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Trump Admin Faces Deep Skepticism in Early Tariff Arguments; Now: Supreme Court Hears Oral Arguments on Trump Tariffs; Treasury Secretary Attends Supreme Court Arguments on Trump Tariffs; Roberts Questions Key Precedent Trump is Relying on. Aired 12-12:30p ET

Aired November 05, 2025 - 12:00   ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

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-- That's not revenue raising. It doesn't implicate the founder's concern. It doesn't implicate the concerns you wrote about in consumers research about the fear of the government.

NEAL KATYAL, LAWYER AND FORMER PRINCIPAL DEPUTY SOLICITOR GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES: You're not answering my question, though, Mr. Gorsuch, I'm talking about just the plain text here. In your moving to major questions or a non-delegate. That's the move you're making, which I think, you know, fine, we can consider that. I'm just talking about on the text, OK?

It says, by means of licenses or otherwise, you've conceded that licenses are economically equivalent to tariffs. And the statute says, by means of licenses or otherwise regulate.

NEIL GORSUCH, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: Right, it's only a means. And we looked at the --

KATYAL: Yeah -- means is, why isn't tariffs a permissible means on the statute?

GORSUCH: Because, again, it has to be related to the nine powers --

KATYAL: Well, license can be we all have -- we have to acknowledge that. And you've said a license can raise revenue, and you could, you've said license is equivalent to a tariff economically. So, what about otherwise?

GORSUCH: Justice -- Gorsuch, if the license where the otherwise is raising revenue, then it is a difference in kind from the other verbs. And we looked at the history of our purposes under -- and we were not able to find any involving licenses or license fees.

KATYAL: OK. Last question, little further afield. Parties discussed a little bit the analogy to the Foreign Commerce Clause, of course, next to it is the Indian Commerce Clause. And delegations there were very broad initially, and involved licenses once again. And why shouldn't that inform our understanding the Foreign Commerce Clause?

GORSUCH: I don't know that I have a position on that. Maybe is a little too a field for me to --

KATYAL: Well, if the president has broad authority in one part of the commerce clause, why wouldn't he even in the next-door neighbor?

GORSUCH: Oh, I see, because -- Congress has specifically been given the exclusive power over tariffs, and so if they're to part with it, I think, as this court has said in J.W. Hampton which is a tariffs case --

KATYAL: So, you'd say the same principle would apply with tariffs with the Indian Commerce Clause is a tariff specific argument?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I think it's at least intelligible principles, is what this court has used for tariffs specifically. And we think that's the way you should look at this. And then under intelligible principles, this is miles away from any delegation we have ever seen.

KATYAL: Thank you. Justice Kavanaugh.

BRETT KAVANAUGH, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: Just on the Nixon point, because you said, I think that the current tariffs are unprecedented. I mean, that was a 10 percent worldwide tax on every import into the United States. I believe.

I mean, we don't need just think that's a fact. You have arguments about that. You made good arguments about that, but just wanted that point to be clear on Algonquin to pick up on, just sort of my worst kind assist. Your argument here is that the statute has to use the word tariffs, I think, basically.

And we went through Nixon and Yoshida, but then Algonquin, the statute for 232, does not use the word tariffs. It uses adjust imports. And President Ford had imposed, again, a pretty significant tariff on oil imports. It was challenged. It got to this court. Attorneys, standing where you are, stood up and said the license fee.

Now before the court involves the broadest exercise of the tariff power in the history of the American Republic. In fact, we would have to go back to George the Third Stamp Tax to determine as broad an executive power is claimed in this case, the statute is a simple one.

It does not mention the tariff on its face, the argument there was the word tariff was not mentioned, used to just imports. The court obviously, 9-0 rejects that argument in part, because, as others have pointed out, the court does a lot of question, what's the difference between a quota and a tariff?

And what's the difference between an embargo and a tariff? And so, when the court writes the opinion, it says, we find no support in the language of the statute, the language for respondents, contention that the authorization of the president to adjust imports should be read to encompass only quantitative methods, i.e. quotas, as opposed to monetary methods, i.e. license fees, of affecting such adjustments.

So, on your basic point that you need the word tariff, Algonquin says you don't need the word tariff, and that was President Ford's oil imports. It's 9-0 the oral argument goes through this your answer.

