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Greenfield at Large

America Strikes Back: Interview With Wesley Clark

Aired October 24, 2001 - 23:00   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
JEFF GREENFIELD, HOST: The news is filled with stories about danger at home, germ warfare in the mail, warnings that terrorists might strike again. Sometimes it makes it hard to remember the fact that the United States is still at war in Afghanistan, that American flyers are at risk everyday.

The nature of that fighting, not so incidentally, may be influenced by a far more complicated question. If that fighting does end with the collapse of the Taliban regime, what comes next? What role, if any, should the U.S. play in that nation's future? We will focus on the post-war dilemma a little later. But first, you want to turn to the fighting that's taking place now with CNN military analyst and former Nato Supreme Commander retired general Leslie Clark.

Good evening, general.

RETIRED GENERAL WESLEY CLARK, FORMER NATO SUPREME COMMANDER: Good evening, Jeff.

GREENFIELD: Given what you are seeing now, is it clear to you that in fact diplomatic and political considerations are shaping the nature of the fighting the U.S. is now engaged in?

CLARK: Well, it's not totally clear, but I would anticipate that if there weren't these considerations, there'd be heavier air strikes directed at the Taliban positions just north of Kabul. So it seems to be a measured effort, a measured series of attacks that are going step by step to reduce the opposition, but not designed to create a breakthrough quite yet.

GREENFIELD: Not designed to create a breakthrough because, for instance, the U.S. might not want to see the Northern Alliance in that much power in a post-Taliban regime?

CLARK: Well, I think it's a matter of trying to get all of the different pieces of the problem lined up so that a solution can be found. The Taliban power has to be broken. The government has to come in. There has to be a decision in the process, to turn over Osama bin Laden, or at least to stand aside from Osama bin Laden while forces from the United States take him.

And what comes next has to be demonstrably better than what's there for the Afghan people in Kabul right now. So the United States certainly wouldn't want to be part of a humanitarian disaster unfolding as a result of its actions. And that could be through starvation. It could be through mayhem in the streets of Kabul. That's happened before, not with the United States active involvement and presence. And certainly the United States wants to take all its measures it can to prevent something like that.

GREENFIELD: And I can understand how this question may seem like echoes all the way back to Vietnam, but let me ask it bluntly. Is it fair to the military? Can the military be expected to conduct a campaign, not just with minimum civilian casualties, let's say, but its force constrained by a whole raft of diplomatic and political considerations.

CLARK: Well, it's required by the military. It's not a matter of what's fair, it's what's required. The military has to be able to meet the political constraints of the campaign. It has to meet the timing requirements.

If they needed a rapid breakthrough, the military is required to try to do that. If they want measured, then the military has to do that. This is what modern war is all about. This is the lining up of this diplomatic, strategic, and operational and tactical means which we saw in Kosovo in that campaign. And it has to be done here as well.

GREENFIELD: Well, let's talk about what's facing United States. Ramadan begins in a few weeks. And at least from our supposed allied Pakistan, from General Musharraf, he's saying that he wants the military campaign ended by then. And winter's coming within a matter of weeks, which I assume makes all kinds of military efforts much more difficult.

Does that mean that the U.S. has to fulfill its military objectives within a relatively narrow timeframe?

CLARK: No, but it makes it desirable. If the politics can be lined up that we could move into another phase of the campaign by that time, that is to say we might be able to move into a phase where the Taliban front north of Kabul had been broken through, there was consolidation of the Northern Alliance, plus some other groups in Kabul, there'd be a new government forming and the United States would have more freedom of action in the southern area, which is probably where Osama bin Laden has been located around Kandahar, to take the actions that were necessary there.

But it may not be possible to line everything up. The debate apparently in Peshawar goes on, as we speak. There's no yet determination of what kind of group will be formed that could govern Kabul.

And so, until it is, the United States is, I think, trying to manage the process so that all this comes together at the right time. I think winter will be a constraint, but it probably won't be as great a constraint in most parts of Afghanistan, as it is in the northern and more mountainous regions.

