that its allies will always line up behind its broader strategy, including its economic campaigns.

[10:05:05]

But as Celeste Wallander writes in "Foreign Affairs," Europe already has its own interests and tools. It holds much of the Russia's frozen assets. It has its own sanctions on Russian shipping, finance and technology. It is home to Swift, the payment system whose exclusion of major Russian banks has been so important.

If Washington wants to relax pressure on Moscow in a bargain with Vladimir Putin, Europe may refuse. If Washington wants to intensify pressure on Iran or China, Europe may hesitate. Then there's the issue of weapons. One of the hidden benefits of American leadership in NATO has been that Europeans buy American arms.

They have bought F-35s, HIMARS, Patriots, P-8 aircraft and many other systems, not simply because they're good, but because they bind Europe to the United States. Common equipment makes joint operations easier. It also reassures frontline states that American troops will remain engaged.

But European officials now speak openly of the need to reduce dependance on American hardware. They fear that the Trump administration could, in the future, withhold software upgrades, spare parts or operational support. When Denmark has to worry about an American president threatening Greenland, it will think thrice before buying its next generation of weapons from the United States.

For American defense companies, this could be a major loss. For American strategy it could be larger still. Weapons sales are not just commercial transactions. They create habits of cooperation and shared strategy.

There is a final danger. We speak easily of Europe's spending more, but defense budgets are still national, and most European governments are broke. As Liana Fix notes in "Foreign Affairs," the country with the greatest capacity to spend is Germany, and it is now beginning to do so on a remarkable scale.

This is necessary. Germany has been too passive for too long. It is a liberal democracy deeply embedded in Europe, and there is no reason to fear some aggressive impulse in its political DNA. But size and power matter in international politics. A Germany that spends vastly more than its neighbors will inevitably create anxiety in France, Poland, and the smaller countries around it.

The genius of America's post-1945 strategy was that it solved this problem. It made it unnecessary for European countries to think and act like traditional great powers. Under the American umbrella, France and Germany did not have to balance each other. The U.S. tamped down the intra-European rivalries that had produced centuries of catastrophic war.

It created a system that was stable, peaceful, and pro-American. We have set off a chain reaction, and over time, Americans will come to miss the old NATO, not because it was fair, but because it was the most successful security system the world has ever known with America at its center.

Go to FareedZakaria.com for a link to my "Washington Post" column this week. And let's get started.

For more on the NATO summit and the view from Europe, I am joined by Jeppe Kofod, former minister of foreign affairs of Denmark, and Frans Timmermans, the former vice president of the European Commission.

Jeppe, let me begin with you. What was your sense at the end of the day of how the summit went, and specifically, was it your understanding that privately Trump pursued the Greenland issue in the way that he did publicly?

JEPPE KOFOD, FORMER DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER: Well, I think the summit itself went as good as it could because there was a clear declaration support for Article Five. And there was a good atmosphere in the end of the summit. They also saw that from the president when he left. But of course, I also heard that, you know, the press, the press room that was of course the comments on Greenland.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

TRUMP: Greenland is very important for the United States, but it's not important for Denmark.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

KOFOD: But I understand in the room it was more normal NATO business. And that was good. So all in all, it was actually probably the best Europe could have hoped for. But it's also clear that the challenges in NATO remains.

ZAKARIA: Frans, what do you think the effect, though, of this public reiteration of his desire for Greenland does? It must rattle the Europeans, right?

FRANS TIMMERMANS, FORMER DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER: Oh, absolutely. I mean, there's a level of also, you know, let him have his reality TV show. There's that as well. And let's do business inside. But at the same time, I do think the American public totally underestimate how profoundly this Greenland issue is affecting our relationship in the transatlantic alliance. It has changed everything in our relationship.

But it has also changed politics in Europe because all those radical and extreme right parties who felt supported by Trump and who Trump has been supporting, now have to distance themselves from them because nobody likes this idea of a European territory being occupied and conquered by Americans. That is something that especially the nationalists and sovereigntists see as very aggressive and very negative.