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KATYAL: There's a lot there. Justice Kavanaugh, so please bear with me. First, I'd like to will clear, clarify what our position is generally and then deal with Algonquin. Our position is not that you have to use the word tariff or any other magic word. It's true that Congress has used a specialized vocabulary since the founding, since 1790 using words like tariffs or duties.

But as I was saying earlier, to Justice Gorsuch, you can even use the word regulate, as our page 15 of our brief says, or you can even imagine something that says, quote, the president may regulate importation by requiring importers to pay 10 percent of the value of goods to the treasury.

So, I don't think you have to use any particular word. The question is, in context, is it does --

KAVANAUGH: Algonquin didn't have anything like that, but keep going.

KATYAL: So, Algonquin does have, I think, context that's miles apart from what the government is seeking here to do with IEEPA. So first of all, it is a common-sense statute. I understand there's some rhetoric by common sense reading and such. I know there's some rhetoric by the lawyer who stood here before which is, of course, forgivable --

It was a statute about one product, 232, is article by article. It's one product. This is a billion products, or even more, that the government is seeking. The Algonquin was expressly a trade statute. It was the 1962 Trade Act. It's everything this case isn't. Algonquin had a specific reference to the word duties in a separate provision.

Algonquin had a legislative history that was clear as day that the president -- was the president was given this power. And I understand this court today doesn't look to the legislative history, but the way Algonquin got to where it was, was by saying the legislative history the chief sponsor of the act.

KAVANAUGH: I think I'll disagree with you on that. It does a plain text and then says, is there anything in the legislative history to defeat the plain text? So, I disagree pretty strongly with you on that, but it doesn't defeat your point. Keep going.

KATYAL: OK. So, I'd also say in the maybe the most important point, 230 -- our point, our argument, is not just that you have to specifically authorize a tariff with some sort of word, but also that one way of understanding whether Congress is delegating its awesome tariff power, its awesome taxing powers, to ask, are there limits to what Congress has put in.

And in Algonquin in Section 232, the court points to and goes painstakingly through all the limits. The first words of the decision are all about how constrained the statute is. It's a reticulated scheme. The Cabinet Secretaries have to make certain findings. There are specific statutory factors Congress says the president must look at before acting.

There are public hearings. There are limited remedies, quote, to the extent necessary. All of that is in the statute, all of that is in the Algonquin opinion, none of it is in IEEPA. That's the problem, and that's why, just like James and Moore, the Algonquin case said, this is a very limited decision, limited just to the facts.

KAVANAUGH: Thank you.

KATYAL: Justice Barrett.

AMY CONEY BARRETT, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: So, this license thing is important to me. And do you agree that pursuant to IEEPA, the president could impose, could regulate commerce by imposing a license fee?

KATYAL: Sorry, could you say that again?

BARRETT: Could the president regulate commerce under IEEPA by using a licensing fee?

KATYAL: Not a fee. So, I should have said this earlier, but license is different from a licensing fee. IEEPA and TWIA authorize licenses, not license fees. And no president has ever charged to my knowledge, fees under these two statutes for the licenses, so fees and permissible licenses,

BARRETT: Fees permissible if they cover the costs of the scheme?

KATYAL: Might be, might be, I mean, but once they start revenue raising, you implicate the most serious concern.

BARRETT: And I thought you conceded it Justice Gorsuch. There was no difference between a tariff and a licensing fee functionally.

KATYAL: If the licensing fee is just to -- I didn't concede that. And so, if the licensing fee is just to recoup the cost of government services, I think that may be OK. I don't think you need to get into it here. The government is asserting a power, which they say in their briefs to you, raises $4 trillion.

BARRETT: So, you understand the statute to permit licensing in the sense of permission, like we will not allow you to trade with us. We will not allow your goods to be imported unless we license it.

KATYAL: Absolutely. And Justice Barrett, I think, like just the natural reading, if you're to look at the word licenses and think, wow, Congress smuggled this incredible power to do all of these different things that the government is doing here, 39 percent taxes on some countries and others through the word license that --

BARRETT: -- license exportation?