And I think Ramadan's a constraint. But in the Kosovo campaign that was waged by Nato 2.5 years ago, Easter was a problem. And yet, Nato did at last make the decision to conduct its bombing right through Easter. And I'm sure that in this case, despite Ramadan being a constraint, if it's required the United States will continue its campaign through Ramadan.

GREENFIELD: Well, and speaking of which, one winter comes which comes in Afghanistan pretty early a few weeks. What specifically can we expect to see in terms of a shift in military strategy on the part of the United States forces?

CLARK: Well, it will very much depend on how winter comes. If it's simply colder and more clear air, well that's an advantage for the United States. If it's accompanied by overcast and snow, and it will be in some areas, especially in the higher areas, then it's going to make it more difficult to use air power. It may mean that there's more reliance on some kind of ground, stay-behind ground action or residual ground presence.

It's really too early to say. It will depend probably more on the logistics considerations, than it will on the weather. But for example in colder weather, helicopters fly further. They carry more the blades are more efficient.

In cold, clear weather, the laser designators work more effectively. The electro-optical binoculars are more effective. And so there are some advantages in this cold clear weather that will come to much of Afghanistan.

GREENFIELD: And finally, General, if you were sitting in a place of command right now, commanding U.S. forces as they go into Afghanistan, what would be your single biggest concern in the days and weeks ahead?

CLARK: Well, I'd be wanting to make sure I had the best, most accurate intelligence information from all possible sources. And then I'd want to measure the campaign step by step, to make sure I've got no constraints in the long run that would force me to do something that wasn't wise in the short run.

Time's on our side in this campaign. We've got to measure it out. We've got to be precise. We've got use the information, but the key to this campaign is going to be accurate, timely information on Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda.

GREENFIELD: All right. My thanks to CNN military analyst retired General Wesley Clark joining us from London.

When we come back, the dangers of not being involved -- the dangers of being too involved perhaps in a new Afghanistan. That's right after this break.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

GREENFIELD: And we're back. We're talking about what ought to happen in Afghanistan after the Taliban. It was about 100 years ago, as America was flexing its muscle around the world, that a U.S. congressman said we will lift China up, ever up until it is just like Kansas City.

Well today, we're a long way from that theory of nation building. In fact, that term itself was used by George Bush in last year's presidential campaign to criticize U.S. arrogance. But now President Bush and a host of other voices are arguing that the war in Afghanistan is not the end of America's task, but the beginning.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

(voice-over): There is a long tradition to this idea. When the allies occupied Germany and Japan after World War 2, they spent years rebuilding the political and economic foundations of those conquered nations. Both became prosperous, democratic allies within a decade.

GEORGE C. MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF STATE: If we decide to do this thing, we can do it successfully.

GREENFIELD: And in those first post-war years, the U.S. spent billions to rebuild the shattered economies of Western Europe, combining humanitarian impulses with the strategic necessity to shore up those countries against Soviet threats.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Millions of villagers have received the benefits of modern medicine.

GREENFIELD: In contrast to those successes, the attempt to promote economic and political progress in South Vietnam did not work, in part, because of division in the United States about that war, in part, because Vietnam's culture differed so widely from that of the West.

So how can we tell whether the seeds of democracy and economic growth will flourish, as they have in Korea, Taiwan, and in much of Latin America, or whether they will wither, as they have in so much of Africa?

Is Afghanistan a nation hungry not just for food, but for political stability and economic modernization? Or is it a nation whose culture and politics are simply immune to outside pressure?

(END VIDEOTAPE)

GREENFIELD: And joining me now to address those questions are Robin Wright of "The Los Angeles Times." She's the author of "Sacred Rage, the Wrath of Militant Islam." And also from Washington, Doug Bandow. He's the syndicated columnist and senior fellow at the Cato Institute, a former special assistant to President Reagan.

Miss Wright, since were you in Afghanistan last year, before we even talk about the intricacies and the political intricacies, give us, if you will, the lay of the land? What is it like, in terms of looking at that country, in trying to figure out what to do?