ZAKARIA: Jeppe, is there a plan that the Denmark, the Danish government can have to, you know, to do something about it? What is the likely scenario? How does this move forward?

KOFOD: Yes. First of all, I agree that the so-called Greenland moment, which happened this year, of course, in Europe, meaning that all the European allies stand together in rejecting the Trump aspiration to take Greenland, sovereignty of Greenland. But, you know, what's going on now is that this high level working group that was established back in January between the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark, so Greenland and Denmark.

And they have been working since then and progressing, and they would look at, you know, how the U.S. can use its already existing access to Greenland because there is a treaty from 1951. They have, you know, in practical terms, almost unlimited military access to Greenland. You know, how they would establish new or reopen old bases in Greenland and also having a much stronger cooperation on economic issues with Greenland and so on.

That group is working, and my information is that it's progressing. And the realist in the Trump administration, they all want this to, yes, to progress. But as we saw with the president at the NATO summit, it doesn't hold him back from commenting on Greenland. And I think his aspirations to take the sovereignty of Greenland is still there, even though the access for U.S. in Greenland is almost unlimited.

ZAKARIA: Frans, also the other country that attracted Trump's ire was Spain, which he really went after. I don't think he seems to understand how trade with the European Union works because he was essentially threatening to cut off trade with Spain. But am I right in thinking that you can't do that? The European Union acts on trade in unison. So it would be a trade war with Europe as a whole. Am I missing something?

TIMMERMANS: No, you're not. This is exactly right. And I saw the Spanish prime minister shrugging it off. You know, deja vu all over again. We are united as Europeans. So in matters of trade, it's Europe. It's not individual member states. Now it's something different if he would be talking about investments or cultural relations, but also there, it's business as usual between Spain and the United States on all levels.

So there's so much rhetoric here. There's so much reality TV performance here. And in actual fact, you know, you see it with the European leaders. They say, OK, let him do his spiel. We'll just carry on and make sure that we strengthen our bonds internally, Europe, and we prepare Europe for being able to defend itself with less support from the United States.

ZAKARIA: Well, stay with us because when we come back, I'm going to ask my two guests about precisely that. What is the long-term plan? What will America's relationship with Europe look like in the next 10 years? When we come back.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[10:18:44]

ZAKARIA: And we are back with the former minister of foreign affairs of Denmark, Jeppe Kofod, and the former vice president of the European Commission, Frans Timmermans.

Jeppe, when you look at the main security issue, Europe now faces, it's Russia's assault on Ukraine, potentially Russia doing something in Europe.

Do you think right now most European statesmen are confident that were Russia to attack a NATO country, which it has come close to doing in various ways, that Article Five would be triggered and the U.S. would come to, say, the defense of Estonia or Lithuania?

KOFOD: No. I think the reality is in Europe, unfortunately, that the trust in Article Five, they 100 percent trust that used to be there only a few years back is not there anymore. Of course, on paper, as I said in the declaration, it's a reiterated Article Five and an attack on NATO is an attack on all and we have a collective defense. But you have heard the president, you know, on several occasions questioning whether U.S. will come to Europe to help if there is actually an attack.

So Europe is working very, very hard to scale up its own defense investment, be prepared, and even, sooner than later, be able to defend itself without the support of the United States, not because Europe wants it, but because it's necessary under these circumstances.

[10:20:16]

ZAKARIA: Frans, is there a thought that we'll just waited out the Trump, you know, it's two more years of Trump, and then things go back to normal? Or is there now a long-term plan that will be put in place kind of no matter what? You know, in other words, Europe is going to buy insurance for itself from America regardless of who is the next president.

TIMMERMANS: Yes, I think it's permanent. I think Europe will take -- have to take care of its own security on a permanent basis. I think if we do that and if we do it right, and if you look at the trends, look at the trends surrounding Ukraine. Ukraine is going to be a security provider for Europe. It's asking for a lot of support now. Europe is coming together to give Ukraine that support, but it will be a phenomenal military power in the future.