KATYAL: I don't think so, for the reason that you know --

BARRETT: Well right now, I actually looked into this. I mean, I think you maybe not licensing fees.

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KATYAL: Exactly.

BARRETT: -- license exportation like saying we're not going to allow certain products that have national security implications to be exported.

KATYAL: Yes.

BARRETT: So, licensing could be used in that sense, not as a revenue --

KATYAL: Correct.

BARRETT: OK. So, you went back and forth with Justice Gorsuch about the implications of the president's authority over foreign affairs and whether the major questions doctrine applies. You say that in IEEPA, the president's war powers are not implicated, and that was part of the reason why you say that we should think of this differently than some of the historical examples where the commander-in-chief power, war powers were implicated.

But the same language appears in the trading with the enemies act in which war powers would be implicated. So do you think that language should be and of course, that is what President Nixon relied on. So, do you think that the language would be interpreted differently in that context, even though the commander-in-chief power and the war power would be implicated?

KATYAL: 100 percent I think, would be interpreted differently. Justice --

BARRETT: Same regulate commerce language.

KATYAL: Yes, because once you're talking about once, you're carrying over wartime precedence to peacetime --

BARRETT: OK, I don't understand that then, because everybody agrees the language came in IEEPA came from the trading with the enemy act. So, you're saying it has one meaning in the trading with the enemy act and a different meaning in IEEPA that same regulate commerce.

KATYAL: No, I think that the conquered territory language and all of that may go to the president's article, two powers, his inherent powers, in conquered territory. But I don't think it gets the government where they need to go. The CAC brief and the brief by Professor Paul Steven (ph) goes through and explains why.

In 1933 when Congress decided to bring these concepts into peacetime, it severed the wartime routes. And there's an extensive legislative history.

BARRETT: OK, I understand that, but I thought that was about, maybe I'm just not tracking. I mean, I think there's been some discussion of whether the president would have inherent Article Two authority in wartime to impose tariffs to this end. Is that what you're talking about, are you actually talking about a statute that said, regulate importation in wartime.

KATYAL: Right.

BARRETT: And you think it could have the tariff power conferred through that language in a war making statute, but not in --

KATYAL: No, I don't think it confers it in either place. I think the president in the it's located the president's power in conquered territories, not in the trading with any exact or anything like that --

BARRETT: OK -- constitutional power coming from the law of war. OK. And then, if you win, tell me how the reimbursement process would work? Would it be a complete mess? I mean, you're saying before the government promised reimbursement, and now you're saying we don't, oh, well, that's rich. But how would this work? It seems to me like it could be a mess.

KATYAL: So, the first thing I'd say is that just underscores just how major a question. This is the very fact that you were dealing with us with quotas. There's no refund process to the tunes of billions of dollars or embargoes. But there is here. But for our case, the way it would work is, in this case, the government stipulated for the five plaintiffs that they would get the refunds.

So, for us, that's how it would work. Your question, I take it is about everyone else. We don't have a class action or anything like that. With respect to everyone else, there's a whole specialized body of trade law, and it's in 19 U.S.C. 1514, outlines all these administrative procedures.

It's a very complicated thing. There's got to be an administrative protest. There was a harbor management case earlier that this court was involved with in the United States shoe in which, you know, the refund process took a long time. There were any number of claims and equitable relief.

BARRETT: So --

KATYAL: So, it's difficult.

BARRETT: OK.

KATYAL: Absolutely, we don't deny that it's difficult. But I think what this court has said in in the McKesson case in 1990 is that serious economic dislocation isn't a reason do something northern pipeline. You guys stayed your decision for a while in order to let the congressional process unfold.

There may be a congressional process here as well. You know you're -- you know you may be able to also be that this court could limit its decision to prospective relief under the John Q. Hammons case, there's lots of possibilities. Justice Jackson. KETANJI BROWN JACKSON, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES: So, I think I read Algonquin differently than Justice Kavanaugh. When I look at its analysis, it absolutely does a textual review, but then it says quote, turning from Section 232's language to its legislative history.

Again, there is much to suggest that the president's authority extends to the imposition of monetary exactions, and I appreciate that perhaps that factor is no longer in vogue. But did you look into the legislative history here to determine whether there is anything that supports the conclusion that Congress actually intended for this IEEPA statute to allow or authorize the president to impose these tariffs.