ROBIN WRIGHT, "LOS ANGELES TIMES": Well, the devastation after two decades of war is really quite profound. The drive, for example, from Peshawar on the border of Pakistan to Kabul, a mere 100 miles can take at least 7 hours. The roads just don't exist. It is like driving through a series of valleys.

The tragedy of children in Afghanistan, as witnessed on the side of the road, where kids throw in dirt as the source of begging for money, hoping that people will -- drivers will throw out a few Afghans.

And of course, this is at a time that $1 equals 73,000 Afghans. This is a society that is living almost centuries ago, where the average civil servant makes about $10 a month. I spent Easter last year at an orphanage with 800 children, most of whom had parents, but the families couldn't afford to keep their children anymore. And so they turned them into an orphanage.

This is a society that just doesn't exist, has no infrastructure whatsoever.

GREENFIELD: All right, let me explain, by the way, to our viewers that some of those sounds you are hearing are the sounds of distress of Washington, D.C. Our guests are out relatively exposed to the elements, which is why you're hearing what you're hearing.

But let me pursue this, Ms. Wright. Secretary of State Powell today, when he talked about nation building in this ravaged land that you've described, had this to say to a House committee on international relations. I want to you to hear what he said.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE: The Taliban government must now go because they are part and parcel to al Qaeda.

We believe that once that regime has gone, it is necessary to find a successor regime that represents all the people of Afghanistan. So there are a lot of things starting to happen. And we hope that we'll be able to cause all of this to gel in the very near future.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

GREENFIELD: Now one of the things that happened today, Ms. Wright, was this meeting of some 800 members of Afghan opposition folks, meeting in Peshawar, Pakistan. They agreed that the ex-king should be the head of state. There ought to be a large constituent assembly. And that U.M. forces from Islamic states should try to keep the peace.

Given what you've described, is that kind of political framework even marginally a hopeful sign of a more stable Afghanistan?

WRIGHT: Well, it's a very important first step, but this is only one group. There are other groups outside Afghanistan.

Another one is meeting in Turkey soon. There are the Bonn group, the king in Rome, the Cyprus group. There are a lot of different groups. And of course, there are those inside Afghanistan that the United States particularly would like to see included, those for example who are leaders of tribes, some of the former commanders who have even fought with the Taliban, some who fought the Soviets during the Afghan war.

It's a first step, but there is still an awful lot to be done. And then there are the bigger questions as you mentioned, the peace force. There's a great deal of controversy about whether an Islamic force actually could be gathered.

There are a lot of Islamic countries that don't want to be seen to be picking up from where the U.S. bombing left off, trying to reassemble the country. They don't want to be tainted by seemingly approving of what has happened in Afghanistan.

And of course, there are those who are arguing that such as the United Nations, the U.N. representative for Afghanistan, who has suggested that it would be better to have an Afghan force pulling together the various factions that have fought as the interim military force in Afghanistan, which in my mind, would be a disastrous formula, given that they've fought each other so often in the past.

GREENFIELD: Now Doug Bandow, even given these difficulties that Robin Wright has outlined, when you consider what happened when the United States walked away from Afghanistan 20-some years ago after the Soviets were defeated, and Afghanistan became the staging area for so many of these terrorists, isn't it in America's -- defined by the most narrow self interest, isn't it in our interest to make sure that post- Taliban Afghanistan is shaped in a way that at least protects our interests?

DOUG BANDOW, SYNDICATED COLUMNIST: Well, I think we have to have narrow goals. I think the most important interests for the United States is that any post-Taliban regime not support and not allow terrorism to flourish.

I think you want to be real careful to say it's in America's interest to try to dictate the composition of a regime. What is the role of the Pashtuns? You know, how much authority does the Northern Alliance have? Where do the warlords come in? These things are enormously complex.

And the problem is, if you don't have a real country to start with, in a sense that we did have, for example, in Germany and Japan after World War II, trying to bring this together is monstrously difficult. And especially the idea of bringing in an American occupational force.