And the border between us and Russia will be the defining border for Europe's future. And we Europeans will have to take care of that ourselves. And we can. The only thing is we need some time to get there. And at the same time, I am deeply convinced that if we do this right, America for its own self-interest will come back to us and we will see a NATO in a different nature, but still with an American involvement in the future.

ZAKARIA: Jeppe, what does this feel like emotionally and, you know, and culturally in Europe? It's, you know, this is the longest alliance that I can think of in years. It is not simply a political and military alliance. It's an alliance that is created a kind of coherent West, you know, intellectually, culturally, politically, militarily. And it does seem as though there are now serious fissures.

The West no longer really exists. We used to always speak about what should the West do, how should the West react. Is it even -- does it make sense, do you think, in the -- you know, in the future, will it make sense to talk about the West when there is such a divide between Europe and the U.S.?

KOFOD: Well, we used to, when I was foreign minister, to talk about the most -- the strongest military alliance in history, NATO, you know, resting on strong common values and interests. And one can, you know, easily argue today the values part is pretty gone because there are a different perception of what values we should pursue. And the interest part, you can say, on the United States first, for example, America first will change -- is changing that and the perception of what that means for us with President Trump is not a strong Europe. It's apparently a weak Europe.

So the whole fundament behind NATO is falling apart in a sense. So that's why Europe needs to put its act together, not talk about Trump or U.S., but talk about itself, and rearm and build up a strong deterrence to the east with Russia because even if there's a ceasefire and hopefully peace with Ukraine, Russia will still be a threat. And the same with United States, even if there is a new president after Trump and his presidency, the structural changes of Europe need to be able to defend itself alone. And U.S. not being a 100 percent reliable ally in all instances is there for the future.

ZAKARIA: Thank you, gentlemen. Fascinating conversation. Really appreciate it.

Next on GPS, Rahm Emanuel has historically been a staunch supporter of the state of Israel. So why is he calling on the U.S. to abandon its unconditional support for it? I'll ask him next.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[10:28:15]

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

EMANUEL: For too long, American policy towards Israel operated under the assumption that the best thing Washington can do for Jerusalem is to blindly, to silently stand behind your government without conditions, without demands, without consequences even when we disagreed. That has been our mistake. And it's been not a favor to you.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

ZAKARIA: That was former U.S. ambassador to Japan, former chief of staff to President Obama, Rahm Emanuel, in an astonishing speech this week in Tel Aviv in which he roundly criticized Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government for undermining Israels international legitimacy and called for a new relationship between the U.S. and Israel.

Joining me now to discuss his speech is Rahm Emanuel.

Welcome, Rahm. I want to ask you about the speech, which was very tough. But to me had a bit of an air of unreality to it in the sense that, you know, you're talking about sanctioning the Israeli government and officials for violence against Palestinians, for settlements, as if these settlements are going to go away. But as you know, over the last 20 years, the settlements have grown, you know, gargantuanly. The chance that they're all going to be dismantled is essentially zero.

The, you know, the kind of Israel you're hoping for, it's not just Netanyahu. Most Israelis agree with Netanyahu on most of his foreign policy. The party that would probably agree with your approach is the Labor Party, which is down to three seats in the Knesset. So, is it -- is it -- is your attack not simply an attack on Bibi Netanyahu, but on most of the Israeli political spectrum today?

RAHM EMANUEL, FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF TO PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, one is if you actually look at the coverage in the discussion, what I said was on Israel, the prime minister has led you into a dead wall. You've lost Europe. You lost the United States in the last three years. You only picked up Somaliland. As my mother would say, such a deal. And I said to the Arab League, which proposed the 23-state solution, game on. You want stability? You get in here and stand up a Palestinian authority that three times rejected Israel's offers. Three times returned it with violence. You have to stand up and be the adult in the room and give Israel a partner for sovereignty.

Make the politics of their desire for stability work with this Palestinian desire for sovereignty, with Israel's desire for security. But Israel should not be doing the things of undermining. Meaning, a government that is complicit with settlers committing violence, not only on the -- on the issue of housing. But as you well know one last thing, in 2009, when the prime minister publicly accused me of being a self-loathing Jew, it was over housing in the West Bank. That was the disagreement he and I had.