KATYAL: I did, and if I blinked, I would miss it, because it was virtually nothing.

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And in fact, both page, page 2 of both the House and Senate report outline all of the powers that are given under IEEPA and none of none of them have tariff. There's one brief mention of tariff in the legislative history, but nothing else. And by the way, IEEPA passed by voice vote.

It was big. You know, there was not controversial. We don't deny IEEPA is a big, major statute, but the question is, did it authorize tariffs, one of the most contested things since our founding --

JACKSON: And you say there's nothing in the legislative -- suggested now, to the extent that Congress did authorize the president to do something, that those verbs are there, that the Congress was giving the president some authority. Do you see a theme connecting those verbs?

What was Congress trying to do? And let me just say that I see in the Senate report, which I mentioned earlier, that Congress says that it was trying to give the president the authority to quote, control or freeze property transactions where a foreign interest is involved, and that seems to dovetail with the verbs that are being used in the statute. But what's your view of what Congress was trying to do with this legislation?

KATYAL: That's exactly right. They're responding to all sorts of foreign policy emergencies and foreign threats, and they're giving the president economic sanctions power.

JACKSON: So, what does the word regulate importation do under that framework? If we understand that Congress was trying to give this kind of embargo authority in the time of an emergency when it says regulate importation, what was it envisioning?

KATYAL: It was envisioning all the things that the president since 1977 going back to Justice Kavanaugh's question have used it for. So, they've used it for quotas, like limitations on the number of goods. They've used it for screening and reporting requirements, like executive order 12 to 84 about reporting property of the -- And they've used it for standards, like domestic safety standards,

environmental standards, labor requirements. They've used it for embargoes. So, all of those are things that I think Congress had in mind in IEEPA. And I think the proof of this, that it's not this massive statute that allows the government to do anything is James and Moore itself, because this court rejected the idea that regulate includes the claims extinguishment that was at issue in that case, it's a much more limited statute.

And Justice Jackson, there was a predecessor Justice Jackson, who said, you know that quote, for all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the executive be under the law and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations.

Such institutions may be just destined to pass away, but it is a duty of this court to be last, not first, to give it up. And I take it my friend's argument on the other side is in deep tension with Youngstown and that canonical principle.

JACKSON: Thank you.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Thank you, counsel. Mr. Gutman.

BENJAMIN GUTMAN, SOLICITOR GENERAL OF OREGON: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court, I'd like to begin by picking up with the exchanges with Justice Barrett and Justice Gorsuch about licenses and license fees. Because --

DANA BASH, CNN HOST, INSIDE POLITICS: OK, we have been listening to live Supreme Court arguments over the authority to impose tariffs, whether President Trump has that to impose sweeping tariffs, tariffs, rather without Congress' approval. Now what he has been using is a national emergency law to do so.

It's the linchpin of his economic agenda these tariffs. Now based on what we've heard, the outlook doesn't seem to be all that great for the president, who earlier this morning, called these arguments and the forthcoming decision that they will make in the Supreme Court life or death.

We're going to talk about what we've heard so far with an incredible panel here. Steve Vladeck, I want to start with you, what is your take on this? And again, I know we're kind of in the weeds on tariffs, but I just want to remind our viewers that this is about so much more.

This is about presidential power and whether Donald Trump has as much as he thinks he does.

STEVE VLADECK, CNN SUPREME COURT ANALYST: You know, Dana, it's such an important moment for the court and the country. We've had so many rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court in Trump cases over the last nine months, but they've all been in this frenetic context of fast moving, emergency applications, of quick hitting.

You know, what should the rules be for weeks, for months, this is the first case to get to the court on the permanent question of whether President Trump can do the thing he's doing, and it's a case about how broadly the executive is allowed to interpret a statute that doesn't use the word tariffs, that refers to a national emergency that was enacted in a context of reining in presidential power after Watergate.

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It's why this is such a big deal. It has massive political implications, because of how central tariffs are to Trump's foreign policy agenda. But it also has massive, what the lawyers would call doctrinal implications, because it's such a signal of where this court is likely to go in the other cases that are already on their way to the court.