I mean, that I think is extraordinarily dangerous, keeps the U.S. entangled. And it's going to keep us there forever. It's going to be very hard to ever pull out, hoping to have a stable regime though.

They've had 30 years of war, coup d'etats, you know, communist you know rule, Soviet occupation, guerrilla fighting. You know, this place is a real mess. It's very sad and tragic, but it's rather like trying to bring peace to Zaire or a number of other countries. The whole infrastructure's collapsed. You have to be very careful.

GREENFIELD: Well, I haven't heard anyone call, in so many words, for an occupying force, which is why I think Secretary of State Powell is looking at this kind of chess game going on. But I think in one sense, you may have contradicted yourself.

I want to give you a chance to uncontradict it or tell me I'm wrong. You say it's clearly in America's interest not to permit terrorism to flourish again in post-Taliban Afghanistan, but it was precisely our departure and the vacuum that was left, that permitted the Taliban to take power and to have Afghanistan become a staging area for terrorism.

So let me ask you, it seems to me that that would argue, based on your own premise, that we have to at least stay and make sure that what is in place is at least minimally OK.

BANDOW: I'm not sure what the -- what you mean by our departure from Afghanistan. You know, we supported the Mujahedeen against the Soviets for geopolitical reasons. We wanted to bleed the Soviets.

We were never there in terms of an occupying force, a bombing force. You know, we were never there in the sense of having our people in control. The problem was it had a succession of fighting that we never really were in control.

The problem today, I would argue, is what we need to make clear is that regime that survives there needs to keep one thing in mind. We won't tolerate terrorism. We need to make that the primary goal. We should be less concerned about what the composition of the regime is, most concerned about it, not support terrorism and make that the fundamental premise of any of our relations with them.

GREENFIELD: All right. I want to pick up on this conversation and reach the broader question of whether or not interventionism itself may be a spark for terrorism. We'll do that when we come back in a moment.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

GREENFIELD: We're back talking about Afghanistan after the Taliban with Robin Wright of "The Los Angeles Times" and with syndicated columnist Doug Bandow.

Ms. Wright, one of the things that critics of American foreign policy have said is that time after time, we stumble into a region. We know nothing about its culture. We don't understand the complexities. We impose a kind of Western model on the political future. And we come a cropper. Isn't that a reason to at least be very, very, very prudent about how much we try to shape post-Taliban Afghanistan?

WRIGHT: Absolutely, and you've raised a very important point. I think, however, that Colin Powell in his testimony today and in recent statements by other U.S. officials has indicated a sensitivity. They are beginning to be aware 25 years after we first came into conflict with the Muslim world over issues of government and the U.S. role in the Middle East.

We are finally showing some sensitivity about what kind of relationship we have in the Islamic world, how much we intervene. I think, in fact, the United States wants to finish this military operation and then back away. It has already made clear that neither the United States nor Britain, which has been a co-partner in the military operation, should have any role in a peace monitoring force or in guiding the government. They're looking for the United Nations to take an administrative role and for Islamic countries or some other force to be on the ground to maintain peace.

GREENFIELD: The idea that a more stable Afghanistan might protect America from terrorism, it would seem to me that, you know, al Qaeda or whoever could simply pack up and go someplace else. Is there any reason to think that a more stable Afghanistan in this particular issue will make America safer from terrorism?

WRIGHT: It'll make it marginally safer because there are very few places for al Qaeda to go anymore. Sudan has begun to cooperate. It's arrested some two dozen different al Qaeda operatives and supporters. It's closed its al Qaeda bases in Sudan.

BANDOW: That's particularly the case if we make it clear to other governments that they face serious retaliation if they cooperate with terrorists. That has to be part of the message that goes out. And I think that probably is going out.

GREENFIELD: And what about, Doug, the question that desperate poverty, to use the analogy everybody uses, is the swamp in which terrorism breeds. The hopelessness produced by poverty is something that the United States really has to take a role in ameliorating?

WRIGHT: Well, that's a very important issue. And I think also the absence of democracy, the fact that people have no control over their lives.