I'm not new to this. I didn't need a war to realize that the prime minister would lead Israel to isolation and being a pariah in its own backyard.

ZAKARIA: But my point is, it's not just the prime minister, it's all of Israel. There was a vote in the Knesset, as you know, on the two- state solution. And I can't remember the numbers now, but it was something like 75 percent of the Knesset voted against a two-state solution. And yet what you are proposing is essentially a two-state solution.

EMANUEL: No, that's actually -- well, let me try to clarify what 23 is, why that's not two, Israel is a pariah. Now, all 21 nations in the Arab league would create diplomatic relations with Israel. That's what they offered in 2013.

Second, let's get away from that. For the first time in 50 years, you don't have an Assad government in Syria. That is the transit route for Iran supplying Hezbollah that is firing missiles at you. That president in Syria said, you, Israel and Syria, have a common enemy in Iran. He said, I would like to get a security agreement. Pick up the phone, we will facilitate it and call him. You would cut off Hezbollah's major patron, Iran. And you would get a security front so that the Northern Galilee and the residents of the Northern Galilee get the security that the residents in Tel Aviv are also seeking. That is another way of achieving peace.

ZAKARIA: So, you know, what I'm asking you is what some people are saying in the United States. You are making this speech because you want to run for president, and you feel that the party would not accept somebody who was regarded as a strong supporter of Israel. So you're now saying this to distance yourself. I just want to give you a chance to respond to that criticism.

EMANUEL: Well, first of all, I worked with President Clinton on the Oslo Accords, Camp David, Wye plantation. In 2000 -- and those were all for seeing a sovereignty and security.

In 2009, when others were still replicating, lip syncing, what Prime Minister Netanyahu was saying I was the only one to his face confronted him, said it to his face. Said that, if you keep doing this, you're going to be isolated, and it will lead to perpetual conflict.

Third, if you're running for president of the United States, going to Tel Aviv is not your first stop. It's usually somewhere else in the lower 48 where you go. But I thought being honest, being direct is better than firing spitballs from across the Atlantic from the comfort zone of the Senate well or on TV.

So I told the Israeli public, this is the price. You have lost America. It's not a Democratic Party problem when two thirds of the American people are not supporting Israel. And for ages 30 and younger, it's down to 21. That's not a Democratic Party problem. That's an America problem.

And I thought it's better to be honest, better to be direct. And one of the things I also know, and it's not a surprise if I do decide to run for president, you might as well know you're going to get the truth from me however it comes. That's what I did as chief of staff for President Obama. That's what I did the other day. And I said, it's better to do it directly to the Israeli people rather than spending 18 years lip synching what the prime minister said or looking away. We did Israel no favors.

ZAKARIA: Rahm Emanuel, always good to have you on.

EMANUEL: Good to have you. Thanks, Fareed.

ZAKARIA: Next on GPS, a pall was cast over French President Macrons historic visit to Syria last week when two bombs exploded right near his hotel.

[10:35:00]

What is going on in that country? I will talk to a Syrian journalist when we come back.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

ZAKARIA: This week, France's President Emmanuel Macron traveled to Syria's capital to meet with President al-Sharaa, becoming the first major western leader to visit since the fall of the dictator Bashar al-Assad. But the visit was quickly overshadowed when two bombs exploded near the hotel where Macron was staying. Although, he wasn't there at the time.

The attack injured at least 18 people. It was tragic. It was also bad press for al-Sharaa, who, you may remember, is a former leader of a group that was designated by the U.S. as a foreign terrorist organization.

[10:40:04]

He is now trying to rebrand his country and attract foreign investment. Joining me now is Loubna Mrie, a Syrian journalist and author who covered the war in Syria. She has a new book out "Defiance: A Memoir of Awakening, Rebellion, and Survival in Syria." It's a wonderful read. LOUBNA MRIE, AUTHOR, "DEFIANCE": Thank you so much.