BASH: Yeah. I mean exactly. And Laura, the signals that we've gotten based on the questions from the justices seem pretty loud and not great for President Trump.

LAURA COATES, CNN ANCHOR & CHIEF LEGAL ANALYST: Out of the gate, they were peppering them with questions. They were peppering the argument that suggests that he had this power to do so, and here's why. Just about a year or so ago, the court was saying they had a major questions doctrine that they were saying, essentially, hold on.

If it's got huge political or economic significance, you got to go through Congress, because you got these different branches of government that are all co equal. What Trump essentially saying is, I have an emergency. It's called a trade deficit, and as a result of that, I need to take action that makes me go around Congress.

Well, the other side saying that's not the emergency. You still got to go through Congress to do so. That's why you're hearing things about delegation. Has Congress given the power of the purse and taxation and leveraging tariffs back to you in some way? They're saying no.

And there was a really interesting one by Gorsuch today, where he essentially was challenging politically, the idea, well, hold on, they can give the power back when they think it's no longer an emergency. And he was essentially saying, in what world does Congress cede power and then get to reclaim it when you got elections that are happening --

VLADECK: And when you have a veto --

COATES: -- veto, right.

VLADECK: I mean two thirds super majorities of both chambers of Congress. What can two thirds of both chambers agree to right now. Other than that, maybe today is Wednesday.

BASH: The question is whether that's relevant to what --

VLADECK: -- the spherically this is where I found most striking about the arguments, which is, you don't usually hear the justices, especially Republican appointees like Neil Gorsuch, bring in the political reality. They want to decide these questions in a world in which institutions are idealized and are acting the way they're supposed to.

That Justice Gorsuch, who is a vote the administration definitely needs, is actually focused on the real-world consequences of how hard it would be to unwind power that the president put in the statutes.

BASH: Yeah.

VLADECK: That is a very telling sign, and not a good one for President Trump.

BASH: Yeah.

COATES: -- credibility too, by the way, because if they go against that theory, and that undermines their own precedent from a year ago.

BASH: Right.

COATES: So, if it's good for Biden to have the restrictions for the student loans and beyond, suddenly it's OK for Trump do an end run. That's going to be a problem.

BASH: Yeah. OK, so let's drill down on tariffs specifically. And I mean, we've talked about this nonstop, that this is so ingrained in who Donald Trump is and what he wants and has been since decades before he ran for office. Just one example. Listen to what he said to "Oprah Winfrey" in 1988.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

DONALD TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: Make our allies forgetting about the enemies, the enemies you can't talk to so easily. I'd make our allies pay their fair share. We're a debtor nation. I think people are tired of seeing the United States ripped off.

And I can't promise you everything, but I can tell you one thing, this country would make one hell of a lot of money from those people that, for 25 years have taken advantage.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

DAVID CHALIAN, CNN POLITICAL DIRECTOR: It's amazing to listen in that younger context and just his voice, but you are right. It is central to his political identity. That was before he was really in politics, but, but it is central to his worldview. What he just said at the end there, though, just to get to the practical impacts that Amy Coney Barrett was getting at another vote.

I would imagine they would probably need. The whole gets rich. This country could get rich. Well, if this doesn't go their way, and they asking the questions about how you pay back, and she's called this whole thing a mess. I mean, you just, you don't hear a Supreme Court justice usually, I think, just like, use the common language of that, but a mess.

And I think to Steve's point about the political fallout of this, Donald Trump has raised the stakes politically on this. He has called this the most important Supreme Court case of all time.

BASH: Life or death.

CHALIAN: It is what he ran on. It is his world view, and he has said this will determine whether or not the country has the future that he envisions.

KASIE HUNT, CNN CHIEF NATIONAL AFFAIRS ANALYST: And Dana, can I just tell you last night, as we were covering the election, I was talking to Republicans who are honestly, privately praying that the Supreme Court rejects Donald Trump's argument here, right?

I mean, they think that if the court decides against him, it will unleash the economy and that maybe they'll have a better chance, or any chance, of hanging out of the house --

BASH: Because economic suffering that voters made their voices heard on last night isn't just about sort of affordability and the groceries, but that it is about that, but that there's also a connection to people hurting because of the tariffs that he's imposed.