BANDOW: I think there's a fundamental moral issue in terms of taking care of people in poverty. But if poverty was the sole cause, then by Zaire, you know, we'd be having, you know, people blowing up buildings. We'd have you know, India, which has mass poverty. You know, there's poverty throughout Africa.

And I think -- and democracy, I mean, the problem in democracy is a very real one, but in a lot of these countries, frankly, democracy is more likely to bring us Islamic fundamentalists. You look at Algeria. You look at Egypt. You look at Pakistan. You know, it's not clear that America really wants democracy in these countries.

I think we have to look at the role of the United States. That plays a role. There's a hatred of American values. There's also a hatred for American intervention, you know, support for regimes like Saudi Arabia, you know, a decade of war against Iraq, you know, being involved in the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. These sorts of things roll in.

GREENFIELD: Doug, you've raised a couple of issues. I want to let Robin Wright come in on whichever one she chooses to.

WRIGHT: Well I think that the United States war on terrorism has to be followed by a real effort to deal with issues of poverty, but also as I said, issues of democracy to try to address the things that make people turn to extremism. To -- whether it's against their own governments or whether it's against the United States.

I do think that as long as the United States is a superpower, we will continue to be the target of attacks. We symbolize strength. And we are also, whether the most important power in deciding which governments we are allied with, which governments we support, including governments like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. And I think some of our alliances make us very vulnerable.

GREENFIELD: And that's a point though that you've raised in a column. You seem to be suggesting that it is our global position in the world, not that justifies terrorism, God knows, Doug, but that is actually a source of some of this. Is your remedy for that that the United States should essentially become -- pull back from the world, become less engaged?

BANDOW: Well, I think the question is what kind of engagement. I think we should always be economically engaged, culturally engaged. We should be much more hesitant, I think, to get involved military, much more hesitant to try to impose on other countries our decisions in terms of their settlements, their internal political arrangements, trying to resolve disputes.

You know, I mean, hideous, you know, emotional disputes going back decades or centuries. So I'd suggest a much greater caution. The reality is there's a huge consequence here we found out of intervening abroad, that we're no longer safe. Our homeland is at risk. We've got to take that consequence into account in making foreign policy decisions.

GREENFIELD: Quickly Robin?

WRIGHT: But if we don't intervene in some cases, look at Bosnia. What would have happened if the United States had not taken the lead?

BANDOW: It's not clear we solved the problem there. We have an artificial country that's not going to be a real country, ever.

GREENFIELD: Do you know what, folks? This is the subject for another time, rather than try to jam the history of Bosnia into the last five seconds. So I'm going to do force majeure here and thank both of you, Robin Wright of "The Los Angeles Times" and columnist Doug Bandow.

And finally, if I might, last night on this program former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright talked about the danger of unintended consequences in foreign policy, trying to solve one dilemma, only to discover you've created another one.

Well, imagine you're an American decision-maker right now, and you look back on some of those unintended consequences. The U.S. backed the Shah of Iran as a force for stability and modernization. When he fell, Iran fell under the control of forces implacably hostile to the U.S. Fearing Iran, the U.S. tilted toward the more secular nation of Iraq in the 1980s. That strengthened the hand of Saddam Hussein. When the U.S. went to war against Saddam a decade ago, it formed a broadbased coalition. But in order to keep that coalition together, it did not remove Saddam and his hunger for weapons of mass destruction while it had the chance.

At the height of the Cold War, as you've heard, the U.S. gave billions to the anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan. But with the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. turned away from Afghanistan. That nation is now a central staging area for terrorist training.

Now with that history in mind, what do you do now? Which forces in Afghanistan do you support? How do you balance the competing demands of Pakistan, Iran, Russia, the former Soviet republics? Do you strike at Iraq, even if it mean angering Arab allies? How much do you push the Saudis to stop playing footsie with the extremists without weakening the government?

This is why journalism is such a rewarding career. You get to ask the questions. You don't have to answer them.

I'm Jeff Greenfield. Thank you for watching. "MONEYLINE" with Jan Hopkins is next.

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