ZAKARIA: So tell us, how do we understand what is going on in Syria right now? You have this former terrorist turned president. Now, Macron goes there and there are these bombs. Whom is he fighting with mostly? And is he -- is he winning? Is he in charge of Syria?

MRIE: The question here is, who is going to benefit from the destabilization of the country? You have the remnants of the Assad regime, but also you have the remnants of extremist groups that they find Ahmed al-Sharaa as a traitor for them, that he had turned his back on them. And now he is shaking hands with the same people that are considered their enemies.

ZAKARIA: Right.

MRIE: So it is understandable why there are so many people in the country now. They don't want Macron in the capital. Why they don't want other western leaders in the country.

ZAKARIA: Do you think al-Sharaa has really turned a leaf and wants to be this pro-western, you know, kind of guy who's bringing capitalism to Syria?

MRIE: I mean, to be honest, when Assad was overthrown in December of 2024, I was, of course, very skeptical of this person. But I knew that Syria deserves a chance. And whoever was able to kind of push Assad out of power, out of the presidential palace deserves a chance. Even though I am aware of the history of this group that he led.

Actually, HTS was one of the main -- along with the Assad regime they are one of the main factors that ended up destroying the 2011 Syrian uprising. So I really wanted to believe that he was capable of, you know, like starting over. And we saw him doing that. But also we saw him focused more on him rebranding his image on the international stage more than trying to get the country to the safe shore.

ZAKARIA: So one of the things that your book does very well is it explains how dissent grows in an authoritarian regime. What was the pivotal thing that made Assad's regime collapse in the end?

MRIE: So there are so many people who look at what happened in December of 2024, and they say it's a -- it's like the success of the Syrian uprising. And I don't really agree with that, because the main reason why Assad was overthrown in 2024 is because Syria found itself in this critical moment on a geopolitical stage that Assad eventually lost his allies, he lost Hezbollah, he lost Iran, the Russians were busy with Ukrainians. So there was lots of factors that eventually led to the removal or Assad government fleeing the country.

ZAKARIA: Fleeing. That's what I thought you would say. And because I've been thinking about your book in relation to Iran today and how people keep waiting for an Iranian opposition against a very tough regime, and it seems like that's not enough.

I mean, if I read you correctly, Iran would -- the Iranian regime still has a lot of power. It would take a lot to dislodge it. And you'd need many, many international setbacks. You'd have to lose a lot of the capacity that that regime has. Would you agree?

MRIE: I would say that if there is one thing that the Syrian uprising taught me is just to understand that it's never up to the people. And unfortunately, we hoped in the beginning that if we document enough atrocities that we can stop them. But eventually you come to the realization that it's never about the atrocities. It's never about the people. It's never about human rights violation. It's never about democracy. It's actually about where are we today in this political moment, on the geopolitical stage?

And today, I feel like after, you know, like 10 years, my faith in journalism kind of shifted. Like now I don't see it as, OK, we need to document the atrocities so we can make a change. Like now our goal of documentation is to make sure that these oppressors, when they win and -- unfortunately, we are seeing the oppressors winning and they are staying in power, it's just to make sure that these oppressors don't tell the future generations that we did not exist. And this applies to Syria and applies to Iran.

ZAKARIA: That's a very sad conclusion to come to.

[10:45:00]

MRIE: It's sad, but also, I think it's really also what happened in Syria made me realize how, like all this faith in like international community or like United Nations or Security Council, it's just like you have this idea that -- like there are powers out there that are making sure that, you know, that people don't get killed by their government. But then eventually you become aware that these are all naive ideas that don't really translate on the ground.

ZAKARIA: Loubna, thank you so much for coming on.

MRIE: Thank you so much for having me. I hope you enjoyed the book.