HUNT: -- right, and the idea that there's a lot of uncertainty right now, a lot of volatility, and I mean, the stock market is going gangbusters.

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There's a sense there might be a bubble there, jobs are really the biggest one, right? Our companies feeling like they're in a position to be hiring. We've just seen obviously, AI is also disrupting that piece of it. So, they're just there. Is this kind of behind-the-scenes tension where these Republicans are just hoping beyond hope that the court fixes the political problem that they feel the president is creating, but they can't say that out loud.

BASH: Yeah.

CHALIAN: He's kind of Republicans that have never been on board with these kinds of tariffs --

COATES: -- powerful again,

BASH: And that's why he didn't do --

VLADECK: -- some of who might be justices on the Supreme Court of the United States.

BASH: Yeah.

VLADECK: I mean, let's keep in mind that, like those political views are not limited to the political branches.

BASH: Carrie, I do -- I want to bring you in, and I want to take this up many thousands of feet, because we're talking about tariffs, because it has a real-world impact. But this discussion about how much power any president has, especially this president, who has been so aggressive in trying to gobble up as much power as he could.

This is just the first, or one of many, I should say, cases that the Supreme Court is going to hear, also control of independent agencies, firing a member of the Federal Reserve, ending birthright citizenship, withholding funds appropriated by Congress, the transgender military service ban, National Guard deployments.

All of this is President Trump saying, I have the power to do this. And coming up through the courts is questions for the Supreme Court to answer, yes or no, whether he's right.

CARRIE CORDERO, CNN LEGAL AND NATIONAL SECURITY ANALYST: Right. And this particular case while it is about tariffs, it also really is about the president's emergency powers. He's using this statute IEEPA to designate emergencies and then to be able to levy the tariffs, which is his signature foreign policy tool. If the Supreme Court takes this particular tool away from him, which he uses extensively in his diplomacy, in his economic conversations with foreign partners and foreign adversaries.

He uses tariffs as his signature foreign policy tool. If they take it away, what is he going to do in the second half of his term? What leverage will he have as to his emergency powers? That is one of the significant things that I wonder whether the court will really take that on, get into whether or not the particular things that he's designated as an emergency -- are emergencies.

I don't think they will. I think they're going to focus more on the statutory interpretation, and whether or not the text of this statute allows him to levy a tariff which the government is saying it's a tariff, whereas the businesses are saying it's a tax.

VLADECK: -- to Carrie's point about like, what is poor President Trump to do? I mean, it's worth stressing. There are other statutes that authorize the imposition of tariffs. I mean, one of the -- I think, most compelling arguments that have been made by the small businesses challenging the tariffs.

And as we're sitting here, by the Solicitor General of Oregon, is that it's not like Congress has given the president no power to impose tariffs. It's that there are other statutes that have more rigorous substantive constraints, more rigorous procedural constraints. And were the Supreme Court to say you can use IEEPA, this emergency statute based solely on your determination that there is some situation of severe, extraordinary harm, not only does that render those other statutes irrelevant.

But it also, I think, would be an ominous harbinger of how the court's going to approach those other statutes in other cases.

CORDERO: Well, and one of -- just quickly, one of the one of the difficulties with the emergencies of the Congress really hasn't legislated in a stronger way, a mechanism to end emergencies. And so, there is this situation this came up a little bit earlier in the oral arguments that emergencies just continue to go on without being anything. BASH: I think you could just end the sentence, Congress. Congress

hasn't legislated a way to period, because you can fill in the blank with pretty much --

VLADECK: -- But it comes back, if I may, really. But one of the striking things here is that there is, there was a provision in the national emergencies act when Congress knocked in 1976 that would have allowed Congress to terminate a national emergency through what's just called a concurrent resolution, through a resolution that had a majority in both chambers.

That's a legislative veto that the Supreme Court struck down in 1983. So, the Supreme Court bears, I think, some responsibility right, for some of the mess in which we're finding ourselves.

BASH: All right, we're going to have to squeeze in a quick break. Coming up, President Trump admits last night was a bad night. What's he going to do about it? We're going to break down the resounding message and learn a little bit more from what voters were trying to tell their elected officials, and especially the president.

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