ZAKARIA: Next on GPS, Trump has once before tried to defang an American adversary deep in a nuclear arms race. It didn't end well. Which country? I'll tell you next.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

[10:50:36]

ZAKARIA: And now for the last look. Donald Trump was mad as hell with Iran this week. At the NATO summit in Turkey, he called the Iranian leadership cuckoo, evil, sick people, and a cancer. In February, he called the regime a very wicked radical dictatorship. Weeks later, he threatened that if Iran didn't accept a ceasefire, a whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again.

By June, he changed course, signing the memorandum of understanding intended to bring an end to the war, temporarily lifting oil sanctions against Iran and dangling the prospect of a huge fund to rebuild the country. He said it was unfair to deny Iran ballistic missiles if other countries had them. And he said he would be honored to meet the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, whose father Trump had called one of the most evil people in history when announcing that the U.S. and Israel had killed him.

If this hot and cold diplomacy surprises you, it shouldn't. Let me take you back to Trump 1.0 when the president was trying to defang the nuclear program of another bitter antagonist, North Korea. As with Iran, it all started with maximalist threats. Faced with North Koreas advancing nuclear program, Trump told reporters in 2017 that the country will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen. Sounds familiar?

In September of that year, Trump pledged to totally destroy North Korea, saying that its leader, Kim Jong Un, was on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime. He also repeatedly insulted Kim personally, calling him Little Rocket Man, referring to Kim's short stature and penchant for missile tests.

But then Trump switched course, agreeing to meet with Kim in Singapore. After that summit, Trump said of the North Korean leader, I trust him and that he had a great personality, that they fell in love through letters. Trump later invited Kim to meet him at the DMZ, where they posed for photographs together.

But the diplomacy went nowhere, and within a year, Trump seemingly lost interest. He has little to show for his sticks or his carrots. Neither a nuclear agreement nor a totally destroyed North Korea. In fact, quite the opposite. North Korea's nuclear program is stronger than ever.

Last month, Kim commissioned a 5,000 ton naval destroyer, the country's largest ever warship that will be capable of carrying nuclear missiles. Pyongyang is also working toward a nuclear powered submarine, which would combine stealth and range, theoretically allowing it to launch a retaliatory strike from sea if it were hit first on land.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute announced last month that North Korea may have as many as 60 nuclear warheads with enough fissile material to assemble at least 30 more. Seven years ago, when Trump and Kim met, experts estimated North Korea possessed just 20 to 30 nuclear warheads. And last year, a top Air Force general told Congress that the hermit kingdom had tested a new ICBM that probably can deliver a nuclear payload to targets throughout north America.

Trump has said that he wants to meet with Kim again, but it will be harder now than ever to tempt North Korea to give up nuclear weapons. North Korea is not the famine struck isolated country it was in the 1990s, eager for handouts of food and fuel. Though a very poor nation, the North Korean economy grew by 3.7 percent in 2024, according to South Korea's central bank, which estimates that that growth has continued.

Part of this turnaround has to do with the fact that North Korea is less isolated than it has been in the past. As the diplomat Jung Pak notes in "Foreign Affairs," Kim has used the growing rift between the United States and China to strengthen his relationship with Beijing, which is Pyongyang's largest trading partner.

But Kim's geopolitical masterstroke may be that after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, he made himself indispensable to Vladimir Putin. In 2023, North Korea started providing arms to Russia. It now supplies up to 40 percent of the ammunition that Russia is using in Ukraine, according to Ukrainian intelligence.

[10:55:05]

In 2024, Putin traveled to Pyongyang and signed a mutual defense treaty with Kim, which reestablished a security guarantee that had lapsed at the end of the Cold War. The agreement paved the way for about 16,000 North Korean troops to fight in Ukraine on Russia's behalf.

The relationship is a huge strategic win for Kim. As Oriana Skylar Mastro notes in "Foreign Affairs," North Korean soldiers have learned the latest in drone warfare from the Russians. And now there's evidence that Russia is helping North Korea develop that nuclear submarine.

Trump's volatile, idiosyncratic and shifting diplomacy did not, in the end, work with North Korea. And as of now, it doesn't seem to be working with Iran either.

Thanks to all of you for being part of my program this week. I will see you next week.

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